US-China Relations (3rd Ed)

by Robert G Sutter

  Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Xi Jinping

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  ment, and it did. The Obama administration favored transparency and pre-

  dictability in Sino-American relations. Unpredictability was generally not

  favored, notably by US officials responsible for managing US-China rela-

  tions, in part because of all the work involved in managing uncertainty.

  Unfortunately, smooth policy management seen as fostered by the predict-

  ability and transparency of Obama policy allowed the opportunistic expan-

  sionism of China to continue without danger of serious adverse consequences

  for Chinese interests.

  CHINA ISSUES IN THE 2015–16 US ELECTION CAMPAIGN

  The ongoing American debate about China policy figured prominently in the

  US presidential election campaign. Going into the campaign, debates over

  US policy in the Asia-Pacific focused heavily on perceived US weaknesses

  in the face of growing challenges from China. Notably, rising China’s promi-

  nent leader Xi Jinping was prone to coercive strong-man tactics at home and

  abroad that kept his opponents and competitors off balance and on the defen-

  sive. In the Asia-Pacific, the Chinese authorities created an environment of

  increasing tensions that was seen in China and elsewhere to benefit Xi at the

  expense of his opponents and competitors, including the United States, here-

  tofore relied on as the region’s stabilizer and security guarantor.

  As the US election campaign progressed, this broad concern with China

  remained active, but it was overshadowed by strong debate on two sets of

  issues: international trade and the proposed TPP accord, and candidate

  Trump’s controversial proposals on burden sharing among allies, nuclear

  weapons proliferation, and North Korea. Criticism of the TPP received broad

  bipartisan support and posed increasingly serious obstacles to US govern-

  ment approval of the pact. Trump’s controversial proposals were unpopular

  and were opposed by senior Republicans in Congress along with many oth-

  ers. Mr. Trump avoided bringing them up in the immediate aftermath of the

  US election. 30

  China Policy

  University of Virginia’s Batten School Dean Harry Harding and other spe-

  cialists detected a broad sense of American disappointment at the apparent

  failure in long-standing US efforts to constructively interact with China’s

  leaders in expectation that those leaders would conform more to international

  norms in line with American interests. Instead, they found an ever more

  powerful Chinese state under the often bold leadership of President Xi Jin-

  ping seeking unfair advantage at America’s expense and posing ever larger

  challenges to important US interests. 31

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  Relevant 2015–16 Election Debates

  Though most presidential candidates voiced harsh criticism of Chinese poli-

  cies and behavior, the mix of strong differences and positive engagement

  seen in the Obama administration’s policy toward China was reflected in the

  candidates’ similarly mixed policy recommendations. The contenders’ views

  also were in line with American public opinion that, on balance, disapproved

  of the Chinese government but ranked China lower than in the recent past as

  an economic threat and viewed China’s military as less threatening to US

  interests than terrorism, nuclear weapons development in North Korea and

  Iran, various conflicts in the Middle East, climate change, refugee flows, and

  infectious diseases. 32

  Hillary Clinton’s discourse on China showed a general theme of injustice.

  China was seen as manipulative, as it maneuvered for selfish gains at the

  expense of US international interests and American workers. Clinton under-

  lined her past record and continued resolve to rectify various wrongs, abuses,

  unfair practices, and China’s threatening of allies. Key themes in her cam-

  paign included holding China accountable for egregious behavior, opposing

  Chinese military intimidation and unfair economic practices, and supporting

  human rights in China. 33

  Bernie Sanders focused primarily on trade and how China’s development

  had come at the cost of American workers. He opposed international trade

  treaties in general and with China in particular, because he said they led to

  job losses in the United States and the weakening of labor unions. Sanders

  also advocated working with China to curb fossil fuel consumption and ad-

  dress global climate change. 34

  Ted Cruz said the best way to approach China was to emphasize US

  military and economic might. He cited former President Ronald Reagan’s

  “peace through strength” approach toward the Soviet Union during the Cold

  War as a model for contemporary US-China relations. On human rights,

  Cruz joined other senators in petitioning for a plaza outside the Chinese

  embassy in Washington to be named after Liu Xiaobo, a human rights acti-

  vist and 2010 Nobel laureate who was then imprisoned in China. 35

  John Kasich was moderate about China. He advised, “We don’t seek

  confrontation with China. But then why would we?” 36 Marco Rubio’s well-developed approach to China was much tougher than what he saw as the

  “disaster” of Clinton’s tenure as secretary of state and the failed engagement

  policy of President Obama. 37

  According to Donald Trump, the main problem the United States had

  with China was that we weren’t using our power to influence them. The

  source of our power over China, according to Trump, was our economic

  strength. Overall, Trump was not hostile to or confrontational with China,

  having said, “We desire to live peacefully and in friendship with Russia and

  Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Xi Jinping

  161

  China. We have serious differences with these two nations . . . but we are not

  bound to be adversaries.” Trump tended to avoid discussing China as a

  national security threat. He averred that issues with China could be dealt with through negotiations, using American strengths as leverage. 38

  Implications

  US policies dealing with China were seen as not working in several impor-

  tant areas. However, China was not seen as an enemy by the candidates or

  American public opinion. Most of the candidates, including leaders Hillary

  Clinton and Donald Trump, favored tougher policies, with Trump focused on

  seeking leverage in negotiations centered on economic issues, while Clin-

  ton’s broader scope of concern included salient national security and human

  rights problems. The overall upshot of all the discussion of China in the

  campaign was moderate controversy over proposed remedies, with the pos-

  sible exception of sometimes strident warnings against Trump’s threat to

  impose 45 percent tariffs on Chinese imports to the United States.

  Officials and specialists in Beijing saw negatives with both Hillary Clin-

  ton and Donald Trump. Like many Americans, they were frustrated with the

  downward trend in US-China relations and judged that trend would worsen

  at least to some degree if Clinton were elected. Some in Beijing nonetheless

  voiced confidence that mutual interests and highly integrated US-China
>
  government relationships would guard against relations going seriously off

  track. Chinese derision of Trump earlier in 2016 shifted to seeking advan-

  tage, given the candidate’s disruption of US alliances along China’s rim and

  emphasis on seeking common ground with China through negotiations.

  Overall, a common view was that China could “shape” President Trump to

  behave in line with its interests, as Donald Trump was seen as less ideologi-

  cal and more pragmatic than Hillary Clinton. 39

  Discerning the Trump Administration’s Approach to China

  President-elect Trump sharply broke with past practice in December 2016 by

  accepting a congratulatory phone call from Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen.

  He reacted promptly to Chinese criticisms with blunt public complaints about

  unfair Chinese economic policies and military expansion in the disputed

  South China Sea. He also publicly questioned US government support for a

  policy of one China that included Taiwan. The phone call was facilitated by

  representatives in the president-elect’s entourage and Republican Party lead-

  ership, who favored an American policy toward Taiwan that was less defer-

  ential to Beijing. The New York Times among other mainstream media de-

  picted the move negatively as dangerously broadening the ongoing frictions

  in US-China relations amid substantial hardening of US policy toward China

  to include sensitive issues involving Taiwan. 40

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  President-elect Trump’s controversial actions regarding Taiwan and the

  one-China policy at least temporarily upset Chinese forecasts of smoother

  sailing with Donald Trump than with Hillary Clinton. President Trump even-

  tually was persuaded to publicly reaffirm support for the American one-

  China policy during the US president’s first phone conversation with Presi-

  dent Xi on February 9. Xi reportedly refused to speak with President Trump

  until he made this reaffirmation. The scope and effect of President Trump’s

  support for the US one-China policy remained vague to many observers,

  especially given his concurrent ambiguous treatment of other sensitive US

  commitments involving the so-called two-states solution for Israelis and Pal-

  estinians. 41

  As noted in chapter 1, the president-elect showed President Xi and his

  lieutenants, in a few gestures and blunt messages to the media and on Twit-

  ter, that the new US leader was capable of a wide range of actions that could

  surprise Chinese counterparts with serious negative consequences. 42 Meanwhile, some elements of the administration’s policy seemed to work strongly

  against Chinese interests. President Trump not only moved away from elec-

  tion rhetoric critical of Japan and its unfair trade policies and inadequate

  defense burden sharing. He and his administration’s defense and foreign

  policy leaders went to extraordinary measures to show solidarity with Japa-

  nese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who was treated to a summit meeting at the

  White House and a weekend of golf with the president at his Florida resort.

  The positive treatment included warm support, according to Prime Minister

  Abe, for Abe’s controversial overtures to the Vladimir Putin government in

  Russia, an initiative that might have been followed by President Trump and

  was viewed with suspicion in Beijing. 43

  President Trump held meetings at the Florida resort with Chinese Presi-

  dent Xi Jinping two months later. The meetings marked progress in setting

  up frameworks for advancing relations and dealing with differences. They

  did not have statements of mutual support and solidarity as were seen in the

  Japan visit, thereby reflecting a more distant and businesslike approach in

  US-China relations. The Trump-Xi summit sandwiched in the US president’s

  abrupt decision on and prompt launching of a large-scale cruise missile at-

  tack on the Syrian government airbase that was involved in Syria’s latest use

  of outlawed chemical weapons against its civil war opponents. As China

  supported the Syrian government as Beijing was urging a negotiated solution

  to the conflict, the forceful US action showed determination to pursue

  American interests despite Chinese sensitivities. 44

  Noted in chapter 1 was the intense Trump government pressure on China

  to use its economic leverage to curb North Korea’s nuclear weapons develop-

  ment. While stoking widespread fears of conflict on the peninsula, President

  Trump stressed his personal respect for President Xi. He promised Beijing

  easier treatment in negotiations on the two countries’ massive trade imbal-

  Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Xi Jinping

  163

  ance and other economic issues. The crisis over North Korea for several

  weeks put a premium on US interaction with China. Planned arms sales to

  Taiwan, freedom-of-navigation exercises in the South China Sea, and other

  US initiatives that might complicate America’s search for leverage to stop

  North Korea’s nuclear weapons development were put on hold or delayed. 45

  It was against this background that President Trump told the media in April

  2017 that he would not accept another phone call from Taiwan’s president

  until he had discussed the matter with President Xi. 46

  Showing a remarkable inclination to change American policy in ways that

  complicated Chinese efforts to seek the advantageous stability it desired in

  relations with the United States, President Trump in June expressed disap-

  pointment with China’s efforts to curb North Korea’s nuclear weapons. What

  followed were US freedom-of-navigation exercises in much faster sequence

  than in previous months in the disputed South China Sea, an announced

  major US arms sales package for Taiwan, strong public statements from

  Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in

  support of American military and other commitments to Taiwan, substantial

  US sanctions against a Chinese bank and Chinese individuals seen by the

  United States as aiding North Korea to circumvent international sanctions

  against its nuclear weapons program, and sharper US government criticism

  of Chinese human rights practices. Administration officials privately indicat-

  ed that tougher trade and other policy measures were to come, demonstrating

  American resolve against Chinese actions seen as opposed to US security,

  economic, and other interests. 47

  Another key element in the Republican Party platform that was strongly

  supported by President Trump and his administration leaders was a major

  increase in defense spending that would allow for a marked increase in the

  presence of US forces in the Asia-Pacific. The main obstacle to this goal,

  which was very much at odds with Chinese interests, was legislation restrict-

  ing such discretionary funding by representatives in the administration and

  the Congress who required offsetting cuts or using other means to allow for a

  rise in defense spending beyond available revenue. 48

  The new US administration’s approach to trade, investment, and related

  issues toward China remained ambiguous and arguably conflicted. Officials

  appointed as leaders of the Commerce Dep
artment, the Special Trade Repre-

  sentative office, and the White House National Trade Council were known to

  be sharply critical of China on economic issues, whereas the leaders of the

  Treasury and State Departments and the director of the White House Eco-

  nomic Council came from backgrounds strongly supporting globalization

  and openness in American trade and investment policies. The latter at times

  were reported to be backed by the president’s adviser and son-in-law, Jared

  Kushner. 49

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  Chapter 7

  Chinese officials stressed their opposition to Hillary Clinton because she

  was “ideological” in her criticism of China on human rights and related

  issues. They expected Trump to be less ideological. Given that the Trump

  government did not have a senior adviser with strong views on China in this

  policy area, the Chinese calculations appeared to be correct. 50

  Going forward, the zigs and zags in 2017 US policy toward China fore-

  shadowed greater uncertainty and probably greater tensions. For its part, the

  Xi Jinping government avoided for the moment the more egregious kinds of

  challenges (e.g., island-building in the disputed South China Sea) that it

  posed for the Obama government. President Trump was distracted, but he

  had considerable power and he proved to be much less restrained than Presi-

  dent Obama had been in using American power against China in pursuit of

  his objectives. Xi Jinping’s China still sought to advance its power and

  influence at American expense, but it seemed determined to avoid a confron-

  tation of major consequence. How Beijing would balance between these

  objectives going forward and how the Trump government would manage its

  various imperatives in dealing with China were not at all clear. What was

  clear was that the long-standing differences between the two powers were

  getting more public scrutiny at the highest levels in both countries. Such

  scrutiny raised tensions without showing mutually accepted paths to resolu-

  tion.

  Chapter Eight

  Security Issues in Contemporary

  US-China Relations

  In the course of US normalization with China since the late 1960s, security