US-China Relations (3rd Ed)

by Robert G Sutter

  naval combatants, including China’s aircraft carrier and air force bombers

  carrying out exercises in areas surrounding Taiwan. China cut off SEF-

  ARATS talks and curbed other formal or informal contacts with Taiwan

  officials. It curbed the active flow of Chinese mainland tourists to Taiwan. It broke with the so-called diplomatic truce in place at the time and established

  relations with two African countries that previously had official relations

  with Taiwan. 21

  Beijing eschewed close contacts with DPP leaders. It used continued

  close contacts with the now-weakened KMT to reaffirm China’s main de-

  mand on cross-strait relations that the Tsai government had to affirm the so-

  called 1992 consensus. The consensus was used by the Ma Ying-jeou

  government and Beijing to provide a sense of agreement on China’s insis-

  tence that what Beijing has called its one-China principle was recognized by

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  both sides, thereby allowing China to go forward with improved cross-strait

  relations. Ma held a summit meeting with President Xi Jinping two months

  prior to the January 2016 presidential elections in Taiwan that reaffirmed

  both sides’ commitment to the 1992 consensus. Though avoiding any abrupt

  changes in the cross-strait status quo she inherited from Ma, Tsai refused to

  meet China’s demands on the 1992 consensus. The result reinforced Bei-

  jing’s suspicion of her alleged pro-independence tendencies and prompted

  carefully applied increases in Chinese military, diplomatic, and economic

  pressure on Taiwan. 22

  While the Obama government stressed cross-strait communication to

  avoid serious instability, American critics of the administration’s policy fa-

  vored stronger support for Taiwan. They included Republican leaders in

  Congress, Republican-leaning think tanks, media, and interest groups, along

  with many Democrats and progressive think tanks, media, and interest

  groups advocating change that would allow for a US-Taiwan policy that was

  less deferential to China. 23

  Some Americans strongly urged US policy to deal with Taiwan for its

  own sake, rather than in a contingent way that was dependent on US interests

  with China. They opposed the US government intervention, by its voicing

  concern about Tsai Ing-wen’s cross-strait policies in 2011, in Taiwan domes-

  tic politics. They favored more forthright American government support for

  Taiwan’s entry into the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) multilateral econom-

  ic agreement, more frequent US cabinet-level visits to Taiwan, and the sale

  of more advanced US military equipment to Taiwan; and they averred that

  strident American leadership complaints about Chinese bullying and intimi-

  dation of neighbors, using military and other coercive means, needed also to

  highlight and condemn China’s two decades of massive bullying, coercion,

  and intimidation toward Taiwan.

  A second group of Americans focused on using Taiwan’s strategic loca-

  tion in opposition to what they saw as Chinese efforts to undermine the

  American strategic position around China’s rim and achieve overall domi-

  nance in the region contrary to long-standing American interests. In their

  view, to counter such perceived efforts required a clear American strategy

  working with China’s neighbors involving maritime control, and interdiction

  if necessary. Because of its location at the center of the so-called first island chain, Taiwan looms large in plans to counter Chinese expansion along its

  rim. The plans involve gaining the Taiwan government’s cooperation in set-

  ting and monitoring sensors and other means of surveillance, preparing mo-

  bile units with antiship missiles to deploy to various locations in the first

  island chain, and preparing the use of mines and other means to deny access

  to Chinese ships and submarines.

  A third group of Americans focused on the Xi Jinping government’s

  coercive expansionism at American expense along China’s rim and the other

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  practices grossly at odds with US interests, to argue that America should take

  actions showing greater support for Taiwan as part of a cost imposition

  strategy to counter Xi Jinping’s anti-American practices. In their view, the

  kinds of steps forward in US relations with Taiwan that were advocated by

  the previous two groups should be considered and used, as the United States

  endeavored to show Beijing that its various challenges to US interests would

  not be cost free and actually would be counterproductive for Chinese con-

  cerns on the all-important Taiwan issue. 24

  Meanwhile, the US election campaign of 2015–16 featured acrimony

  with China and some attention to Taiwan. A few Republican candidates and

  the Republican Party platform used the arguments of the three schools of

  thought described above in calling for change in policy toward Taiwan. Since

  before his stint as a presidential candidate, Senator Marco Rubio has been

  active in congressional measures to support Taiwan along the lines of the

  first group of critics noted above, who urge treating Taiwan for its own sake

  and without so much deference to Beijing. He frequently highlighted those

  initiatives during his campaign. He notably backed a US military buildup to

  ensure Taiwan’s protection in the face of China’s military power. He advised

  that US policy should be guided by historic American reassurances of sup-

  port for Taiwan and not by reputed need to avoid exacerbating tensions with

  China over the issue. 25

  Senator Ted Cruz released a statement on the results of Taiwan’s January

  2016 presidential elections lauding Taiwan on ideological grounds as a bea-

  con for democracy and inspiration to those in China and Hong Kong seeking

  freedom against the oppressive Communist government. 26

  Senator John McCain and other senators visited Asia in May–June 2016

  to reassure US allies and partners of continued strong American regional

  engagement despite Trump’s call for allies depending on US military protec-

  tion to do more to offset the US costs or face American withdrawal. McCain

  and six of the visiting senators stopped in Taiwan to affirm support for

  recently installed President Tsai Ing-wen. The visit marked the first by the

  Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee in twenty-six years and the

  largest group of US senators to visit Taiwan in ten years. 27

  Though Mr. Trump said little about Taiwan, Professor Peter Navarro, an

  Asia expert, used a byline as a policy adviser to Trump on Asian issues in

  publishing in July 2016 an extensive assessment of the importance of strong-

  er US support for Taiwan; he employed the arguments of the three schools of

  thought noted above. 28

  Overall, the implications of the US election debates on policy toward

  Taiwan were limited. They showed little deviation from the arguments seen

  in the Congress and the media prior to and during the American campaign.

  How Hillary Clinton’s promised hardening of policy on disputes with China

  would impact her approach to Taiwan remained undefined, though her senior

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Asian Maritime Disputes

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  staff member Jake Sullivan said in July 2016 that Hillary Clinton would not

  change Taiwan policy. 29 Candidate Trump devoted little attention to the issue.

  Interviews in Taipei with officials and think tank experts in July 2016

  showed concern that Taiwan would suffer if Trump followed through with

  pledges to negotiate major agreements with China as the Taiwan issue would

  likely be raised by the Chinese side in those negotiations. There also was

  worry in Taipei that candidate Trump’s stance on demanding more payment

  from US ally Japan would seriously weaken the US ability to support Taiwan

  in the face of China’s military intimidation. Observers in Taiwan appreciated

  the resolve shown by Senator McCain and his Senate colleagues to continue

  support for US allies and partners in Asia regardless of the results of the

  American presidential election. They were encouraged by interactions with

  Navarro when he visited Taiwan and by strong support for Taiwan registered

  in the Republican Party platform. There was broad worry among Taiwan

  observers on how they could advance Taiwan’s importance in US adminis-

  tration’s policy deliberations. In particular, the Taiwan government was pre-

  paring actively for future entry into the TPP and hoped the agreement would

  be approved by Congress, thereby allowing Taiwan to be supported for entry

  by the United States in the next round of membership for the body. 30

  Interviews with officials and specialists in Beijing in July 2016 registered

  low concern over the US election campaign and its implications for US

  policy toward Taiwan. Observers in Beijing saw negatives with both Hillary

  Clinton and Donald Trump. Like many Americans, they were frustrated with

  the downward trend in US-China relations and judged that trend would wors-

  en at least to some degree if Clinton were elected. Some in Beijing nonethe-

  less voiced confidence that mutual interests and highly integrated US-China

  government relationships would guard against relations going seriously off

  track. Chinese derision of Trump earlier in the campaign shifted to seeking

  advantage, given the candidate’s disruption of US alliances along China’s

  rim and emphasis on seeking common ground with China through negotia-

  tions. Overall, a common view was that China could “shape” President

  Trump to behave in line with its interests as Trump was seen as less ideologi-

  cal and more pragmatic than Clinton was. High-level interlocutors in Beijing

  judged that Hillary Clinton’s tougher approach than Obama toward China

  would not involve major moves on Taiwan. 31

  The uncertainty surrounding US China policy under a Trump administra-

  tion included the sensitive issue of Taiwan. As noted at the start of this

  chapter, although Donald Trump said little about Taiwan during the cam-

  paign, once elected he broke ranks with past practice and reflected the views

  of many Republican Party leaders and other Americans in publicly question-

  ing past deference to Beijing over this matter of acute sensitivity to Chinese

  leaders. The outgoing Obama government reacted in part by halting a

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  planned large US arms sale to Taiwan at the end of the US president’s term.

  Subsequently, President Trump saw the wisdom of adhering to the conven-

  tional US policy and practice in dealing with Taiwan discreetly and in accord

  with the so-called American one-China policy. In a summit meeting with

  President Xi in April 2017, President Trump sought improved relations with

  China and an increase in Chinese pressure on North Korea as part of the

  Trump government’s strong interest in international pressure on Pyongyang

  to halt its nuclear weapons development. He lavished repeated public praise

  on President Xi’s integrity and leadership. In that context, planned US arms

  sales to Taiwan were postponed and a suggested second phone conversation

  with Taiwan’s president was publicly rejected, as these activities could

  undermine Chinese support for the United States at such an important junc-

  ture. 32

  As of this writing, the durability of the trajectory in US administration

  policy toward Taiwan remains to be seen. Limited experience with President

  Trump’s reversal of major policy positions in Asian and world affairs in his

  initial months in office has put observers in the United States, China, Taiwan, and elsewhere on guard for circumstances, moods, and other factors that

  could prompt further abrupt change. Trump is easily capable of seemingly

  minor actions such as tweets, phone calls, and remarks in interviews and at

  press conferences and rallies that in a few words will surprise leaders in

  China, Taiwan, and elsewhere with serious negative consequences. He val-

  ues unpredictability and does not place the high value President Obama did

  on policy transparency, carefully measured responses, and avoidance of dra-

  matic actions. He is much less constrained than the previous US administra-

  tion by a perceived need to sustain and advance US-China relations. Like

  President Xi and unlike President Obama, President Trump does not eschew

  tension and presumably seeks advantage in tensions between the two coun-

  tries. Also like his Chinese counterpart and unlike President Obama, he is

  prepared to seek leverage through linking his policy preference in one area of

  the relationship with policies in other areas of the relationship. 33

  EAST ASIAN MARITIME DISPUTES AND

  CONTEMPORARY US-CHINA RELATIONS

  As reviewed in chapter 7, early Chinese tests of the Obama administration’s

  resolve on sensitive issues in US-China relations reached a more assertive

  stage around the time of the Obama government’s launching of its rebalance

  to Asia policy in 2011 and the ascendance to power of President Xi Jinping,

  strong-man ruler and Communist Party leader, in 2012. Following President

  Hu Jintao’s last visit to the United States in January 2011 and concurrent

  reassurance of the United States and other concerned powers in statements

  Taiwan and East Asian Maritime Disputes

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  about commitments to peace and development by authoritative Chinese

  foreign policy leaders, there was some anticipation that China would avoid

  the type of disruptive assertiveness at US expense that was seen in the first

  years of the Obama government. The hope was that China would return to

  the pragmatic cooperation with the United States that had marked most of the

  Hu Jintao government. 34

  Unfortunately, 2012 saw unprecedented demonstrations of Chinese pow-

  er short of using military force in defense of Chinese claims to disputed

  territories in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. The measures were

  accompanied by official Chinese commentary that accused the United States

  of fostering the territorial disputes and using them to advance US influence

  in the Asian region to the detriment of China. The Chinese demonstrations of

  coercive power went well beyond established international norms and re-

  sulted in extralegal measures and in some cases in widespread violence and

  property destruction. They placed China’s nei
ghbors and concerned powers,

  notably the United States, on guard. They compelled the neighbors and the

  United States not only to consider methods of dealing effectively with Chi-

  nese pressures, but also to consider more carefully the wide range of differ-

  ences they had with China that might set off highly disruptive and assertive

  actions by the now second-ranking and rapidly growing power in world

  politics. The implications for regional order clearly took a negative turn in

  2012. 35

  Subsequent developments in the East China Sea and the South China Sea

  saw no meaningful letup in China’s determination to advance its disputed

  claims at the expense of neighbors and at the expense of the US position as

  security guarantor of the Asia-Pacific. China’s interest in avoiding military

  conflict with the United States meshed with American priorities; senior US

  and Chinese leaders stayed in close contact with one another in an effort

  highlighted by China to search for a “new type of great power relationship”

  that would avoid conflict and manage tensions as China’s rising power and

  expanding interests rubbed against American interests, policies, and prac-

  tices.

  Competition for influence and advantage characterized US-China rela-

  tions over these disputes as well as many other issues during the remainder of

  the Obama government. As noted earlier, the Obama government was

  pleased overall with its record in dealing with China, including over the

  disputes in the maritime regions adjoining China’s mainland. Many others

  saw reactive and overly restricted US responses to Chinese affronts that gave

  priority to other goals. A notable result was substantial setbacks and lost

  influence as the United States seemed weak and less than resolute in the face

  of determined Chinese expansion at others’ expense. 36

  Amid rising frictions in US-China ties, President Obama was pressed by

  the sharp attacks on Chinese economic and security policies by Republican

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  challengers in the 2012 presidential election campaign. He joined the fray

  with harsh rhetoric not seen in his presidential campaign in 2008. In the third presidential debate on October 22, veteran China specialist Donald Keyser