US-China Relations (3rd Ed)
Page 47
ative trends in US-China relations, there remain optimists among American
officials, specialists, journalists, and others with an interest in human rights in China. They tend to argue that US policies and practices of political and
economic engagement with China that seek cooperation and avoid confronta-
tion are helping foster trends in China that create conditions in which
progress in democracy and other aspects of human rights has been and will
continue to be made. Pessimists among these groups of Americans point out
that US policies of engagement and avoidance of confrontation have appar-
ently failed to produce political transformation of China’s continued authori-
tarian political system and have not even worked effectively in setting in
motion meaningful political change. The pessimists aver that efforts to pro-
mote democracy and better human rights conditions through quiet diplomacy
and dialogues have been ineffectual; some argue for a much tougher US
public stance regarding human rights issues with China. 70
The George W. Bush administration from time to time, and congressional
leaders more frequently, pressured China though public criticism of human
rights conditions and calls on Chinese leaders to honor the rights guaranteed
under its own constitution, bring its policies and practices into line with
international standards, release prisoners of conscience, and undertake major
political reforms. President Bush appealed personally to President Hu Jintao
to allow more religious freedom; the president met in the White House with
Chinese independent Christian leaders, the Dalai Lama, and prominent Chi-
nese political dissidents. The Democratic-led 110th Congress (2007–8) spon-
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sored around twenty resolutions aimed at promoting improved human rights
conditions in China. The US government also provided funding for programs
within China that helped strengthen the rule of law, civil society, government
accountability, and labor rights. In addition, Washington supported US-based
NGOs and Internet companies that monitored human rights conditions in
China and helped enable Chinese Internet users to access Voice of America,
Radio Free Asia, and other websites that are frequently blocked by the Chi-
nese government. 71
The Obama administration and the congressional leaders generally pursed
the above courses of action. In public interactions with Chinese leaders,
human rights issues received secondary priority. President Obama went to
extraordinary efforts to avoid offending China by not meeting the Dalai
Lama when he visited Washington in October 2009, a few weeks before the
president’s first visit to China. Obama did meet the Tibetan leader in Wash-
ington several weeks after he returned home from Beijing. Despite their
actions in China in the 1990s showing strong opposition to Chinese human
rights practices, both Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and House of Repre-
sentatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi adopted a generally low profile on human
rights issues during their official visits to China. 72
The Chinese government has cooperated with the United States on some
programs promoting the rule of law, civil society, village elections, and other programs dealing with aspects of human rights seen as beneficial for China’s
development; Chinese officials engage in human rights dialogues with the
United States and other governments. The Chinese authorities remain sensi-
tive to perceived US or other foreign interference in Chinese internal affairs
affecting the continuation of authoritarian one-party rule in China. Beijing
takes or threatens strong action against perceived infringements on sensitive
issues. Chinese officials have been especially sensitive regarding Tibetan
matters and issues involving Uighur dissent in Xinjiang in recent years.
Chinese statements affirm China’s commitment to a number of broad princi-
ples and practices governing international human rights. They sometimes
offer negative commentaries regarding the human rights practices of the
United States and other countries that tend to be critical of Chinese human
rights policies and practices. 73
Some activists argue that the United States should take principled stands
against China’s human rights abuses more openly, forcefully, and frequently.
Many prominent Chinese dissidents have emphasized that international pres-
sure and attention has protected them from harsher treatment by PRC author-
ities. Other experts believe that more overt efforts may undermine human
rights objectives. Some observers contend that US open criticism of PRC
human rights policies can strengthen hard-liners in the PRC leadership or
create greater suspicion of foreign influences and ties.
Issues of Human Rights in Contemporary US-China Relations
263
Against that background, US experts and policy makers have disagreed
over the best methods to apply toward promoting democracy and human
rights in China. Congress and successive administrations often have em-
ployed a range of means simultaneously. Policy tools include open criticism
of PRC human rights policies and practices, quiet diplomacy, hearings,
foreign assistance programs, support for dissident and pro-democracy groups
in China and the United States, sanctions, coordination of international pres-
sure, bilateral dialogue, Internet freedom efforts, and public diplomacy.
Some experts recommend a “whole-of-government” strategy whereby hu-
man rights policies are coordinated across US government departments,
agencies, and delegations to China. 74
Offering a comprehensive approach for American policy options in this
issue area, the Asia Society Task Force on US-China Relations reported in
2017 an overall negative assessment of recent trends in US-China relations
that gave special attention to human rights. Its recommendations were in line
with the group’s emphasis on US insistence on reciprocity with China in all
areas of the relationship.
Following are its recommendations on human rights:75
• Seek Chinese agreement to allow US counterparts to China’s Confucius
Institutes, such as government-funded American Corners or privately
funded Jefferson Institutes or Lincoln Centers, to operate in China.
• Increase support for US government–funded media and research outlets—
such as the Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and the National Endow-
ment for Democracy—and support the development of technology that
would enable more Chinese citizens to circumvent the Great Firewall
blocking their access to the global Internet.
• Open high-level bilateral government discussions seeking similar access
for US media outlets to operate, publish, and broadcast in Chinese markets
that their Chinese counterparts enjoy in US markets.
• Seek a negotiated end to the harassment, delays, cancellations, and out-
right denials of visas for US journalists, academics, and NGO representa-
tives who end up on political “blacklists.”
• Urge university and NGO boards to review their programs and campuses
in China to make sure they meet their ow
n campuses’ principles for aca-
demic freedom.
• Pay more attention to the UN’s Human Rights Council in Geneva by
fielding a larger and more active US delegation that should continue to
urge China to end its practice of repatriating North Korean refugees in
violation of international law.
• Change the ground rules of the bilateral human rights dialogues to in-
crease the role of independent NGOs, and focus agendas of meetings more
sharply to make them more substantive and productive.
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• Make the so-called People-to-People track in the Strategic and Economic
Dialogue more substantive.
• Work with civil society organizations, including universities, think tanks,
and cultural-exchange organizations, to formulate a code of conduct for
interacting with China, especially when Chinese authorities attempt to
dictate what can be discussed or who can participate.
• Urge talks between Chinese leaders and the Dalai Lama concerning Tibet-
an religious and cultural freedoms while continuing to recognize Chinese
sovereignty over Tibet, and urge President Trump to meet with the Dalai
Lama in his capacity as a spiritual leader, just as other US presidents have
done in the past.
• Collaborate with other like-minded democratic countries to coordinate
common responses to human rights violations.
Chapter Twelve
Outlook
The twists and turns in US-China relations assessed in this book argue for
caution in predicting the future direction of the relationship. Powerful ele-
ments of convergence and divergence have long characterized US-China
relations. In the modern period, since the opening of official relations seen in President Richard Nixon’s summit with Mao Zedong in 1972, the changing
mix of areas of close cooperation with enduring differences has seen rela-
tions shift in positive or negative directions.
This volume has depicted tenets of realism in international relations (IR)
theory as useful in understanding these shifts from negative to positive and
vice versa, especially since the Cold War. The kinds of cost-benefit analysis
seen in realism seem evident in decision making in Beijing and Washington
during key episodes—notably, the breakthrough under Nixon and Mao in the
1970s, Deng Xiaoping’s pullback from pressing the Ronald Reagan adminis-
tration in the 1980s, the mutual accommodation in line with China’s avowed
“peaceful rise” during the George W. Bush administration, and the Chinese
government’s greater international assertiveness at US expense in the past
decade.
Liberalism in IR theory has been employed to explain promoting cooper-
ation through increased engagement—notably, economic interchange. Liber-
alism also has been used to explain the strong US disapproval of the Tianan-
men crackdown of 1989 as Chinese leaders reversed nascent politically liber-
al trends in the period of reform. US disappointment also was registered to
some degree recently in the face of the Xi Jinping government’s tightening of
control over Chinese civil society.
Constructivism in IR theory has been used to explain the positive signifi-
cance of mutual learning by participants on both sides as they discerned and
acted upon areas of common ground and mutual interest. At the same time,
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constructivism has also explained the distinct and often strongly divergent
identities of China and the United States that seriously impede improving
relations, especially in sensitive policy areas involving ideology, sovereign-
ty, and security.
Looking ahead in 2017, the changeable mix of positive and negative
elements in US-China relations now features two assertive and dynamic
presidents who avow a close and cooperative relationship, at least for the
present. As reviewed in chapter 7, the Donald Trump government’s seeming-
ly high expectations regarding China’s role in halting North Korea’s nuclear
weapons amid warnings of confrontation and unspecified US military action
against Pyongyang will be disappointed unless China reverses past policy
calculations and is prepared to apply a lot more pressure and risk major
tensions with its recalcitrant neighbor. Whether President Trump’s positive
rhetoric about the Chinese president is contingent on the US leader getting
what he wants from China on North Korea remains to be seen. Meanwhile, as
explained in chapter 7, the US administration’s defense plans seem at odds
with China’s interests and its economic policy is conflicted on how to deal
with various trade and investment issues.
In the pursuit of his top priority of Chinese rejuvenation in accord with
what Beijing calls the “China Dream,” Chinese President Xi Jinping has
overseen substantial advances in Chinese control in the disputed South China
Sea at America’s expense. As explained in chapter 7, Xi also has challenged
US economic leadership through massive Chinese economic initiatives high-
lighted by various silk road investment and infrastructure plans. By collabo-
rating more closely with Russian President Vladimir Putin on a variety of
issues challenging the United States, the Chinese president underscores rival-
ry with America. Under his rule, Chinese trade and investment practices
disadvantaging American interests persist as does the massive Chinese mili-
tary buildup focused on the American military presence in the Asia-Pacific
region. The Chinese security forces confront and try to intimidate Taiwan
and US ally Japan. The Chinese government’s negative turn against US and
other Western interests in China, the nongovernment organizations (NGOs)
they support, and gross violations of US-backed human rights at home and
abroad have negatively affected American attitudes toward China.
Such differences offset the many positive mutual benefits in the Sino-
American relationship and have moved recent ties in a negative direction. As
shown in chapter 6, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, such
important differences were held in check by pragmatism of leaders on both
sides who recognized the benefits of positive engagement, the perceived
costs of friction given the increasingly interdependent US-China relation-
ship, and preoccupations by leaders of both countries with other important
problems. Unfortunately, the Xi Jinping government calculated that it could
be more bold and assertive in pursuing various challenges to American inter-
Outlook
267
ests without upsetting the overall US-China relationship in ways disadvanta-
geous to China. As explained in chapter 7, in retrospect, that calculation
seemed broadly correct as the Barack Obama government continued to give
priority to maintaining stable and positive relations with China despite the
challenges to American interests coming from the Xi government’s often
bold initiatives.
For the time being in 2017, the Xi government has not followed the path
it used with President Obama and thus far has avoided challenges likely to
&
nbsp; prompt sharp reactions from the more unpredictable Trump government. In
addition to concern about President Trump’s possible responses to Chinese
assertiveness, another reason that the current Chinese government may be
following a less assertive posture is China’s stated assessment that interna-
tional trends are moving in its favor, notably in the all-important Asia-Pacific region, 1 especially as the Trump government’s policies and practices in the region seem fragmented and less than effective.
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION POLICY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
The Trump government’s preoccupation with North Korea and China rein-
forced a prevailing drift in American policy in Southeast Asia and much of
the rest of the region. Trump and his officials have announced the end of the
Obama government’s “pivot to Asia” policy and repudiated its economic
centerpiece, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). 2
The Obama administration attached high priority to Southeast Asia,
which has traditionally been second in American attention to Northeast Asia.
In contrast, Southeast Asia was rarely mentioned in the long 2015–16 US
presidential campaign. Trump’s only references to the region were occasion-
al criticisms of China’s island-building in the South China Sea. 3
As of mid-2017, President Trump’s policy in Southeast Asia, South Asia,
and Central Asia at best reflected belated and episodic attention based on a
poorly staffed administration with no coherent strategic view. In contrast
with a sharp focus on North Korea, China, and Northeast Asia, only very
recently did administration officials begin to take steps to show interest in
positive engagement with other parts of the Asia-Pacific. 4
On security, Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Vice President Mi-
chael Pence were leading administration officials in persuading the president
to play down his campaign rhetoric on Japan and South Korea—namely, that
American alliance commitments to these allies were dependent on their pay-
ments to the United States. US military presence in these countries is viewed
as a stabilizing influence by US partners in Southeast Asia and the Asia-
Pacific.