Cochrane in the Pacific

by Brian Vale

  San Martin's first complaints were caused by the apparent sloppiness and inconsistency in Cochrane's demands for cash and supplies. But more alarming were the methods Cochrane began to use to get the money he needed. First, Cochrane and his agents charged a huge fee of $71,392 for hiring out the prizes Potrillo, Dolores and Aguila as transports to the Liberating Expedition. Then, early in 1821, instead of arresting blockade runners, Cochrane began to issue 'trading licences', which allowed vessels to trade freely with the Spaniards in Peru on receipt of a payment amounting to 18 per cent of their cargo value, or 3% per cent if they were carrying specie.4 Sir Thomas Hardy's protests had already persuaded the Chilean Government to restrict its blockade of Peru to the few hundreds of miles of coast around Callao.5 Now he was back with another official complaint. O'Higgins was deeply embarrassed by Cochrane's latest actions. Not only was he offending neutrals, but his licensing scheme nullified the whole point of the blockade. Writing to San Martin about the matter, O'Higgins bitterly complained 'I have had to humiliate myself before the British commander-in-chief in order to make up for the stupidities of this man, and have repeatedly written to him about the need for moderation.'6 In similar vein, when the new Peruvian Government expelled all unmarried Spanish males after confiscating half their property, Cochrane demanded a fee before issuing them with the passport they needed to leave. The amount was said to be between $2500 and $10,000 a head - the sources of the information are divided as to the exact amount.7 Likewise, during the latter stages of the siege of Callao in August, Cochrane offered surrender terms that would have permitted Governor La Mar to ship out all Spanish property in the port on receipt of a payment of 33 per cent of its value in cash. La Mar refused the offer in one sentence of chilly dignity:

  Most Excellent Sir,

  In all the correspondence which has passed between Don José de San Martin and this Government, there is nothing that refers to the proposal which Your Excellency makes to me in your honourable note of 9th instant.

  God preserve you many years.8

  Underestimating, or unaware of, Cochrane's real need for cash to keep the squadron paid, fed and supplied, San Martin's entourage, coining the nickname 'el metalico lord', cynically assumed that much of this money was going into his own pocket. Some of it certainly was - but no more than was his due. Paroissien reflected their views when he ruefully commented 'It really is requisite to have more than the patience of an angel when dealing with Lord C. ... He appears only to be anxious about making money. Avarice and selfishness do certainly appear to form the groundwork of his character and from his speculative disposition he is often in great want of money to obtain which he is not so scrupulously exact in his word as every man ought to be, particularly a man of his rank and station.'9

  During the first half of 1821, Cochrane had been able to cope by using equipment, gear and money taken from Spanish and neutral prizes. In March, he had even managed to pay four months salary to his crews. But when, in July, Peru became independent and the war at sea effectively came to an end, this source of supply dried up and the squadron's situation became critical. Things were made worse by the common belief among the sailors that San Martin had seized a huge treasure in Peru, and that the army was being indulged while they starved. Cochrane now expected San Martin to provide for all the squadron's needs and, at the end of July, he demanded the immediate payment of $420,000 - that is £80,400. This comprised $150,000 in arrears of pay; $110,000 in prize money for the Esmeralda; and two promised bonuses - one of $50,000 for capturing the frigate, the other of $110,000 on the fall of Lima.10 San Martin was unsympathetic. He fully accepted responsibility for the payment of the two bonuses - and, indeed, explained that orders had already been given to collect the $160,000 needed. But as far as he was concerned, the pay of the Chilean sailors was the responsibility of the Chilean Government, and should be distributed in the normal way when the squadron returned to its home port. In regard to Esmeralda, he pointed out that the frigate was owned by the Chilean Government, now flew its flag, and that the payment of prize money was therefore its responsibility.11

  Cochrane and San Martin met on 5 August to sort out these problems. It was a dramatic encounter and was witnessed on the one side by Bernardo Monteagudo and Juan Garcia del Rio and, on the other, by William Bennet Stevenson. Monteagudo was now the Peruvian Minister of Marine and Garcia del Rio was Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the course of the meeting, San Martin and Cochrane both became angry, but there are conflicting accounts about what exactly was said. Cochrane's version - first retailed by Stevenson then repeated by all his other biographers - depicts the Protector as triumphalist, devious and obstructive, while the Vice Admiral is reasonable, honest and positive. Responding to Cochrane's request for money, San Martin is accused of attempting to get the ships under his control by saying that 'he would not pay the Chilean squadron unless it was sold to Peru, and that the payment should be part of the purchase money.' The argument continued until San Martin, turned to Cochrane, rubbing his hands agitatedly, and said 'I am Protector of Peru.' 'Then', replied Cochrane, 'it now becomes me as the senior officer of Chile and consequently the representative of the nation, to request fulfilment of all the promises made to Chile, and the squadron.' San Martin then came forward, snapped his fingers in Cochrane's face and said 'Chile! Chile! I will never pay a single real to Chile! And as to the squadron, you may take it where you please, and go where you choose: a couple of schooners is enough for me.'12

  It did not take Cochrane's entourage long to ensure that his account of the meeting, and of San Martin's alleged refusal to provide the squadron with funds unless it was handed over to Peru, was being circulated in Chile. San Martin issued an indignant denial. But his version of events never received the same publicity. San Martin's account of the meeting was that he had repeated his position that responsibility for the squadron's pay and prize money lay with Chile and not with him; and had confirmed that a percentage of the customs revenue of Callao had already been earmarked to pay the $160,000 he had promised in gratuities. Regarding the sale of the Chilean squadron, all he had done was to observe that he was on the brink of creating a Peruvian navy, and was prepared to buy some of the ships if it would help to solve Chile's known financial difficulties.13 He repeated these points in writing on 9 August. Cochrane made no reply except to say that unless he was sent $150,000 immediately, he would be unable to halt 'the tempest' of insubordination by his crews.14

  The seamen were certainly becoming truculent over the non-appearance of pay, and during September, when the shortage of supplies had became critical, there were disturbing messages from O'Higgins, Galvarino and Lautaro of sailors refusing duty. The morale of the officers was also sagging. And when, on 17 August, San Martin's government began to recruit men for the new Peruvian Navy -sending Paroissien and Spry to lobby them personally - 13 of the squadron's 30 sea officers signed on.15 Their numbers included five of seven captains and six of 25 lieutenants. Cochrane himself was invited to become its admiral, but indignantly refused. Guise, Spry and Freeman inevitably offered their services - but so did many others who had previously been Cochrane 'followers' like Prunier who was now commanding Pueyrredon and had already attracted the Admiral's displeasure. Forster too had fallen from favour, and had resigned his commission after having been excluded from an active role in the capture of the Esmeralda.16 Cochrane claimed that the officers who joined the new navy were bribed to leave the Chilean service with estates and awards. But it is just as likely that they were disturbed by the conduct of the Valdivia court martial and by Cochrane's obsession with plots, and decided to leave before they too came under suspicion. In private letters, officers tactfully refrained from revealing their feelings. Captain Henry Hind sidestepped the subject, writing that he was 'no party man',17 and Miller, on the brink of going off on campaign, told Paroissien darkly that he had much to say but would only do so verbally.18 It was only later when, describing events at the time, he hinted at his real feelings when he
wrote, 'the squadron was divided and agitated by the conflicting parties of Cochrane and Guise. These originated in bickering on some unimportant points of etiquette and were carried to a length which proved highly detrimental to the service. But as these disputes reflect credit on neither party, I will make no further observation.'19 It was not long after that Miller transferred back to the army.

  Then came the final confrontation. At the beginning of September, when General Canterac had marched out of the mountains to threaten Lima and Callao, San Martin not only deployed his troops to defend the capital, but took the precaution of moving the entire contents of the Mint and the State Treasury to the coast. There it was loaded onto the schooner Sacramento and taken to the Bay of Ancon, which was being used as the assembly point for prizes. HMS Superb was also there, keeping an eye on British interests. On 13 September, Paul Delano, now commanding the frigate Lautaro, arrived at the anchorage. He soon became aware of what was on the Sacramento and sent immediate word to Cochrane off Callao. The Vice Admiral now had two choices - to seize the schooner and take the money or to wait and rely on San Martin's assurances, for the Captain General had already published orders in the Gazette for the bonuses to be paid. Cochrane did not hesitate. Putting to sea with O'Higgins and Valdivia, he sped to Ancon and, by nightfall on 14 September had seized the Sacramento and the money and bullion she carried.20 It would be difficult to think of any act more insulting to Peru's dignity and prestige. It was also a devastating blow for a country that was financially exhausted and whose monthly government revenue was only $130,659.21

  The Peruvians estimated that the amount carried on the Sacramento was $400,000 - the equivalent of £80,000 -$283,000 of which belonged to the state, $40,000 to private individuals, and the rest to the Army. Cochrane generously agreed to return the latter sums, but was adamant about retaining the $283,000 of state funds. At first the Peruvians demanded the money back. There was little chance of that. The seamen were fully aware that large amounts of money had been seized and transferred to the O'Higgins, and demands that it be used to pay them were becoming vocal and violent.22 Then Tomas Guido arrived with a compromise formula whereby a commissary would come on board, pay the crews, then return to Lima with the balance of the money. Cochrane was on the point of agreeing, but at the last minute changed his mind and decided to keep it all. He distributed $131,618 among his officers and men as one year's pay and an advance of prize money, sent $40,000 back to Valparaiso, and kept the remaining $111,382 for future expenses. He claimed self-righteously that he paid himself nothing. This may be so, but he nevertheless loaded $13,507 - the equivalent of £2700 - in coin and bullion on 14 September onto HMS Superb to be shipped back to his bank account in England.23 Indeed, he had sent another $5000 back to Miers in Chile only a fortnight before.24 Then he added injury to insult by seizing the schooner Mercedes as she was in the act of surrendering to the Peruvian authorities, and hijacking a cargo of rope and supplies from the Lautaro, which had been ordered for San Martin's army.

  Cochrane may have been secretly satisfied with the way he had cut the Gordian knot, but in the long run it worked to his disadvantage. Zenteno had accepted Cochrane's valuation of Esmeralda without question and had already authorised San Martin to pay the squadron $120,000 for the frigate and another $10,000 for the captured schooner Aranzaza.25 Unfortunately for Cochrane, the Peruvians were so affronted by the Sacramento incident that they flatly refused to accept the charge, and left him with a worthless letter of credit in his pocket. Likewise, they declined to pay both the $50,000 bonus promised for the capture of the frigate, and the freight costs of the prizes that had been used as transports.26 San Martin was shocked by Lord Cochrane's behaviour and by his refusal to compromise. He was also amazed by his indiscreet language. San Martin had been surprised to receive official letters from Cochrane publicly blackguarding the Chilean

  Government - writing, for example, on 4 August 'to what state has the Senate brought the beautiful and fertile province of Chile. Can confidence be restored? Has not their notorious want of good faith deprived them -notwithstanding the value of their rich mines and their public and confiscated lands, of the resources formerly possessed even by the Spanish Government - of the credit necessary to obtain a single dollar in foreign countries or even in their own.'27 At the same time, Cochrane was complaining to O'Higgins about San Martin, writing about 'secret plans by the Government of Peru to get the squadron in their power' and the need to avoid letting it fall into the hands of those 'who have made themselves, in my opinion, worse enemies of Chile than the Spaniards'.28

  At first San Martin confined his complaints against Cochrane to private letters addressed to O'Higgins, in which he enumerated 'the crimes of this noble pirate'. But then he learn that Cochrane's entourage were spreading hostile rumours about his activities in Peru, and were even making public their version of the interview of 5 August and of his alleged plot to get control of the Chilean squadron.29 By this time San Martin had had enough. On 26 September, he ordered Cochrane back to Chile. Cochrane replied with a long letter of justification and accusation,30 then led the squadron out of Callao in the opposite direction. San Martin's staff began drafting an official complaint.

  The loss of so many officers to the new Peruvian Navy hit Cochrane's squadron hard. The seamen too, now that they had been paid, began to desert in droves and when Lieutenant Wynter of the O'Higgins was sent ashore to round them up, he was promptly arrested. Fortunately the crew of the San Martin was available for redistribution, and Lautaro and Galvarino were sent back to Valparaiso to ease the demand for men. Even so, when Cochrane eventually sailed on 6 October 1821 with O'Higgins, Valdivia, Indepen-dencia, Araucano and the Mercedes schooner, the ships were only three-quarters manned, with hardly any foreign seamen, only nine lieutenants and with three newly promoted captains. Where he was bound was unknown, but by not heading for Valparaiso, San Martin's entourage accused Cochrane of disobeying orders. This was not his interpretation. In his view, by becoming Protector of Peru San Martin had relinquished command of the joint expeditionary force and now had no right to tell him what to do. Indeed, Lord Cochrane regarded himself as being the sole representative of the Chilean government. In relation to his destination, however, there was no confusion. After years without a refit, Cochrane's frigates were leaking like baskets, with pumps and other gear worn out. His plan was to take them north to Guayaquil for repairs then to scour the Pacific for the last remnants of the Spanish Navy, the frigates Venganza and Prueba.

  Chapter 13

  GUAYAQUIL AND THE SPANISH MAIN

  Cochrane's flotilla reached the broad arms of the Bay of Guayaquil on 21 October, skirted the sandy spit that marks the western tip of the Island of Puna and made its way up the 20 miles of river through mangrove swamps and malaria infested mud flats to the port. Guayaquil was a picturesque town, laid out to a grid pattern with churches, convents, and low houses standing white against the greenery of the tropical vegetation around. There was a rapturous welcome from the local inhabitants and an exchange of salutes and congratulations. Cochrane was presented with an illuminated address, to which he responded by treating the inhabitants to a long proclamation spelling out the virtues of constitutional government and liberal trading practices.1 As a gesture of solidarity with Chile, the head of the local government, José de Olmedo, put the facilities of the dockyard at Cochrane's disposal, though he had to pay the bill.2 Working flat out in the crushing heat, it took the artificers a month to refit and reprovision the ships. The total cost was $10,428 plus a bonus of $1000, which Cochrane gave as a reward to the dockyard workers.

  Cochrane was anxious to concentrate on the work and resume the task of hunting down the Prueba and Venganza. But there were two distractions. First, anchored off the town on his arrival he found the brig San Antonio, bound for Acapulco from Valparaiso carrying two British-born officers, Brigadier Arthur Wavell and Colonel Philip O'Reilly.3 The two men carried passports signed by O'Higgins on 3 September 1821,
in which the Supreme Director declared that they had been entrusted with a special mission by the Chilean Government and requested the assistance of all in facilitating their journey. Cochrane, unfortunately, tried to do the opposite. Arguing that the presence of the Spanish frigates in Mexican waters made the continuation of San Antonio's voyage too dangerous, he prevented them from sailing. There were weeks of wrangling. Wavell explained that he was charged with a confidential mission to the patriot Government of Mexico -though declined to show his secret orders - and rejected the reason Cochrane put forward for detaining the San Antonio by revealing that the latest news was that Venganza and Prueba had left Acapulco a month before. Cochrane finally relented and gave permission for Wavell and O'Reilly to proceed.4 When he later recorded these events in his Narrative of Services, Cochrane tried to justify his behaviour by discrediting Wavell and O'Reilly and claiming that their credentials were false.5 As usual, biographers have swallowed and repeated the story even though it has no basis other than Cochrane's desire for self-justification. The second problem was trickier. In the middle of November, one of Bolivar's aides, Colonel Diego Ibarra, had arrived in Guayaquil to make arrangements for the transfer of Columbian troops to the area by sea for a joint assault with San Martin's forces on the royalists in Upper Peru. Finding Cochrane in town, Ibarra immediately requested his assistance. Cochrane, who was now focused on the military necessity - and prize money advantages - of capturing the Venganza and Prueba was uninterested and evasive. Ibarra returned to Bolivar empty handed, reporting that some intrigue by San Martin lay behind Cochrane's non-cooperation.6