Second World War, The

by Corrigan, Gordon

  The operation would be secured in three phases, using the now standard German tactic of encirclement and destruction. Phase One would involve an armoured pincer movement from south of Orel eastwards for 100 miles to Voronezh on the River Don; Phase Two would see the Army Group split into two, Army Groups A and B, and an armoured thrust from Kharkov east to the Don (Army Group A) which would link up with the armour and motorized units coming down the Don from Voronezh (Army Group B); Phase Three would be a gigantic pincer movement on Stalingrad by an advance down the Don to the eastern extremity of the bend, to link up with the southern thrust coming from north of the Sea of Azov along the southern stretch of the Don that would also secure Rostov, at the western end of what would become the jumping-off line for the advance to the Caucasian oil fields. The two pincers would cross the Don at the point nearest to the Volga, push up to that river and deal with Stalingrad. When that had been done, Army Group A would push south into the Caucasus. Army Groups Centre and North would reinforce Army Group South and its successors, A and B. There the panzer divisions would be brought up to their full establishment of three tank battalions, whereas in the other army groups they would have but one. In total, there would be fifty-three infantry, eight panzer and seven motorized divisions for the offensive, but, impressive though this appeared to be, there was no armoured reserve, and the three Waffen SS motorized divisions, Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, Das Reich and Totenkopf, were withdrawn back to Germany to be refitted and trained as panzer divisions. It was at this stage, it should be noted, that the German navy was advocating an even more ambitious advance, through Persia and on to the Suez Canal to coincide with an attack on Egypt by Panzer Army Africa.

  Tactically, Case Blue made a great deal of sense, and the Operations Sections of OKW and OKH were in favour – they had, of course, produced the original plan which, even after Hitler’s tinkering, they felt was sound. Others were not so enthusiastic. Some of the field commanders, notably Colonel-General Georg von Kuchler commanding Army Group North, recommended a thrust against Leningrad instead, but as Leningrad was in his bailiwick his views were not surprising. More seriously, Colonel-General Friedrich Fromm, Chief of Army Ordnance and commander of the Replacement Army, the officer responsible for providing both equipment and men to replace losses in the East, Major-General Wagner, the Quartermaster General, and Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, Chief of Foreign Intelligence, all doubted whether the army was strong enough or had sufficient mobility to take all of the Caucasus. Paradoxically, the oil crisis was receding somewhat owing to strict rationing and imposed economies at home and a lower than expected consumption of fuel by the Wehrmacht due to its having lost a great many vehicles. There were also other problems to be considered. If only the northern oil fields were taken, the single realistic way of getting the oil to Germany was by ship across the Black Sea and failure to take the whole of the Caucasus would leave some Black Sea ports in Russian hands, thus making transportation difficult. Despite these doubts, nobody was able to come up with a better plan, other than trying to make peace, as some thought advisable, or withdrawing, shortening the front, and going on the defensive, neither of which was remotely acceptable. Hitler’s view, which was surely right, was that centres of production – like those in Moscow – could be rebuilt or relocated, whereas raw materials – like the oil in the Caucasus – would be irreplaceable once lost. At this stage, Stalingrad was a secondary objective. The Volga was an important means of moving goods and men by river transport, Stalingrad was an important centre of armaments production and major railway lines ran through the city. To put those facilities beyond Soviet use would be convenient and helpful, and would improve the security of the German left flank for the thrust into the Caucasus, but it was by no means essential.

  Although the staff of Foreign Armies East, that department of the army high command which looked at the structure and capabilities of enemies and potential enemies, had underestimated both the ability of the Red Army to raise new formations and the number of men of military age in the USSR, it was well aware of the disparity in the manpower available to both sides. German losses so far had been enormous. Of the 209 divisions of the Ostheer in June 1941, 64 per cent were classified by OKH as fit for any offensive operations. On 30 March 1942 the frontage had expanded but the number of divisions had shrunk to 162 and only 5 per cent were classified as fit. While this percentage was expected to – and did – improve greatly before the onset of the summer campaigns, the losses in men could not be made up entirely by Germans, and so Germany turned to her allies. In 1941, when Barbarossa was first launched, German propaganda had made much of the participation of allied units, with newsreels showing Dutch, French, Danish, Croatian, Slovakian, Hungarian, Romanian, Spanish and Italian soldiers marching east. Apart from the Romanians and Italians, however, these contingents were tiny, drawn from various fascist or quasi-fascist organizations, and of no military significance, even if they were politically useful in that they emphasized the extent of the European Crusade against Bolshevism. In 1942, even though the additional manpower provided by Germany’s allies might not have met the exacting standards of her own army, these troops could at least be used in support and in rear areas, thereby releasing German formations for offensive operations.

  In June 1941 Italy had provided the Italian Expeditionary Force in Russia (CISR) of three infantry divisions and a cavalry group supported by an air force of eighty-nine fighter and reconnaissance aircraft, a total of 60,900 men, 5,500 vehicles and 4,650 horses. Now Mussolini offered to make this up into an Italian army, with the addition of three infantry and three mountain divisions, which would total nearly a quarter of a million men with 16,700 vehicles, 960 guns, fifty-five light tanks and 20,000 mules for the Alpine Corps. Mussolini’s motives were straightforward enough: he wanted Great Power status for Italy and to secure her territorial claims in the Balkans and in the sea routes between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean – and the only way to obtain these, he believed, was to play a significant part in the German victory in the East. The Italian Chief of Army Staff, Marshal Count Ugo Cavallero, was opposed to the expansion, on the grounds that one Italian army would make little difference to the result of the war in Russia, whereas it might make all the difference in North Africa. The Commander CISR, General Giovanni Messe, was also opposed, on the grounds that the Italian Army was not up to coping with the conditions on the Russian front, that its equipment was sub-standard, that its tanks were useless and that relations with the Germans, on whom they would have to rely for resupply, were not good. Mussolini insisted, however, and the Italian Army in Russia was created, although his suggestion for its commander – Crown Prince Umberto of Savoy – was vetoed by OKH, which insisted on a professional, getting General Italo Gariboldi, an ex-governor of Libya.

  The largest allied contingent in 1941 had been the Romanians, who provided four infantry divisions, three mountain brigades and two cavalry brigades as part of the German Eleventh Army. Now that was to be increased to two armies of twenty-seven divisions in their own Army Group, with the agreement that Germany would provide rations and medical services. Again, the motives for the Romanian dictator Marshal Antonescu were political. Permanent recovery of the provinces lost to Russia in 1939 could only be ensured by a German victory, and it was not only manpower that Romania provided, for, until the Ukraine and the Caucasus could be thoroughly exploited, Romania was a major source of oil and cereals for Germany. In contrast, Hungary had managed to avoid a major contribution to the German war effort so far. Unlike the leaders of other countries in the German camp, Admiral Miklós Horthy, the Hungarian acting head of state and regent, had to pay some attention to his parliament, which was much more anti-Romanian than it was anti-Russian. After much negotiation by the German foreign minister, Ribbentrop, and the chief of OKW, Field Marshal Keitel, Hungary at last agreed to provide nine infantry divisions, an armoured division and seven security units – these latter being second-class divisions that would be used to maintain or
der in the rear areas.

  In the north, there was not a great deal that could be expected of Finland, which was still a parliamentary democracy, albeit one operating under some wartime restrictions. Marshal Mannerheim, the president and Commander-in-Chief of the army, was not interested in the racial and ideological aspects of the German war, but simply wanted to win back territory lost to the USSR in the Winter War. Although he had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1941, he had no treaty of assistance with Germany and attempted to fight a parallel war, hoping not to offend the Western Allies. He was somewhat perturbed when the UK declared war on him in December 1941 and even more so when the United States, traditionally a friend of Finland’s, made it clear that, once she entered the war against Germany on 11 December 1941, she was henceforth an ally of the Soviet Union. Finland would fight on, but the more grandiose schemes for cooperation with Army Group North would not now take place.

  Spain had not joined the war, and nor would she, but she did provide the Blue Division, which fought as 250 Division as part of Army Group North’s reserve. As we have seen, Franco constantly promised Hitler that he would join the war, but not before the British were defeated. When this became increasingly unlikely, Franco saw a way of repaying Hitler for his assistance during the Spanish Civil War, of keeping his claim to French Morocco and Gibraltar alive in German eyes and of getting rid of his more extreme Falange youth. At the same time, and despite the popular support for Germany and detestation of Russia amongst the majority of the Spanish people, Franco had no intention of sending more than a token force. Initially, this was to be from the Falange Militia, but the regular army dug its heels in and insisted that, while the Militia might have been perfectly adequate for fighting other half-trained Spanish Republican militias, it could not possibly be expected to perform against the Soviets, and the army must have its say. Eventually, it was decided that the force would be called the División Española de Voluntarios, or DEV, and it would be 18,000 strong. Two thirds of the second lieutenants and sergeants would be from the regular army, the remainder from the Militia, and all officers of the rank of lieutenant and above and all specialists (heavy weapons operators, signallers, drivers, technicians) would be from the regular army. If the Falange could not fill the junior ranks, then regular soldiers would be permitted to volunteer. As commander of the division Franco selected an old comrade, Major-General Muñoz Grandes, acceptable to all as while a regular officer he had at one point commanded the Falange Militia. He had a reputation as a competent and brave officer; indeed, British Intelligence considered him‘one of their best and most resolute generals’.51 He was also well known to the Germans, having been involved with them in the planning of the abortive Case Felix, the capture of Gibraltar.

  Recruiting for the DEV, which was to be drawn from all over Spain, was patchy. In strongly Nationalist areas, recruiters were overwhelmed, and many reserve officers joined as private soldiers. In others, particularly areas that had been Republican during the Civil War, only committed Falangists joined and the balance had to be made up from regular soldiers, supposedly volunteers but, in some cases, pressed men. Initially the uniform was exotic – red berets, blue shirts, khaki trousers and black boots, with officers wearing a khaki tunic with blue cuffs and collars. It was this preponderance of the Falange colour of blue that gave rise to the name – the Blue Division. During negotiations with the Germans, it was agreed that the Spanish volunteers would be paid, uniformed, rationed and armed by the Germans, and that, once they left Spain, they would wear standard German army uniform with a shoulder title of España and a red and gold shield, Spain’s national colours, on the arm of the jacket. The need for the Blue Division to change its organization from the Spanish standard four regiments to the German three was managed eventually, and the only sticking point was that of rations. The egalitarian German army issued the same ration for all ranks, whereas in the Spanish Army officers’ rations were superior and more plentiful. The Spanish had to agree, with rather bad grace, that not only would they have to accept the same amount and quality for everybody, but, as the Germans had no intention of providing a different ration for every national contingent, they would have to put up with sausages, sauerkraut and German bread, rather than the hoped for fresh meat, vegetables and light bread. The Blue Division duly joined Sixteenth Army in Army Group North, where it saw action in the fighting around Leningrad in October 1941. While the Spanish government would, for the time being at least, maintain the division at its established strength, and would provide so-called Blue Squadrons of aircraft operating under Luftwaffe command, it would make no increase in its contribution.

  Other sources of manpower were ethnic Germans or those the Germans considered to be Germanic (for example, the Flemish, Dutch and Scandinavians), all of whom were enlisted into units of the Waffen SS, while non-Germanic volunteers (such as the Spanish, and also the French and Croats) were incorporated into the army. It was specifically forbidden to enlist Czechs and Russians, except for a few individuals with certain specialities. Later this would change, although by then it would be too late.

  From the Russian point of view as well, matters in the spring of 1942 seemed a lot less gloomy than they had in the autumn of the previous year. The Germans had not captured Moscow, Soviet industry had largely been relocated eastwards and was again in full production, and the first trickles of vehicles and equipment from the Americans and the British were beginning to come through. The foreign minister, Molotov, had been to England. Travelling under the name of Mr Brown, he had flown to Scotland, been met by the Foreign Secretary, Eden, and conducted to London by train. Stalin had instructed Molotov to persuade the British to sign a treaty recognizing the borders of the USSR as those existing in 1941 before Barbarossa. As this would have given legitimacy to Soviet occupation of East Poland and the Baltic States, the British were not going to fall for that one; nor would they promise a second front in 1942, but a treaty saying nothing about boundaries was signed and a second front was promised ‘as soon as possible’. Molotov and his entourage stayed at Chequers – where the bed-making staff were somewhat taken aback to find a loaded revolver under every pillow – and he enjoyed amicable late-night discussions with Churchill before departing happily for the USA, where he was similarly well received by Roosevelt.

  The Russians now disposed of around 6 million men – German intelligence thought 5 million – facing around 3.25 million Germans. The Soviet divisions were full of inexperienced junior officers terrified to show any initiative lest it led to their being taken out and shot, and they had all sorts of manning and logistical problems, but the Red Army was still in being despite the horrific losses in men and equipment of the previous year, and it still had manpower as yet not mobilized – indeed, during the course of 1942 it would create another 134 divisions. The German was a far better soldier, he was better led and, so far at least, was equipped with better weapon systems, but there were precious few reserves and extra manpower could only come from stripping the garrisons at home in Germany and in the occupied countries. From the point of view of Hitler and the OKW, 1942 was all or nothing.

  Russian intelligence, such as it was, predicted that the German objective for 1942 would be Moscow, and Stalin concurred. The movement of German troops getting into position for the advance on Voronezh, Phase One of Case Blue, was interpreted as preparations for an outflanking movement northeast to get behind Moscow and cut it off, which the Russians thought would coincide with a thrust from Orel towards the city. The logical conclusion was that the Germans would have weakened their south to bolster up their centre – exactly the opposite of what had been done. On 12 May, Marshal Timoshenko, commanding the South-Western Front with the future prime minister of the USSR, Nikita Khrushchev, as his chief commissar, launched an attack to retake Kharkov, completely unaware of the pending German attack from that area. With 640,000 men and 1,200 tanks supported by 900 aircraft, the Russian attack came out of a salient to the west of the River Donets and s
outh of Kharkov, and by 19 May its main thrust had penetrated about thirty miles and leading Soviet armoured units were forty miles from the headquarters of Army Group South. While that operation was taking place, a smaller attack, across the Donets farther north, got within ten miles of Kharkov. The Germans were initially alarmed but then realized that the Russians still had not learned and were obligingly pushing deeper and deeper into a pocket, which on 17 May the Germans took steps to nip off when von Kleist’s First Panzer Army struck north through the Russian flanks. By 23 May the German armour had made contact with Sixth Army to the north of the pocket, and by 28 May resistance inside the pocket had ended. The best part of four Russian armies, twenty-two rifle and seven cavalry divisions, and fifteen armoured brigades, were wiped from the Soviet order of battle; 1,200 tanks, 2,000 artillery pieces and 540 aircraft had been captured or destroyed and 239,000 prisoners taken – it would have been more had the Germans not run out of fuel.

  This was a further stunning victory, but German commanders could see a little dark cloud on the horizon. Despite another error by their high command, the Russians were improving – as General of Panzer Troops Eberhard von Mackensen, commanding III Armoured Corps of von Kleist’s army, noted: ‘[the Red Army’s conduct of operations] is more fanatical, more ruthless and more solid [than in 1941]… the Red leadership is risking everything. It generally takes clear decisions and employs everything to implement them. Field commanders and troops execute its decisions far more resolutely than last year…’52 Yet the Red Army still suffered from the oppressive supervision of the political commissars, who had joint responsibility with the military commander but in many cases had little or no military experience and viewed any backward move as treasonable, and anything other than constant and repeated frontal attacks as evidence of incompetence. Eventually, in October 1942, Stalin curbed the influence of the commissars, who could no longer overrule the military commander, although they could, and did, sneak to Moscow on a general they disliked or disapproved of. As a result of the fate of the armies trapped on the west side of the Donets while trying to retake Kharkov in May, and those in the Crimea, it was beginning to come home to Stalin and the Stavka that refusing to allow commanders to pull troops out when it was tactically necessary only led to their being surrounded, cut off and wiped out. From now on, while ‘No Retreat’ orders were still read out to the troops, withdrawals would be permitted. The difference is a fine one: both involve going backwards, but a withdrawal is something that the commander decides to do, whereas a retreat is forced upon him.