Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862

by Edward Cunningham

  If the staff of the army was not working smoothly, many of the field officers were doing even worse. General Beauregard had ordered the troops to be issued five days’ rations, which should have been plenty for the proposed campaign, but unfortunately there were problems connected with this. The rations had to be cooked by the troops, and some of the more inept soldiers managed to spoil all or part of their food. In the Twenty-second Alabama, most of the food did not arrive until the regiment was ready to push off. The men only had time to cook up two days’ supply. The rest was loaded on board a wagon and sent off along with the unit. Unfortunately, a clumsy driver turned the wagon over in the mud, thoroughly ruining all of the food. The four hundred members of the regiment were forced to tighten their belts several extra notches. In good army fashion many of the Rebels promptly devoured their rations in the first twenty-four or thirty-six hours of the march.36

  The roads were already thoroughly muddy from rains during the past night, but on Friday night, as the half-hungry Confederate army tried to settle down, the heavens literally seemed to burst open. Most of the soldiers lacked tents, and they were quickly soaked to the bone by the cold rain. A blistering north wind added to their misery by blowing the stinging drops of water into their faces. To add to the gloominess of the night, it suddenly began to hail. Lumps as big as musket balls pelted the already weary soldiers with staccato like frequency.37 Most of the soldiers carried a blan ket or even two, but they quickly became soaked. A very few officers and enlisted men owned non-regulation gum coats or water proofed tarpaulins. These were the exceptions. The weather Thursday night might have been severe, but Friday night it was even worse. By dawn most of the Confederate army was in good shape to visit a pneumonia ward.38

  The next morning, Saturday, conditions along the line of march were chaotic. A heavy drizzle continued to harass the cold, exhausted soldiers, most of whom had not been able to get any sleep. Every step was like filing through quicksand. In General Bragg’s Corps, the infantry stumbled along in foot-deep mud. Finally about midday, the rain stopped, giving the weary men a little respite.39 General Hardee’s soldiers moved as fast as they could, but it was the middle of the morning before they were drawn up in order of battle about two miles from the Union army’s camp area.40

  Discipline was pretty shaky in the Confederate army. Members of Colonel John Wharton’s Eighth Texas Cavalry were riding around in the slush, firing their shotguns and revolvers at trees or stumps, or at an occasional rabbit. Many soldiers shot their guns off into the air just to see if they would still work in the dampness. A poor frightened deer suddenly ran from a thicket, and hundreds of Confederate soldiers, spying the nervous beast, let go a tremendous war whoop.41

  About noon some troops from the First and Second Corps began to straggle into the deployment area, including many of the artillery units that had not left Corinth until Friday morning.42 General Bragg’s Corps was still not all in position. In fact a whole division was lost somewhere along the Monterey Road. At last General Johnston lost his patience with General Bragg. “This is perfectly puerile!” he exclaimed, “This is not war! Let us have our horses.”43 Accompanied by part of his staff, General Johnston rode back along the road to find that some of General Polk’s wagons and artillery had blocked the missing division off. The Confederate commander and his subordinates finally man aged to get the traffic jam unsnarled, but it was about 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon.44

  There was no possibility for an offensive on Saturday. To attack with only the part of the army that was deployed was to invite disaster. Indeed it was increasingly becoming a moot question if the army should attack at all. The success of the Confederate plan depended in a large part on achieving at least strategic surprise over General Grant. If the Federals were alerted and massed behind fortifications at Pittsburg, then the Southern chances for victory were practicallynil. After three days of troop movements in the field, it was quite possible that the Federals were on the alert. Even more serious was the danger that General Grant’s soldiers had heard the Confederates firing their guns off and yelling. The most dangerous possibility of them all however, was that the Union army had been tipped off by the increasingly heavy skirmishing near the Federal camp.

  Just before dawn on Thursday morning Colonel James H. Clanton’s First Alabama Cavalry lost a minor argument with General Grant’s cavalry. Clanton’s Alabamans were placed around Pittsburg Landing to keep an eye on Northern movements. General Sherman decided on Wednesday to try and pick up some prisoners from the Confederates for the sole purpose of intelligence. Colonel William Taylor, with a force of Fifth Ohio Cavalry, was assigned the task of making the sweep. Just after midnight the Ohioans pulled out of Pittsburg. A Doctor Parkes (or Parker), who lived near the Landing, spotted Taylor’s force and rode off to warn Clanton’s picket post. About six miles from Pittsburg, Taylor’s men stumbled upon a Confederate picket post of nine men. There was a wild exchange of shots, and the Southerners quickly mounted their horses and galloped off. The Ohioans fired pretty wildly in the murky predawn haze, but they managed to wound one Alabaman, and they bagged a Private Lammon. The raiders continued on down the Corinth Road, stumbling upon Doctor Parkes, who was busily engaged in alerting the other picket posts. With his two prisoners, Colonel Taylor broke off the expedition and returned to the Landing.45

  The early morning skirmish of April 3 was only an opener. Early Friday morning Confederate scouts shot up a company of the Sixth Iowa Infantry on guard along the Purdy Road beyond Owl Creek. Private Charles Statton was the only Union casualty. One Johnny Reb shot Statton through the hand, and a surgeon was later forced to amputate one of his fingers. There were no more casualties on either side, as the cavalrymen quickly rode away.46

  On April 4, General Sherman’s soldiers managed to pick a pretty good firefight with the advance elements of the Confederate army. On Friday, Colonel Ralph Buckland took his Fourth Brigade out on a training exercise, in accordance with orders from his divisional commander General W. T. Sherman. The Ohio brigade marched out along the Corinth Road about three or four miles. Colonel Buckland decided to give his regimental commanders a little time to drill their units before returning to camp at Shiloh Church. About 2:30 p.m., Buckland heard scattered small arms fire and yells from about where he had posted a picket post of the Seventieth Ohio. The brigade commander ordered Major LeRoy Crockett to end the training exercise and swing his Seventy-second Ohio around for a sweep in the direction of the noise. While the infantry prepared to move, Colonel Buckland galloped on ahead to find out what was going on. He found out, and the news was all bad. Lieutenant W. H. Herbert and six enlisted men of the Seventieth Ohio had been overrun and captured by Confederate cavalry, Clanton’s First Alabama. The colonel ordered Lieutenant John Geer to ride back and notify General Sherman of the incident. As Geer galloped off, a courier from Major Crockett came up with the information that the Federal officer had deployed his Company B to swing way right of the picket post in the hope of engaging the enemy. Colonel Buckland sent word to Major Crockett to send Company H out to reinforce Company B.

  These troop movements consumed a good bit of time, and Lieutenant Geer returned with the word that General Sherman was sending out a battalion of the Fifth Ohio Cavalry, under Major Ricker. It was Colonel Buckland’s understanding that Major Crockett would return to camp as soon as he completed his swing, unless of course he ran into strong enemy opposition. There was no noise to indicate any such happening, so Colonel Buckland took the rest of his brigade on back to Shiloh Church. At the camp Buckland nervously waited for Major Crockett to show up. Eight companies of the Seventy-second came on in, but there was no sign of Crockett and Companies B and H. Long minutes passed, and then Colonel Buckland’s ears began picking up the sounds of small arms fire. Rounding up a hundred men from Companies A, D, and I of the Seventy-second Ohio, he headed back to find his wayward men.47

  A short distance beyond the Jack Chalmers’ plantation Colonel Buckland encountered some soldi
ers from Company H, who excitedly told him that the two companies had become separated and that Major Crockett was probably captured by enemy cavalry. Stumbling through the mud, the relief party moved faster toward the continuing sound of gunfire, oblivious to the heavy rainfall which had just started. Rounding a bend in the Bark Road, Colonel Buckland could see his Bluecoats engaged in a hot fire fight with a party of Confederates. Buckland’s relief party raked the First Alabama with a heavy burst of musket fire. The Rebels quickly fell back to an open field where they could reform. The pugnacious Colonel Buckland started forming his own men up for a pursuit when Major Ricker and his cavalry arrived.48

  In response to General Sherman’s call, Major Ricker had reported to Fifth Division headquarters. “Cump” Sherman directed the major to take his battalion out and discover the fate of the missing Herbert and his men. Within a few minutes the major had rounded up one hundred and fifty of his troopers and was en route to the trouble spot. About 3:30, the Ohioans reached Sherman’s outpost on the Corinth-Pittsburg Road. From the officer in charge, Major Ricker learned that Colonel Buckland and his relief party had passed by sometime before. Ricker could hear gunfire, and he decided to try to envelop the enemy force that was fighting with Colonel Buckland. He sent part of his force out along the Bark Road, while with half of his men he rode on a flanking movement, designed to come in at the point where the noise indicated the enemy’s flank rested. The troopers found that Colonel Buckland and his infantry had the situation safely under control.

  Colonel Buckland decided to attack the Southerners, and he led his command forward in a sort of slow charge. The Alabamans fell back for a quarter of a mile, to behind the brow of a hill. As Major Ricker’s men followed them over the hill, they suddenly ran into stiff Confederate artillery fire.49

  Notified that Clanton had run into an enemy force, Major General Hardee ordered Brigadier General Pat Cleburne to deploy his infantry brigade to cover the Bark Road and the approach to Mickey’s. Cleburne’s infantry fanned out across the road, while Captain John T. Trigg unlimbered his battery of two 6-pound smoothbores and two 12-pound howitzers. The guns were sighted in to command the top of the hill. As Clanton’s men frantically rode over the rise in the ground and scattered to the sides, the Arkansas gunners braced themselves. When Major Ricker’s men galloped over a few yards behind them, Trigg’s four guns roared. The Southerners made a bad mistake, however, in not waiting until the Ohioans’ momentum carried them out into the open where they would have been an easy mark. The sudden detonation of the big guns provided a rather spectacular, if harmless, effect on the Union cavalry. Several of Major Ricker’s soldiers’ inexperienced mounts went completely berserk, carrying their startled riders in all directions. One unruly horse headed straight in the direction of Pat Cleburne’s infantry. His gallant rider quickly drew his revolver and pistoled down a Confederate soldier. The Southern infantry instantly riddled the daring Northern trooper with a spray of musket balls. Major Ricker and the other Federal soldiers quickly rode away, rejoining Colonel Buckland to the rear. The two field officers decided to return to camp and report the situation to General Sherman. They carried back with them two badly wounded Federals and nine bewildered Confederate troopers of the First Alabama Cavalry.50

  Back at his Shiloh Church headquarters, General Sherman heard the sound of Captain Trigg’s cannon. Realizing Colonel Buckland and Major Ricker might be in trouble, he took two of his infantry regiments out along the Corinth-Pittsburg Road to the Bark Road junction, where he found his missing flock. The total losses for the Federal army were Major Crockett and Lieutenants Geer and Herbert, and nine other Federals captured, eight men wounded, and one man killed.51

  A little past 5:00 p.m. in the afternoon, the Federal prisoners were brought into Confederate headquarters, where Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and Bragg were conferring. Lieutenant Colonel J. F. Gilmer and Colonel Thomas Jordan personally interrogated Major Crockett and the other Federals. On the basis of the information gleaned from the prisoners, Jordan and Gilmer reported to Generals Johnston and Beauregard that the enemy was apparently still completely unprepared for an attack.52

  Over at the Union camp, the Federals still seemed unconcerned over Major Ricker’s and Colonel Buckland’s collision with the Confederates, although General Sherman was quite irritated with the colonel for becoming involved with the Southerners against orders.

  General Grant had other things on his mind than a skirmish with the enemy. While he was riding back from investigating the Buckland and Ricker affair, just before darkness fell, the commanding general’s horse lost his footing in the mud and went down, rolling over the general’s leg. Grant’s ankle bone was bruised so severely that it was necessary for the boot to be cut off. For the next day or so, the army commander would have to hobble around on a pair of crutches.53

  If Generals Grant and Sherman did not seem particularly interested in what was going on at the front, some of the Federal soldiers around Pittsburg Landing were becoming a little nervous at the slowly increasing signs of enemy activity. The Twenty-fifth Missouri Infantry Regiment picked up a couple of Southern civilians prowling through the regimental camps. The two unwelcomed intruders boldly proclaimed that they were hunting cattle, but the rank and file of the Federal army insisted upon considering them as spies. After an investigation, the two fellows were finally released.54

  On the following day, Saturday, April 5, there were more alarms in the Federal camp. A rumor was steadily circulating that General Albert Sidney Johnston was about to launch a surprise attack; however, most of the Federals simply laughed off the idea as being rather ridiculous.55

  Apparently Major General John A. McClernand picked up some of the general nervousness floating around the Federal camps, for just after lunch, he ordered a cavalry party out to reconnoiter in the direction of Hamburg for a short distance. The troopers, however, did not go far enough or even in the right direction to find the Confederates.56

  Out on General Sherman’s picket line, Captain W. B. Mason of the Seventy-seventh Ohio, suggested to Sergeant C. J. Eagler and Private Samuel Tracey that the three might take a walk beyond the picket line to relieve the monotony. After a quarter of a mile beyond the divisional picket line, the three men reached an open field, from where they could see in the distance a strong force of Confederate infantry and artillery. Captain Mason ordered Sergeant Eagler to report to regimental headquarters what they had seen. Back at Shiloh Church, Eagler found Major D. B. Fearing and told him the news. The major told Eagler to go back to the picket post with the assurance that the matter would go to General Sherman at once. When Major Fearing informed Sherman, the general exploded. He ordered Sergeant Eagler placed under arrest for spreading a false alarm, although Captain Mason managed to protect his sergeant.57

  The incident attracted Colonel Hildebrand, who immediately went out to find out what was going on. Mason explained that besides observing the Confederate camp he had also seen Confederate cavalry in the distance, as well as numerous rabbits and squirrels running about, aggravated by what ob viously was some large scale movement. Colonel Hildebrand even saw Confederate infantry’s shiny musket barrels in the distance himself. The sixty-two year old ex-militia officer quickly saw the light, and he returned to Shiloh Church to in form General Sherman. Unfortunately the Fifth Division’s commander refused to believe that the Confederates were anything more than a reconnoitering party.

  Colonel Buckland personally visited several picket posts during the day, and he observed Confederate cavalry in the distance. Some of his soldiers on guard reported occasionally catching glimpses of enemy artillery and infantry moving in the distance. About noon a Confederate patrol probed one of Colonel Hildebrand’s outposts, and Privates Sam Dillon and Dave Brown, Company A, Seventy-seventh Ohio, fired at them. The Southerners fired a few shots in reply before riding away.58

  Colonel Jesse Appler was drilling his Fifty-third Ohio in an open field near the divisional camp when he observed a party
of Southern horsemen perhaps half a mile away. He immediately dispatched a company to engage the Confederates. The Ohioans were unable to catch the troopers but followed them until they were fired upon by several Confederate infantrymen, pickets of General Hardee’s Corps. None of the Yanks were hit, but when they reported to Colonel Appler what had happened, the colonel ordered Lieutenant J. W. Fulton to go tell General Sherman. In a little while Fulton returned with the general’s reply, “Tell Colonel Appler to take his damned regiment to Ohio. There is no force of the enemy nearer than Corinth.”59

  Farther down the line the Sixth Division was going through a review. A rumor, later confirmed, ran through the ranks that there were Confederate cavalry watching the men drill from less than a half mile away. Colonel Everett Peabody’s brigade adjutant, Captain George Donnelly, openly told the enlisted personnel and junior officers to get ready for a fight for the army was about to be attacked. The troops were told to sleep with their rifles and cartridges ready at hand.60 Colonel Peabody was fully in accord with Captain Donnelly’s opinion, and he tried to persuade General Prentiss that an attack was eminent; however, the divisional commander was skeptical.

  Oblivious to the increasing menace, General Grant wired General Buell on Saturday that the Confederates were still in Corinth, Mississippi, and to his superior, he wrote the same day that the “main force of the enemy is at Corinth.”61 Untroubled, Sherman dropped General Grant a line in the early afternoon, commenting that “all is quiet along my lines now…. The enemy has cavalry in our front, and I think there are two regiments of infantry and one battery of artillery about 2 miles out.”62 Later in the day Sherman optimistically in formed General Grant that he felt sure “nothing will occur to-day more than some picket firing.” He claimed to have given the Southerners the worst of it Friday, maintaining that this would dis courage any aggressiveness on their part. “I will not be drawn out farunless with certainty of advantage,” he went on to say, “and I do not apprehend anything like an attack on our position.”63