One Million Steps: A Marine Platoon at War
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3 Other Marines These were Cpl. Jake Romo and Sgt. Patrique Fearon, an engineer.
4 “I don’t think he would have” Maryland Independent, December 1, 2010.
5 The Marines traded shots Lance Corporal Schoemaker did most of the shooting.
6 nearby compound Cpl. Ayala was at point.
7 Thanksgiving 2010 On November 27, 1st Squad was back to shooting. When the Marines saw two Taliban shadowing his patrol, they responded with machine gun fire, killing one enemy. In seconds, several others opened up from an irrigation ditch and a compound. Garcia called for his 60mm mortars to start dropping shells. Back at company headquarters, Beardsley called for air and brought in two F-18s. The pilots dropped four GBU-12s—Laser-Guided Bomb Units attached to 500-pound bombs. The enemy firing ceased.
The battalion continued to take losses. On November 30, four IEDs were uncovered about 300 meters south of Kilo Company headquarters at Inkerman. A fourth IED exploded, shearing off the legs of the engineer who was disarming another IED.
CHAPTER 7: GONE
1 But they don’t cope with death “In the States, the young don’t have to think about death,” Father Bill Kennedy, the regimental chaplain, told me after Abbate’s death. “But out here in Afghanistan, the grunts can’t avoid death. They gain a rough belief in God and eternity.” In the questionnaire answers 3rd Platoon provided to me, thirty of the fifty-one Marines said they “believed in God and His rules,” five said they did not believe in God, and sixteen were uncertain.
CHAPTER 8: ENEMY RESPITE
1 Eli Corpus Christi Caller-Times, December 6, 2010.
2 their son, Michael Akron Beacon Journal, December 12, 2010.
3 “God has a plan” Evansville (In.) Courier & Press, December 30, 2010.
4 “You’ve had your fun” That same day, 1st Squad came under fire in sector P8T and called in 120mm mortar shells that packed a heavy punch. While pursuing a man with an Icom, the squad found and destroyed an IED. Next, they captured a man named Abdul Ahad, who had fired an RPG at them. Ahad was turned over to the police at the district center. Third Platoon never heard what happened to him.
5 hailstorm of bullets Platoon log, December 16, 2010.
6 base of fire Staff Sergeant Cartier and Corporal Hess led this flanking party.
7 “Frankly, progress” Department of Defense press release, December 10, 2010.
8 “Earn the support” Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013, p. 326.
9 “a fully resourced” Gates, Duty, p. 342.
10 “fantasy” Ibid., p. 336.
11 “There was a pledge” Patrick Quinn, Associated Press, January 3, 2011.
12 with the British In 2007, the district governor confided to the British that the Alakozai, the largest tribe in northern Sangin, had decided to revolt against the Taliban that were aligned with the Ishaqzai, a rival tribe. The British gave the Alakozai ammunition, but no supporting troops. The Alakozai were crushed. Yet somehow the few British civilian officials still remaining in Sangin in 2010 as economic and political advisers had encouraged the Alakozai to try again. The Alakozai, particularly strong in the Kilo’s area north of the market, insisted they could persuade the local Taliban to cease fighting if the Marines pulled back.
13 an IED cooked off Platoon log, December 22, 2010.
14 “I’m honored to say” Corpus Christi Caller-Times, December 22, 2010.
15 “got a bad feeling” Platoon log, December 23, 2010.
16 “We are all family” “Funeral, Procession Emotional Affairs,” TheTelegraph.com, January 1, 2011.
17 “The bottom line” Quoted in 3/5 Facebook page, December 2010.
18 in opposition to the Taliban On December 27, 3rd Squad encountered the baffling contradictions that define counterinsurgency. When they began their patrol, they were picked up by the usual spotter with an Icom. They shot at him, missed, pushed on, dropped off a sniper team to ambush the spotter, missed again, picked up the team, and pushed on. After searching a few compounds, they entered an abandoned building that was well decorated, with rugs on every floor. The owner was likely to be a drug dealer or Taliban, or both. Whoever he was, no one touched any of his belongings when he was away.
Farther on, the squad bumped into a family lugging their few possessions in a wheelbarrow. Why they had left their farm was a puzzle that Stevie, the doughty interpreter, was unable to solve or, more likely, to explain properly in his pidgin English. That it involved local animosities became clear when the family, friendly and polite, pointed toward a nearby compound, indicating it was Taliban. Perhaps it was their way of getting a bit of revenge.
The squad crossed a nineteenth-century rope bridge and entered the empty enemy compound. Yaz spotted small holes drilled through the thick walls—murder holes for enemy snipers to use. He looked around carefully and found first one and then a second pressure plate, both connected to a plastic jug filled with thirty pounds of explosive. The squad also uncovered a hidden underground room, with a bag of heroin stashed in a corner. They blew the building, took some harassing PKM machine gun fire, and returned to base.
A decade earlier, Gen. Chuck Krulak, then Commandant, had written an article about a “Three Block War”—Marines aid refugees in one block, tussle with insurgents in the second, and confront heavy fire in the third. In the span of a few hours, 3rd Squad had encountered all three scenarios.
Over the next few days, 3rd Platoon patrols uncovered and destroyed fourteen IEDs and Cpl. Richard Hur of 2d Squad killed a man digging in an IED. Stoic and unexcitable, Hur drove Sergeant Dy crazy because of his mumbling into the radio, thus earning the nickname “Kermit the Frog.”
During a night ambush on December 29, Palma of 1st Squad fell into a freezing canal. He climbed out and assumed the watch. By morning, he was shivering violently, an icy sheen covering his cammies.
“I’m okay,” he insisted.
That was typical of Palma. Bored after graduating from high school, he had joined to get away from home in Arizona. He liked Marine traditions, tough conditions, and the challenges at Fires.
“Out here, I see life snatched away,” he told me after one patrol. “When I get back, I’m going to love my family, not take things for granted. I’m going back to college, but after that I want a fast-paced job. Maybe the DEA.”
19 “He didn’t drink” “Hutto Marine Tevan Nguyen Killed in Afghanistan,” Austin American-Statesman, December 30, 2010.
CHAPTER 9: MIDWAY TO HOME
1 “We’ve reassured them” Washington Post, January 5, 2011.
2 “I want you to be honest” Jonathan Alter, The Promise: President Obama, Year One. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010, p. 390.
3 “A commander can more easily” Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Book Six. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 482.
4 the 800-man battalion No commanding general would design one single operational template to control operations across Afghanistan. Local diversities and complexities overwhelmed central decision making. Each battalion needed the freedom to evaluate and adapt to the problems in his area. Major General Mills understood that. To the south of Sangin, seven Marine battalions were spread along seventy miles of Green Zone bordering the Helmand River. Next to the meandering river, one million people belonging to fifty subtribes lived in insular clans, resulting in a kaleidoscope of loyalties and security conditions. The Marine battalion in Nawa district, for instance, rarely heard a shot fired. In Marjah, another battalion averaged one small fight a week as the Taliban were pushed out into the desert. Down in Garmsir, a third battalion had dispersed into fifty squad outposts, each manned by an equal number of American and Afghan soldiers. Had 3rd Platoon broken down into similar squad outposts, they would have been wiped out.
5 Back to work The grunts in Kilo Company, though, knew they had it better than their brothers in I
ndia and Hotel Companies farther to the south in the heavily populated areas where IEDs were buried in every wall and alley.
While Kilo engaged in a few fights each day in the open, the rifle companies to the south were walking through narrow alleyways, surrounded by walls and civilians. The Taliban planted IEDs on every footpath and bridge over the stinking irrigation ditches used as sewers. It would take a patrol two hours to advance a hundred meters. Glimpses of the enemy were rare, and shooting in the crowded streets was impossible.
6 “Concentrate on destruction” FMFM 8-2, Counterinsurgency Operations. U.S. Marine Corps, 1980.
7 “We need to challenge” Conway quoted in Long War Journal, January 28, 2011.
8 Day 82 On January 2, 3rd Platoon walked back to Fires to resume patrolling. Along the way, Lance Corporal Meirink, a sniper working with 2d Squad, stepped on an IED that mangled his foot. On January 4, Delany and LCpl. Michael Williamson, twenty-two, from Arizona, killed three dickers. Williamson planned to become a sergeant major one day, explaining that then he “could change what he didn’t like about the Marine Corps.”
9 “My bad” The tension ran deeper than any platoon commander. Afghan soldiers were independent; Marines were rigid, accustomed to strict rules. Americans weren’t supposed to discipline or give orders to the Afghans. An Afghan soldier could not achieve the standards of an American grunt. An askari had a third-grade education, came from a northern tribe, and received $200 a month. If he was killed, his family was left with nothing. Yet still they left the wire as long as the Marines were alongside them.
We all sense when someone dislikes or disdains us, and we respond with surliness or disobedience. Afghans are unruly. Without firm leadership, they act like a high school class with a timid substitute teacher. To be effective, an adviser has to impose firm rules on an equitable basis. That combination of empathy and consistent discipline requires maturity. The Army Special Forces teams were terrific advisers. The average age in the Special Forces was thirty-two, ten years older than 3rd Platoon.
10 Day 89 The previous day, 3rd Squad had tripped off a two-day battle. The patrol was headed northeast toward a wide bend in the Helmand River in sector Q5H when the G-Boss telescope spotted a half dozen Taliban ferrying a few wounded in a shallow-draft boat across the river.
The squad hastened to the spot, and the first fire team to wade across took fire from Building 20, to the east. There were dozens of abandoned compounds among several hectares of bare fields and icy irrigation ditches. When McCulloch maneuvered toward #20, his squad was hit from #34, to the northeast. When the Marines returned that fire, a PKM machine gun in #17, closer to them, opened up. The squad pummeled the building, and then closed in, finding brass and blood trails amid the corn stalks.
As the Taliban pulled back, McCulloch stayed after them. He went down momentarily when a bullet creased his thigh, a searing wound equivalent to being branded. He hopped up swearing and fired a LAAW rocket. In response, the enemy returned fire from six buildings.
Outnumbered, the squad pulled back and called for Cobras. The gunships rolled in, launching Hellfire missiles against three compounds in rapid succession. Led by Cpl. Jeremy Moreno, the Marines assaulted Compound 32, finding one dead Taliban and three wounded civilians.
“I saw motorcycles in a tree line,” Moreno, twenty-one, from Riverside, California, said. “They could’ve left anytime. They didn’t back off.”
11 “I do not believe the officers” Ulysses S. Grant, The Complete Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant. Ulysses Press, 2013, p. 79.
12 “will nurture women leaders” Gretel C. Kovach, San Diego Union-Tribune, March 23, 2011.
13 “the graduate level” Comment by General Petraeus, February 9, 2011.
14 “attack the enemy relentlessly” FMFM 8-2, Counterinsurgency Operations.
15 In response to my survey See Appendix D.
16 “The families” Tom Bowman reports, NPR, October 30 and 31, 2011.
CHAPTER 10: THE ROUTINE
1 “spirit of the body” Col. Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle. New York: Macmillan, 1921.
2 “Got PID” BBC video, January 20, 2011.
3 “We watched him” BBC video, January 25, 2011.
4 Time and again Cpl. Brett Sullivan stopped a man driving by on a motorcycle with a car battery strapped on the rear. Sullivan pitched the battery into a canal and turned the man over to the police, who promptly released him.
5 Palma took fire While LCpl. Dylan Nordell led his fire team in a long loop to flank a PKM machine gun, Alvarez’s fire team reinforced Palma.
6 “a person of no account” Gina Cavallaro, Marine Corps Times, January 21, 2011.
7 another Marine This was Lance Corporal Marcum.
8 the squad was listening It was Lance Corporal Gonzalez who was listening.
CHAPTER 11: END OF TOUR
1 On February 8 On February 3, 3rd Squad had uncovered in Q1C a cache containing 300 pounds of explosives, six pressure plates, 200 feet of wire, and a soldering iron. A few days later, the camera on the blimp above Kilo Company headquarters showed a man hiding an AK on the riverbank in P8T. Second Squad searched the spot and uncovered another large cache of IED materials. At a nearby crossing point, Yazzie discovered and blew two IEDs.
A few days later, 3rd Squad found a pressure plate and two IEDs up in P8Q. Second squad, patrolling in the same area, saw movement in a set of compounds long abandoned. Inside were several families of destitute squatters. They had moved in because they believed the original owners were never coming back.
Garcia took this as a moderately encouraging sign. Although the families were dirt poor and likely had nowhere else to go, they were the first civilians to migrate into P8Q. One family moved in next door to the compound where Wagner had found two IEDs. Garcia hoped the local Taliban would warn the squatters which fields and houses were mined.
2 “We have finally gotten” Gen. David Petraeus interview, February 9, 2011.
3 “have lost the support” Jim Michaels, “General: Heart of Afghanistan Insurgency Beaten,” USA Today, February 14, 2011.
4 71 percent smallwarsjournal.com/documents/moshtarak1.
5 99 percent January 2011 ICOS survey released in June 2011.
6 sooner or later The next day, 3rd Squad went back to P8Q. Inside one compound they found an 82mm mortar shell hidden behind a false wall. Once a pressure plate concealed in the dirt floor was connected to the shell, the resulting blast would kill all Marines in the room. The technique came from Pakistan and had been used a year earlier with devastating results in another district.
7 On March 5 On March 4, 1st and 2d Squads had pushed into Q5H on parallel paths, hoping to trap some Taliban between them. A running firefight broke out, with intercepts of Icom chatter suggesting the enemy was trying to trap one of the squads. Dy laughed. Knowing Stevie was translating every word, the Taliban had pulled out, hoping to avoid pursuit by faking an imaginary attack.
8 The machine gun crew They were aided by Lantznester with his Squad Automatic Weapon.
9 Dy decided Corporal Halcomb was also firing his SAW.
10 As the enemy pulled back The Marines stepped out in Ranger file behind the engineer, Corporal Bradach, who swept a lane to the next tree line.
11 every Taliban gang On one out of every three patrols, the average Marine saw at least one Taliban. Obviously, many of the same Taliban were seen on different occasions. In total, the Marines believed they had hit 221 of the enemy with small arms. It cannot be judged how many others were hit by mortars, bombs, and rockets. Even allowing for exaggeration and double counting, by direct and indirect fire 3rd Platoon probably killed more than 200 Taliban over the course of 400 patrols.
12 psychological toll You become much more hesitant and cautious when you know the other side is diligently patrolling in a random fashion. Let me give an example.
In 2009, I had embedded with a British adviser team farther to the south.
A Marine battalion moved into the area and, as in Sangin, patrolled extensively. The translator with the British team said the Taliban were radioing back and forth, asking where all those Americans had come from. After several days, I said good-bye to the Brits and hopped in a Ford Ranger with three Afghan soldiers to return to base.
But when we reached a stretch of open road, the driver abruptly stopped and the soldiers peered around, whispering. I sat silently, cursing my stupidity for not having a weapon. Why had I trusted renegade Afghan soldiers? What a dumb, brainless way to die.
Ignoring me, however, the askaris dashed into the field and within seconds were back inside the truck, clutching a half dozen watermelons. Off we sped. The Marines were paying the farmers a dollar per melon, a princely sum. They would come down hard on any Afghan soldier for stealing. The chances of getting caught in the vast fields of the Green Zone seemed low to me, but not to the thieves.
The melon heist illustrated the pressure the Taliban were feeling as 3rd Platoon rolled forward like a steamroller.
13 “Since October” Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Sangin, March 8, 2011, as reported in Leatherneck.
14 “The president doesn’t trust” Gates, Duty, p. 557.
15 “I was torn” Ibid., p. 359.
16 “dramatically weaken” Ibid., p. 572.
17 “rooting the Taliban” Ibid., p. 571.
18 “a tighter focus” Ibid., p. 570.
19 “the troops had become” General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero: The Autobiography. New York: Bantam, 1992, p. 188.
20 203 casualties David W. Taylor, Our War: The History and Sacrifices of an Infantry Battalion in the Vietnam War 1968–1971. Medina, Ohio: War Journal Publishing, 2011, p. 634. (Parenthetically, this book is superb in describing the daily combat south of the DMZ.)
21 Forty-five percent Moni Basu, “Survey: Veterans Say Afghanistan, Iraq Wars Not Worth It,” CNN.com, October 5, 2011.