Joey Jacobson's War

by Peter J. Usher

  Concern at senior levels that bombers were sometimes not on target was not new, even if the difficulties were thought to be occasional or temporary. The Butt Report initially set senior air staff scrambling for explanations and excuses, but the scale of the problem was completely unanticipated, and its implications were devastating. Once Churchill himself had been apprised of its content, the need for correctives became urgent. The Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Charles Portal, undertook to improve astro-navigation in aid of reaching the target area, to mark the target area with flares for bomb-aimers to see it, and reassured the prime minister that radio navigation aids would soon come into regular service. But in the view of Bomber Command’s Air Officer in Chief Sir Richard Peirse, the problem lay squarely with his navigators, who needed to pull up their socks. Improvement, he asserted, would come if air observers “take a personal grip on the situation and kill any tendency to complacency which may have grown up because of the known difficulties of night navigation.”3 Only eighteen months prior, the RAF had dismissed the importance of navigation and the need for trained air observers. Things were turning around far too late.

  In fact, it was nearly impossible to find a target by dead reckoning over a darkened landscape. Astro-navigation could confirm proximity to a target within a few miles, but only when the upper atmosphere was cloud-free, a condition that would rarely prevail through the coming autumn and winter. And once close to the target, the crew had to find it, accurately aim a bomb at it, and hope the bomb would do the damage intended. Portal acknowledged to the prime minister that the accuracy of night bombing was the greatest operational problem facing Bomber Command. But there was no prospect for an immediate fix.

  The findings of the Butt Report, even if not fully disclosed to aircrews, must have been as disturbing to them as it was to their commanders. Joe knew that he had not always been able to find or hit the exact aiming points he had been assigned on his first sorties, but believed he had bombed the target cities with attendant destruction on at least three out of four of them. Other crews were providing similar reports to intelligence officers on debriefing. “Large flashes followed by explosions,” “bursts observed in target area,” “fires seen to break out,” were phrases commonly recorded in squadron diaries. Another common one was “results not observed.” This last meant more than intended: fires, flashes, and bomb bursts did not necessarily mean destruction, as was now becoming evident, but looking at the ground at night, crews could not know that. Joe’s pilot recalled that while interrogators and crews did their best to reconstruct what happened, the debriefing process was not noted for its rigour.

  Six months earlier, when these problems were first suspected, the Command’s senior navigation staff had called for the investigation and analysis of inaccurate navigation (deemed to be where an aircraft had failed to follow its prescribed track, or where there was an appreciable difference between actual and calculated ground speed), based on the flight log and chart from each sortie. A new questionnaire was devised for debriefing officers, designed to root out what went wrong regarding proper procedures, to detect and correct error, and better understand the effects of adverse weather conditions.

  What came of all this data collection was less than hoped for, mainly because station staff had little time to assess it. Nonetheless, the monthly Navigation Bulletin began drawing attention to individual cases of careless or lax dead reckoning and radio fixes, failures of communication between navigators and pilots, and insufficient attention to astro-navigation. Concerns about how intelligence officers conducted and recorded their debriefing sessions continued into the summer, as did the nagging question of bombing accuracy. Everyone knew that the key problem was navigation, and that radio-navigation aids were desperately needed. But everyone also knew that none would be available until 1942. In the meantime, air observers would be under fire to improve their performance by honing the dead reckoning, astro-navigation, map-reading, and radio-fixing skills they had already learned, and making better use of the compasses, sextants, radio direction finders, and wind-finding aids already available to them.

  The more immediate effect of the Butt Report was that cameras became standard equipment on all bomber aircraft. When the observer released his bombs, a flare was also dropped that was timed to light up the target area before the bombs landed. The observer opened the camera shutter just after impact, so a good photo required the pilot to fly straight and level for the additional thirty seconds or so that it took the bombs to fall. Subsequent interpretation would normally provide confirmation of the location of the aircraft and pinpoint bomb bursts, although searchlights and decoy fires could obscure the results. Night photography documented the occurrence of navigation failures, but it couldn’t fix them.

  On 4 September, Joe was dispatched on a raid of 140 bombers on German battleships in the port of Brest, this time with a new gunner, Sid Harding, and Duncan Hodgkinson, now first WO/AG. This would be Gerry Roberts’s regular crew for the next three months.

  We reached the French coast near Moraix – but the weather was closing in fast near our base and all over England so there was a general recall of all ships on the operation. We were supposed to bomb the Gneisenau, the Scharnhorst and the Prince Eugen. One or two kites evidently were over because we could see terrific flak going up – the coloured tracer is definitely a sight – when it is on somebody else. (JJOD 4 September 1941)

  The raid was unproductive. Two-thirds of the aircraft were recalled, the remainder bombed the estimated position of the battleships through a smokescreen the German defences had generated before the bombers arrived.

  Two days later Joe was briefed for an operation on the Chemische Werke synthetic rubber plant at Huls, in the Ruhr, which produced half of Germany’s synthetic rubber for the tires that kept the Wehrmacht moving. This would be the first of several trips Joe would make to this factory.

  We were first over the target and received enough attention for the whole effort – we were ringed and blinded by searchlights and accurately pasted by aak aak so we had no chance to stooge quietly over and bomb accurately – Jack McIntyre did and I imagine others did whilst the defences were busy with others.

  We were attacked by 3 ME109s over Amsterdam but shook them off – The searchlight belts were not as concentrated as usual – but we saw two planes shot down – The moon was almost full and you have an extremely exposed and vulnerable feeling when flying during these light periods.

  You get rather used to these more or less shaky do’s. I had a game of billiards after I got down past midnite with Curtis Gunners – they shot down a ME109 – we nearly had it from 3 of them – yet it worries us little now – of course if we think about it too often or long you get nervous but by leading a normal, active life you manage to take it all in stride – just part of the game. (JJOD 6 September 1941)

  The crew reported that they had located the target visually by reference to adjacent water features and bombed it from eleven thousand feet, although they did not observe the bomb bursts. They had carried three high-explosive bombs intended to blast the factory open. The squadron record states that four of the aircraft dispatched could not locate the target, but the other fourteen bombed

  with good effect on what they presumed to be the target, despite surprisingly heavy opposition returned safely to base. All crews emphatic [said] they had successfully bombed required objective, but photos taken in daylight revealed the works to be almost unscathed. It would appear that despite brilliant moonlight the raid was not a success.4

  Subsequent analysis of night photos taken by bomber crews themselves produced an even more dismal result. Of thirteen photos successfully taken, six reported as Huls were plotted at a location forty miles east, and the others were eight to twelve miles from the target.

  The Huls raid was among the first to be analyzed by Bomber Command’s newly established Operational Research Section, charged with improving operational efficiency as measured by bombs on target per aircraft loss. Th
e report suggested that interrogation officers should pay closer attention to verifying target identification by crews, and that navigators be provided with a photo as well as a map of the target.

  The next night Joe was assigned his first crack at Berlin. Berlin was a well-defended target, and so distant as to be at the limit of range for a Hampden carrying a two-thousand-pound bomb load. There was no room for mistakes or misjudgment. It was the ultimate prize for aircrews even if it inspired dread when announced in the squadron briefing room as the target for the night. Joe was thrilled by the opportunity.

  7 AM – just got back from the big show – 13 planes from our sqdr – 7 Canadian navigators – all keen on their look at Berlin – the others all shaken rigid at the thought – my pilot & gunner complained of the cold – refused to go so we pasted Kiel instead – very hot … it was a hectic night with everybody getting pasted from all places along the line – going to bed for the day when Rouse & Dave get back from intelligence. (JJD 8 September 1941)

  He added in his operational diary:

  A most exciting night for our squadron. Last night we were the only 5 Group station on ops – to-nite we supplied most of our group’s effort – there were 200 planes on Berlin all told.

  Since the Hampden can fly only for ten hours – most of our pilots viewed the trip with misgiving – but half the navigators on our squadron are Canadians and we all wanted to bomb Berlin – and so a pilot-navigator feud developed –

  Our heating system did not function and the cold which was considerable allowed Robby & Hodge a fine excuse despite my energetic protests, cajoling – disgust, etc. – I just couldn’t make them go & Robby is captain of the aircraft.

  McIver was North of his target & bombed Kiel – Rousseau got within 50 miles and got back with 20 min. reserve petrol – McIntyre got there – was wounded slightly in the foot – had their plane shot to hell when forced down to 200 ft and came back with bullet holes everywhere – but likely winners of the DFM.

  Good old Pop Miller got there & back somehow – Dunn got there – Matkin is missing5 – and so it is with a sense of failing to carry out a stated and desired objective that we bombed Kiel – a real hot spot.

  I was so disgusted that we tracked onto the docks despite aak all around – we stooged around – took pictures – got pasted a bit and came home – ordinarily Kiel itself is a shaky do – but evidently it seemed easy compared to Berlin – but I will get a crack there yet –

  It was an extremely exciting evening and made the trip of the night before fade into the past and appear to have taken place ages ago.

  This much is certain – the biggest mistake the govts made was training so many Canadian observers – we are the keenest men on the station – but the most initiative lies with the pilot – that is what we should be – if and when I finish my 200 hrs I am going to train as a pilot – I want the authority to make and carry out the decisions when flying. 20 planes lost this trip. (JJOD 7 September 1941)

  By his own account, at least, Joe wanted two things above all out of his wartime flying career. One was the thrill of being in complete control of his own airplane, which was why he wanted to become a fighter pilot. But the other was to be in a position to lead his men into battle with courage and determination. For that he would have to be a bomber pilot, or at the least, the captain of his airplane.

  Failing to reach Berlin had been a huge disappointment to Joe, and it prompted him to write home a couple of days afterwards:

  I hope that … your connections still hold good at Ottawa, Pop. I am in pretty well here and should be able to swing what I am aiming at. I have another twenty trips over Germany to make before going on my rest. That will take at least three or four months as the weather slows us up shortly. Instead of going on the usual three months instructors job I want to go back to Canada and train as a pilot which will take me next to no time. Then I would like to take things easy and come back here as a fighter pilot.

  However, twenty more trips is still a rather classy feat these days so there is still a considerable period before we need to start panicking. However, if you know the right men who can get my application thru when it comes along it might help. … I don’t want to get stuck in the regular routine over here. But for the present my hands are full. We have a real job to handle and I probably get more kick out of it than anybody else, though truth to tell, the Canadians here are mostly full of enthusiasm – yes – we are doing our end of it very nicely and efficiently. …

  Roger and I and some of the other Canadians were wondering why we did not feel homesick in England – the answer for me was not hard to find. Outside of missing my family – my friends are all over here or will be shortly. I have more pals – real ones now than I ever had before. We fly to see each other when making our night flying tests. We go on leave together – some of us live together – we write and generally never get that lost feeling of knowing no one – having nowhere to go. Added to that I have a home to go to and a very nice one at that – a girl friend and a lovely one at that plus a nice billet and an adventuresome life. This is one of the greatest shows I will ever attend and I would not have missed it for the life of me. Also I would not be in it in any other capacity. The fellows we meet – the things we do and the trips we have are vital experiences.

  I think most of us have a thorough and solid appreciation for many things in life that we once took for granted – also we have learnt that it is not until you are ready to take the very considerable chance of losing your life that you can begin to know what living means and should mean. Oh yes I have become quite the old philosopher and between my trips over Germany and those with the boys after our trips – with the odd peaceful quiet evening by Mrs. Lettice’s fireside – with our bikes and holidays and undisturbed rest – excellent feeds … I can safely assure you that no one ought to have any qualms about Joe Jacobson taking care of himself over here and making the most of his time in England. Roger and I stick together of course – fly on the same trips – have the same number of hours fly time and what is more important he is teaching me French – and don’t get alarmed by any rumours that probably will start floating around about my romancing. I can still see straight and have both feet on the ground – at times so I shall arrive home, sane sound and still a bachelor. (JJL 10 September 1941)

  He added, in the next week’s letter home:

  events that occurred last week seem now to have taken place in the far past – things I did in Canada seem to be closer at hand than things I did a couple of nights ago. Everything now moves on such a rapid scale with us – the panorama of a lifetime takes place within a few hours, that after I write a letter I can no longer become a part of that letter in a few days time than I can remember what I did when I was six months old.

  However, despite the rapidity and transience of events and people with whom we are associated I do not think that I have in any way lost the graceful art of living which I have been brought up to appreciate. That has been mainly due to my good fortune in being billeted in a private home. Altho there is no particular brilliance or vitality about the home or its owner – there is a quiet dignity – a restfulness and comfortableness about the surroundings which is of more value to us at the moment than anything else could be. … (JJL 18 September 1941)

  Joe had no complaints other than not being top dog in the aircraft, but even in the immediacy of battle, he was making plans for his life. Percy marvelled that he could do so. “In the midst of his bombing operations, operations that are full of peril, thank God he can still think of his future.”

  Joe went on two more operations shortly after the Berlin fiasco: one on the distant Neptun submarine factory at Rostock on the Baltic coast on the 11th, the second another attempt to bomb the German battleships at Brest two nights later. Of the first, Joe wrote:

  We were all pretty keen on this job – it was the first time an attack had been made on this target and the defences were not too strong. Dunn is missing. … That is about two-
thirds of the plane losses on our squadron have been from our flight. Roger and I will have to break that jinx.

  (JJOD 11 September 1941)6

  His crew reported bombing the town in the vicinity of the target, but observed no bursts due to almost complete cloud cover.

  Of the second, he recorded:

  An uneventful trip to bomb the Gneisenau & Scharnhorst. The weather was 10/10 cloud at 3000' so we could not see our objectives. The flak was not as heavy as Kiel – we were over the target at 0400 – I guess the battle ships are still safe and sound since it was impossible to see them. All our planes returned safely.

  All in all a most uneventful and unsatisfactory trip – I don’t mind taking chances or risks but I like to get a show for my money. Of course the only risk this trip was the fear of hitting English balloons or meeting English fighter planes, but still I like to feel I did a good job.

  (JJOD 13 September 1941)

  On debriefing, Joe’s crew reported bombing flak guns estimated to be in position of the cruisers from twelve thousand feet.

  The bombing of German battleships at Brest was an Admiralty priority, which in Bomber Command’s view had been foisted on it at great cost to its own resources and with the effect of diverting effort away from the attack on German industry. Over a thousand bombs had been directed on the battleships that summer and fall, but only four were believed to have caused significant damage. The Air Officer Commanding of 5 Group, Air Vice-Marshal John Slessor, opposed further attacks, especially because it had become obvious that by the time his force arrived, the ships and docks were obscured by a smokescreen. Over eight hundred tons of bombs had been dropped on Brest, but only four of those bombs were considered to have inflicted damage. It was useless, in Slessor’s view, to make up for lack of bombing accuracy by multiplying the attacking force, and he asserted that his crews were unhappy about being sent on useless operations.