The Man Who Could Be King: A Novel

by John Ripin Miller

  The spirit of freedom which at the commencement of this contest would have gladly sacrificed everything to the attainment of its object has long since subsided, and every selfish passion has taken its place. It is not the public but the private interest which influences the generality of mankind nor can the Americans any longer boast of an exception. (See Thomas Fleming, The Perils of Peace, 127)

  WASHINGTON’S ATTITUDE TOWARD WOMEN SOLDIERS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR, PAGES 33-34

  There are many stories of women in combat with the American army, including those described by Josiah here. The one of Deborah Sampson, whose alias was Robert Shurtliff, seems well founded. That Washington only discharged her after a surgeon, examining her wounds, discovered she was a woman indicates that Washington spent little time determining whether a recruit was a man or a woman. With regard to woman soldiers, there seems to have been a Revolutionary War version of “don’t ask, don’t tell.” The story of Mary Ludwig, a.k.a. Molly Pitcher, is less certain, although the story had great currency at the time and Congress gave Mary Ludwig a pension for her alleged service. (See Walter Hart Blumenthal, Women Camp Followers of the American Revolution, 69, 70; Holly Mayer, Belonging to the Army, 20, 21, and 144.)

  WASHINGTON’S ATTITUDE TOWARD INDIANS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR, PAGES 34-35

  Washington frequently acknowledged to others, as he acknowledged to Josiah, the superior ability of Indians when it came to fighting in the woods. (See Ron Chernow, Washington, 88.) Washington understood the Indians’ suffering at the hands of the settlers but was not able to implement his dream of integrating the Indians into American civilization. (See Chernow, Washington, 666.) At no time did Washington’s feelings toward the Indians lead him to advocate restricting settlement of the colonists. To ban settlement anywhere in the promised land would have been as far-fetched to Washington as banning the Israelites from settling any part of the Holy Land.

  WASHINGTON’S ORDER CALLING THE SATURDAY MEETING, PAGES 35-36 (QUOTED IN FULL IN APPENDIX B, PAGES 272-273)

  CHAPTER TWO: DAY TWO, TUESDAY—THE SECOND ANONYMOUS LETTER

  THE SECOND ANONYMOUS LETTER, PAGES 37-40 (QUOTED IN APPENDIX B, PAGES 273-278)

  The quotes here are all taken verbatim from the letter. The author is a masterful writer who understands the grievances of the army and plays on the insecurities of his readers, who feared with much justification that the American people did not appreciate their service and would not reward their efforts after the war ended. The writer cleverly makes the case that the army’s leverage will disappear if it doesn’t act while it is still armed before the peace treaty is signed.

  PENNSYLVANIA 1781 MUTINY, PAGES 41-43

  While John Nagy’s previously cited Rebellion in the Ranks covers the 1781 Pennsylvania mutiny, as well as other mutinies, two books focus exclusively on the 1781 mutiny that Josiah learns about from his cousin. Mutiny in January by Carl Van Doren is a judicious and well-researched account of the largest mutiny of American troops to actually take place during the Revolutionary War. The Proud and the Free, a fast-paced novel by Howard Fast, tries to create a Marxist framework by picturing the 1781 mutiny as a working-class revolt by troops against a bourgeois and planter officer class. There were undoubtedly resentments against officers, but as Van Doren makes clear, what distinguishes the Pennsylvania mutiny was the troops’ focus on grievances against the Congress and state governments, not against their officers. The mutinous troops’ apparent respect for many officers, including Washington and General Anthony Wayne; the willingness of these troops to undertake actions against the British under the command of American officers; and their rejection of British overtures, going so far as to arrest and turn over British emissaries to American officers, are not the actions one would expect from the usual mutineers angry at their officers.

  JOSIAH CALCULATES THE CHANCES OF A REVOLT SUCCEEDING, 43

  As I mentioned in the Afterword, given Washington’s character and the fact that he did not lead the mutiny, historians have assumed he never considered that course. Similarly, since the mutiny did not take place in the end, historians have spent little time assessing whether it would have succeeded. To the extent such consideration has been given, there have been varying opinions about the chances of success. Thomas Fleming sees the army marching on Philadelphia and, without predicting whether the revolt would have succeeded, sees the possibility of a civil war, the British “irresistibly tempted to get back in the game,” and the potential collapse of the Confederation (The Perils of Peace, 273).

  Barry Schwartz believes that “Washington could have taken over the government by military coup . . .” (George Washington: Making of an American Symbol, 44).

  Those expressing skepticism about the success of a revolt point to the innate reservations of Americans about the military based on years of British quartering of troops and the ties of soldiers and officers to their families.

  Yet, as Josiah calculates, it is hard to dismiss the chances of success, which I believe were quite good. By the end of 1782, all the major cities and seaports were occupied by the American armies except for New York, where London had sent General Carleton, whose mission was the withdrawal of the fourteen thousand troops there. The Congress might have fled Philadelphia, which it did during the short-lived Pennsylvania mutiny put down with Washington’s help in 1781. But even if it found a town willing to host the Congress, where would it have found the revenue to carry out any governmental functions?

  Control of seaports meant that a revolting army would have immediately controlled the vast majority of revenues coming to the government set up in 1776 since those revenues were derived from imposts on trade. The revenues raised by the states through taxation were meager, and the states showed no inclination to turn over the revenues they did raise to the national government.

  A revolt, especially one led by Washington, would have quickly established the only national government with both revenues and a military arm. The states would have been given a stark choice: join the new government (which already controlled several states through the army’s occupation of the major cities) or resist and try to go it alone. The latter alternative would not have seemed very attractive. Either the states would have fallen victim to a military filled with its own sons or, more likely, the revolting army with Washington leading the new government would just have waited for the holdouts to join the new government, feeling the same pressures not to go it alone that they felt in 1776 and were to feel during the Constitution ratification process in 1789.

  The pressure to join the new government would have increased; a government with Washington at its head promised all the benefits of the previous one plus benefits for the soldiers, without the Congress’s reputation for incompetence. Foreign nations would have augmented the pressure. Given that nations like France had premised their loans on their respect for Washington and not the Congress, it is easy to see to which government foreign states would have given their backing. After all, the loans from France and Holland and the moral support of others were not based on the Declaration of Independence but on a desire to lessen British influence. This had been accomplished, and both repayments of loans and the continued lessening of British influence would seem more likely under a respected military leader like Washington.

  As for the British, a majority had finally come to power in Parliament, which favored an immediate withdrawal of British troops and independence for America under whatever government was set up. As Washington had predicted, if the states continued the war long enough, the British would eventually tire of the struggle. All in all, I believe, while nothing was certain, the prospects for a revolt were good.

  LETTER TO ELIJAH HUNTER AND ORDER TO WILLIAM SHATTUCK, PAGE 44

  The orders and letters that Washington issued at Newburgh are contained in part in the various biographies previously cited. There are many full compendiums, such as the Washington Papers at the University of Virginia made available to the author by Editor-in-Chief William Fe
rraro, as well as The General Orders of Geo. Washington, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Revolution, Issued at Newburgh on The Hudson, 1782–1783 at the Harvard University Library and The Itinerary of General Washington, edited by William S. Baker and published by J. B. Lippincott & Co. in 1892. Every reference to an order or letter at Newburgh, such as this letter to Elijah Hunter on Hunter’s stolen horses and the order to William Shattuck sending him to Vermont to track down criminals, is based on actual orders and letters.

  CORRUPTION AND PROFITEERING, PAGES 44-45

  Profiteering takes place during every war, and the Revolutionary War was no exception. Chase and Sands, cited here, are two notable examples of corruption among many hindering the American war effort. (See Thomas Fleming, The Perils of Peace, 187.) The victims of those who profited were the half-naked and distressed soldiers. This precipitated the eruption of Washington’s volcanic temper about the triumph of private greed over public spirit. Washington said, “Chimney corner patriots abound: venality, corruption, prostitution of office for selfish ends, abuse of trust, perversion of funds from a national to a private use, and speculations upon the necessities of the times pervade all interests” (Gore Vidal, Inventing a Nation, 48).

  The General, as was usually the case, did not let his anger escape into print. That he left to his aide Alexander Hamilton, who wrote scathing letters under the pseudonym Publius attacking Chase, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, for sullying the American cause by trying to corner the wheat market in advance of the arrival of the French fleet. (See Alexander Hamilton, American by Richard Brookhiser, 40.)

  AMERICAN SOLDIERS OVERCOMING INCREDIBLE ODDS, 46

  The theme of the American soldier overcoming incredible odds in prevailing over the more numerous, better trained, and better equipped troops of the British Empire was expressed many times by Washington, although never more eloquently than in the letter to General Greene:

  “If Historiographers should be hardy enough to fill the page of History with the advantages that have been gained with unequal numbers (on the part of America) in the course of this contest, and attempt to relate the distressing circumstances under which they have been obtained, it is more than probable that Posterity will bestow on their labors the epithet and marks of fiction; for it will not be believed that such a force as Great Britain has employed for eight years in this Country could be baffled in their plan of Subjugating it by numbers infinitely less, composed of Men oftentimes half starved; always in Rags, without pay, and experiencing, at times, every species of distress which human nature is capable of undergoing.” (“Letter to Nathanael Greene,” The Writings of George Washington, 484.)

  In overcoming the improbable odds, Washington is careful to never refer to his generalship but instead always refers to the valor of the American army.

  BAND OF BROTHERS, 47

  The phrase “band of brothers” was probably first uttered by King Henry V in his St. Crispin’s Day speech in Shakespeare’s King Henry V. It has recently been the title of Stephen E. Ambrose’s book on a US army airborne company in World War II and the title of an album by Willie Nelson, and has been attributed to Lord Admiral Horatio Nelson in describing his captains in 1798. But years before Lord Nelson, George Washington was using the phrase to praise those who came together from thirteen states to fight under his leadership. His most notable use was in his farewell address to the armies of the United States on November 2, 1783, when Washington, after again pleading for just treatment for his troops, marvels at how troops from such diverse backgrounds had come together to overcome the might of the British Empire (again modestly overlooking his own role):

  Who, that was not a witness, could imagine that the most violent local prejudices would cease so soon, and that Men who came from the different parts of the Continent, strongly disposed, by the habits of education, to despise and quarrel with each other, would instantly become one patriotic band of brothers, or who, that was not on the spot, can trace the steps by which such a wonderful revolution has been effected, and such a glorious period put to all our warlike toils? (See The Writings of George Washington, 543)

  In another reference, Washington in a later letter writes to General Knox, “My first wish would be that my Military family, and the whole Army, should consider themselves as a band of brothers, willing and ready, to die for each other.” (John Frederick Schroeder, Maxims of George Washington, 95; Joseph J. Ellis in His Excellency cites Washington’s use of the phrase in his farewell at Newburgh, 146.)

  WASHINGTON’S FIRST COMBAT EXPERIENCE, 47-48

  While Washington was restrained in describing his French and Indian War experiences to Josiah, Washington describes his first combat with French and Indian forces in a letter to his brother John Augustine in May of 1754. After laying out the results of the victory and assuring his brother that he was not wounded, Washington closes by stating, “I can with truth assure you, I heard bullets whistle and believe me there was something charming in the sound” (The Writings of George Washington, 48). The words found their way into a London periodical, and King George III reportedly commented, “He would not say so if he had been used to hear many” (Ron Chernow, Washington, 44).

  WASHINGTON’S VALOR COMPARED WITH THAT OF OTHER GENERALS, 48

  When compared to other generals of that period (American and particularly British), Washington’s desire to rush to the fore was notable not just to Josiah and made him beloved by his troops. “March on, my brave fellows, after me” and “Parade with us, my brave fellows” were words of Washington quoted by observers at many battles. (See, for example, David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing, 241, 249, 334.) While almost every book about Washington has numerous reports of his great leadership when his men went into combat, I have found no accounts of British generals, such as Gage, Howe, Cornwallis, or Clinton, demonstrating similar leadership.

  MEDALS FOR ENLISTED MEN, PAGE 48

  While at Newburgh, Washington introduced awards for service by enlisted men. This may not sound like much, but no army, as far as it is known, had previously given awards to other than officers. To Washington, this was a way to boost morale and recognize that the American army was different than the armies of kings. First came a white stripe for three years’ service with “bravery, fidelity and good conduct,” and then two white stripes for six years of such service. Beyond that, Washington created a badge of merit, which later became the Purple Heart, an award for military merit for both officers and enlisted men with a figure of a heart in purple cloth or silk edged with narrow lace or binding to be worn over the left breast. Wearers could pass guards without challenge like officers, and names were recorded in a book of merit, even if the wearer had been previously punished. While the chevrons were awarded to many, and the purple hearts, at least then, were awarded to few, the idea for decorating enlisted men was clear to Washington: “the road to glory in a patriot army and a free country is thus open to all” (William M. Fowler Jr., American Crisis: George Washington and the Dangerous Two Years After Yorktown, 1781–1783, 103).

  COLONEL NICOLA’S APPEAL TO WASHINGTON, PAGES 52-55 (QUOTED IN APPENDIX B, PAGES 262-270)

  Colonel Lewis Nicola, the author of the appeal to Washington cited by Josiah, was born in Ireland, served twenty years in the British army, and then migrated to Philadelphia, where he established a dry-goods store, founded a library, and was a curator with the American Philosophical Society. At age sixty, he volunteered for the American army. An able recruiter and administrator, Nicola conceived the idea, which Congress approved, of recruiting thousands of wounded veterans, unable to serve in combat, into an invalid corps performing light duties such as guarding supply depots and hospitals and protecting local property. The heart of Nicola’s letter to Washington lays out the thesis that a republic (he cites Holland as an example) would not remain independently strong over centuries, let alone fulfill the promises to its military that Congress made, and that a monarchy, albeit with some improvements over the Englis
h form, offered the best chance for America surviving and the army receiving justice. He contrasts the weak performance of the American Congress with the “noble” performance of the army under Washington and draws the conclusion as to who should lead the future American government.

  This war must have shown to all, but to military men in particular the weakness of republics, and the exertions the army has been able to make by being under a proper head, therefore . . . in this case it will, I believe, be uncontroverted that the same abilities which have led, through difficulties insurmountable by human power, to victory and glory, those qualities that have merited and obtained universal esteem and veneration of an army, would be most likely to conduct and direct us in the smoother paths of peace. (See Thomas Fleming, The Perils of Peace, 196, 197; Barry Schwartz, Washington: The Making of an American Symbol, 134; Ron Chernow, Washington, 428.)

  Nicola suggests that Washington’s title, at least temporarily, should be a more “moderate” one than king. His letter to Washington is a lengthy one, too long to quote here in full, because in addition to laying out the case for a monarchy over a republic, he lays out the woes of the army, elaborates a lengthy scheme for paying veterans involving western lands, and warns (similarly to the anonymous letter) that the army should not lay down its arms if it wants justice for itself.

  WASHINGTON’S REPLY TO NICOLA, PAGE 54

  Washington’s reply rejecting Nicola’s proposal is as brief as Nicola’s is verbose. (See The Writings of George Washington, 468, 469.)

  Washington expresses surprise at Nicola’s proposal, says he is pained by and disagrees with the proposal, and pledges to keep Nicola’s letter secret. He goes on to state his support for the justice of the army’s grievances and urges Nicola to forget his proposal:

  Sir: With a mixture of great surprise and astonishment I have read with attention the sentiments you have submitted to my perusal. Be assured Sir, no occurrence in the course of the War, has given me more painful sensations than your information of there being such ideas existing in the Army as you have expressed, and I must view with abhorrence, and reprehend with severity. For the present, the communication of them will rest in my own bosom, unless some further agitation of the matter, shall make a disclosure necessary.