Alamein (Major Battles of World War Two)

by C. E. Lucas Phillips

  General Briggs, as we have seen, had directed 2nd Armoured Brigade to a feature two miles north-west of Tel el Aqqaqir and 8th Armoured on to the indeterminate Tel itself. He had appreciated, from the enemy’s dispositions, that the counter-attack would be most likely to come in on the Durham’s flank. The whole division (whose order of battle for this occasion is given in Appendix F), moved up from the Springbok Track during the night under conditions which were, if anything, even worse than those which 9th Armoured Brigade had experienced, the dust-fog being so thick that tank commanders had to hold out torches to the rear for the following tank to keep touch. With tanks, artillery, infantry, engineers, ambulances and front line services, they numbered well over 2,000 vehicles. We shall follow first the fortunes of Fisher’s brigade in the north.

  Here the Queen’s Bays, under the very tall and aquiline Alex Barclay, advanced on the right, 9th Lancers, commanded by Gerald Grosvenor, of handsome bearing and distinguished lineage, in the centre and 10th Hussars, under Jack Archer-Shee, tall and willowy of figure, with a good tactical flair, on the left. Each regiment was preceded by its Reconnaissance Troop and accompanied by its affiliated battery of Priests from 11th RHA, its infantry company of the Yorkshire Dragoons and other supporting elements. The 10th were delayed in their approach march through misdirection by a military policeman and the other regiments were about two and a half miles behind Currie’s brigade at the moment when his regiments first came under fire from the guns on the Rahman Track. That was too far to take advantage of any breach, if one were made. Fisher had been unable to make wireless contact with Currie and did not know how matters stood ahead of him.

  Shortly afterwards, 10th Hussars were engaging in the half-dark the tanks of 21st Panzer Division that had assailed the Wiltshires. Here Archer-Shee’s own tank was knocked out; the enemy, having located his tanks’ point of emergence from the minefield gap, made it a very hot spot.

  All three regiments, however, after passing through the enemy’s artillery counter-barrage, moved on steadily in the cold dawn mist, meeting batches of Germans coming in to surrender from the ground overrun by Currie’s tanks.

  In the gloom of 7 a.m. Gerald Grosvenor met Currie himself, who appears to have just pulled back. Grosvenor records that ‘Never before or since have I ever experienced such shelling. The air seemed to be thick with both armour-piercing and HE coming from the front and both flanks. It was not quite light and, what with the smoke, one could see literally nothing, except the flames from 9th Armoured Brigade’s burning tanks.’[77]

  As Grosvenor drove up, he saw a group of people sheltering in the lee of Currie’s tank, but Currie himself was sitting right out on top of the turret, taking less notice of the missiles than if they had been mosquitoes. Grosvenor dismounted from his tank and walked towards Currie, who called down to him:

  ‘Come up and join me.’

  Grosvenor did so. Currie waved towards the smoke and flame to the westward and said:

  ‘Well, we’ve made a gap in the enemy anti-tank screen, and your brigade has to pass through, and pass through bloody quick.’

  Grosvenor, gazing out at the angry chaos, replied:

  ‘I have never seen anything, sir, that looks less like a gap.’

  Currie made a tart observation and Grosvenor, feeling that this was no time or place to argue, returned to his own tank and reported to his brigade on the air. Archer-Shee, tall and slim, going forward when his tank was knocked out, also met Currie, alone in a group of wrecked tanks; Currie was ‘a bit cross’ and said: ‘You’re bloody late.’

  Twenty minutes later 9th Lancers were about 1,000 yards short of the devastation on the Rahman Track, across which the flash and counterflash showed the remnant of Currie’s brigade in the last throes of their engagement with the enemy guns. The Bays were a little farther back on their right and 10th Hussars 1,500 yards away to the south-east; engaging the tanks of 21st Panzer Division that were shaping eastward towards them, they saw them off behind their curtain of anti-tank guns.

  Briggs himself, moving by the Boomerang route, very shortly came up behind one of the leading regiments. He used two Crusader tanks for his tactical headquarters; one of these was a spare ‘charger’ and in the other he took only a junior staff officer, signallers and driver. His Main divisional headquarters was some way back, in their Armoured Command Vehicles, in charge of Roger Peake, his GSO 1. Briggs made a practice of having a telephone line laid forward from Main, which he could tap into from his Tac for freedom of speech, though it was frequently broken by shell fire or tank movement.

  As he came up, he was very concerned at the inability of 2nd Armoured Brigade to get forward more quickly, but realized that now there was no purpose to be served by attempting to force a way through in Currie’s path. It was not his mission to support Currie, but to bring Von Thoma’s panzers to battle on ground of his own choosing. That prospect he thought was now probably very near. He therefore wanted room to manoeuvre. For that purpose he hoped, as his orders prescribed, to be able to push on beyond the Rahman Track on to the Aqqaqir feature. The hither side of the Track was very exposed, littered with derelicts and cluttered by our own troops; the whole of the terrain captured during the night was being heavily shelled and mortared from front and flanks, and the infantry brigades, among whose forward elements Fisher’s tanks were now taking up position, were sustaining mounting casualties.

  About this time, and repeatedly during the next hour or so, Fisher reported that his regiments had reached the Rahman Track, but Briggs quite rightly did not accept this report. The squadrons had perhaps been deceived, it appears, by the fact that somewhere, not recorded on the map, a line of telegraph poles branched off from the track. The only tanks actually across the track, which we have already observed to have been obscured by a small undulation, were a few sad and gallant wrecks of Currie’s.

  At about 7.40 the sun lit the horizon behind the British lines like an enormous gunflash, but failed to dispel the mist and the drifting smoke of burning tanks, which continued for some time to obscure observation and hinder progress. A few minutes later Lumsden arrived at divisional Main headquarters and Roger Peake reported the position to him. Lumsden stayed a little while, listening to the reports coming in by radio, and heard just after eight o’clock that both 9th Lancers and 10th Hussars were engaging enemy tanks, and that the Bays, who had made contact with the withdrawn survivors of 3rd Hussars, had had to turn north to fight the anti-tank guns attacking them.

  Lumsden was not wholly satisfied and ordered that the brigade must press on and this order was passed forward to Briggs. At the same time Lumsden, speaking personally to Briggs by radio, warned him that he must expect a counter-attack by ‘everything that the enemy had got’ and that he must look particularly to the west and north-west. It was clear that a vital situation might develop very soon.

  Twenty-five minutes later (8.45 a.m.), the telephone lines forward now being through, Peake spoke to his general again, telling him of a message received at 30th Corps from 9th Brigade. It said that Currie thought ‘2nd Armoured Brigade is not really in touch and may ruin a good opportunity’. Several signals were passing from Fisher’s three regiments about this time which showed that they knew little about the situation of their ‘friends in front’ — who were, by now, not very much in front.

  Fisher, who had been forward to look at the ground (and had not-much liked what he saw), was therefore told to ensure a good link-up. He was again asked how far he was from the Rahman Track and again replied that 9th Lancers were on it. Briggs was in a sharp mood, fretting at the lack of progress on the ground, though Fisher’s regiments were not having an easy time. At four minutes past nine Fisher asked the divisional commander:

  ‘Is it intended that I push on or stay?’

  To which Briggs replied: ‘Your instructions are to destroy tanks and get into positions where you can.’

  A minute later Fisher reported: ‘In accordance with orders, Brigade has taken up posit
ions ready to take on attack from west or north. Being engaged by tanks and anti-tank guns.’

  Briggs replied: ‘Destroy opposition and get on.’

  And ten minutes later he said: ‘We must have room. You must push on.’[78]

  The two commanders were obviously not thinking alike. Briggs was thinking ahead, but Fisher was satisfied that he was in good position to meet an attack and wanted to fight where he was. He controlled his regiments shrewdly and kept them all balanced.

  By now the remnants of Currie’s brigade had come under command and it was clear that no live tanks were across the track. It was equally clear, however, that Fisher’s brigade had not reached the track, as they thought they had, and that there was no immediate likelihood of their doing so.

  There were still plenty more anti-tank guns to north and south of the fracture made by Currie; there were tanks and guns on the Durham flank and there were the tanks and guns on the Aqqaqir feature which B Squadron of the Wiltshires had observed and which were now engaging 9th Lancers. On the northern flank the Germans’ guns were so close that the Bays could clearly see the detachments reloading after each round, until they were disposed of. Fisher came up to see the regiment in his Grant and told them to ‘stick it out where they were’. From here also could now be seen the slim, white minaret of the mosque of Sidi Abd el Rahman, a beckoning symbol gleaming in the sun.

  That was the situation which had developed since first light and it was not the business of 1st Armoured Division to make any more Balaclava charges. Their assignment was to invite attack by the main strength of the enemy armour, and this they proceeded to do, although not on top of the Aqqaqir Ridge as had been intended.

  All this time the watching and probing armoured cars of 12th Lancers had been reporting a great deal of tank, gun and lorry movement behind the enemy’s immediate front, clearly in preparation for a powerful blow by large forces. Soon after 9.30 Briggs learnt that the ‘Y’ service had intercepted a signal from either Rommel’s or Von Thoma’s headquarters ordering 21st Panzer Division to attack southwards on the Durham flank. Twenty minutes later Fisher’s brigade was engaged and almost at once 8th Armoured Brigade also came into the battle picture, as eighteen German tanks shaped to attack the Staffordshire Yeomanry under James Eadie.

  Custance’s brigade, following behind Fisher’s in the approach march, were naturally much later on the scene, and, in accordance with orders, were shaping course to come up on Fisher’s left and make for Tel el Aqqaqir. Like Fisher’s they were in regimental groups, accompanied by their batteries of 1st RHA and the infantry companies of The Buffs. Their delayed advance was fortunate, in the sense that the Burton men of the Staffordshire Yeomanry observed a panzer attack developing on the Durhams’ flank to the north and were able to turn and face it. The panzers appear, from the map references given in the records, to have penetrated on this flank and the Staffordshires, in the middle of the infantry positions in the ‘funnel’, became involved in a long duel.

  Further evidence very soon came in of the enemy’s impending main counter-attack from the north-west. From the look-out position in which the Crusaders of 3rd Hussars had been posted by Farquhar, Heseltine observed tanks moving from both north and south to join up and, as one of these columns passed at 1,000 yards, the remnant of Farquhar’s regiment, unbowed by their dawn battering in the gun line, destroyed two Germans and three Italians.

  Briggs, warning his brigades of the anticipated attack from the north or north-west, ordered 8th Brigade to link up with 2nd, but at the same time to be prepared to assist the Staffordshires. He also ordered 7th Motor Brigade to deploy against the same threat. Currie’s band of survivors, still full of fight, were sent to guard the northern flank. A further ‘Y’ intercept showed that 21st Panzer Division had ordered an anti-tank screen to be deployed to the north-west of the British position, which Briggs rightly saw as intended to be a defensive screen for the deployment of the German armour; indeed a force of forty enemy tanks began to approach in the distance from that direction.

  The whole of the northern and western portions of the New Zealand funnel were being so heavily shelled that it called for no little determination, not only for the infantry but also for the armour, to face it; 7th Motor Brigade resolutely deployed, nonetheless, taking many casualties. The detachments of 239th Anti-Tank Battery, who had fought so gallantly under Baer and Willmore at Snipe, were with them, together with the rest of their battery, and deployed under trying conditions to meet the new threat.

  A new factor now came into the situation. At 10.37 Montgomery himself intervened and spoke on the telephone to Roger Peake at divisional Main headquarters to enquire about the situation and the locations of units. On being informed of them, he directed that 8th Brigade should be relieved from its role facing north, (‘I will take care of that’, he said) and should be moved westwards round the southern flank of 2nd Brigade.

  Briggs gave orders accordingly, but Custance was unable to comply in full immediately as the Staffordshires were still joined in conflict with German tanks, now numbering twenty-six, attacking from the north. However, he dispatched 3rd RTR, under Pyman, followed later by the Sherwood Rangers under Kellett, and himself made a forward reconnaissance towards the Tel to within a few hundred yards of the telegraph poles.

  A big armoured battle was now imminent and Briggs’s attention became riveted on the north and north-west. He ordered 2nd Armoured Brigade not to give ground and asked if they were knocking out tanks. Fisher replied:

  We are not giving ground. 40 enemy tanks to NW, 30 to West, 18 to SW are keeping at long range behind an anti-tank screen. 11 RHA are knocking out anti-tank guns with some considerable success.

  Fisher’s regiments had by now moved right-handed from their furthermost points of advance, and were disposed to meet the new threat. Briggs visited them there and afterwards drove south to 8th Brigade and saw Custance.

  Then, out of the heat haze, the enemy made his attack. From the north-west and west and, to a lesser degree, the south-west also, his squat, black shapes — panzers and Italians — came on in serried lines to the number of about 120. The two forces, which had already been engaged in intermittent combat since dawn, became locked in a grim and exhausting duel in the heat of the day in which tanks, anti-tank guns and field artillery joined with concentrated intensity on both sides. This was the vital battle that might make or break the fortunes of the campaign. The British tanks, well enough sited, and aggressively supported by their artillery, stood their ground and dealt out the most fearful punishment, while from the air, in response to Briggs’s call, repeated attacks were made on a very large concentration of vehicles observed between the tank battlefield and the mosque of Sidi Abd el Rahman to the north-west.

  The desert, quivering in the heat haze, became a scene that defies sober description. It can be discerned only as a confused arena clouded by the bursts of high explosive, darkened by the smoke of scores of burning tanks and trucks, lit by the flashes of innumerable guns, shot through by red, green and white tracers, shaken by heavy bombing from the air and deafened by the artillery of both sides. Upon the British forces in the funnel — tanks, infantry and supporting arms — a ‘torrent of shell and shot’ was poured in from three sides. In the words recorded by the sober historian of 9th Lancers, ‘for hours the whack of armour-piercing shot on armour plate was unceasing’. Overhead, fierce conflicts were fought in the air as the Germans twice attempted to attack the British armour with Stukas, only to be fought off by the RAF.

  The long and violent action continued throughout that suffocating afternoon as the enemy made one attack after another in different sectors. B and C Squadrons of 9th Lancers repulsed no fewer than six determined attacks upon them. Again and again the British tanks ran out of ammunition, and each time the replenishment lorries, with great daring, drove out across the shell-swept ground into the heat and clamour of the conflict. The infantry and anti-tank gunners in whose midst this armoured battle was fought —
the Motor Brigade, The Yorkshire Dragoons, the Durhams, the Seaforth and Cameron Brigade — suffered considerably. On one occasion the panzers broke across the infantry front, but were quickly forced to pull back. Everywhere else the enemy was met by an inflexible front.

  Tel el Aqqaqir, like Thompson’s Post, ranks as a battle within a battle. In this exhausting battering match, the biggest and most critical armoured engagement of the campaign, Von Thoma’s panzers and their Italian allies were fought to a standstill. It was the hardest hammering they had so far endured and there was to be only one that was harder. By the end of the action sixty-six or more tanks had fallen to the two British armoured brigades. Others fell to the anti-tank gunners, to the survivors of Currie’s brigade and to the field and medium artillery. By the end of that day Rommel’s strength in tanks had fallen by approximately 117, of which seventy-seven were German.

  It was a crippling loss. The enemy’s chances of saving himself from ruin were now small indeed. First Armoured Division had not succeeded in making capital out of the sacrificial attack of 9th Brigade and it had made no ground at all, but it had fulfilled a substantial part of its prime mission of ‘finding and destroying the enemy armour’. It had also knocked out battery after battery of guns and, when the enemy positions were later overrun, the pits were found full of dead and their weapons broken by the accurate fire of the British artillery. The gunner OPs, pushed right forward among the tanks, had been eagerly calling for fire throughout the day on all manner of targets. Three guns had been knocked out by Jack Tirrell, FOO of B Battery, 1st RHA. The division’s own losses in tanks had been no more than fourteen, with a further forty damaged.

  Granted the overall superiority in numbers (which did not necessarily mean a superiority at the points of attack), the British armour fought with skill, courage and excellent leadership at all levels, brilliantly supported by ‘the terrible British artillery’. They thoroughly deserved their impressive victory. Once again, the tank in attack was seen to be helpless against a determined defence.