Bullshit and Philosophy

by Reisch, George A. ; Hardcastle, Gary L.

  The results of dissociation, understood as producing two new terms from one old term, can be found amongst the same cases as euphemism. Characteristically, the two new terms will correspond to a pair of distinct cases, where one of the terms is intended to preserve the original tone, while the other covers circumstances incompatible with that tone. Thus one of the pair will be drawn from lines i through l and the other from lines m through p. For example, ‘ordinary temperance’ and ‘true temperance’, understood as a dissociation, would correspond to lines m and l respectively. ‘Ordinary temperance’ preserves the sense and reference of ‘temperance,’ but by implication lacks its positive tone; ‘true temperance’ keeps the tone, but on Huxley’s account, nothing else.

  Good Definitions

  How can backfire be avoided? Can PD ever be used safely, and if so, when? We have seen that a proper account of definition should have regard to the sense, reference and tone of the term at issue. Semantic negligence with respect to any of these components of the meaning of a term can lead to backfire, and the pernicious consequences outlined in the last section. Bad practice is, however, easier to describe than good practice, which we might term ‘semantic diligence’. Describing the due diligence required for a satisfactory definition is a topic with a long and inglorious history.134 The emphasis is often on the pursuit of an ‘essence’ of the concept being defined: so-called ‘real’ definitions accurately track the essence, whereas other definitions are merely ‘nominal’. This talk of essences made some sense for Plato and Aristotle, in whose works it was first deployed, as it reflects their broader metaphysical commitments. However, for modern thinkers who do not share those commitments, and even for those who do, it is very hard to defend: the most that can be made of essence is that it “is just the human choice of what to mean by a name, misinterpreted as being a metaphysical reality” (Definition, p. 155).

  Aristotle is also the source of a conventional list of rules for good definitions which has recurred with surprisingly little variation in generation after generation of logic textbooks right up to the most recent editions. Although some of these rules, such as ‘avoid circularity,’ may have a modest but valuable role to play in an account of the semantic diligence necessary for good definition, others are either couched in metaphysically discredited terms: ‘state the essential attributes,’ or incompatible with proper consideration of tone: ‘avoid figurative language’.

  The crucial point is that practices such as PD, which seek to stipulate some aspect of the meaning of an expression, are disguised arguments. It is common in all branches of knowledge for an initially contentious identification to be transformed into a definition. For example, consider the definition of ‘planet’ as ‘satellite of the sun’. However, this is the hard-won result of protracted consensus building. We saw above how this was essential to the widespread acceptance of the liberal definition of ‘rape’. Semantically negligent definitions are parasitical on this process: they foreclose argument about doubtful identities by disguising them as definitions. Hidden arguments are difficult to criticize—but also easy to ignore. Thus the semantically negligent definer may gain short-term rhetorical advantage by disguising his arguments as definitions, but risks the backfire effect, which is a direct consequence of his neglect of the full meaning of his redefined expression. For a definition to be semantically diligent any concealed arguments must be made explicit to all parties. Moreover, if the proposers hope for their definition to prevail, these arguments must be won. Conversely, this explication must be absent for an accusation of malign PD, or similar semantic negligence, to be just.

  Is Frankfurt’s Definition of ‘Bullshit’ Itself PD?

  Having employed an insight derived from Frankfurt’s definition of bullshit to clarify our understanding of definition in general, and PD in particular, we are now in a position to close the circle by asking whether this definition is PD, and if so whether it is malign. ‘Bullshit’ clearly has a strongly pejorative tone, which Frankfurt intends to preserve. By offering a new, stipulative definition of ‘bullshit,’ Frankfurt changes the sense of the term. This in turn affects its reference: some cases that qualify as Frankfurt-bullshit would not meet the demotic definition of the term. For example, one might tell a critically injured person that “Help is on its way,” despite having no idea whether this was true, because one was hoping for the best, and did not wish to needlessly demoralize someone clinging to life. There are also common uses of ‘bullshit’ which are outside the scope of reference of Frankfurt-bullshit, as discussed by Cohen (“Deeper Into Bullshit,” pp. 119–120). So, as an instance of case d from Table 1, Frankfurt’s definition of ‘bullshit’ is clearly PD.

  For Frankfurt’s definition to be semantically diligent it needs to be defended by an explicit argument, as it clearly is, with particular attention to the points at which it departs from conventional usage. As regards the first of these, the ‘Help is on its way’ cases, an argument could be made on the grounds of theoretical simplicity for including them within the scope of reference of ‘bullshit,’ but suitably qualified to indicate their good intentions. Something similar already applies to lying: we distinguish ‘white lies’ as lies to which the generally pejorative tone of ‘lie’ should not apply. As Frankfurt observes, bullshit is a “vast and amorphous” phenomenon upon which “very little work has been done” (On Bullshit, p. 3), so we should not be surprised that fresh distinctions such as this still need to be drawn. The omissions identified by Cohen are harder to defend. If Cohen’s dissociation of the “bullshit of ordinary life” from the “bullshit that appears in academic works” is defensible (“Deeper into Bullshit,” p. 119), then Frankfurt has a hard case to answer. However, that does not make his definition semantically negligent, but rather indicates that the last word on bullshit will not be written for some time yet.135

  11

  Different Kinds and Aspects of Bullshit

  HANS MAES and KATRIEN SCHAUBROECK

  The publication and subsequent popularity of Harry Frankfurt’s On Bullshit has inserted a rather conspicuous and somewhat comical point of discontinuity in the philosophy sections of many bookstores. For here we have a small, unassuming book with ‘Bullshit’ printed on the outside but lacking the quality of bullshit on the inside.

  The exact opposite, one cannot fail to notice, is true of so many other books sold under the heading of ‘philosophy’ today. Books like Chakra Balancing Kit: A Guide to Healing and Awakening Your Energy Body, The Hidden Messages in Water Crystals, Numerology Helps You to Master Your Relationship and to Find the Right Career, or Astrology: A Cosmic Science appear in the same bestseller lists and sometimes even on the same bookshelf as On Bullshit—almost as if they are put there on purpose to illustrate the unusual topic of Frankfurt’s philosophical study and his claim that bullshit is indeed “the most salient feature of our culture.”

  When Frankfurt’s analysis of bullshit was first published as an essay in 1986, no one could have predicted the philosophical sensation (and hilarious situation) it would cause in twenty-first-century bookstores. The original essay was received in much the same way as most academic articles are received, that is, without attention from press or public. The essay did, however, provoke discussion among fellow philosophers; one admiring but critical response is especially worth mentioning since it puts some of Frankfurt’s claims in a new perspective.

  In “Deeper Into Bullshit” G.A. Cohen gives credit to Frankfurt’s “pioneering and brilliant discussion of a widespread but largely unexamined cultural phenomenon,” but he also raises some doubts about the scope of Frankfurt’s account (Chapter 8 in this volume). Frankfurt’s definition, says Cohen, does not cover all types of bullshit. On the contrary, “the explicandum that attracted [Frankfurt’s] interest is just one flower in the lush garden of bullshit” (p. 120). So, “On Bullshit” is really only about one kind of bullshit. Other flowers in the “lush garden of bullshit” remain unexamined, and Cohen’s principal aim in “Deeper i
nto Bullshit” is to identify and define a very specific kind of stercore tauri, to be found in academic circles, but altogether ignored by Frankfurt.

  Harry Frankfurt on Bullshit

  People who produce, package, or sell bullshit, says Frankfurt, are in some way comparable to slovenly craftsmen. They are not really paying attention to the quality of their product. There’s some kind of laxity in their work, though this laxity cannot be equated with inattention to detail or carelessness in general. What is lacking in the prime examples of bullshit, to be found in “the realms of advertising and of public relations, and the nowadays closely related realm of politics” (p. 22) is not concern for detail—political spin doctors, for instance, often dedicate themselves tirelessly to keeping every tiny thing under control—but concern for the truth. According to Frankfurt, the essence of bullshit lies in a “lack of connection to a concern with truth—[an] indifference to how things really are” (p. 33). To be sure, advertisements and political speeches may contain true statements but they will nevertheless strike us as bullshit as soon as we realize that the person who produces these statements could not care less whether his statements are true or not, as long as they have the desired effect. As such, it is a feature of the bullshitter’s state of mind, namely his indifference to truth, that is crucial to the production of bullshit.

  This is not the whole story, however. While an indifference to truth is an essential ingredient of bullshit, it is not the only ingredient, according to Frankfurt. The case of so-called “bull sessions” illustrates this. In a bull session, Frankfurt explains, people try out thoughts and attitudes about various aspects of life (relationships, religion, and so forth) in order to discover how others respond and how it feels to say such things, without it being assumed that they are committed to what they say.136 These discussions may be very animated and significant, but they are typically not “for real.” Thus, bull sessions are “like bullshit by virtue of the fact that they are in some degree unconstrained by a concern with truth” (p. 37). But they are not bullshit. Frankfurt is very explicit about this: “The statements made in a bull session differ from bullshit in that there is no pretence that this connection [between what people say and what they believe] is being sustained” (p. 38, italics added). Bullshit, by contrast, always involves a particular form of pretence or deceit. This is the second essential ingredient of bullshit.

  Does this mean that the bullshitter is a liar? Not necessarily. Admittedly, both the liar and the bullshitter try to deceive people through misrepresentation but Frankfurt points out that there is a significant difference. The liar essentially misrepresents the state of affairs to which he refers or his beliefs concerning that state of affairs. The bullshitter, on the other hand, may not deceive people, or even intend to do so, about either the facts or what he takes the facts to be. What he says may very well be true. So, unlike lying, bullshit is not a matter of falsity. It’s rather a matter of fakery or phoniness.

  The bullshitter essentially deceives people about his enterprise. His audience is not to understand that he is utterly disinterested with how things really are and that his intention is not to report the truth. Frankfurt’s example of a Fourth of July orator, who bombastically prates about the achievements and divine blessings of his country, serves as a good illustration. “He is not trying to deceive anyone concerning American history. What he cares about is what people think of him. He wants them to think of him as a patriot” (p. 18). So, what the orator misrepresents is not a particular state of affairs but rather his particular state of mind. The truth-value of his statements is of but marginal interest to him; winning votes is his prime concern. However, he cannot and does not admit this openly. Frankfurt calls this tendency to misrepresent what one is up to an “indispensably distinctive characteristic” (p. 54) of the bullshitter, making it as central to the concept of bullshit as the tendency for indifference as to how things really are.

  In order to tell a lie, says Frankfurt, one needs to know how things really are or one must at least think that one knows what’s true. It’s clear by now that this does not hold for bullshit. The bullshitter does not have to keep his eye on the facts, whereas the liar must do precisely that in order to conceal the facts. That is why, according to Frankfurt, lying does not render a person unfit for telling the truth in the same way that bullshitting does. The biggest problem with bullshit, so to speak, is not that the bullshitter hides the truth, but rather that he does not even remember where he put it. Hence, Frankfurt’s striking conclusion that “bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies are” (p. 61) and his appeal to oppose bullshit wherever it may be found, in defense of a civilization built upon a concern for truth.

  In Frankfurt’s analysis, then, the bullshitter is (i) unconcerned about the truth but also (ii) concerned about hiding this fact and thus (iii) morally reprehensible. We will now challenge all three of these claims.

  A Different Take on Bullshit

  In the first part of his book, Frankfurt describes a rather intriguing conversation to illustrate his account of bullshit. Fania Pascal, Wittgenstein’s Russian teacher, received a call from Wittgenstein when her tonsils had just been taken out. Pascal relates: “I croaked: ‘I feel just like a dog that has been run over.’” He was disgusted: “You don’t know what a dog that has been run over feels like.”137 Frankfurt explains Wittgenstein’s strong reaction to Pascal’s innocent remark as follows: “To the Wittgenstein in Pascal’s story, judging from his response, this is just bullshit.” (p. 29)

  Given Frankfurt’s own account of bullshit, this diagnosis seems problematic. For one of the essential ingredients of bullshit is clearly missing. Fania Pascal is not hiding something or deceiving someone and there seems to be no fakery or phoniness involved. So why should her statement be interpreted as bullshit?

  Frankfurt might reply that it should, in fact, not be interpreted as bullshit and that it is only Wittgenstein who thinks that Pascal is talking bullshit. Frankfurt seems to take this stance when he says: “It seems extraordinary, almost unbelievable, that anyone could object seriously to what Pascal reports herself as having said” (p. 25) and “Wittgenstein’s reaction . . . is absurdly intolerant” (p. 31). So, Frankfurt himself seems unconvinced that Pascal’s utterance is bullshit. But Wittgenstein thinks it is—that’s the point. Should we assume then that Wittgenstein thinks that Pascal is deceiving people about her enterprise or hiding something? If we hold on to Frankfurt’s analysis of bullshit, we should. But this assumption is plainly false. Wittgenstein’s objection does not amount to an accusation of either fakery or phoniness. That is not what bothers him. Another explanation is needed.

  Fania Pascal is not concerned with how things really are, that much seems certain. She obviously does not know, except in the most vague sense, how a run-over dog feels. Nevertheless, she employs the image to describe her own state of mind. This mindlessness is what bothers Wittgenstein. He finds her indifference to the truth obnoxious and clearly sees this as sufficient ground for discarding her remark as plain bullshit. Wittgenstein, we know from various sources, was extremely demanding when the truth was concerned. In philosophical discussions, but also in daily life, one should never trifle with the facts, he thought. One should always try to get things right. This notorious exact-ingness probably explains why Wittgenstein almost never engaged in playful “bull sessions” or chitchat, not even when this was part of a language class (Fania Pascal recalls how hard it was to find a suitable subject for a conversation with Wittgenstein: “The conversation lessons were excruciating. We sat in the garden. With the utmost impatience he rejected any topic I would suggest . . . To him they were all absurd, non-topics” (p. 29). It also explains why he was so “disgusted” with Pascal’s remark. Pascal was playing fast and loose with the facts and did not even make an attempt to get things right. Wittgenstein found this intolerable.

  There is something slightly absurd about this intolerance, as Frankfurt rightly points out. Most of us would not disapp
rove of, let alone express disgust at a loose remark like Pascal’s. It’s easy to understand why. Most of us do not share Wittgenstein’s exacting standards. We do not always expect people to be as accurate and precise as humanly possible. Sure, Pascal is “cutting corners” like a slovenly craftsman, but who doesn’t, once in a while? Besides, the purpose of conversation is not always to give an accurate description of reality. People sometimes say things just to be funny, agreeable or sociable. In many conversations, it’s not so important what one is saying, but rather that one is saying something and talking to someone. It is about making the other feel comfortable, for instance, and not about trying to get things right.

  A certain amount of sloppiness in our speech may be tolerated, but this does not mean it goes undetected. Most people, when pressed, would acknowledge that Pascal’s comparison of her own feelings to those of a run-over dog, is bullshit. Yet they do not seem to mind as much as Wittgenstein. They do not think this sort of bullshit is unforgivable or unreasonable. Being intolerant in this respect, that would be unreasonable.

  If this diagnosis is correct, Frankfurt’s account has to be revised in at least two ways.