Swords From the Desert

by Harold Lamb

  Various stories are told to explain the disaster to the army of Jerusalem. Some chroniclers of the time accuse Raymond, Prince of Galilee, of treachery. But it is clear that Raymond kept the field until the issue of the battle was decided. He had urged the other leaders not to advance, and had gone forward with them against his better judgment.

  And later-day writers have assumed that the crusaders of Hattin were incapable and weak compared to the men of Godfrey of Bouillon and the first Baldwins, who conquered Palestine. That is not so. Individually the men who fought their way to the Horns of Hattin were as courageous, and certainly as able soldiers, as the first crusaders. Only a decade before Hattin, the Templars had routed Saladin on the southern coast, forcing the sultan to flee at the full speed of his horse for a day and a night to escape capture. After that, Reginald, or Renault, of Kerak had transported ships across the desert to the Red Sea and sailed down the coast to raid the Moslem holy cities-a bit of sheer daring that astonished the Moslems. The adventurers from Kerak were killed or taken prisoner almost to a man, and the Arab chroniclers said, after questioning the prisoners, "the stories they told us of their hardships and exploits almost burst our hearts with astonishment."

  The exploit of the Wolf of Kerak aroused Saladin and his emirs to settle the issue once and for all-to risk a decisive battle after generations of border warfare.

  The crusaders lost this battle, but not because they were weaklings. They had no leader able to cope with Saladin. The lord of Kerak and the master of the Templars were responsible for the fatal advance toward Hattin, and Saladin, seeing clearly their mistake, hemmed in the wings of the Christian host and penned it on the barren plateau where it could not get at water.

  A day and a night without water finished the crusaders' horses, and in a few hours more the men themselves were done.

  A little over a year ago I visited the battlefield of Hattin, and understood a bit of what the crusaders faced. The plateau from Nazareth to the edge of the Galilee depressions is without shelter or water of any kind except occasional deep wells in the villages. The lake of Galilee lies some six hundred feet below sea level, and down by the shore of the lake -in the sunken valley- the air is bearable enough, cooled by the breeze over the water.

  But on the height of Hattin over the lake the heat is stifling. The hot air from the depression seems to hang on the edge of the slope. I visited the place on a cloudy day in October. What the heat would do to a man under a clear sun, in early July-after a day's march in armor and under arms-can be imagined.

  And after a day's fighting without water, and after the brush was set on fire!

  A word as to Saladin's character. Recently the great sultan has been painted as a man merciful in all things. A kind of chivalrous saint. Saladin was more than that-a just man, and very wise. Moreover he held inviolate his given word.

  There was nothing emotional in the mercy he displayed. He ordered the men of Kerak to be executed after the Mecca raid as retribution, and the Templars after Hattin. With his own hand he struck down the lord of Kerak, as he had sworn to do.

  He granted the best of terms to the Christian garrisons which surrendered after Hattin, because it was essential to him to take possession of the crusaders' citadels before a new army could arrive from Europe to take the field against him. No, Saladin was not a sentimentalist. He was merciful beyond his age to women and children who appealed to him, while he dealt sternly with men under arms.

  One of the wisest generals who ever lived, Sun Tzu, who won battles in China long before our era, said "Never attack desperate men, and never attack men who have no way of retreat open." Saladin's policy of mercy made it easier to surrender than to resist, and we are beginning to understand how his sagacity gained more for Islam than his armies.

  December 15, 1930

  A note from Harold Lamb in connection with his Crusades narrative, "The Walls of Acre," in this issue:

  New York, N. Y.

  We are all beginning to understand after the last show in France that wars are not decided by grand strategy alone, in spite of what the brass hats say. We have been realizing it more and more after each war. The strategists and disciplinarians point to Austerlitz as the perfect battle; but Austerlitz was fought on terrain like a parade ground-and strategy and tactics alike went by the board when Napoleon's grande armee was confronted by the bare plains of Russia in early winter a little later.

  Weapons and ground, and the thing called morale-the character and feelings of the men themselves-are apt to settle things once the actual fighting has begun. Genghis Khan rather than Napoleon gives us our best example of a strategist who was supremely successful. Napoleon's plans usually went astray when his armies maneuvered outside the familiar and easy terrain of middle Europe-failed, for instance, in Syria, Russia, and Spain. While the plans of the Mongol conqueror stood the real test-they worked.

  Genghis Khan won his campaigns upon every kind of ground, under all conditions. But we are apt to forget that his Mongol horsemen, believing him invincible after the first years, had what might be called a trouble-proof morale, and their bows out-ranged and outhit any opposing weapons. Era Carpini, one of the first Europeans to journey to the court of the Mongol khans, said emphatically that the Mongol mounted archers were so destructive that they would cut the enemy forces to pieces before the "battle" began.

  Take the late war, the Gallipoli campaign. The Allies had all the odds but one in their favor, and a strong fleet to back their landing. They had numbers, morale on their side, and the element of surprise. Military critics say the strategy of the landing was perfect. For nearly two days the detachments landed had only a few battalions of Turks, badly bewildered, and still fewer machine guns concealed in higher ground, to oppose them.

  What happened is familiar enough. The detachments lost touch, and proved again what the Allied higher command proved so often-that riflemen in the open cannot advance against concealed machine guns.

  Leaving Constantinople the last time, I passed over the Gallipoli peninsula in a seaplane, and saw only sheep moving on the shore where the Australians and the others had landed. There was also a gray stone monument of some kind on the tip of the land. A Greek captain of aviation was with me, and writing in French on some unused vomit bags in the plane, he pointed out tome the gray tracery of trenches still visible, and a cemetery enclosure. Those trenches and the cemetery were the real monument to the men who carried rifles against machine guns. And there are plenty of similar monuments around northern France.

  Weapons, ground, and morale have all been used to the last, ultimate advantage by the great captains of history. It maybe heresy to say it, but it does not look nowas if the Germans were beaten in the last war until the advantage in weapons and morale passed over to us, and they were driven out of their prepared strong points. Even at the last, in Palestine, Allenby's fine sweep up to Damascus-strategy that really worked-only took place when the British and Arabs had enormous superiority in weapons and transport-in such things as motors and planes-and when the Turko-German morale was about broken.

  This is rambling off the subject. What I'm getting at is the odds faced by the crusaders. We are accustomed to think of them as men physically stronger than the Arabs and Turks, and wearing heavy armor, equipped with much heavier weapons. That is mostly wrong.

  The crusaders had heavier shields and lances-those who had lances. The Moslem shield of the time was usually leather strengthened by metal, small and round-shaped to the forearm of the riders. Not at all lance-proof. The Arabs and Turks relied on their agility and the speed of their horses to avoid the long, massive lances. And it seems that the crusaders did most of their fighting with their swords and short axes. Lighter Moslem lances, with six- to eightfoot bamboo shafts, were handier than the long ash weapons of the crusaders.

  Crusaders' swords were shorter and heavier than the Moslem curved sabers, and had more iron in them. But the long blades of the Moslems met the crusaders' weapons on even terms, by
and large. The Moslem horsemen also used javelins and the short, curved khanjar and yataghans with considerable effect, while the crusaders did not. Nobles and knights who came out of Europe had more complete body armor (link or chain mail) than the average Moslem horseman. But the Christian archers and miscellaneous soldiery did not.

  This was before the day of plate armor, long bows, and closed helms with visors. By 1220, in the later stages of the Crusades, the closed helm came into use, gradually, among the Christians. The Moslems never did take to it kindly, favoring light helmets with chain mail drops, and nasal and sometimes cheek pieces. The English longbow with the cloth-yard arrow only reached its great power a century later.

  About the time of the siege of Acre the crusaders were beginning to bring in crossbows, which did a lot of execution in close siege fighting and little elsewhere. Coeur de Lion was the first king to use the crossbow-the French chivalry always looked on it as unsportsmanlike, and the Popes banned it until about 1210.

  This was about the only weapon the Moslems adapted from the crusaders, and they never liked it very much because it was clumsy to handle on a horse. The same applied to the long two-handed sword that some crusaders, mostly Germans, carried in the thirteenth century and later.

  It is clear that in arms and armor, the Moslems were on even terms with the crusaders. In other matters, they usually held the advantage. They had better horses, bred in the country, and greater strength in mounted men. The Christian archers were usually on foot. The Moslems had more serviceable kits for carrying water and rations; they were adept at scouting and maneuvering. Saladin had a portable siege train and a pigeon post as well as a pony express to carry messages.

  Zangi, Saladin, and Baibars were much better strategists than the leaders of the crusaders, and were of course more familiar with the terrain.

  One advantage that Moslems always held: flame weapons. The Arabs were as skilled as the Greeks of Constantinople in the use of the mysterious flame that the crusaders called "Greek fire" or "wild fire," and sometimes "sea fire" because it burned on the water. It was made variously out of naphtha or the ingredients of gunpow der. The crusaders never learned the secret of it, and were besides unwilling to use it, looking upon it as black magic. The church forbade its use.

  The Moslems employed it in siege warfare, beginning with Acre, and also in hand grenades and "fire-maces." In time they learned to cast barrages of it, and smoke screens, before or into an attack. It gave them a decisive advantage for generations-until serviceable firearms were in use.

  This fact has escaped the notice of most historians. But it is clear enough when we read the amounts of men on both sides who were present at such events as the siege of Acre.

  It is also clear that the crusaders in their long conflict with the armies of Asia had only one real advantage-command of the sea at their backs. And in their morale. All the other advantages were on the side of the Moslems.

  January I, 1931

  A note from Harold Lamb, relative to his narrative, "Richard the Lion Heart," in this issue:

  New York City

  Richard of England, Coeur de Lion, must have a word said about him. Long before Scott wrote "The Talisman" the errant king of England had been a hero in legend. But of later years the debunkers have been busy, and they have not forgotten Coeur de Lion. They have plastered mud over the great warrior of legends, saying that Richard was "a had son, a had husband, a worse king." A kind of all 'round black sheep, a waster, good for nothing except carousing and treacherous fighting at the head of his boon companions, the mercenary men-at-arms. We are not concerned with Richard as a king. It is true that he was one of the bravest men and the worst monarchs ever to rule England. But then we must remember that Richard was practically an exile in his youth, and when he came to the throne he was already pledged to the Crusade. Unlike his rival, Philip-Augustus of France, he devoted himself to the Crusade instead of the government of his realm. And when he journeyed back from the East, he was seized and made captive by the European princes unlawf ully-for it was against all written and unwritten laws to seize the person of a crusader returning from the war in the East. When Richard was at last ransomed-at a further cost to England-he not unnaturally devoted himself to vengeance.

  So much for Richard's motives as a king.

  The real interest of his life lies in his crusade, the brief years between 1190-1r94. And here we are faced with a puzzle. Was Richard an invincible fighter-the real Lion Heart of the crusade-or a dismal failure? Scott pictures him as a hero incarnate, and modern historians, especially of the French school, picture him as a troublemaker and an inefficient leader. *

  Consider his actions: His march toward Jaffa delays and delays again; he keeps his army on the defensive, even in the open fighting atArsuf; he fortifies Jaffa and tries to rebuild Ascalon; constantly he importunes Saladin for terms of peace; twice, when the army erawlst toward Jerusalem, he is the first to urge a retreat. No doubt about it, the debonair Coeur de Lion has become a timid general. Why?

  It is not that Richard was wholly unfit as a commander. A worthless leader usually sacrifices his men to try to gain an advantage. St. Louis of France did so two generations later, without being blamed. Richard safeguarded his men and fought the veteran Moslem army led by the ever-dangerous Saladin on slightly better than even terms during his year of command in Palestine.

  I think the answer is this: The moment he set out from Acre, at the head of a great army of all nationalities, Richard found himself confronted by what the French call the grande guerre-the war of large armies maneuvering over open country. The country was strange to him, and the fate of the crusade itself hung upon a decisive battle. Until then the Lionheart had only experienced the foray-and-siege warfare of Europe, where his own prowess in arms could wrest success out of a struggle in which at most three or four thousand men were engaged on each side.

  And it seemed as if Richard realized at once his inability to command in such a war as this. He could not relinquish the command. For one thing, the other leaders of princely rank-even Conrad, the ablest of them -had deserted him. The rank and file of the army was determined to press on to Jerusalem, and Richard had to lead them.

  So he became afraid, not of personal peril, but of disgrace and disaster. Unable to turn back, he must go on, realizing his own inabil ity to cope with the Moslem armies. The blind devotion of the common men only made his situation more intolerable. The had tidings from England, where his brother, John Lackland, and Philip-Augustus were overrunning his lands, in spite of their oaths to him, added to his mental torment.

  We do not know what Richard thought about it, but what he did in his dilemma is pathetically clear. While he shielded his army in camp and town, he went out himself, with a small picked following, to engage the Moslems at every chance. Instead of sacrificing his men, he risked his own life. Tried to win a war as he had won tournaments so often. He stormed hill towers, captured the Egyptian caravan, drove the Moslem warriors before him in a dozen handto-hand encounters. Possibly he sought death in these ventures. It was a hopeless task, to gain victory by such minor feats. It was not war but it was magnificent, and Richard's final stand at Jaffa when he waded ashore in the face of a victorious army is about the finest thing of its kind in the records of history.

  Grant that Richard of England was a poor king, a troublemaker, and a failure as a general in his greatest test. But remember that he hazarded his own life, not his men's, and stuck to his cause. He was one of the most courageous men who ever breathed. Saladin himself said that he would rather lose the Holy Land to Richard than to any other. And the name of Malik Ric (King Richard) has been preserved among the Moslems as the greatest of all the crusaders.

  I have tried to set down Richard's actions during those years, 11911192, without prejudice for or against the English king. Those actions tell their own story of his character. And I think that Richard will keep his surname of the Lion Heart in spite of the debunkers.

  Febru
ary 15, 1931

  A few words from Harold Lamb, in connection with his narrative, "Beausant Goes Forward," in this issue:

  Piedmont, Cal.

  The Battle of Gaza in 1244 is one of those little-known affairs that shaped destinies. The pages of history have little to say about it because we have almost no authentic reports as to what happened and why. Nearly all the crusaders were killed. Like the Custer fight, it has come down to us as a name and a date and a casualty list. We will probably never know just what happened there.

  The Moslem chroniclers, however, have shed some light on the campaign, and we have learned some details from them. Such details are given in this article. The battle itself changed the whole course of the Crusades. It marked the final loss of Jerusalem-until Allenby walked into the city with his army in one of the last cam paigns of 1918. It marked also a new force on the Moslem side, the arrival of contingents from Central Asia, driven west by the hardfighting Mongols, who had first appeared under the horned standard of Genghis Khan.

  Before Gaza the crusaders on the coast and the cultured Arab sultans, the descendants of Saladin, managed to live and let live, and probably Jerusalem would have been recovered in time by the Christians. But the incoming of the new fighters from mid-Asia, who increased in numbers as the years went by, brought the conflict to a head again, and gradually turned the scales against the crusaders.

  From that time the tolerant Arabs were pushed out of power by the masses of Turks and Tartars, who gathered together in Cairo, and presently founded the Mamluk dynasty that endured until Napoleon entered Egypt.

  For another thing, Gaza saw the rise to fame of that redoubtable fighter, the Panther, who was destined to do what Saladin had not been able to do. And the battle brought about the great Crusade of Saint Louis, the last general crusade to reach the East.

  March 15, 1931