On to Victory

by Mark Zuehlke

  [14]

  Minor Skirmishes

  A BRIDGEHEAD OVER THE Schipbeek Canal was vital to II Canadian Corps’s next operational phase. Looking at his battle map on April 7, Lieutenant General Guy Simonds was presented with an unusual picture. No divisional front stood alongside another. Instead, the front line straggled from 4th Canadian Armoured Division’s far advanced position on the Ems River at Meppen south to Almelo and then curled along the Twente Canal before hooking north from Zutphen towards Deventer. South of Zutphen, a small holding force extended along the IJssel to Doesburg and a junction with I Canadian Corps.1

  After its stunning sixty-mile dash in just three days from the Twente Canal to Meppen, 4th Division was badly strung out. Its artillery regiments were particularly far behind the leading armoured regiments and were hampered in their efforts to catch up by poor roads. It was clear this division could not resume its rapid run without some regrouping. Once that was complete, however, Simonds wanted it to force a crossing and advance north up the eastern flank of the Ems.

  The corps’s 2nd and 3rd divisions, meanwhile, were to advance into northern Holland, their flanks protected by the IJssel River to the west and the OverIJsselch Canal to the east. This left Simonds with an ever-widening gap between 4th Division and his two infantry divisions. To plug this, General Harry Crerar placed 1st Polish Armoured Division under his command.

  Meanwhile, Deventer—a vital link in the transportation corridor sought by Twenty-First Armoured Group and also the start line for 1st Canadian Infantry Division’s forthcoming advance westward to Apeldoorn—had to be won also. While 3rd Division had been fighting for Zutphen, the Red Patch Devils had concentrated behind it to prepare their planned amphibious assault across the IJssel—codenamed Operation Cannonshot. But until Deventer fell, its crossing sites were too insecure to allow the operation to begin.2

  Simonds expected Deventer to be as stubbornly defended as Zutphen, since the German Twenty-Fifth Army was obviously determined to hold on to the east bank of the IJssel for as long as possible. The tenacity of this defence surprised First Canadian Army’s intelligence staff because it so dramatically differed from the collapse that had taken place in front of 4th Armoured Division’s “lightning thrust northward on the right flank[, which had been] the cause of great confusion to the enemy.”

  From the German perspective, II Fallschirmjäger Corps commander General der Flieger Eugen Meindl described that rout as “a period of complete confusion in which each commander acted on his own initiative without reference to higher authority.” The Dutch border had formed the boundary for his corps and that of LXXXVIII Corps, but contact between the two had been lost as 4th Division cut into his divisions. Meindl’s 6th Division had been in touch with LXXXVIII Corps on the right and had become separated from the rest of the corps, which was being left behind while his other divisions retreated into Germany. Meindl retained only the 7th and 8th Fallschirmjäger Divisions to attempt to stall the Canadian advance at the Ems River.

  As the Canadians poured over the Twente Canal, Generalleutnant Hermann Plocher’s 6th Division had been forced to escape westward from Germany into Holland. Sorting through the confused, vague, and contradictory orders that reached him, Plocher had decided his job was to move behind the IJssel River and defend its western bank, putting his men close to Deventer.3

  The German command chain in Holland had been disrupted when the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht in the Netherlands, General der Flieger Friedrich Christiansen, had been replaced by Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz. Assuming direct command of Twenty-Fifth Army, Blaskowitz’s orders were to defend Fortress Holland at all costs. On the night of April 7, he set up headquarters at Hilversum, in the heart of the western Netherlands, and began preparing for a last stand. Always energetic and inclined to aggression, Blaskowitz was not about to rely on Seyss-Inquart’s tentative opening of negotiations towards a ceasefire. Instead, he assumed his troops would face I Canadian Corps from behind the Grebbe Line and was determined to check its advance there. Breaching the dykes enclosing the Eem and Grebbe rivers, Blaskowitz flooded the country to the east of the line and closed sluices to raise the IJsselmeer so that its waters inundated the weak point in the Grebbe Line defences north of Amersfoort. Should his men be forced back from the Grebbe Line, a second stand would be offered along the old Holland waterline works to the west of Utrecht.4 In order to buy time for strengthening the Grebbe Line’s defences, Blaskowitz ordered Deventer held for as long as possible.

  Like Zutphen, Deventer was ideal for defence. Its approaches were well protected by “a maze of waterways,” and the Canadians were once again forced by these canals into attacking the city from the east. Although a canal called the Zijkanaal barred the approach from this direction, it was a less formidable obstacle than the Schipbeek Canal on the city’s southern outskirts.5

  The 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade attack on Deventer called for the Regina Rifles to advance out of the bridgehead gained on April 7 by the Royal Winnipeg Rifles and to cross the Zijkanaal directly in front of the city, while the Canadian Scottish on their right seized the village of Schalkhaar on the northeastern outskirts.6

  At 0040 hours on April 8, the Reginas’ ‘A’ Company led off with an attack to clear a small wood bordering the Schipbeek Canal’s north bank and to secure a jumping-off point for crossing the Zijkanaal.7 By noon, the company had taken thirty-five prisoners and secured the wood for ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies to use for the main attack. Both companies were to advance to a bridge that appeared intact and cross over to establish a bridgehead. Supporting arms were in generous supply—a squadron of Sherbrooke Fusiliers, a troop of British Crocodiles, and good lines of communication to call in tactical air as required. Zero hour was set for 1500 hours.

  As the two companies formed on the start line, shells inflicted several casualties, but after that the advance proceeded smoothly. The few pockets of German resistance encountered surrendered the moment the Crocodiles released their “great inducement” of flame. After a two-hour advance that yielded eighty prisoners, the Reginas reached the bridge and found it damaged. To cover the engineers as they made the bridge passable for armour, the Reginas were to establish a small force on the other side.8

  A sharp counterattack threw back the first attempt at 0235 hours on April 9, but by 0700 hours the next morning, the Reginas had a complete company on the opposite shore. With the Reginas keeping German snipers at bay, the engineers began working on the bridge.9

  At 2030 hours on April 8, the Canadian Scottish had also launched “a 3,000 yard attack straight north of our position” that was “to be a prologue to the attack on Deventer, as we must be sure our flanks are cleared before this assault,” their war diarist explained.10 ‘A’ and ‘C’ Companies advanced across “two miles of fields, woods, and swampland.” Travelling with them was a Sherbrooke squadron and a troop of Crocodiles. Searchlights bounced off the clouds and “cast an eerie moonlight effect over the battlefield.”11 ‘C’ Company was pestered by indirect machine-gun fire from a position on its right flank, which wounded two men. Shortly after midnight, ‘B’ and ‘D’ Companies leapfrogged to the front and the push continued. Map inaccuracies caused more delays than the Germans, ‘B’ Company entering a supposed forest that was really “a first class bog.”12 The morning of April 9 found the Can Scots on their objectives with a bag of thirty-six prisoners.13

  In the early afternoon, the sporadic sniping in the Reginas’ perimeter escalated rapidly and forced the bridging effort to shut down.14 Brigadier Graeme Gibson decided to try capturing a new bridge to the north and ordered a two-mile advance by the Canadian Scottish, which “meant another sleepless night in store for the men.”15 The brigadier also moved the Royal Winnipeg Rifles up on the left of the Reginas to protect their exposed flank. With all three battalions now committed in front of the Zijkanaal, Major General Holly Keefler passed the Queen’s Own Rifles from 8th Brigade to serve as 7 CIB’s reserve. The QOR was to secure t
he Schipbeek Canal, but also to “project one company” across the Zutphen-Deventer railway track and occupy a southern wedge of ground where the Schipbeek and Zijkanaal met.16

  THE BRIDGE THE Can Scots headed for lay astride the Zijkanaal two miles due east of Schalkhaar. By the time ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies with the troop of Crocodiles were on the move, it was already 1330 hours. Hopes that Deventer would fall quickly had already fizzled for want of a bridge, but Gibson counted on the Can Scots retrieving the situation. The two leading companies soon reached the midway point. ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies passed through and reached the canal at 1950 hours, finding the bridge badly damaged but still usable by infantry. After a quick inspection, the company commanders advised that the engineers would have to put a Bailey bridge across to handle any vehicles. As ‘A’ Company started feeding its platoons single file across the rickety remains, the Germans opened up with mortar fire.17 Within ninety minutes, however, the Can Scots had both ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies across the canal and were widening a bridgehead sufficient to protect the engineers from small-arms fire. At 2230 hours, ‘C’ Company pushed the bridgehead out to the west.18

  The engineers started constructing the Bailey bridge just before midnight, and Gibson decided to funnel the brigade’s main drive on Deventer over it. To make room, he ordered Lieutenant Colonel Larry Henderson to capture Schalkhaar. “This would enable us to push in an attack on the town very rapidly and quite easily.” With the brigade establishing itself across the canal, the only obstacle then barring an advance into Deventer would be an anti-tank ditch that surrounded the town.19

  The Can Scots moved off at 0100 hours on April 10, its “tired platoons” advancing “along the white concrete road, stepping over telephone wires, fallen tree branches and other debris of war.” They encountered only one German wandering lost through a wood. Within two hours the battalion gained Schalkhaar. Everything was quiet, but Henderson told his staff he was “extremely suspicious of the enemy’s intentions.” For his part, Gibson declared himself “delighted with the entire ‘show.’”20

  North of the village, a section from the carrier platoon had established a blocking position alongside a house about a hundred yards from an intersection. The carriers were tucked out of sight behind the house, while the section had set up inside it. Sergeant Alfred Robertson Minnis and his eleven men were opening ration packs for an early breakfast when a couple of shots rang out. The twelve men dashed up to the house’s second storey, clutching Bren guns and spare cans of ammunition. Heavy mist cloaked the ground, but Minnis spotted a long line of troops following a hedge about a hundred yards to his right. Although the men moved “as if they didn’t have a care in the world,” Minnis was not sure if they were Canadians or Germans. Suddenly a ray of sunlight cut through the mist and glistened on the clearly identifiable helmets of a party of heavily armed German paratroops. From the house, three Bren guns started chugging out rounds in unison, and a nearby section from the battalion’s mortar platoon joined in. “It wasn’t long until the white flag was raised and we got 23 prisoners out of the bunch,” Minnis reported.

  A quiet hour ensued before Minnis spotted about seventy-five paratroops forming in woods five hundred yards from the house. Lurking among the trees were also three enemy tanks. Undeterred by the presence of German armour—an increasingly rare occurrence—the twelve men opened up on the infantry as they entered a ditch by the road. Obviously caught by surprise, the Germans scrambled back to the woods. Knowing that if the Germans advanced their tanks his men would be seriously outgunned, Minnis was happily surprised to spot four Shermans rumbling up to his right. He dashed out of the house to contact the troop commander.21

  The tanks were the No. 2 Troop of the Sherbrooke’s ‘B’ Squadron. Minnis pointed out the German armour on the edge of the wood, and the Shermans opened fire. One German tank burst into flame and another took a direct hit that caused it to hurriedly withdraw.22 The remaining tank struck back with three rounds that smashed into the building sheltering the Can Scots. Most of the men were in a room facing the road, and one of the shells flashed through its window to explode inside. Twenty-one-year-old Corporal Frank Arthur Cherry was instantly killed. Privates J.J. Hards, K.D. Williamson, and D. MacDonald, and Corporal H.M. Edwards were wounded. Minnis and the other eight uninjured men managed to evacuate the wounded out the back door and escape in one of the carriers to a position across the road. The German force also withdrew. Minnis was awarded a Military Medal for his leadership.23

  At 0400 hours, the Queen’s Own Rifles had advanced ‘A’ Company out of the bridgehead to clear the wedge of ground where the Schipbeek and Zijkanaal met. A bridge here linked the small suburb of Snippeling to Deventer, and the QOR was to try and take it intact. No. 9 Platoon headed straight up the road leading to the bridge with No. 7 Platoon and company headquarters trailing, while No. 8 Platoon advanced to the left. After a brief firefight for possession of Snippeling, the company made for the bridge, only to come under heavy artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire from positions inside Deventer. Although the bridge had been blown, a small footbridge was discovered still standing next to it.24

  Suddenly a runner from No. 8 Platoon arrived and reported that it had been heavily counterattacked while moving along a narrow lane in the half-light of dawn. The platoon had been badly cut up by the time its sergeant sent the runner for help. He believed everyone had either been killed or taken prisoner moments after his escape. Lieutenant Colonel Steve Lett immediately sent ‘C’ Company to No. 8 Platoon’s rescue. They soon found the site of the violent encounter. Scattered pieces of equipment and spent shell casings covering the ground attested to a sharp fight, but the bodies of two dead riflemen were all that remained of the platoon.25 “During the whole war the battalion had one officer and twenty-seven other ranks captured by the enemy. It was rather ironical that twelve of the twenty-seven were taken at this point in a minor skirmish,” the regimental historian later wrote.26

  The battalion dug in facing the bridge and spent most of the next day under heavy mortar fire from positions inside Deventer. Seething with anger at the loss of their comrades, ‘A’ Company’s survivors eyed the footbridge and waited for covering darkness. At midnight they would lead the battalion across and carry the fight to the Germans.27

  WHILE THESE SMALL, intense skirmishes fought by the Can Scots and QOR had unfolded in the early morning of April 10, Brigadier Gibson had been making final plans for taking Deventer that afternoon. At the same time, Major General Keefler had decided 7 CIB could be left to finish the job with the four battalions and supporting forces on hand. The rest of 3rd Division must start its bold advance, which Simonds expected to punch through all the way to Leeuwarden, the capital city of Friesland, about fifty miles due north—almost on the North Sea coast. To achieve this, 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade and the 17th Duke of York’s Royal Canadian Hussars were to carry out a running charge, keeping them apace with 2nd Division’s advance to the right towards Groningen, the largest Dutch city outside the western Netherlands. If successful, this advance would liberate virtually all of Holland to the east and north and free Simonds to swing his entire corps into northwestern Germany.

  Adding urgency to the northward push was a bold and unusual gamble taken by Twenty-First Army Group on the night of 7-8 April. Since the end of March, plans had been in the works to drop small packets of Special Air Service (SAS) troops well to the front of First Canadian Army. With the many canals and streams offering ideal defensive positions for the Germans, SAS commander Brigadier J.M. Calvert had proposed that parachuting in small groups of these elite troops, equipped with jeeps to provide rapid mobility, could confuse and disrupt enemy operations. Twenty-First Army Group embraced the plan, code-naming it Amherst. Two French SAS units, chafing to see combat before war’s end, were selected—the 2nd and 3rd Régiments de Chasseurs Parachutistes. Together they numbered about seven hundred men and would be dropped along with their armoured jeeps into a triangular area
formed by Groningen, Coevorden, and Zwolle. Added to the SAS force was 1st Belgian Parachute Battalion, which would race into the area by jeep rather than be air-dropped. Unlike the French paratroops, the Belgians had seen action with a drop behind the lines in France and in the Ardennes during the Battle of the Bulge.

  Once on the ground, the primary French task was to secure two airstrips at Steenwijk. Beyond that, their job was to sow chaos in the German rear—seize bridges to speed the advance by II Canadian Corps, harass the enemy, and provide the Canadians with guides and intelligence as each came into contact with the advancing ground forces. Because the Canadians were expected to reach the SAS troops quickly, no arrangements were made for resupply air drops. They would carry sufficient rations, ammunition, and other supplies to last to the linkup.

  From the outset, Amherst had encountered problems. Deficiencies in training caused the paratroops to be dropped without any of their jeeps. Although some jeeps were then driven in overland, many of the troops were left reliant on their feet. They were also scattered across a much broader front than intended. While Canadian forces reached a few of the French paratroops and the Poles linked up with the Belgians on April 9, it would take six or seven days for the others to be contacted. The paratroops did succeed in spreading chaos as directed, but the Steenwijk airfields remained in German hands. Ultimately, ninety-one SAS troopers were killed, wounded, or lost as prisoners. Post-war assessments of the value of Amherst could not determine whether the results justified these costs.28