On to Victory

by Mark Zuehlke

  More than at any time before, the thirty-year-old Mackenzie felt burdened by the responsibility of sending men into battle. Unable to sleep the previous night, he had asked the battalion’s intelligence officer, Lieutenant Jack Pickering, to sit with him. Mackenzie had seemed deeply disturbed and repeatedly mentioned that this might be the last battle the Highlanders fought. The inevitability of casualties, “just at the end,” haunted him.21

  The advance followed behind a heavy artillery barrage. Captain Mike George’s ‘B’ Company was divided, with a platoon either side of an eight-foot dyke that led straight to the woods. George’s third platoon trailed behind a Sherman that lumbered slowly along the top of the dyke to keep pace with the forward platoons. Completely exposed, the tank drew the full attention of the Germans in the woods. They blasted it with machine-gun and mortar rounds, while a self-propelled gun firing from the woods scored a couple of hits that failed to penetrate the armour. Preoccupied with the tank, the Germans only realized the presence of the infantry when the company stormed into the woods and drove them out.

  Major George Beal’s ‘A’ Company had a tougher time, coming under heavy fire just short of the intersection and being pinned down shortly before 1400 hours. Beal counted six machine guns and three self-propelled guns firing on the leading sections as he crawled across two hundred yards of open ground to join them. First pin-pointing the SP guns, Beal radioed the coordinates back to 2nd Canadian Field Regiment’s FOO, Major Con Harrington, at Mackenzie’s tactical headquarters, and a mix of high-explosive and smoke shells smothered their positions. With the armour blinded, ‘A’ Company rushed forward and silenced the machine guns.22

  The fact that Beal had been able to communicate with the battalion tactical headquarters made a difference, but generally the wireless link proved “ragged.” Mackenzie’s frayed nerves noticeably worsened when the companies were out of contact. He paced back and forth across the floor of a house outside Wilp, growing increasingly agitated. Finally, when Beal reported meeting the machine guns and SPGs, Mackenzie decided to get closer to the action. At 1445 hours, Mackenzie and Pickering set out by jeep to find a location near the road intersection for his tactical headquarters.

  En route the two officers met a troop of tanks being shelled and found Captain Bill Leadbeater, the 1st Hussars’ liaison officer, there. Pickering was in a dither, wanting to get Mackenzie away from the shelling. But Mackenzie asked Leadbeater if he could establish contact with his tanks that were helping the two forward companies. He stood next to the Shermans while the officer worked the wireless inside the troop leader’s tank. Mackenzie began consulting his map, ready to situate the companies when Leadbeater provided the tank coordinates. Suddenly, precisely at 1500 hours, a shell exploded next to Mackenzie and Pickering. Stunned by the explosion and badly wounded in his left arm, Pickering rolled onto his hands and knees. Staring through the drifting smoke and bits of earth spattering back to earth, Pickering saw Mackenzie lying motionless. When he crawled over, Mackenzie looked up at him and said, “See where I’m hit, Jack.” Pickering saw no wound, but in seconds Mackenzie died—the result of massive internal injuries caused by concussive force.23

  Mackenzie’s death might have thrown the 48th’s attack into disarray, but fortuitously the battalion second-in-command, Major Jim Counsell, had arrived at tactical headquarters just before the lieutenant colonel went forward. Counsell immediately assumed command and ordered ‘D’ Company to pass through the forward companies to clear the northwestern part of de Hoven, while ‘C’ Company swept the Germans out of Steenenkamer. Both companies were supported by tanks, which made short work of German machine-gun positions in the villages. At de Hoven, ‘D’ Company set up amid some houses that sheltered it from sporadic shellfire, while Captain Gus Angus and his platoon commanders studied the open ground between the buildings and the village proper. Angus figured the village’s centre lightly held, while Lieutenant Morley Hunter asserted that it was “loaded.” Rather than throw a lot of men out in the open, the officers decided on a fighting patrol formed by Lieutenant R.L. “Tubby” Graham and six volunteers, all armed with Sten guns. A Sherman tank would accompany the men, and the company’s Bren gunners would provide covering fire from the upper floors of the houses. Two of the men were wounded during the dash across the open field, but within five minutes the survivors and the tank were advancing along the main street with the tank having destroyed four machine-gun positions. The rest of ‘D’ Company caught up and closed on a last stubborn German outpost near the railway. Again the tank cleared up the opposition, hammering the position with main-gun fire that killed three of nine defenders, convinced three others to surrender, and prompted the last three to take flight. At 1630 hours, both ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies had gained their objectives.24

  An hour later, brigade ordered Counsell to push the battalion on to the village of Twello, about a mile west and on the road leading from Deventer to Apeldoorn, while the Royal Canadian Regiment came up alongside the 48th’s left flank to widen out the advance. Counsell passed ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies to the front. Each company had a troop of tanks in support. While ‘A’ Company went forward on the road, ‘B’ followed a paralleling railway track.25 The RCR, meanwhile, advanced with ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies forward—moving along local farm roads.

  No sooner had the Highlanders set out than both companies met heavy machine-gun fire from emplacements in houses alongside both the tracks and road. The approach to Twello was quite built up, which made the tankers wary. It was also getting near dusk, when things would begin tilting in favour of the defence, so ‘B’ Company and the troop of Hussars set up a charge, with two platoons each mounted on a tank and the third following behind on the run. Out front, the troop commander’s tank remained unencumbered by infantry in order to allow its main gun and machine guns to be fired unhindered.

  The tanks lunged forward at top speed, the Highlanders clinging to whatever hand or footholds they could find. Some fell off, rolling desperately to avoid the tracks, then scrambling to join the third platoon as it panted up. Any German pockets of resistance short of the town were bypassed, the fire from these fortunately flying harmlessly over the heads of the completely exposed and helpless Highlanders. In short order the force gained Twello. “The Highlanders disembarked in a scrambling rush, and raced down the main street in belligerent squads. The startled Germans began running as they saw their attackers were backed by tanks.” By nightfall, the village was secure.26

  On the Highlanders’ left flank, the RCR encountered only scant resistance during its paralleling advance. ‘B’ Company came to a fortified house but quickly killed several of its defenders and took a dozen prisoners. Other Germans, hiding in woods or farm buildings, were easily eliminated at the cost of a single casualty. The day’s advance, noted the regiment’s historian, “had been less war than beating a preserve, with stray birds apt to be flushed anywhere.”

  The two companies had expected a stop once they reached Twello, but midnight brought orders to keep marching cross-country while the tanks followed by a roundabout road route. “It was heavily cultivated land with a profusion of small streams; ‘C’ Company forded eleven of them, some with water breast high. Penny packets of prisoners were plentiful, with the reserve companies picking up almost as many as the forward companies. Sometimes small groups elected to fight . . . a particularly obstinate handful of Germans held up ‘B’ Company and ‘C’ Company found itself alone, with snipers on three sides. At 0145 hours on April 13, the tanks arrived and eased the situation; they also brought welcome boxes of food. Two hours later the forward companies called it a day . . . [they] were more than four miles beyond the IJssel, or almost halfway to Apeldoorn.”27

  WHILE 1ST DIVISION had been advancing towards Apeldoorn, the 49th (West Riding) Division had attacked Arnhem, at 2240 hours on April 12. Originally, this assault was to have been made by crossing the Neder Rijn out of the Nijmegen Island, but realizing the river was entirely overlo
oked by high ground on the northern bank, Lieutenant General Foulkes had directed the British division to force a crossing of the IJssel to the city’s east. This was not a popular decision with the British divisional staff, which had devised the earlier scheme and thought Foulkes incapable of making up his mind. When this griping reached the ears of Brigadier C.A. Campbell, I Canadian Corps’s chief engineer, he snapped back tersely that in Italy, the Canadians had crossed “more rivers than they’ve had hot breakfasts.”28

  Concerns about the change in plan proved baseless. The 49th’s 56th Brigade crossed over unmolested in Buffaloes under cover of a shatteringly heavy artillery barrage that had been preceded by almost continuous Typhoon and Spitfire strafing of the city and its approaches from early afternoon to nightfall. By morning, the brigade had penetrated Arnhem’s southeastern outskirts, repulsed a half-hearted counterattack, and firmly controlled a bridgehead filling rapidly with troops, armour, and artillery. Supporting the division were Ontario Regiment tanks, whose war diarist observed that the “enemy nowhere showed much willingness to fight.”29

  The threat of machine-gun positions and snipers in the city’s badly battered buildings required the infantry to carefully clear each structure. Two ‘C’ Squadron tank troops ran into a nasty trap when a cleverly situated anti-tank gun covering an intersection near a factory and the main railway opened fire. While one troop kept the gunners preoccupied with counter fire, the other dodged around the corner and knocked the gun out from behind. On the morning of April 14, a tank troop under Lieutenant J. Cameron accompanied the British in clearing the city centre through to the northern outskirts, “where his troop spent the day taking a reckless toll of the enemy. The Hun was completely confused and in spite of his numbers and equipment, which included unbelievable numbers of [Panzerfausts] and Anti-Tank guns, he was unable to do anything but give up.” One troop of tanks in the southeast corner of the city took two hundred prisoners alone. When three German light tanks appeared in front of another troop, they waddled across the Canadian gun sights like ducks in a shooting gallery. “The first was brewed up; the second was knocked out, and the third gave up.” By the end of the day, Arnhem was clear. 30

  At I Canadian Corps headquarters, meanwhile, April 13 had been a day for celebration due to the transfer of 1st Division back from II Canadian Corps control. Foulkes now had three divisions under command—the 49th, 5th Canadian Armoured, and 1st Division.

  The last division’s advance towards Apeldoorn continued to progress well. A major transportation hub for the area, Apeldoorn lay at the northern tip of an area of high ground that extended up from Arnhem with two good roads running south from it through this area. Foulkes considered these roads of primary importance to clearing these heights. The Apeldoorn Canal, however, barred easy access to the city and provided an ideal defensive position for the Germans.31

  Major General Harry Foster wanted to avoid a direct assault across the canal into the city. “It was a friendly city [with a normal population of 72,000], filled with refugees, and I was not prepared to use [artillery] on it. The plot was to isolate the city, by having [1 CIB] face up to it and thus keep the enemy garrison there occupied, and by putting [3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade] across the canal south of Apeldoorn, thus coming in from the rear.”32

  Accordingly, on the morning of April 13, the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment passed through the 48th Highlanders and took over that axis of 1 CIB’s advance towards the canal, while the RCR continued pushing forward on the left flank. Farther to the left, 3 CIB advanced at 1050 hours with the Carleton and York Regiment on the right and the West Nova Scotia Regiment the left. The Royal 22e Regiment provided the reserve.

  Supported by the 1st Hussars’ ‘A’ Squadron, the Hasty Ps sent a patrol from ‘C’ Company mounted on carriers to seize a crossroads about a mile west of Twello. After a short fight, the crossroads was secured, and when the rest of ‘C’ Company and the tanks caught up, the pace of advance quickened. By noon, the battalion had taken a wood just to the east of Teuge and advanced about two miles from Twello. Along the way, sixty prisoners were swept up and the regiment “had put the fear of the Lord into the Hun in this area,” wrote the battalion’s war diarist.

  To the left, the RCR advance had been delayed by German snipers, who had infiltrated the entire battalion front. ‘A’ Company spent precious time rounding up eleven prisoners, but the infantrymen were almost outdone by the battalion’s cooks, who took it upon themselves to go after snipers near the headquarters and brought back nine prisoners. ‘A’ and ‘D’ Companies then headed for the canal at 0800 hours. ‘D’ Company was drawn into a stiff fight for a group of fortified buildings that took two hours to win, five Germans being killed before the remaining thirty-two surrendered. By noon, ‘D’ Company had caught up to ‘A’ Company—which had the surprising good fortune to be able to liberate a hospital housing 789 wounded Allied POWs. One of the two Germans guarding the prisoners, however, shot and wounded one Royal Canadian before they were eliminated.33

  The initial brigade plan had not foreseen driving all the way to the canal, but with both battalions so close, they were ordered at 1545 hours to go nonstop for it. The Hasty Ps mounted ‘A’ and ‘D’ Companies on the tanks and rolled forward, “shooting up small packets of enemy as they advanced,” but mostly rushing past and leaving the two reserve companies to mop up. “There was a steady stream of prisoners . . . at this time, the total bag for the day was 242.” The battalion’s advance was not as one-sided as its war diarist made it sound, for one officer and twenty-three men were wounded and five other ranks lost their lives.34

  The RCR enjoyed a similarly rapid advance, closing up on the canal at 2100 hours.35 Arriving three hours later, the Hasty Ps spent the pre-dawn hours of April 14 clearing Germans out of housing on its east bank. Learning that a bridge nearby still stood, ‘D’ Company hurried to the site, only to have it blow up as they were fifty yards away.

  When the bridge was blown, Lieutenant Colonel G.E.B. Renison ordered ‘D’ Company to establish a solid position facing the wreckage and requested that engineers come forward with bridging material. No sooner had an engineering officer come forward to survey for a possible crossing site than he was wounded by enemy fire. Then, late in the afternoon, orders from brigade advised the Hasty Ps to sit tight. Instead, the 48th Highlanders would pass through and make a frontal assault on Apeldoorn with the RCR alongside.36

  Left of 1 CIB, the easterners of 3 CIB had expected clear sailing to the canal for both the New Brunswick-based Carleton and York Regiment and the West Nova Scotia Regiment. While this proved largely true for the latter, the Carletons met heavy resistance and had to win the ground piece by piece. ‘D’ Company with the 1st Hussars’ No. 2 Squadron in support suffered many casualties among the infantry and considerable damage to the tanks.37 ‘D’ Company’s No. 17 Platoon had two men wounded and its commander, Lieutenant Richard Savage, killed. Quickly taking over, Sergeant James Scott led the platoon forward to overrun the main enemy position, killing two Germans and taking eight prisoners.

  After that, the company slogged through a seemingly endless string of enemy strongpoints until ‘B’ Company passed to the front in the mid-afternoon and continued the grinding advance. Passing by the village of Achterhoek, the company came under heavy fire from a group of buildings clustered around a solidly built school-house. Realizing the school was the key position, Acting Corporal John Senechal crawled to within a few yards of it and then dashed inside. He soon emerged with twelve prisoners, who surrendered three machine guns and six Panzerfausts. For singlehandedly eliminating this position, Senechal received a Military Medal. 38 Pushing on through the night, the battalion had gained its objective west of Achterhoek by 0700 hours and secured a start line for the Royal 22e Regiment to pass through and continue the advance. ‘B’ Company had suffered one man killed and eight wounded, Lieutenant Wilfred Brosseau being among the injured.39

  The West Novas had been hampered more by t
he large numbers of buildings along their route that had to be searched before being passed by. Still, they met sufficient opposition that the battalion reported one man killed and fourteen wounded during the course of the day. “The enemy had shown no inclination to make a determined stand and during the day 51 prisoners were taken . . . The general tactics of the enemy were a steady withdrawal covered by sniper and Self-Propelled Gun fire whose slowing up progress was very effective.” By nightfall, the West Novas were on their objective and awaiting arrival of the Carletons.40

  [19]

  Jerry Is Running

  ON THE EVENING of April 13-14, Lieutenant General Charles Foulkes realized the 49th (West Riding) Division assault on Arnhem had created an opportunity to exploit. If the 49th advanced north along the IJssel River road at the same time as 1st Canadian Infantry Division drove southward, he could clear the ground across from Zutphen. This would provide an ideal bridging site linking the west bank to a network of roads that converged on the city from all points of the compass.

  Although Major General Harry Foster agreed that the bridge would serve I Canadian Corps well, he disliked adding a southward advance to his agenda. His 1st and 3rd brigades fully committed to seizing Apeldoorn, Foster must assign the task to 2nd Brigade—returning a unit to action that had already “done enough by making the assault crossing and [establishing the bridgehead.]”

  The scheme left his division “facing three ways at once.” On the right, 1 CIB—with an exposed north flank—stood before Apeldoorn, 3 CIB was closing on the canal with orders to get behind the city, and now 2 CIB must march south.1 Facing so many equally urgent demands, Foster was heartened by Dutch underground reports that the Germans were withdrawing from the city and partisans controlled a major bridge over the canal. Three Royal Canadian Regiment scouts and two partisans confirmed that the bridge still stood, but not whether it was in Dutch hands.