On to Victory

by Mark Zuehlke

  After the Irish Regiment had taken over Wagenborgen east of Delfzijl on the early morning of April 24, the Germans had used the momentary confusion as the Canadian Scottish handed over positions to counterattack and regain part of the town. Attempts to hold these gains were half-hearted, and by dawn the Germans had been thrown out and had lost nine men as prisoners.7

  On either flank, the division spent the daytime hours mustering its strength and shaking out for a fight. The Westminster Regiment (Motor) lined up to the right of the Irish, while the British Columbia Dragoons concentrated in Appingedam to the south of the Perth’s line of advance. The tankers were irritated by the way the Royal Winnipeg Rifles had handed over Appingedam, an officer simply telling a Dragoon of equal rank, “The Germans are there, we’re getting the hell out of here. Goodbye.” They soon discovered that parts of the town were still in German hands and were forced to dismount most of their men to fight as infantry. Even deploying ten tank troops to this duty yielded just 120 men—the equivalent of a single infantry company. Lacking portable wireless equipment, the tankers had to string phone lines behind their advance. Grudgingly, they set about sweeping the town and sending patrols out beyond—being continually harassed by snipers and the fiery rain of shells from the coastal batteries. When the Dragoons entered Appingedam, only about a half-dozen houses had suffered shell damage, but by the time they would leave on May 2, German artillery “had completely destroyed one hundred and nineteen buildings and badly damaged two hundred and forty others.”8

  The need for the Dragoons to provide their own infantry spotlighted 5th Division’s inherent deficiency in ground troops—despite Hoffmeister having transferred all 11 CIB’s regiments to Cumberland, causing Brigadier Ian Johnston to lament on the night of April 24 that “for the first time in its history [the brigade] had no one under [command].” It was a short-lived situation, for at 0900 hours the next day, Hoffmeister reversed the arrangement and put Johnston in charge of collapsing the pocket. Not only were the infantry regiments returned to his control but also 5 CAB’s 8th New Brunswick Hussars and BC Dragoons were passed to 11 CIB. The Westminster Regiment was also placed under Johnston’s command. For artillery, 8th Field Regiment (Self-Propelled) deployed on the eastern flank and 17th Field Regiment to the west. Engineering requirements would be provided by 10th Field Squadron.

  Johnston was displeased with the scope of his task, for the brigade’s frontage sprawled across 25,000 yards lacking even a scrap of cover, while the Germans could hide within the many hamlets and villages. Everyone by now was realizing that intelligence projections of German strength were seriously understated, and that in fact aerial photographs of the battery emplacements and surrounding defences showed them to be virtually impregnable. There were also the guns of Borkum in the middle of the estuary and at Emden across from Delfzijl, which could reach anywhere within the pocket while being immune to anything the Allies threw at them.

  His infantry was “spread very thinly,” while the armour was road-bound. The 25-pounders that Johnston was restricted to because of the prohibition on heavier artillery “were outranged . . . and appeared to have little effect on the concrete positions.” Weather also conspired against him—rain and heavy cloud rendering precise tactical air strikes, which could ensure no damage to the harbour, being impossible. The Germans were so numerous and well deployed that Johnston decided it “would be necessary to have at least three battalions deployed throughout the whole period. There was little cover, the weather was miserable and the enemy shelling was taking its toll of casualties. It was accordingly decided to push forward.”9

  Johnston already had three infantry battalions committed, so only the Cape Breton Highlanders remained in reserve. The BC Dragoons continued in their tankers-cum-infantry role at Appingedam. To the west, the Perths were at Holwierde, and on the eastern flank the Irish and Westminster regiments were engaged. Despite the poor weather, the Perths called for an air strike on Nansum Battery, with the artillery marking its position with smoke. When the “planes arrived too early,” however, they attacked without guidance from the artillery, and “the bombing was ineffective.”10

  To the east, the Irish were still trying to figure out, with gingerly extended patrols, where the Germans were located and their strength. The Westminsters, meanwhile, had shifted somewhat westward during the night to allow the Irish to concentrate in a narrower area.11 With the ground lit up by “a brilliant moon,” ‘A’ and ‘C’ Companies had crept along water-filled ditches and canals from one farm to the other in order to clear the area. “As Wednesday became Thursday, it became increasingly apparent that Jerry had good observation and fire control, since the slightest movement brought down accurate and heavy shelling, much of it airburst from the very heavy guns” at Reider Spit.

  In the early morning, a Dutch farmer connected to the resistance appeared at the Westminster’s battalion headquarters and told Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Corbou ld that the spit’s guns were 12.8-centimetres. He described “their size, numbers and subsidiary guns and defences in terms difficult to believe, but which were subsequently substantiated.”12

  Morning of April 26 dawned cold, with a heavy mist that initially helped cover ‘C’ Company’s advance “across the flat, open ‘polder’ toward the sea.” The goal was Termunten, which lay fifteen hundred yards due west of the base of the spit. Its capture would isolate the spit from the rest of the pocket.13 When the mist lifted just after noon, ‘C’ Company found itself “in such open ground that they were heavily and regularly shelled. Three were killed: P[rivates] C.G. Lelond, J. Petrak, and D.R. Sawyer, and one was wounded during the . . . advance this sunny spring afternoon in the tulip fields of northern Holland.”14

  Deciding to forgo the attempt to approach Termunten directly, Corbould sent the battalion towards Woldendorp, about five thousand yards southwest of the spit. He planned a pincer attack—‘A’ Company would strike across flats to the right with ‘C’ Company close behind, while ‘B’ Company approached from the left. As any movement by day immediately drew accurate shelling, Corbould planned to make his move after midnight.15 The Irish Regiment conducted one of the division’s last daylight operations during this period when it advanced ‘A’ and ‘C’ Companies on a wide right hook towards a position three thousand yards northeast of Wagenborgen in the late afternoon of April 26. Shelling inflicted four casualties en route. ‘D’ Company then passed through and continued a further two thousand yards along the southern dyke of a large polder to close on a canal within fifteen hundred yards of Weiward. Meeting stiff resistance the whole way, the company netted only five prisoners and finally gained its objective at 2300 hours, most of the move being completed under the cloak of darkness.16

  Divisional intelligence had cautioned that the Germans were under “a ‘last round, last man,’ order and the obstinacy of the defenders certainly [did] not point towards a hurried evacuation of the area.” Although the many ships reported at Emden might “smack of at least preparation for the exodus,” it was deemed too early to clearly divine German intent. But it was thought “reasonable to conclude that the pocket will remain active until the defended perimeter of Delfzijl itself is reached, and it is then and not likely before that a choice between evacuation or ‘last man’ will be made.” The April 25 report concluded that the situation favoured the Germans because of their clear fields of observation and fire. “There appears to be no shortage of food or ammunition, not unnatural in a coastal fortress, and this together with the fact that he has a number of guns does not suggest of any hurried need to leave.” Declaring the defenders a “hodgepodge” made up mostly of naval land forces, the report also noted that their relatively poor training was “overcome to a degree by the equally apparent determination and efficiency of their commanders.”17

  Ultimately, the German artillery advantage forced the division to grope forward at a crawling pace in the hours of darkness and to lay low during the day. On the western flank, the Perth Regiment moved to
clear the Germans out of the coastal area north of Bierum to a point two thousand yards from Nansum Battery. This would provide them with secure lines to the rear when they attacked the battery itself. With the 8th Hussars’ ‘A’ Squadron in support, the attack was scheduled to begin at 2000 hours on April 26. As the leading ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies formed on their start line, they were caught by artillery fire that killed one man and wounded seven others. After a short delay, the advance proceeded and met little opposition until ‘D’ Company passed into the lead shortly after sunrise. Dogged by increasing small-arms fire, the company came up onto the coastal road running east to Nansum at 0618 hours and its commander called for tank support.18

  ‘A’ Squadron’s No. 2 Troop responded. When “mines and marshy ground necessitated the tanks moving over narrow dirt trails, the troop came under heavy HE [high explosive] fire from the coastal guns. Despite the jinking of one tank it was eventually hit and knocked out, the heavy HE literally caving in the side of the tank. The remainder were successful in reaching the Perth company position.” 19 Advancing farther during the day was deemed impossible and the Perths were still discovering German positions behind their front. As the day progressed they rounded up seventy-one prisoners, all of whom turned out to be sailors from a transport flotilla bypassed by the advance.

  At 1445 hours, Lieutenant Colonel M.W. Andrew set out his intention to take Nansum that night. ‘A’ Company would go for the village and the road leading to it from Holwierde, while ‘C’ Company took the battery itself. Once these two objectives fell, ‘D’ Company would move a short distance farther south to block any counterattack aimed at regaining the battery. ‘B’ Company was to remain in Holwierde to protect the battalion’s right flank. The attack was scheduled for 0035 hours on the morning of April 28.

  ‘C’ Company soon mired in a minefield. The company commander was wounded and six men killed before Andrew ordered a withdrawal to the start line and began working up a new plan for the next night.

  While the Perths had been trying to close on Nansum, the Westminsters had been equally engaged in attempting to isolate the battery on Reider Spit. Despite a late start at 0240 hours on April 27, the attack proceeded better than Corbould had expected. ‘A’ Company’s Major William James Neill decided on a bold dash rather than stealth to surprise the Germans in Woldendorp. Putting Lieutenant James Oldfield’s carrier platoon out front, Neill’s force charged straight up the road behind a sharp barrage by artillery and a troop of tanks from the 8th Hussars’ ‘B’ Squadron. As the carriers roared forward, the mounted machine-gunners shot “up everything in sight.” Neill’s Company rushed into Woldendorp, seizing the northern sector, capturing thirty prisoners and killing “a large number for no casualties to themselves.”20

  Woldendorp’s loss seriously threatened the Germans’ ability to defend Reider Spit, and they immediately counterattacked. The battery opened up with a terrific barrage on the Canadian sector, and at first light the Germans struck from three sides. For two hours the battle raged before the Germans began losing steam. Soon ‘B’ Company moved up on the western side of the village, and ‘C’ Company moved into Woldendorp to help ‘A’ Company clear the portions still in German hands.

  Brigadier Johnston visited Corbould at noon. “On most sectors of the Delfzijl Pocket,” he reported, “the going was still quite sticky. Some of the units were suffering heavy casualties from shelling and advances were neither great nor rapid.” Consequently, he urged Corbould “to get on to the sea in order to put the pressure on the remainder of the pocket, take a number of very bothersome guns [Reider Spit Battery], and prevent a very large scale evacuation from the small port of Termunterzijl [next to Termunten].” Corbould cautioned that he first had to gain control of Woldendorp, and the push for the coast was unlikely to begin until Saturday, April 28.

  Inside Woldendorp, ‘A’ and ‘C’ Companies were not in contact with each other when Neill’s men were assaulted by another counter-attacking force that numbered about two hundred men. Other smaller forces attacked the other two Westminster companies. Two troops of Hussars under Captain H.D. Keith tore into the Germans with their machine guns to devastating effect. But inside Woldendorp, ‘A’ Company’s situation grew critical as men began to run out of ammunition, many grabbing up German weapons. Neill, who earned a Distinguished Service Order this day, dashed from platoon to platoon, encouraging the men to stand fast. Finally, at 2230 hours, ‘C’ Company slugged its way through to ‘A’ Company’s lines and the counterattack broke. Skirmishes continued until 0600 hours, when the Germans melted away. Immediately, the guns at Reider started “shelling and air bursting was heavy and many of the flimsy buildings were soon reduced to rubble and ashes.” Despite the intensity of the bombardment and the counterattacks, casualties were surprisingly light. With Woldendorp in hand, the Westminsters passed the daylight hours of April 28 as comfortably as possible, those in the village hunkering down inside cellars to escape the shelling. Corbould was already making plans for the push towards the coast “to continue after last light.”21

  Left of the Westminsters, the Irish Regiment had spent April 27—“a dirty, rainy day”—under continual shelling with no intention of trying to advance until after dark. Five men were wounded. At 0100 hours the following morning, ‘C’ Company under Major W.H. Mitchell headed for a position five hundred yards short of the village of Heveskes. This would put them on the south bank of a wide canal that branched off the Eems Canal at Farmsum and extended eastward towards Termunten. Like the Westminsters, the Irish were trying to close up to the coast between Delfzijl and Reider Spit. Despite considerable opposition and seven casualties, by daylight the company reached the canal. Right of Mitchell’s men, Captain Fred Whyte’s ‘A’ Company ran into a rat’s nest of Germans firing from all sides and was pinned down. Lieutenant B.D. Sandwell’s platoon managed to fight its way back to the start line, but dawn found the rest of the company trapped. Whyte decided to stay put through the rest of the day. Lieutenant Colonel L.H.C. Payne also waited for darkness, planning to send ‘B’ Company to relieve Whyte and then continue to the western edge of a canal trending on a northeasterly axis from Wagenborgen to Termunterzijl, in order to tie in with the Westminsters on the opposite shore. The relief force rescued Whyte and his men at dawn, but two of the company had been killed and another sixteen were missing and presumed captured.22

  ON APRIL 28, Simonds met with Hoffmeister to discuss how long the operation was taking. Hoffmeister had decided to go straight for Delfzijl’s port itself because “three or four more days of mucking about will cost us more in the end.”23 He and Brigadier Johnston agreed that an attack from the northwest once Nansum fell offered the best chance of success and the Cape Breton Highlanders would be brought out of reserve to carry it out. At the same time, the Westminsters and Irish would advance on Delfzijl from the east while continuing to isolate Reider Spit battery.

  The Perth’s ‘D’ Company advanced at 1515 hours on April 28 to establish a strongpoint one thousand yards along the coast immediately north of Nansum Battery. When the company met opposition from a cluster of farm buildings, a Wasp was summoned. “Houses in this area were burned down and the enemy driven outside,” the Perth war diarist noted. At 1630 hours, ‘C’ Company came up behind ‘D’ Company, which was “having a lot of trouble from shellfire” out of the battery. The two companies kept leapfrogging each other, as the battalion’s mortars dropped smoke bombs around the battery to blind its gunners and artillery harassed the emplacements with fire.24 ‘D’ Company was within a few hundred yards of the battery at 2045 hours. Moving through quickly and still screened by artillery and mortar fire, ‘C’ Company “took the Germans by surprise, captured the guns, and bagged 177 prisoners, more than twice the strength of the assaulting company. An examination of the position afterwards showed what a feat the assault had been,” wrote the regiment’s historian. “The area of the guns was heavily armed with automatic weapons, and the gun emplacements were
of heavy concrete, built into the dyke.”25

  Pushing out of Holwierde, ‘A’ Company headed for the village of Nansum west of the battery. By 0525 hours on April 29, they were close to Nansum’s outskirts and had taken seventy prisoners, but were also running out of ammunition. Fifteen minutes later, the company was counterattacked “and had to resort to using enemy weapons and ammunition for defence.” Calling artillery almost onto the company’s position broke the German attack. It took the rest of the day, but at 1650 hours, ‘A’ Company entered the town and within an hour reported it clear. An hour later, the Cape Breton Highlanders began taking over the front in preparation for their attack of Delfzijl .26

  By 2300 hours this relief was complete, and thirty minutes later ‘B’ Company attacked towards the village of Uitwerde, which was separated from the northern corner of Delfzijl by a narrow canal. ‘A’ Company advanced ten minutes later. The speed with which the Canadians had followed up on the fall of Nansum Battery obviously confounded the Germans, for by 0300 hours Uitwerde was taken with 240 prisoners. By dawn, the Hussars had tanks inside the village.27

  ‘A’ Squadron’s No. 3 Troop was firming up alongside ‘B’ Company when a previously unseen large pillbox was spotted. The tanks hammered it with armour-piercing shells to no noticeable effect, and the Germans inside lashed back with machine-gun fire. Finally, a 17-pounder Firefly blasted it with a Sabot round. Developed by the British in early 1944, the Sabot armour-piercing shell had a piece of solid shot set inside a plastic casing, which fell away after leaving the gun barrel. With a much higher kinetic force than a normal AP shell, it could penetrate thicker armour. When the shell struck the pillbox it caused concrete inside to break loose into chunks of shrapnel. Immediately, the Germans inside showed a white flag. The pillbox was later determined to have seven-foot-thick walls that normal shells had penetrated only to a depth of five feet. Having eliminated the pillbox threat, the tankers turned their guns to a coastal battery on the northern edge of Delfzijl. Tanks and guns duelled throughout the day, with neither achieving any decisive hits.28