Colonial America

by Richard Middleton, Anne Lombard

  The Mohawks, for their part, also made a conscious and considered decision to pursue a trading relationship with the Dutch as fully as they could. Ever since the arrival of the French in the St. Lawrence valley, the Mohawks' once powerful position in the diplomatic and trading relationships of their region had eroded. As we have seen, access to trade goods was vital to creating political and social alliances among Native American societies. European trade goods were especially valued because of their rarity and high prestige, which translated into political power. In addition, European goods were valued for their utility. But the Mohawks' main supplier of European trade goods for nearly two decades had been their long-time adversaries, the Hurons, who obtained them from the French. The Mohawks deeply resented their dependence on the Hurons. The arrival of the Dutch offered a unique political opportunity, for the Mohawks could regain their old autonomy and political power by entering an exclusive trading relationship with the Dutch. Accordingly the Mohawks went to war, finally driving the Mahicans out of the Fort Orange region in 1628 in order to keep the Dutch trade for themselves.

  The creation of a Dutch–Mohawk trading alliance unleashed a torrent of unintended consequences that would shape European and Native American relations in the region for decades. First, the Dutch supplied the Indians with guns. These were so effective in hunting for beaver that the Mohawks' beaver supply was rapidly depleted. Second, regular trade with the Dutch meant increased exposure to European epidemic diseases, the effects of which caused the population of the Mohawks as well as other Iroquois peoples to decline dramatically by about 1640. In response to these twin disasters, the Iroquois became much more aggressive in making war upon their neighbors. The purpose of these wars was multifaceted. In part the Mohawks wanted to drive competitors out of their hunting grounds so that they could establish themselves as the dominant fur traders in the region, thereby restoring their former claim as the most powerful political entity in the northeastern region. In part, the Mohawks went to war so as to gain captives who could substitute for lost clan members, the traditional purpose of the mourning war. Both motivations contributed to an increased number of war parties, since every death caused by smallpox could inspire a raid so that the grieving relatives could avenge their loss or acquire a replacement.

  If these wars were traditional in their motivation, they soon became anything but traditional in their execution. In a conventional mourning war, cultural taboos limited both the scope of attacks and the casualties they produced, since risking the loss of warriors defeated the purpose of a war whose object was to replenish the population. During the 1640s these taboos dissolved, as Iroquois warriors developed the ability to conduct sustained and large-scale wars against their neighbors and to coordinate their attacks with other members of the Five Nations. Having turned themselves into something of a war-making juggernaut, the Iroquois proceeded to drive the Huron people from their tribal villages in 1648 and 1649 so as to eliminate their competition in the fur trade. The Iroquois then turned on the peoples who had sheltered fleeing Huron refugees, plundering trade goods and furs from every village they destroyed. In a vicious cycle, casualties suffered in these wars in turn created pressure for more wars to avenge the dead. For decades these wars, called the Beaver Wars, produced conflict and instability for any northern tribe that allied itself with the French or the English. The European colonies on the other hand benefitted from the stepped-up warfare, since it had the effect of motivating neighboring Indians to seek alliances with the colonists rather than to turn against them. Constant warfare also forced many of the native peoples to leave their ancestral homelands, opening up large areas of land around the new English and French colonies to potential settlement by Europeans.

  Meanwhile, Dutch exports of furs grew slowly but steadily. To obtain the coveted beaver pelts, the Dutch offered not only European manufactured goods but also wampum belts, which originated in Long Island.7 Dutch traders' ties with the tribes in eastern Long Island who produced this wampum gave them important competitive advantages over French traders to the north.

  After a few years, divisions developed between the investors about the future direction of the Dutch company. In 1629, one group within the company pressed the directors to make a decision which they hoped would attract more settlers as well as provide another source of profit for themselves. Any investor bringing over 50 able-bodied persons would be offered a large tract of land with manorial rights, called a patroonship. Each patroon was to receive a four-mile stretch of the Hudson River extending back east or west as far as the land went. As with the previous company-sponsored settlements, the patroons had first to secure title by purchasing the land from the local inhabitants. The company agreed also to relinquish its monopoly on trading rights and to allow patroons to trade along the coast, subject to a five percent duty payable at New Amsterdam.

  Although several patents were issued, the patroonship system did not succeed in attracting many colonists. Only Kiliaen Van Rensselaer, one of the investors in the company, made any real attempt to establish a patroonship, securing a large tract of land in the vicinity of Fort Orange and eventually sending out some 200 tenants to cultivate his patrimony. In time, the number of immigrants flowing into the colony increased as smaller grants were made to those who paid their passage and had money to invest. But at least in the short run, the more important consequence of the grant to Van Rensselaer was to begin eroding the company's monopoly on the fur trade. Increasingly, settlers in the colony engaged illegally in private trading, which the company was unable to control. In 1638, the company decided to relinquish its monopoly and open the fur trade to all colonists, while recouping some of its lost revenues by taxing the profits of the new traders. Inevitably, the new competitiveness in the fur trade destabilized the relationship between the Dutch and the Indians.

  Another source of strife by the late 1630s was the growth of the settler population in Manhattan and the lower Hudson valley. The indigenous Algonquian-speaking inhabitants resented encroachments by settlers who were now increasingly engaged in farming around New Amsterdam. Attempting to recoup some of the lost trade revenues now going to the company's competitors, Director General Willem Kieft began levying a tax on wampum in 1639. Some of the local Algonquians refused to pay and murdered several colonists. In 1643, Kieft resolved to retaliate, enlisting the Mohawks to assist the Dutch in their assault on the Algonquians. The hostilities began on February 25, 1643 with a bloody massacre, reminiscent of the destruction of the Pequots, when a contingent of Dutch soldiers surrounded the village of Pavonia and set it on fire. All those trying to escape, including women and children, were brutally cut down. The attack was especially shocking to the Algonquians because most of the victims were refugees who had fled the Mohawks to seek asylum with the Dutch. This assault in turn provoked reprisals. Among the victims was Anne Hutchinson, who had by now moved with her family from their exile in Rhode Island to eastern Long Island. Peace was re-established only in 1645, by which time much of the province had been devastated and 1,000 Indians killed.

  As noted previously, the government of New Netherland was initially autocratic, reflecting an ownership concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy investors. There was no general assembly of stockholders as in Virginia and Massachusetts through which power could be diffused to the settlers. New Netherland was ruled for much of its history by the director general and a few officials who implemented company policy, dispensed justice, and levied the company's dues. When trouble with the native inhabitants was brewing in 1641, Kieft did order the heads of households to choose 12 men to represent them, though when they demanded a more responsive administration, they were promptly dismissed. Two years later Kieft arranged another meeting, this time summoning eight representatives, who immediately repeated their predecessors' protests against the company's arbitrary taxation. Even more boldly, they wrote home demanding a new director general.

  This action led to a partial reorganization of the colony in 1645.
Authority in future was to be concentrated in the hands of three officials: a director general, his deputy, and a fiscal. Together they were to make up a council, though they were to continue the concession of allowing “one or two persons to inform the director and council, at least every twelve months, of the state and condition” of their settlements. To help the economic development of the colony, permission was given to private individuals to import Africans, which pleased the larger merchants and landowners since it eased the labor shortage, while another concession granted the right to trade overseas on payment of a customs duty.

  These changes were inaugurated by Peter Stuyvesant, who was appointed to be the colony's new director general in July 1646. Stuyvesant duly allowed the election of nine inhabitants to consult about the levying of taxes but soon terminated the experiment. Indeed, within two years the inhabitants were writing to the States-General in Holland complaining about the autocratic manner of the director general, who browbeat everyone “in foul language better fitting the fishmarket than the council board.” They charged Stuyvesant with openly breaking the contraband laws by selling arms to the Indians, even when others were hanged for doing so. They also asserted that he had arbitrarily confiscated property for the nonpayment of taxes, ignoring the fact that many people were late in paying because they had suffered heavily in the recent war. New Netherland's bad reputation was affecting trade, the petitioners urged.

  Following recommendations made by the States-General in 1650, more concessions were made. Stuyvesant turned New Amsterdam into a municipality in 1652, and established local courts of justice to resolve disputes. Consistent with Dutch practice, these courts were subordinate to the director general and his council. Stuyvesant also summoned representatives from the various settlements when war threatened with England, and created two new classes of burgher in 1657; the purpose was to raise enough money to complete the city's defenses by selling full or half memberships.

  Challenges to Stuyvesant's authority were meanwhile emerging from another quarter. During the 1640s a number of New Englanders began settling on Long Island. Accustomed to different types of governing institutions, and in particular to participatory town meetings, the New Englanders soon began to demand a local government. In due course this was granted, but it was hardly what the New Englanders wanted, since the officials were chosen by the director general. The one concession was that the appointees be residents, but this was as far as local participation could go.

  Historians disagree as to the import of these changes. In the past, some have argued that Stuyvesant's changes were designed merely to protect Dutch profits from the fur trade, and were essentially unprincipled. These historians assert that the Dutch failed to build effective institutions in New Netherland before 1664. More recently, other scholars have argued that Stuyvesant sought to create a government that conformed to Dutch ideas of efficiency and fairness. The administration of New Netherland in the early years closely resembled the administration of other Dutch trading posts. As the colony gradually developed into a settler colony, however, its governing institutions became more and more like local institutions within the Dutch Republic. Though they differed from English institutions, they were effective. Just as important is that they were generally welcomed by the Dutch settlers in New Netherland.8

  Another important difference between the government of New Netherland and those of most of the early English colonies was its de facto policy of religious toleration. Jews were permitted to settle here, and from 1657 became burghers, as in Holland. Though only a handful did so, their status was testimony to the tolerant nature of the Dutch back home, in contrast to other European nations.9 The arrival of the Quakers, however, prompted the director general to issue an edict in 1656 banning all Christian services which were not held according to the Calvinist Synod of Dort. Given the heterogeneous nature of the population, the edict proved unworkable, and it was relaxed in 1663.

  The policy of religious toleration was largely responsible for turning New Netherland into what, for its time, was the most ethnically and religiously pluralistic colony on the continent. With low rates of unemployment at home, relatively small numbers of Dutch people wished to immigrate to the colony. But New Netherland attracted Germans from Westphalia, Huguenots from France, and Puritans from New England, in addition to Belgians, Scandinavians, and Dutch. A French Jesuit who visited New Amsterdam in 1643 commented on the town's “confusion of tongues,” although historians have also found that most immigrants became assimilated to Dutch customs and learned the Dutch language once they arrived.

  Dutch success in New Netherland coincided with growing Dutch dominance in the Atlantic slave trade, and this too would have an impact on the colony's ethnic and racial makeup. By the 1630s as many as 10 percent of the people being brought to the colony were enslaved Africans. Slavery in New Netherland resembled slavery in early Virginia in the sense that both systems were relatively fluid. Elderly slaves who belonged to the Dutch West Indian Company were eligible for a status called “half-freedom,” which manumitted them late in life (but did not enable them to pass on their status to their children). Nevertheless, many enslaved Africans in New Netherland had enough experience with Europeans to be able to find ways to expand their rights and become incorporated into Dutch society. Slaves successfully petitioned the company to be allowed to work for wages with the object of purchasing their freedom. They learned Dutch, adopted Dutch surnames, had their marriages blessed and infants baptized in the Dutch Reformed Church, brought successful lawsuits in the courts, and participated in the militia. By 1664, one in five Africans was free, and some freed people had been able to acquire land and create independent communities. Making up perhaps 20 percent of the total population of New Amsterdam, Africans were a highly visible part of its ethnic patchwork. Even so, there is evidence that the economic position of Africans in New Netherland began to erode as the Dutch increased their commitment to slavery. By 1660 two out of every five households in New York City had an African slave, and manumission was becoming less common.

  By 1660, the colony's total population had grown to perhaps 7,000. The fur trade brought in a steady income, and the colony was more than self-sufficient. In the late 1650s, however, a scarcity of beaver depressed the value of wampum, so that Stuyvesant had to issue a proclamation to stabilize prices and prevent profiteering. Also, further disputes with local Algonquian peoples began when an Indian woman was killed as she took fruit from an orchard; before hostilities ended a considerable number of both Dutch and Algonquian people had been killed.

  Meanwhile, competitive pressure for the fur trade was increasing because of the creation of a new settlement west and south of New Netherland. Dutch claims to the Delaware or South River were challenged by Sweden beginning in 1636, when King Augustus Adolphus chartered a general trading company and secured a new charter specifically for the Delaware region. Ironically the first group of Swedes was taken there late in 1637 by the former director general of New Netherland, Peter Minuit, who established Fort Christina near present-day Wilmington.

  New Sweden was always a struggling entity. Sweden was remote, and the company rarely sent supplies to the colonists. Without trade goods from Europe, the New Swedish settlers could not take part in the fur trade in a conventional sense. Yet because the Delaware Valley was centrally located at the convergence of various Indian and European trade networks, the Swedes were able to serve as brokers in arranging trade between various European and Indian groups. They bought trade goods, mostly from English merchants in New England, exchanged them for furs, and then resold the furs in New Amsterdam, New England, or Virginia. A steady supply of furs came from their main Indian trading partners, the powerful Susquehannocks, who themselves ranged far inland to arrange purchases from other Indians. To safeguard their favored trading relationship, the Swedes armed the Susquehannocks with guns, just as the Dutch occasionally did with the Mohawk. The Swedes also traded with the local Lenape Indians (later renamed the Delawa
re), who supplied them with food.10

  The venture on the Delaware always posed a threat to the Dutch West India Company's aspirations to control the Indian trade in the region. From the time he had first heard the news of Minuit's settlement, Director General Kieft had warned that New Netherland would preserve its sovereignty. And when the English began the first of its trade wars against the Dutch in 1652, the Dutch became fearful of a Swedish–English alliance. So in 1655 the Dutch captured Fort Casimir, ending Swedish control in the region. Under the terms negotiated between Stuyvesant and the Swedish director, all the inhabitants were allowed to depart with their possessions. Those who stayed were to swear loyalty to the Dutch States-General. Stuyvesant then appointed a deputy director general to govern the area as a province of New Netherland.

  Even more threatening to the Dutch than Swedish encroachments was the spread of the English settlements on Long Island and along the coast. During the 1643 hostilities with the Indians the Dutch and English had cooperated, but once that danger receded the tension between them returned. The Dutch still occupied Fort Hope on the Connecticut River but were becoming increasingly isolated by the presence of English colonists in that area.

  The Dutch recognized that they could not treat the English as they would treat the tiny colony of New Sweden. Consequently, Stuyvesant decided to negotiate, and in September 1650 he met with representatives of the New England confederacy and agreed to a boundary line dividing Long Island in the vicinity of Oyster Bay. Two sources of potential conflict remained, however: the Dutch were to keep their post at Hartford, and the English settlements of Flushing and Hempstead remained on the Dutch side of the border. Although this treaty was not recognized by Oliver Cromwell, the effective leader of the English Commonwealth after the execution of Charles I, Massachusetts insisted on honoring it when war broke out between England and Holland in 1654, being reluctant to fight a Protestant neighbor merely for the sake of England's commerce. Connecticut, however, took a different view and unilaterally seized Fort Hope. With the remaining English settlements in New Netherland still expressing discontent, it was clear that further conflict was yet to come.