Colonial America
Page 79
A century earlier English colonial governments had been able to organize reasonably effective military operations, defending themselves against occasional raids by Spanish or French forces and even prevailing in the end against sizable Indian rebellions such as King Philip's War. Now the British colonies seemed helpless to meet the new military challenge of a full-fledged war with New France. Their populations had ceased to be wary of Indian attacks, since most of the Indians had moved further west. Moreover they were now facing a new kind of threat. Instead of a regional Indian rebellion or localized raids, the British colonies now faced a broad coalition of Indian peoples along with the French who were coordinating their actions. This new foe was better armed, supplied, and organized than past enemies had been. And finally the scale of warfare had changed significantly. Places like Ticonderoga and Niagara were no longer simple wooden structures; they were built of stone. It required skilled engineers and a siege train to batter them into submission. By early 1756 it was clear to British officials that further British aid would have to be sent to the colonies if the French were to be stopped.6
3 The Conquest of Canada
The British government resolved to persevere with its objectives in North America, even though France was threatening to invade Britain itself early in 1756. For once it was America which was engulfing Europe in war. First, a new commander, Lord Loudoun, was sent to replace Braddock, who had died in the engagement on the Ohio. Accompanying him were two more regiments of regulars. Plans were also made to raise four battalions from among the German inhabitants of Pennsylvania, to be officered by Swiss and other German-speaking professionals. However, the threat to invade Britain delayed Loudoun's departure, and he arrived too late to prevent the marquis de Montcalm from seizing Oswego in August 1756.
After arriving in North America Loudoun struggled to organize the colonial volunteers who had agreed to join the British war effort. A New England force had been gathered at Lake George under the command of John Winslow, who experienced all the supply difficulties that had dogged Shirley and Johnson the previous year. When Loudoun tried to amalgamate the New England force with his own, he met resistance. Previously the duke of Cumberland, the captain general of the British army, had decreed that no colonial should rank ahead of any regular officer. A British lieutenant could thus give orders to a provincial colonel, creating much resentment in the process, although the colonial lack of military experience partly justified this rule.
Map 26 The struggle for Canada, 1756–1760.
The colonial rank and file were equally disenchanted with Loudoun's plans to create a joint force. They had witnessed the severity of regular discipline and had no wish to experience it themselves. For most of them, soldiering was merely an interlude to earn some money and experience a bit of adventure. They were determined not to have their service prolonged past a single campaign, which they feared would be the result if they served alongside the regulars. To New Englanders especially, military service was a contract which both parties must observe. If the government broke its part of the bargain, then desertion was no crime. Their officers recognized this, realizing that they must appeal to their men's better nature rather than command through brute discipline. Such views were quite alien to the British officer corps; they were used to commanding a force made up of poor and working-class British men who became professional soldiers because they lacked other economic options. British soldiers learned to obey orders without question.7
Loudoun also struggled to get the supplies he needed from the provincial assemblies, whose members seemed to him to worry more about preserving their political prerogatives than about defeating the French. In Pennsylvania, even with the Quakers gone, the new assembly remained just as mired in conflict with the proprietors as the previous one. Unwilling to tax the population unless the proprietors paid their fair share, the assembly inserted a clause taxing the proprietary estates into the bill appropriating money for the war, which the Penn family vetoed as a result. In Maryland the lower house remained at loggerheads with the proprietary government, so that even when the house granted supplies, it did so in a manner which the proprietors felt bound to reject. In Virginia, Washington complained bitterly about the attitudes of representatives in the House, whom he called men “tenacious of liberty,” who “condemn all proceedings technically illegal, without considering their necessity.” The result was that Loudoun was chronically short of funds.
Although Loudoun complained bitterly that the colonial assemblies were lacking in patriotism, members of the assemblies in fact represented constituents who were lacking in cash. Even though settlers in the rural areas of the colonies were relatively prosperous in the sense that they had better food and shelter than their contemporaries in rural England or Scotland, colonial economies also suffered from chronic shortages of currency. Farmers had adapted to the scarcity of specie by going heavily into debt, meaning that the impoundment of livestock or of a crop of corn or wheat would seriously threaten their financial solvency. Under these circumstances, colonial assemblymen were understandably reluctant to burden their rural constituents with additional taxes. Loudoun, however, failed to comprehend why the colonials were unwilling to defer to his commands.
Despite his frustration, Loudoun was determined to adopt a more radical approach to defeating the French, namely an assault on the center of French power in the St. Lawrence. To this end he requested an army of 10,000 regulars and a sizable fleet. His plans coincided with the creation of a new ministry in London headed by William Pitt and the duke of Devonshire. They had come into office on a wave of public anger following the loss of the island of Minorca, which was imputed to the incompetence of the Newcastle ministry. The new government promised a more vigorous conduct of the war, authorizing eight additional regiments, or 8,000 men, plus a fleet of 12 ships of the line with orders to attack Louisburg and Québec.8
Loudoun's plan was to transport most of the regulars by sea, leaving a holding force to prevent another incursion such as had happened at Oswego the previous year. Loudoun by now thoroughly distrusted the military capabilities of the provincials but, realizing that he could not do without them, he visited the several provincial capitals between Boston and Philadelphia during the spring of 1757. Yet his brusque manner merely exacerbated the existing conflicts between the civilian and military authorities.
A major point of tension concerned quartering. In Britain, the Mutiny Act allowed the army to quarter its men on local inns and taverns. The colonists argued that this legislation did not apply in North America. Most American taverns in any case were gin shops, with no stables for horses or accommodation for guests. Loudoun accordingly began billeting his men in private houses. The colonists quickly protested, appealing to the English Bill of Rights, which forbade this practice. Loudoun then pointed out that it was inconsistent to accept one act of Parliament but not another. He believed that the colonies were in the same constitutional position as Scotland, where quartering on the local population was allowed. When the magistrates refused to act, Loudoun ordered his officers to take the matter into their own hands, lodging the largest number of men on the offending magistrates themselves. Similar difficulties occurred over the army's demand for wagons and horses, which Loudoun also believed he could demand as of right.
Though tensions undoubtedly plagued Loudoun's relationship with the colonial population, the degree of hostility should not be exaggerated. Most colonials recognized that the army needed quarters, transport, and supplies. In 1755 New York passed an act allowing the impressment of ship's carpenters and boatmen for the Niagara and Lake George campaigns; and in 1756 it provided for the billeting of troops and passed another measure allowing the impressment of carriages. Even Pennsylvania passed an act in March 1756 approving the military use of farmers' wagons. Substantial contributions from New England and the middle colonies enabled Loudoun to sail for Halifax in June 1757 with a considerable armada to await the forces from Britain.
Unfortunately
for Loudoun, events in Halifax did not work out as planned. Although he arrived in good time, the forces from Britain did not appear before July, by which time the French had gathered a powerful fleet at Louisburg. Without command of the sea, Loudoun dared not proceed in case his army became trapped on the barren wastes of Cape Breton Island. Even if the French fleet remained in port, Louisburg was almost impossible to attack, since French naval guns could bombard the besieging force.
While the British tried to get organized, the French under General Montcalm were preparing for an assault on Britain's Fort William Henry at the foot of Lake George. Ever since the French success at Oswego, Indians from the Catholic mission settlements (reserves) in New France and the pays d'en haut had been flocking to Montréal and the forts at Lake Champlain to volunteer for service with the French. By late July of 1757, approximately 2,000 Indian warriors had assembled at Fort Carillon where Montcalm was readying some 6,000 French and Canadian forces for a planned assault on the fort. The garrison there had fewer than 1,500 British and North American soldiers by this time, having recently suffered a number of losses from Indian and Canadian attacks. Additional British regular and colonial forces were available at Fort Edward on the Hudson. Nevertheless, General Webb at Fort Edward decided he was not strong enough to send significant numbers of reinforcements until his own fort had been reinforced by the provincial militias of New England.
Montcalm arrived in early August, laid siege to Fort William Henry, and within a week convinced the British commander to surrender. Montcalm assured him that the British and provincial forces inside the fort would be granted the honors of war, meaning the French would allow them to keep their arms (though not ammunition) and guarantee them the right to travel safely to Fort Edward. What Montcalm had not anticipated was the reaction of his Native American allies. The Indians had expected to be allowed as was customary to take captives and trophies as proof of their bravery in battle, but Montcalm's agreement with the British had deprived them of what they believed was their due. Angry, many of the warriors decided they would take captives and scalps anyway. The night after the surrender, the Indians killed most of the British sick and wounded and took their scalps. The following morning they surrounded the retreating British soldiers and their civilian camp followers, taking prisoners. When Montcalm tried to stop them, the Indians killed a number of the prisoners rather than allow their captives to go free. In all, between 100 and 200 Britons were killed and more than 300 carried off captive.9
This defeat concluded what had been a most unhappy year for the British. From April to July the country had no ministry because Pitt and Newcastle were unable to work together. In New England there was even talk of reviving the seventeenth-century Confederation of the United Colonies so that the war could be prosecuted independently of the British. The scheme came to nothing because early in 1758 news arrived that the government, with Pitt firmly back in power, had made important concessions. First, the issue of rank was settled. In the future colonial officers would rank with the regulars, albeit as the most junior in each category. Next, the abrasive Loudoun was to be replaced by a new commander-in-chief, General Abercromby. Third, the British treasury would feed and arm the colonial troops; the provincials would merely have to provide their pay, and even this expense would be reimbursed.
In the colonies, outrage at the news of the defeat at Fort William Henry rapidly solved the problem of recruitment. Especially in New England, anger over “the massacre” at the fort fused with longstanding anti-Catholic resentment towards the French and their alliances with Indians. Male inhabitants of the New England colonies became convinced that this was a war with providential significance and enthusiastically joined the fight. Their newfound enthusiasm was no doubt strengthened by Pitt's new promises of financial support. In Boston, where Loudoun had been seeking 2,000 men, the news of Pitt's letter induced the assembly immediately to vote 7,000 men. A similar response came from Connecticut, while New York also agreed to meet its quota of 2,400. Of the northern colonies, only Pennsylvania proved difficult, though supplies and men were finally secured after the proprietary government had agreed to be more flexible. Even the Virginia House of Burgesses voted to raise two regiments of 1,000 men, now that the major expense would be borne by the British, since this allowed the payment of a large bounty and eliminated the need for a compulsory draft from the militia.
While Pitt's determination to raise thousands of new men boded well for the British, other developments taking place by 1758 were weakening the ability of New France to resist. The western Indians who had participated in the Battle of Fort William Henry had been deeply offended by Montcalm's attempts to stop them from taking captives after the battle. Moreover their people were becoming exhausted by the continuous demands of war. New France had experienced two failed harvests in the previous two years, which meant that both the Indians and the settlers were suffering from food shortages. To make matters worse, the British navy during the previous fall had established blockades that prevented supplies from reaching New France. Not only was it impossible to import food to relieve the starving population, but it was also becoming difficult for traders to supply the guns and gunpowder upon which their Indian allies depended to hunt. Morale and military readiness – as well as the enthusiasm of the Indians for the French cause – were beginning to wane.
For 1758 the British ministry decided upon a three-pronged offensive. General Amherst, supported by the fleet, was to command an army of 14,000 regulars in another attempt against Louisburg and Québec. Abercromby was to advance north from New York towards Montréal with 8,000 British and 20,000 provincial troops. Finally, Brigadier John Forbes, commanding a mixed force of 2,000 regulars and 5,000 provincials, would advance westwards in a new effort to capture Fort Duquesne at the forks of the Ohio.
The British attack on Louisburg was successful, since the French fleet that was intended for its relief was prevented from sailing. The fortress finally capitulated early in July 1758. After Amherst had secured it, however, it was too late to move on to Québec.
Meanwhile, Abercromby had suffered a setback on the northern front, where the largest number of men were deployed. He reached his first objective, the fortress of Ticonderoga, early in July, and then heard that Montcalm was expecting reinforcements of 3,000 Canadians and Indian warriors. Although Ticonderoga was a stone fortification, Abercromby reasoned that if he stormed the outer entrenchments which held most of Montcalm's 6,000 men, he would be able to take the fort at his leisure. It proved a fatal miscalculation. Montcalm had protected his army with a breastwork of trees lined with sharpened stakes. When the assault began, the British were unable to break through the enemy's lines, and over 1,500 regulars and 300 colonials were killed or wounded as a result. The carnage was so severe that Abercromby decided to retreat back down Lake George to reorganize his shattered command.
In August, Abercromby's ambitious quartermaster, Colonel John Bradstreet, achieved an unexpected victory further to the west. Bradstreet had long advocated an attack on the French post of Frontenac on Lake Ontario. He argued that this post must now be denuded of troops, given the operations elsewhere, and that its destruction would strike a blow against the French chain linking Canada with Louisiana and help Forbes in his attempt on Fort Duquesne. Abercromby sensibly agreed, giving Bradstreet a force of 2,500 men mainly from New York. Bradstreet began his advance in August and found the French defenses negligible. Frontenac was burned, along with several boats and numerous stores. Bradstreet made no attempt to hold the post or to reoccupy Oswego, judging the French ability to retaliate too formidable. Nevertheless, a major blow to French power had been delivered. The destruction of the supplies at Fort Frontenac and the boats that were used to transport them deprived the French of their ability to provision the western forts and deliver trade goods to their Indian allies in the West.
Forbes, too, was successful at Fort Duquesne, though as a result of numerous troubles he reached his objective only in Novemb
er. The Maryland assembly refused aid even for the 300 troops it had previously supplied at Fort Frederick. Next, Forbes found his Native American allies difficult to control. The Cherokees alone observed Pitt's timetable for an offensive starting in May. When it seemed that the British would never advance, the Indians began to drift away, carrying their supplies with them.
Before the attack, Forbes received assistance from an unexpected quarter. The eastern Delawares, supported by the antiproprietary faction in Pennsylvania, convinced the western Delawares to attend a peace conference with representatives of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and the Iroquois nations. The eastern Delawares hoped that in exchange for an agreement by their western kin to withdraw from the war, Pennsylvania would repudiate the Walking Purchase and compensate them for the land they had lost. The western Delawares had become exhausted by the war and were interested in finding a way to get out of it if they could do so without sacrificing their independence. Pennsylvania officials promised a better-regulated trade and assured the Delawares that land west of the Alleghenies would be returned to them. In exchange, the western Delawares agreed in October 1758 to stop fighting, under the Treaty of Easton. By this time representatives of other western nations were indicating a similar desire for peace. As a result the French were abandoned at a critical time and there was no repetition of Braddock's defeat. The French commander eventually burned Fort Duquesne rather than surrender it.10