Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army

by Jeremy Scahill

  When asked directly whether this was a murder, which Iraqi officials had alleged, Prince said, “It was a guy that put himself in a bad situation.” Pressed further, Prince consulted with his advisers and said, “Beyond watching detective shows on TV, sir, I am not a lawyer, so I can’t determine whether it would be a manslaughter, a negligent homicide, I don’t know. I don’t know how to nuance that. But I do know he broke our rules, he put himself in a bad situation and something very tragic happened.”

  The committee also released an internal e-mail from a Blackwater employee to a colleague just after the shooting, noting that an Iraqi TV report had erroneously attributed the killing of the bodyguard to a U.S. soldier. “At least the ID of the shooter will take the heat off us,” the Blackwater employee wrote. Representative Elijah Cummings concluded, “In other words, he was saying: ‘Wow, everyone thinks it was the military and not Blackwater. What great news for us. What a silver lining.’” Prince responded, “I don’t believe that false story lasted in the media for more than a few hours, sir.”

  This exchange would set off a discussion about one of the main questions of the hearing: was Blackwater hurting the U.S. military’s stated counterinsurgency program in Iraq?

  “It does appear from some of the evidence here that Blackwater and other companies sometimes, at least, conduct their missions in ways that lead exactly in the opposite direction that General Petraeus wants to go,” Democrat John Tierney told Prince. “That doesn’t mean you’re not fulfilling your contractual obligations.” Tierney then read numerous comments from U.S. military officials and counterinsurgency experts raising questions about Blackwater’s actions having a blowback effect on official U.S. troops.

  Tierney quoted Army Col. Peter Mansoor: “If they push traffic off the roads or if they shoot up a car that looks suspicious, they may be operating within their contract, but it is to the detriment of the mission, which is to bring the people over to our side.” He quoted retired Army officer Ralph Peters: “Armed contractors do harm COIN—counterinsurgency efforts. Just ask the troops in Iraq.” Brig. Gen. Karl Horst: “These guys run loose in this country and do stupid stuff. There is no authority over them, so you can’t come down on them when they escalate force. They shoot people and someone else has to deal with the aftermath. It happens all over the place.” And Col. Thomas X. Hammes: “The problem is in protecting the principal, they had to be very aggressive. And each time they went out they had to offend locals, forcing them to the side of the road, being overpowering and intimidating, at times running vehicles off the road, making enemies each time they went out. So they were actually getting that contract exactly as we asked them to—it was at the same time hurting our counterinsurgency effort.”

  Tierney told Prince, “So when we look at Blackwater’s own records that show that you regularly move traffic off the roads and you shoot up cars—in over 160 incidents of firing on suspicious cars—we can see, I think, why the tactics you use in carrying out your contract might mitigate [sic] against what we’re trying to do in the insurgency.”

  “I understand the challenges that the military faces there,” Prince responded, adding, “We strive for perfection, but we don’t get to choose when the bad guys attack us. You know, the bad guys have figured out—the terrorists have figured out how to make a precision weapon with a car, load it with explosives with a suicidal driver.”

  Representatives also raised the issue of cost, pointing out that each Blackwater operative cost taxpayers $1,222 per day. “We know that sergeants in the military generally cost the government between $50,000 to $70,000 per year,” Waxman said. “We also know that a comparable position at Blackwater costs the federal government over $400,000, six times as much.” Prince was confronted with Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s statement a week earlier on the issue of the disparity in pay between soldiers and private forces. “I worry that sometimes the salaries they are able to pay in fact lures some of our soldiers out of the service to go to work for them,” Gates had said, adding that he was seeking legal advice on whether a “noncompete” clause could be put into security contracts. Prince said it would be “fine” with him but asserted that “it would be upsetting to a lot of soldiers if they didn’t have the ability to use the skills they learned in the military in the private sector.”

  Toward the end of the hearing, it was noted that General Petraeus makes about $180,000 a year. When asked his own salary, Prince said he didn’t know exactly and then, when pressed, offered that it was “more than $1 million.” He estimated that about 90 percent of the business of the Prince Group empire (Blackwater’s parent company) comes from federal contracts. He wouldn’t say how much the company had made for its work in Iraq, but “as an example” he said under some contracts Blackwater earns a profit margin of about 10 percent, which one Congressman remarked could mean more than $100 million. Prince adamantly refused to answer the profit question directly. “We’re a private company,” he said. “The key word there is ‘private.’”

  Connecticut Democrat Christopher Murphy, incredulous, asked, “How can you say that information isn’t relevant?” adding, “my constituents pay 90 percent of your salary.” Finally, Prince quipped, “I’m not a financially driven guy.”

  While Blackwater’s actions in Iraq over the past four years have consistently resulted in an escalation of violence and bloodshed there, many of the most infamous incidents involving the company were not discussed or only brought up in passing at the hearing. Some of the Democrats on the committee appeared to be reading their briefing papers while Prince was testifying, giving the impression that they were ill-prepared to address Blackwater’s central role in the U.S. war machine. Prince did face some tough and important questions, but often his answers were left to stand with no credible follow-up or challenge. All the while, the very reason Prince found himself before Congress that day and the reason the world watched his testimony—the Nisour Square massacre—went undiscussed, the Iraqi victims unmentioned.

  The Republicans did their best to portray the hearing as a witch-hunt and heaped praise on Prince for his patriotism and service. “This is not about Blackwater,” said conservative California Republican Darrell Issa. “What we are hearing today is, in fact, a repeat of the MoveOn.org attack on General Petraeus’s patriotism.” Several Republicans thanked Prince for keeping them alive when they toured Iraq, the irony of how this could impact their impartiality apparently lost on them.

  It wasn’t lost on Massachusetts Democrat Stephen Lynch. He said in his trips to Iraq, he too had been protected by Blackwater, which he acknowledged “did a very, very good job.” He added, “I find myself right now with this committee having a difficult time criticizing those employees, because I am in their debt . . . which brings me to my problem. If I have a problem criticizing Blackwater and criticizing the employees and some of the times that you have fouled up, what about the State Department?” Lynch questioned how any effective investigations into Blackwater’s conduct could be expected when Blackwater itself is responsible for the safety of those tasked with investigating the company. “The State Department employees, you protect them every single day. You protect their physical well-being, you transport them, you escort them. And I am sure there is a heavy debt of gratitude on the part of the State Department for your service,” Lynch told Prince. “And yet they are the very same people who are in our system responsible for holding you accountable in every respect with your contract and the conduct of your employees. . . . That is an impossible conflict for them to resolve.” Prince never addressed the matter because Lynch’s time expired. But Lynch’s point was an important one. According to the Oversight Committee’s investigation, “There is no evidence” that “the State Department sought to restrain Blackwater’s actions, raised concerns about the number of shooting incidents involving Blackwater or the company’s high rate of shooting first, or detained Blackwater contractors for investigation.” 116 Indeed, the State Department had not only failed to effective
ly investigate or rein in Blackwater; there was evidence that it had done the reverse, covering for the company when it landed in the hot seat.

  As the duration of the hearing neared four hours, Prince was asked if he wanted to take a break or deal with the remaining questions. “I’ll take them, and then let’s be done,” he shot back. Moments later, Prince’s lawyer shot up from his chair behind the Blackwater chief and frantically directed a “T” for “time” with his hands toward the committee. With that, the hearing came to an end. Prince stood up, grabbed the paper with his name on it from the table, and marched with his entourage from the room.

  There is no question the Justice Department’s intervention at the eleventh hour took some of the heat off Prince over Nisour Square. “He gave a very self-serving testimony to us,” said Waxman. “I can understand that that’s what he wanted to do. That was in his interest to do it.”117 Blackwater clearly felt its man had won the day. Emboldened by Prince’s defiant appearance before Congress, Blackwater would launch a new PR campaign to defend its image, and its star would be Prince himself. Far from facing the heat of a critical media, Prince would find friendly faces and softball questions as he met the press. Shortly after his Congressional testimony, Prince’s longtime friend archconservative California Congressman Dana Rohrabacher compared the Blackwater chief to another controversial figure who had once been forced to raise his right hand before Congress. “Prince,” Rohrabacher said, “is on his way to being an American hero just like Ollie North was.”118

  In the meantime, in Baghdad, the survivors and victims’ families of Nisour Square were learning what U.S. justice really meant.

  Nothing You Say Can and Will Be Used Against You in a Court of Law

  Any criminologist will tell you that it is essential to seal off the scene of a crime as soon as possible. Evidence must be secured, witnesses interviewed, suspects identified and taken into custody. It is a race against the clock. The Bush administration’s handling of Nisour Square was a textbook case in how not to investigate a crime. Perhaps that was the point all along.

  Ten days after the shooting, and with the administration facing a mounting scandal, the State Department’s “first blush” report on Nisour Square was leaked to the media. Dated September 16, 2007, the day of the shooting, and stamped “Sensitive but Unclassified,” it was titled “SAF [small-arms fire] attack on COM team.”119 The report alleged that the Blackwater team entered the square and was “engaged with small arms fire” from “8-10 persons” who “fired from multiple nearby locations, with some aggressors dressed in civilian apparel and others in Iraqi police uniforms. The team returned defensive fire.” It made no mention of any civilian deaths or injuries. While it appeared as though the State Department had investigated and was contradicting the widespread allegations of an unprovoked shooting, what was not revealed at the time was that the report was written by a Blackwater contractor, Darren Hanner, and printed on official State Department letterhead.120

  It would be two weeks before the Bush administration would get around to deploying a ten-person team from the FBI—the official investigative body of the U.S. government—to Baghdad to investigate the shooting.121 As the FBI prepared to depart for Baghdad, reports emerged that the agents were to be guarded by none other than Blackwater itself.122 Senator Patrick Leahy quickly raised questions about the arrangement, forcing the Bureau to announce it would be guarded by official personnel and not personnel from the same company it was investigating.123

  In the meantime, the official investigation of the Bush administration would be conducted by the State Department, whose personnel continued to depend on the chief suspects to keep them alive. “To rely on non-law enforcement to conduct sensitive law enforcement activities makes no sense if you want impartial justice,” said Melanie Sloan, a former federal prosecutor who currently serves as executive director of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington.124

  Normally when a group of people alleged to have gunned down seventeen civilians in a lawless shooting spree are questioned, investigators will tell them something along the lines of: “You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.” But that is not what the Blackwater operatives involved in the Nisour Square shooting were told. They were questioned by State Department Diplomatic Security investigators with the understanding that their statements and information gleaned from them could neither be used to bring criminal charges against them nor even be introduced as evidence.125

  ABC News obtained copies of sworn statements given by Blackwater guards in the immediate aftermath of the shootings, all of which began, “I understand this statement is being given in furtherance of an official administrative inquiry,” and “I further understand that neither my statements nor any information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be used against me in a criminal proceeding.”126 CCR’s Ratner said the offering of so-called “use immunity” agreements by the State Department was “very irregular,” adding he could not recall a precedent for it.127 In normal circumstances, Ratner said, such immunity was granted only after a grand jury or Congressional committee had been convened and the party had invoked its Fifth Amendment right for protection against self-incrimination. Immunity would then be authorized by either a judge or the committee.

  “What the State Department has done in this case is inconsistent with proper law enforcement standards. It is likely to undermine an ultimate prosecution, if not make it impossible,” said military law expert Scott Horton of Human Rights First. “In this sense, the objective of the State Department in doing this is exposed to question. It seems less to be to collect the facts than to immunize Blackwater and its employees. By purporting to grant immunity, the State Department draws itself more deeply into the wrongdoing and adopts a posture vis-à-vis Blackwater that appears downright conspiratorial. This will make the fruits of its investigation a tough sell.”128 One U.S. diplomat described the relationship between the U.S. Embassy’s security office in Baghdad and Blackwater to the Los Angeles Times. “They draw the wagon circle,” the diplomat said. “They protect each other. They look out for each other. I don’t know if that’s a good thing, that wall of silence. When it protects the guilty, that is definitely not a good thing.”129

  But it wasn’t just that the State Department was apparently corrupting or stifling the investigation or hindering a successful prosecution of Blackwater. As Congress investigated Nisour Square, what emerged was evidence of a clear pattern of the State Department urging Blackwater to pay what amounted to hush money to Iraqi victims’ families. “In cases involving the death of Iraqis, it appears that the State Department’s primary response was to ask Blackwater to make monetary payments to ‘put the matter behind us,’ rather than to insist upon accountability or to investigate Blackwater personnel for potential criminal liability,” according to a report of the House Oversight Committee. “The most serious consequence faced by Blackwater personnel for misconduct appears to be termination of their employment.”130 Congressman Waxman charged that the State Department was “acting as Blackwater’s enabler.”131

  On Christmas Day 2006, the day after Blackwater operative Andrew Moonen allegedly shot and killed the Iraqi vice president’s bodyguard, the State Department recommended that Blackwater pay off the guard’s family. The U.S. Embassy’s chargé d’affaires wrote to the regional security officer, Blackwater’s handler, “Will you be following in up [sic] Blackwater to do all possible to assure that a sizeable compensation is forthcoming? If we are to avoid this whole thing becoming even worse, I think a prompt pledge and apology—even if they want to claim it was accidental—would be the best way to assure the Iraqis don’t take steps, such as telling Blackwater that they are no longer able to work in Iraq.”132

  It was a prophetic warning, coming a full nine months before the Iraqis would demand just that in the aftermath of Nisour Square. The chargé d’affaires initially suggested a $250,000 payment, bu
t the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service said this was too much and could cause Iraqis to “try to get killed so as to set up their family financially.”133 In the end, the State Department and Blackwater reportedly agreed on a $15,000 payment. During his Congressional testimony, Prince corrected that figure, saying Blackwater had actually paid $20,000.134 In another case, in Al Hillah in June 2005, a Blackwater operator killed an “apparently innocent bystander” and the State Department requested that Blackwater pay the family $5,000.135 “Can you tell me how it was determined that this man’s life was worth $5,000?” Representative Davis asked Prince. “We don’t determine that value, sir,” Prince responded. “That’s kind of an Iraqi-wide policy. We don’t make that one.”136 In cases where the government and Blackwater claimed the guards fired in self-defense, though, no money was offered to victims’ families. The three victims of the Blackwater sniper at the Iraqi TV station in February 2007, for example, received nothing.137

  Shortly after the Nisour Square shootings, the State Department began contacting the Iraqi victims’ families. Dr. Jawad, whose son and wife were the first victims that day, said U.S. officials asked him how much money he wanted in compensation. “I said their lives are priceless,” Jawad recalled.138 But the U.S. officials continued pressing him for a dollar amount. He said he told a State Department representative “if he could give me my loved ones, I would gladly give him $200 million.” To many Iraqis, the U.S. offers were an insult. “If you perceive marriage as half of your life, Mahasin was my best half,” Jawad said, talking about his wife. “We were always together. I don’t know how to manage my life or care for my other two children without her.”139