Victoria's Generals

by Steven J Corvi

  While Buller was trying to extricate Hart’s men, a second disaster was unfolding. Colonel C J Long’s 1st Brigade Division, RFA had been ordered to support Hildyard’s crossing of Iron Bridge. Buller had given Long strict orders not to move his guns forward, a tactic that he had successfully utilised in the Sudan in 1898, and to remain under the cover of Barton’s 6th Brigade. Long disregarded the command and pushed past his escort. Boer firepower quickly silenced the guns and all attempts to rescue them failed. Although Hildyard’s brigade managed to advance coolly towards the river in extended formation and drive the Boers from their trenches on the other side, and most of Lyttelton’s brigade had seen no action, without the guns and without Hart’s support, Buller did not want to risk a river crossing. He ordered a retreat and British forces fell back to Chieveley and Frere.55

  Some, like Amery, have suggested that Buller lost heart at Colenso. But if he had, his men still were not aware of it. Dundonald, who was deeply disappointed in the outcome of the battle, believing that he could have taken Hlangwane with support from Barton, wrote of his chief, ‘He was here, there and everywhere, riding over the field. Buller’s personal courage created a feeling of confidence amongst the men which they held throughout the whole Natal campaign.’56

  Although the men may have still supported Buller, the Cabinet no longer did. Following this third loss of ‘Black Week’, Lansdowne wanted change. He wanted both Gatacre and Methuen sacked, the latter of whom he wanted replaced by Sir Charles Warren. Buller saw these ‘proposals’ as meddling, and he also thought that it was unfair to condemn these generals directly, and himself indirectly, for the limitations that the War Office and Treasury had placed upon them. If Buller’s intransigence was not enough to earn Lansdowne’s ire, his final undoing was an awkwardly worded message to White which was interpreted by Lansdowne as an invitation to surrender. There is no way to read Buller’s 16 December heliogram to White as anything but despairing. He informed White of the Colenso defeat and his inability to relieve Ladysmith with his current forces. He told White that no help would be coming for at least a month. He encouraged him, if he could not hold out, to destroy his ammunition and to ‘make the best terms you can’.57 Although Buller could claim afterwards that he was not telling White to surrender, the pessimism of the message and other exchanges with both White and Lansdowne rang loudly. Lansdowne made it clear that the government did not consider surrender an option.58 On 18 December, Buller was notified that although he would continue to command ‘the prosecution of the campaign in Natal’, Roberts had been appointed the Commander in Chief of British forces in South Africa.59 Buller wrote to his wife that same day, ‘Two days after I arrived here they ordered me to supersede Sir George White, and I would not, they then ordered me to supersede Gatacre and I would not, and then Methuen and I would not, so now they have superseded me.’60

  White did not surrender and, as Buller had ordained, Warren’s 5th Division was ordered to Natal rather than the Cape Colony. It arrived there on 2 January. Buller put Warren in command of the next advance. By 11 January, British forces had returned to the Tugela but Warren was not ready to try to cross it. With an entrenched Boer force at Potgeiter’s Drift, what Buller wanted from his subordinate was a crossing near Trichardt’s Drift, 5 miles up river, followed by a wide flanking movement towards either Acton Homes or Fair View, which would have opened up a clear path to Ladysmith. The plan was similar to the one he had conceived prior to Black Week. Especially after Colenso, he wanted to avoid another attempt to force the Boers from a difficult spot. But, after crossing the Tugela, seizing the hills that commanded the drift and sending the mounted brigade toward Acton Homes, Warren decided that his army did not have enough food to carry out the operation, a claim that Buller later vigorously denied.61 Warren then vacillated and Buller grew frustrated. ‘I debated with myself,’ he wrote, ‘whether or not I should relieve Warren of his command.’62 But Buller chose not to dismiss Warren and pressed him to take action. Still concerned about his supplies, however, Warren gave up on the flank march and gravitated towards a more direct route to Ladysmith. He challenged the enemy’s defences at Tabanyama, made some headway, but called off the attack. He then considered Spion Kop, a position that towered over the Tugela and commanded any movement towards Ladysmith. According to Warren, Buller gave him two choices: immediately attack Spion Kop or retreat. On 23 January, he attacked.63

  The British had been threatening action for over a week and the Boers had plenty of opportunities to extend from Potgieter’s Drift toward Spion Kop and Tabanyama. However, they only weakly reinforced their position atop Spion Kop. At 2100, Major General Edward Woodgate and 1,600 men of his 11th Brigade began their advance. They reached what appeared to be the summit, chased off the Boers with a bayonet charge and, in complete darkness and under the cover of a thick mist, began to entrench. Only when light began to pierce the mist at about 0800 did Woodgate realise that he had failed to position his men on the crest, and they were now subject to enfilading fire from nearby Aloe Knoll. Woodgate was one of the first casualties of this error. As Boer fire continued, now in support of their counter-attack, Warren gave orders to Major General J Talbot Coke to take two battalions of his 10th Brigade up Spion Kop. Lieutenant Colonel Alec Thorneycroft was appointed acting commander replacing Woodgate, although this order was not communicated to either Thorneycroft or Coke.64 Thorneycroft was forced temporarily to evacuate the trenches due to a concerted Boer attack, but once companies of the 10th Brigade began to arrive, he was able to retake them. The British held the line till nightfall but then Thorneycroft, unbeknownst to Warren and Coke, made the decision to retire; the Boer guns were still pounding his trenches and they could not be silenced, he had no knowledge if any further support was forthcoming, and his men were running out of provisions.65 As Thorneycroft descended to the foot of Spion Kop he was surprised finally to run into reinforcements.66

  Buller found Warren’s inactivity particularly disturbing. He did little to alter the course of events atop Spion Kop, giving no orders for most of the day. Away from Spion Kop, he also did little. Twin Peaks commanded Aloe Knoll. Had the British succeeded in taking that position they would have silenced most of the artillery fire directed at Spion Kop and removed a substantial threat to Thorneycroft’s men. Lyttelton’s 4th Brigade had been making good progress in taking Twin Peaks, but Warren called it back prematurely. So frustrated was Lieutenant Colonel Buchanan Riddell of the 60th Rifles that he refused to obey Lyttelton’s orders and actually seized the heights. Riddell’s untimely death led to the withdrawal of the Rifle Brigade.67

  The day after the battle, Buller called Dundonald to his side. ‘I blame myself for not controlling [Warren],’ Buller told him, ‘but he was sent out after Colenso under such auspices that I did not like to interfere with him.’68 After Spion Kop, Buller would not feel any pressure again to give Warren any major role in his operations. Roberts also complained about Warren: ‘That it failed may, in some measure, be due to the difficulties of the ground and the commanding positions held by the enemy – probably also to the errors of judgement and want of administrative capacity on the part of Sir Charles Warren.’69 But in Roberts’s opinion, the failure was ultimately Buller’s. ‘But whatever faults Sir Charles Warren may have committed, the failure must also be ascribed to the disinclination of the Officer in supreme command to assert his authority and see that what he thought best was done …’70 So damning were Roberts words that the Cabinet decided not to publish them, although Lansdowne went ahead and did it anyway.71

  After reassuming command, Buller was ready to try to relieve Ladysmith again. Roberts, however, was sceptical. He did not want to see another failed attempt and preferred inaction expecting that his own advance towards Bloemfontein would help weaken Boer defences in Natal. Buller, finally showing the strength of will he demonstrated so often during his early career, was determined to break the siege. He pressed his case and convinced Roberts that he had a very good chance in str
iking the Boers a few miles east of Spion Kop at Vaal Krantz. Roberts gave his approval to the plan on 4 February. Buller attacked the next day.

  Buller’s basic plan involved a feint attack on the Boer position at Brakfontein. This was conducted by Major General A S Wynne and four battalions of infantry. Within two hours of this diversion starting, Lyttelton launched the main thrust at Vaal Krantz. Prior to the attack, Buller had his engineers construct a 1½-mile road up the steep Zwarts Kop and put his naval guns and mounted guns atop to support Lyttelton’s advance. Under the cover of artillery fire, the British successfully laid pontoons and crossed the Tugela, and Lyttelton’s force chased the Boers from their positions, sometimes at the point of the bayonet. By nightfall, Lyttelton had taken Vaal Krantz and had ordered his men to dig in, an extremely difficult job since the ground was so rocky. It was also impossible to bring up the guns. To make matters worse, Boer guns, which remained safely out of range of Zwarts Kop, were able to mark the British positions.72 Lyttelton, however, remained on Vaal Krantz through the night and most of the next day, repelling a Boer counter-attack in the afternoon. He was relieved later on the 6 February by Hildyard. Having taken Vaal Krantz, Buller could not think of a way to utilise it and continue the advance. On 7 February, he called his generals to a council of war. He wanted to retire and try again another day at another spot. Lyttelton, Wynne and most of the other generals agreed.73 Keeping a token force near Potgeiter’s Drift, the British returned to Chieveley.

  This third failure to relieve Ladysmith had very little impact on Buller’s overall vision or upon his morale. British forces remained very active on the Tugela for the next ten days, seizing a number of key positions on the south side of the river and extending their lines to the east past Colenso. Buller had already picked where he would strike next and was only waiting for good weather. On 17 February, he ordered Lyttelton to follow up on the successful attack made on Cingolo Hill the day before by the 2nd Cavalry Brigade. Dundonald would co-operate on his right; Hildyard, on the left. Warren and Barton’s men were held in reserve. Despite reinforcement, the Boers could not withstand the steady British bombardment and Lyttelton’s advance. After occupying Cingolo Hill, the advance continued on 18 February with a move across the nek and a successful assault on Monte Cristo. The next day, the guns were brought up to Monte Cristo and Hart and two infantry divisions moved against Hlangwane. The Boers put up fierce resistance but were forced to pull back across the Tugela. Although they managed temporarily to stop the British at Colenso on 20 February, a renewed attack on the 21st by Coke’s 10th Brigade led to its occupation. British successes continued for the next several days at Onderbrook Spruit, Pieter’s Hill, Railway Hill and Hart’s Hill. The Boers retreated and the route to Ladysmith was finally cleared. On 28 February, Dundonald entered the beleaguered city and Buller followed on 1 March.74 The siege of Ladysmith was finally over.

  Even Leo Amery could not find fault with Buller’s operations between 10 February and 1 March, writing, ‘The credit of it belongs, in the first place to Buller.’75 But his overall judgement of Buller’s performance remained severe. ‘In every great war there have been unexpected failures, and always must be,’ he wrote. ‘Buller was one of these.’76 Roberts likewise had already made his mind up about Buller. With the threat to Ladysmith now over, he rejected Buller’s suggestions to reoccupy the northern Natal and attack the passes leading to the Orange Free State. Instead he ordered him on the defensive and began stripping him of his divisions, arguing that they were needed in the Cape Colony and for his advance on Bloemfontein. For the next two months, Buller’s men saw little action.

  In early May, Roberts allowed Buller to begin advancing through northern Natal, a task he completed in just a couple of weeks. With a sizeable enemy force secure in the mountains concentrating in and around Laing’s Nek, Buller moved quickly to threaten their flanks, seizing Botha’s Pass on 8 June and driving them away from Alleman’s Nek on 11th. The Boers were forced to retire from Laing’s Nek without a fight on the night of 12 June. Much of the credit for the success of this operation was given to Roberts for his single-minded advance through the Orange Free State.77 Many critics argued that the Boers pulled out of the northern Natal in order to defend against that advance. But Buller’s flanking movements were decisive. ‘None of the [Boers] can see that Lord Roberts’ advance in any way affected [their] movements,’ one of Buller’s defenders wrote.’78

  Through June, July and into August, Buller’s operations were very limited in scope with his force acting around Standerton. Roberts would not approve any offensive thrust and anyway Buller no longer had the manpower to carry one out. But Buller did still possess some fight left in him. After a council of war on 25 August, Roberts ordered Buller, in conjunction with Major Generals John French and Reginald Pole-Carew, to attack the Boers 3 miles south-east of Belfast at Bergendal. The battle of Bergendal on 27 August is arguably the last set-piece battle of the South African War.

  Bergendal Farm lay on a high crest at the junction of the Carolina and Dalmanutha–Belfast roads. A few hundred yards to the west, a Boer force occupied a ‘natural fortress’ of immense stones and rocky crevices. Colonel J F Brocklehurst was ordered to take some cavalry, mounted infantry and artillery to the left and provide cover for an advance and, at the same time, prevent the Boers from receiving reinforcement. Colonel Walter Kitchener took a second force to the right, entrenched, and then brought the guns forward. From these two positions and with assistance from other guns, the British opened up a massive three-hour bombardment of the kopje. Taken prisoner after the battle, a Boer declared, ‘We dared not leave the post. We dared not – it was certain death.’79 At about 1400, with Roberts observing, Buller ordered Kitchener’s 7th Brigade to advance. Extended across open ground, the 1st Bn Inniskilling Fusiliers and 1st Bn Rifle Brigade assaulted the Boer position. As the British fought their way into the enemy’s defences, the Boers fled, abandoning all of Dalmanutha. ‘The capture of Bergendal,’ Buller cheerfully reported, ‘cleared the whole of the high veldt of the enemy.’80

  Although Buller continued on the offensive driving the enemy from Machadodorp and Helvetia in late August and Lydenburg in September, Buller’s time in South Africa was coming to an end. Confident of an impending victory, Roberts had elected to return to Great Britain and succeed Wolseley as the Commander in Chief of the British army. Lord Kitchener was to take over his responsibilities in South Africa. Buller, who outranked Kitchener, would have to return to England. On 6 October 1900, the Natal Field Force was broken up and Buller said his goodbyes. A soldier wrote, on the occasion,

  When he appeared on the road to mount his horse, the guard of honour came to the present and forgetting all discipline broke out into three loud cheers, poor old Buller held up his hand, and with a broken voice, he thanked them for their kind cheers, and made a short speech [to the] lines of cheering soldiers. His eyes were very wet.81

  Back in London, Buller was reinstated at his former post at Aldershot. Despite some reservations by those who felt Buller had made serious mistakes in the war, it seemed almost pro forma to William St John Brodrick, the new Secretary of State for War, that Buller would quietly finish his term there. Those who had objected, however, were not so quiet. Leo Amery, The Times correspondent who had reported from South Africa and was currently editing the newspaper’s history of the war, was furious. Amery had heard rumours about Buller’s alleged ‘surrender’ telegram to White and, under the pseudonym of ‘Reformer’, launched a series of scathing personal attacks on Buller in September 1901, declaring, ‘[Buller] was so utterly shaken and unnerved by the unexpected and terrible reverse of Colenso that for the moment he abandoned all hope.’82 The Morning Post, the St James’s Gazette, and the Spectator all joined with The Times in calling for his removal. Buller was beside himself. At a speech on 10 October, he defended his actions to a group of soldiers. But impetuously, he went too far. He referred to the secret telegram he had sent White, and, in doing so, h
e broke the King’s regulations. Roberts demanded Buller’s resignation and told Brodrick if Buller did not step down then he would.83 Despite letters of support from his fellow officers, including the Adjutant General, Thomas Kelly-Kenny, Roberts would not budge. When Buller refused to step down, Brodrick went directly to Edward VII and Buller was removed from his Aldershot command and put on half pay on 22 October 1901.84 All of Buller’s appeals for a court-martial to give him a chance to tell his side of the story were rejected. His military career had come to a humiliating end. Buller died on 2 June 1908 from gall-bladder cancer and was buried in Crediton.

  Bibliography

  Two contemporary biographies are Walter Jerrold, Sir Redvers H Buller V.C.: The Story of his Life and Campaigns (London: S W Partridge & Co., 1900) and Lewis Butler, Sir Redvers Buller (London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1901). The standard biography is Colonel C H Melville, The Life of General the Rt. Hon. Sir Redvers Buller, 2 vols (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1923). Geoffrey Powell, Buller: A Scapegoat? A Life of General Sir Redvers Buller 1839–1908 (London: Leo Cooper, 1994) attempts a re-assessment but is not entirely satisfactory in assimilating the most recent research. A study of Buller at the War Office is James B Thomas, ‘Sir Redvers Buller in the post-Cardwellian Army: A Study of the Rise and Fall of a Military Reputation’, unpub. PhD thesis, Texas A&M University, 1993.

  Inevitably, it is Buller’s later career in the South African War that has attracted most interest. The case for the prosecution was put forward by Julian Symons, Buller’s Campaign (London: Cresset Press, 1963), while there was the beginning of a rehabilitation in Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (New York: Random House, 1979). The military politics surrounding Buller’s appointment are summarised in Ian F W Beckett, ‘Buller and the Politics of Command’, in John Gooch, ed., The Boer War: Direction, Experience and Image (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 41–55.