Victoria's Generals

by Steven J Corvi

  Accordingly, on 8 August Gladstone authorised Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Stephenson, GOC in Egypt, to begin assembling transport and supplies, to concentrate a British force at Wadi Halfa and to begin contingency planning. Gladstone still hoped that Gordon might be induced to escape through Dongola, that the Mudir there might be induced to play the Zubeir role, that a small force might suffice to convince the Mahdi to withdraw and that the government would not become ‘enslaved’ to Gordon’s views. He further insisted that no further decisions be taken until every Cabinet member had been consulted. Despite Gladstone’s hesitancy, Hartington proceeded to spend £750,000 on military preparations. Again at Hartington’s insistence and despite the Duke of Cambridge’s strenuous objections, Wolseley was given command of the relief expedition on 26 August.

  As the preparations began to be put in hand in Britain and Egypt, the Mahdi himself was moving towards Khartoum, arriving at Omdurman on 21 October. Slatin later estimated the force’s strength as 200,000 spear-carrying men.71 It was reported to Gordon that there were 40,000 riflemen but Gordon refused to believe it. Already, on 4 September, however, a force commanded by Mohammed Ali Pasha Husayn, who Gordon had ordered to break up an Ansár concentration at El Foun, 25 miles up the Blue Nile, went beyond the range of his steamer guns and was ambushed. He and over 1,000 of Gordon’s best infantry were killed. As a result, the Ansár tightened their noose around the city, and the resupply of the city from the surrounding countryside virtually ceased.

  Now more cut off than ever before and perhaps convinced that only direct information from Khartoum would finally move the British government to action, Gordon resolved on 9 September to send Stewart, Power and the French consul, Herbin, north on the specially refitted steamer Abbas, carrying letters, dispatches, Stewart’s journal, Gordon’s cipher books and a letter reproaching Baring for his inaction and silence. Gordon’s exact reasons remain a mystery since, in various places in letters and in his journal, Gordon implied both that he had decided to send Stewart and also that he accepted Stewart’s request to be sent. He sent the steamers Mansurah and Safia as well as two sailing boats loaded with nineteen heavily armed Greeks to escort them past Berber.

  Wolseley arrived in Cairo on 9 September and, after three weeks’ debate, vetoed Stephenson’s plans to utilise the 480-mile Suakin–Berber route for the main force and to recruit 5,000 loyal tribesmen from Dongola to assemble native boats and drag them past the Nile Cataracts. Wolseley insisted that the falling Nile would not permit their use, choosing instead the 1,650-mile-long route up the Nile. Wolseley also determined to take some 1,600 men and 68 officers from crack mounted units to form a camel corps to race across the Bayuda desert shortcutting the Nile loop from Korti to Berber and El-Metemmeh, and then proceed upstream on Gordon’s steamers to relieve the city.

  Gordon did not initially believe word smuggled into Khartoum of the first British infantry arriving at Wadi Halfa but more definite news was received on 22 September. The day before, Gordon had received two smuggled-in telegrams which he couldn’t read because he had sent his cipher books north with Stewart, some old photographed letters telling him that British senior officers were proceeding to Wadi Halfa and a message from Kitchener asking after Stewart’s health that puzzled him. Gordon ordered a gun salute and pamphlets printed and distributed informing the populace of the news to raise their morale. On 29 September Gordon recorded his thoughts on the role the troops would play and about the Sudan’s future:

  My idea is to induce Her Majesty’s Government to undertake the extrication of all peoples or garrisons … and if that is not their programme, then resign my commission and do what I can to attain it…. Therefore, if her Majesty’s forces are not prepared to [do this], the General should consider whether it is worth coming up – in his place I would not.72

  On 3 October, he even drew up a detailed schedule for the progress of the relief force.

  Anticipating the arrival of a relief force, Gordon sent Mohamad Nushi’s steamers Bordein and Tel el Hawein, each with 300 soldiers, north to Shendi or Metemmeh to await its arrival. They would wait for 112 days. Wolseley, however, was moving deliberately, faced as he was with logistical failures from the lack of experience of the boat crews, the overloaded boats and dromedaries, and the lack of coal for the steamers. He also believed the messages from Gordon, who, unable to understand Arabic, selected the most optimistic bits from the rumours picked up by his staff and transmitted them through Kitchener at the El-Debbah terminus of the telegraph line. In turn, Kitchener emphasised Gordon’s positive attitude to Cairo. In the messages transmitted the other way, Kitchener overestimated the speed and progress of the rescuing force. To staunch these overly optimistic reports, Wolseley himself sent ciphered messages to Gordon, reporting that the mission had fallen behind schedule, but without his cipher books, Gordon was unable to read them. Both Gordon and Wolseley felt that their opposites were not supplying them with sufficient or accurate intelligence, and the Nile was beginning to fall. In fact, Wolseley’s mission was closely defined in the instructions Baring transmitted to him on 8 October: ‘The primary object of the expedition up the valley of the Nile is to bring away General Gordon and Colonel Stewart from Khartoum. When that object has been secured, no further offensive operations of any kind are to be undertaken.’73

  An inventory made by Gordon on 19 October now showed that he had 2,316 Sudanese regulars, 1,421 Egyptian regulars, 1,906 Bashi-Bazouks, 2,330 Shagiya tribesmen and 692 town militia, totalling 8,665 men at arms. For these, he had 2,165,000 rounds of Remington ammunition and his arsenal was producing 40,000 more each week. He had 12 artillery pieces on land and 11 in his remaining 7 steamers, and had 21,141 rounds of ammunition for them. But the food he needed for his soldiers and the 35,000 civilians in the city was running short. He estimated that he had nine weeks’ supply. As hunger spread, looting broke out. Through spies and defectors, the Mahdi was kept well informed of the food situation and, given the leisurely pace of the rescue mission, believed the city could be reduced through starvation. Then on 22 October Gordon received a letter from the Mahdi politely requesting his surrender, and informing him of the deaths of Stewart, Power and Herbin and, as proof, providing a detailed list of the papers recovered from them. Though Gordon refused to believe the report, it was true. North of Berber, the Abbas had hit a rock at full speed and foundered. Its passengers and crew were forced to wade to an island, from which, after two days, Stewart sent a message asking for transport to a seemingly friendly local sheikh, who invited them to his house. Stewart, Power and Herbin went unarmed to confirm their intentions. While eating, armed men accosted them and they were massacred, followed by the crew and other passengers.74

  On 12 November the Mahdi ordered his Nordenfelds and Krupp mountain guns, chronically short of ammunition and fired by locally recruited gunners, to disable or sink Gordon’s remaining steamers. The Ismailia was hit numerous times as she steamed back and forth firing at Ansár forces. The next day, the Husseinieh was holed below the waterline, was grounded to prevent her sinking and, once her guns were removed, was abandoned. Shortly thereafter, as the falling of the Nile enabled the Ansár to move ever closer, the systematic shelling of the city began. Telegraphic communication between Khartoum and Omdurman was cut on 13 November. Gordon believed that this was a minor concern. Nonetheless, on 13 December, Gordon decided to close his journal and send it, along with some last letters, downstream to safety. The next day, after writing letters to his sister and to his friend Colonel Watson, Gordon made his last journal entry: ‘Now MARK THIS, if the Expeditionary Force, and I ask for no more than 200 men, does not come in ten days, the town may fall; and I have done my best for the honour of my country. Good bye. C. G. Gordon. You send me no information, though you have lots of money.’75Two days later, he loaded them on to the Bordein and sent it through a gauntlet of fire to El-Metemmah. He also sent a small written message, ‘Khartoum all right 14.12.84,’76 and a longer verbal message by messenger to W
olseley, who received it on 31 December and interpreted it as advice to come quickly, but without leaving a hostile Berber behind. Wolseley reacted by strengthening his advance column and supply depots, causing further delays. At this point, there were about 14,000 civilians left in the city.

  Recognising that his forces and supplies would not be at full strength until 22 January and conscious of Gordon’s dire condition, Wolseley ordered Kitchener and his Arab scouts to lead the 1,100-man advance party of Herbert Stewart’s Desert Column from their camp at Korti on 30 December to establish an intermediate supply depot at the wells at Gakdul 100 miles away and halfway to El-Metemmeh. They arrived on 2 January to establish British control. Leaving the Camel Regiment and Royal Engineers to prepare and defend the place, Stewart returned to Korti to lead on the rest of the force and their supplies. Stewart left Korti again with the remaining 2,000 men and supplies on 8 January and arrived back at Gakdul on 12 January. During this period, additional British forces arrived at Korti and Wolseley estimated that he would be ready for a full-scale assault in early March.

  After several unsuccessful sorties to draw Ansár forces away from Omdurman, Gordon ordered the garrison, led by Faragh Pasha, to attempt a break-out on 4 January. But the Ansár forced them back into the fort. Shortly thereafter, completely out of food, Gordon authorised the fort’s surrender. On the same day British units captured Hamdah and linked up with the River Column under General Earle. On 12 January the Mahdi again wrote to Gordon, pleading with him to surrender. Gordon did not reply.

  After resting the exhausted animals for 60 hours, the Desert Column resumed its march toward the wells at Abu Klea, 20 miles north of the Nile at El-Metemmeh on 14 January. Colonel Sir Charles Wilson accompanied the column as its intelligence officer. He had warned, contrary to Wolseley’s assumptions, that a considerable Ansár force blocked its way. Alerted by cavalry scouts that Abu Klea was occupied by a strong Ansár force, Stewart prepared a strong fortified position on 17 January and marched his column forward in a large battle square which absorbed attacks from the north and the east by some 10,000 onrushing Ansár warriors. Largely due to jamming problems in both the rapid-fire artillery and the soldiers’ rifles, Ansár succeeded in penetrating the square, but the British emerged victorious. However, the man who Wolseley had selected to lead the advance from El-Metemmeh, Lieutenant Colonel Fred Burnaby, was killed. The next morning, the British began their march from the wells straight through to El-Metemmeh. They were confronted by another Ansár force near Abu Kru. Fire from the advancing Ansár mortally wounded Stewart, and Wilson, who had never commanded in combat before, took over. Fending off furious attacks, the force reached the river after nightfall and, succumbing to thirst and exhaustion, collapsed for the night. The next day, the Mahdi ordered a 101-gun salute to be fired outside Khartoum, signalling a great victory, but Gordon, watching the Ansár camps through his rooftop telescope, saw women wailing and recognised it as a ruse to convince him that the British advance had been halted. That evening the Mahdi held a war council where he determined to assault the city by way of a route suggested by a deserter, at the western end of the ditch and rampart where the river had lowered to dry land which the sun had dried into a soft bog. As the river receded, it took many of the protective mines with it.

  On 21 January Wilson led an attack on El-Metemmeh, but finding a strong, well-entrenched Ansár force waiting there for him, ordered it halted. The British returned to Gubat. They were met by Gordon’s armoured steamers: the El Mansureh had been sunk by Ansár guns, but the Bordein had by now joined the little fleet that also included Tel el Hawein and Safia. Wilson thus received Gordon’s letters and journal but Abu Klea had convinced him that the Ansár were truly formidable, and his small force was exhausted and in disarray. Burnaby was dead, Stewart lay dying – he died on 28 February – and Lord Charles Beresford and he himself were wounded. Besides, a message from Gordon, perhaps intended to deceive the Mahdi and dated 29 December, stated ‘Khartoum all right, could hold out for years.’77Wilson spent the next two days reorganising his forces, before deciding to load two of the steamers for a run to Khartoum on 24 January. Some 240 Egyptian and Sudanese soldiers and 20 men of the Royal Sussex Regiment in red tunics, led by Wilson, steamed upriver from Gubat toward Khartoum aboard the Bordein and the Telahwiya, which towed a grain-filled barge. With the river low, the boats moved slowly in daylight for three days, often running aground and engaging in fire-fights. Wilson approached the city under heavy fire on 28 January. When he observed the smouldering ruins of the Governor’s Palace where he had expected to see an Egyptian flag flying, he ordered the steamers to turn northward. Under heavy fire, he retreated tortuously down the lowering Nile to Gubat. On 5 February Wolseley reported the fall of the city to the War Office.

  On 25 January Gordon had observed the Ansár preparing to attack and called every able-bodied man to arms. The Mahdi ordered that Gordon not be killed in the attack and that night skirmishers crept through the city’s southern defences. Before daybreak on 26 January, several thousand men overran the Egyptian defenders, while another attack was launched at the northern end of the rampart. By midday, most of the city’s remaining male inhabitants had been killed along with Gordon himself. The varying accounts of his death, fighting to the last, attempting to detonate explosives in the Governor’s Palace, serenely confronting his attackers (in the style of a Christian martyr), became the stuff of legend. Slatin reported that his severed head was presented to the Mahdi.

  Gladstone’s first response to the disaster – he barely survived another vote of censure on 27 February – was to call for a second, larger Sudan expedition to avenge Gordon. The Desert Column was reinforced and the River Column proceeded southward and successfully thwarted another attempt by the Ansár to delay it at Jebel Kirbekan on 10 February, though Earle was killed. Gerald Graham, who returned to Suakin on 12 March with a new expeditionary force, proceeded inland and won several hard-fought battles. Then, on 21 April, using Graham’s securing of the Red Sea ports as his excuse, Hartington ordered Wolseley to withdraw, leaving all of the Sudan except for Suakin to the Mahdi. Gladstone’s government resigned on 8 June, succumbing to its own internal rivalries. On 20 June, the Mahdi died, probably of typhus, and was succeeded by the Khalifa Abdullahi. Poor harvests, epidemics, tribal rebellions, Ansár misrule and enforced isolation combined to bring the Sudan to a sorry state, while the British compensated by idolising Gordon. Sensing the popular mood, the House of Commons awarded his family £20,000 and declared a national day of mourning. A final battle was fought at Ginnis on the Sudan-Egyptian border, where Ansár raids had been taking place: the British, under Stephenson, won, marking the end of the 1885 campaign.

  Khartoum and environs.

  As for Gordon himself, he has remained a controversial and enigmatic character. His courage, his competence as a military engineer and his expertise in irregular warfare are unquestioned. His personal charisma and incorruptibility, which enabled him to win respect from the (often native) soldiers who fought under him and the civilians who supported him, his acts of charity and distain of material profit and his diplomatic skills, despite his sometimes foul temper and periodic bouts of depression, made him both an effective administrator and a popular hero during his own lifetime. Though not without Victorian prejudices, he was more open than many of his contemporaries to judge individuals on their abilities, rather than on their race or class, and was willing, within limits, to permit native peoples to govern themselves, rather than subject them to imperial control. However, his independence of mind and casual attitudes toward authority and instructions gave the military hierarchy, already jealous of his popularity, ample excuse to treat him badly.

  On the other hand, his oft-proclaimed and highly eccentric religious certitude about the righteousness of his actions led him blithely to accept seemingly hopeless assignments, and his successes only fuelled his sense of divine direction – until his luck ran out. This sense of divine inspiration also ju
stified his frequent policy reversals, his willingness to sacrifice principle to tactical advantage (both of which often angered or bewildered his supporters), his characteristically modern co-option and use of the press to build popular support for his private, if often noble, purposes and his belief that his character and policies would lead inevitably to a moral outcome, whatever the evidence to the contrary. His flexibility over the issue of slavery, his determination to reinstate the slaver Zubeir Pasha and his, it turned out, misplaced faith in the character of Leopold II to offset these compromises are the most visible examples of this. And his often capricious and scattershot flood of directives, proposals and information confused and exasperated both his friends and the military forces sent to rescue him at the end.

  Ultimately he was a very Victorian religious reformer, who revelled in his perfectly acceptable eccentricities and cultivated outsider status, and who fervently believed that – with Bible and sword – the spread of Christian virtue and European ideals could enlighten the world.

  Bibliography

  Gordon was a prolific letter writer and, at times, an equally expansive keeper of journals. Four volumes of his letters, edited and ‘corrected’ to suit Victorian taste were published after his death, by, among others, his sister M Augusta Gordon, Letters of General C G Gordon to his Sister (London: Macmillan & Co., 1888); Demitrius C Boulger, General Gordon’s Letters from the Crimea, the Danube, and Armenia 1854–1858 (London: Chapman & Hall, 1884); and George Birbeck Hill, Colonel Gordon in Central Africa 1874–1879, from Original Letters and Documents (London: Thomas de La Rue, 1884, 4th edn, facsimile reprint by Kraus Reprints, 1969). His friend, the newspaper correspondent Samuel Mossman, published General Gordon’s Private Diary of His Exploits in China (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1885) and his colleague and acquaintance, A Egmont Hake, similarly published The Journals of Major-General C G Gordon CB, at Khartoum (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 1885) and the Private Diary of the Taiping Rebellion of C. G. Gordon (London: W H Allen & Co., 1890).