Victoria's Generals

by Steven J Corvi

  Roberts had many troops at his disposal, and yet he was still not able to force his will onto the Boers. After the capture of the Boer capitals and the annexation of both republics, Roberts was convinced that the Boer forces had been reduced to ‘a few marauding bands’,34 and that the war ‘is degenerating, and has degenerated, into operations carried on in an irregular and irresponsible manner by small, and in many cases, insignificant bodies of men’.35 Roberts’s lack of understanding of the prevailing military situation, is underscored by the fact that he allowed a considerable number of his officers and men to terminate their voluntary engagements, sending a regular unit home and asking soldiers to join the constabulary – in line with the misconception that only police work still remained to be done. These decisions fuelled the (wrong) perception that by the end of 1900 the war was ‘practically over’.36 In practice, the war was about to escalate geographically.

  When purely military actions alone did not produce the desired results, Roberts resorted to unconventional methods. In Afghanistan, as was done on the North-West Frontier in India, the British Army from time to time burnt dwellings to pacify the country – in line with the unwritten rule of imperial warfare (against ‘non-white’ people). The almost summary execution of Cavagnari’s alleged killers was most certainly also geared towards having a particular psychological effect on the local population. In South Africa, Roberts was adamant that it should be a white man’s war. Initially, he also treated the Boers (the first white people he ever fought against) very leniently, hoping that a policy of conciliation would lead to the pacification of the country. For example, upon entering the OFS in the second week of February 1900, he made it clear that he would ensure the safety of ordinary citizens and their possessions, and in his proclamation of 15 March 1900 he invited the Free Staters to surrender and to take an oath of neutrality, so that they could return to their homes. On 31 May 1900, shortly after entering the Transvaal, a similar type of proclamation was issued.37 Roberts hoped that, by treating the Boers leniently, they would surrender and the war would end. These and the following proclamations can, with hindsight, be regarded as a form of psychological warfare, and initially proved to be quite successful; for example, from March to July 1900, some 13,900 Free State and Transvaal burghers voluntarily surrendered.38

  But Roberts underestimated the power of Afrikaner nationalism, because several Boers who surrendered, took up arms again. Where Boers who voluntarily surrendered previously could settle on their farms, they were now taken into custody, and in a proclamation dated 1 June 1900, Roberts said that those Boers who did not surrender would henceforth be regarded as rebels.39 However, these threats did not intimidate those Boers who believed in their cause; they referred to Roberts’s proclamations as ‘paper bombs’, and guerrilla activities increased. Consequently, Roberts gradually changed his attitude and strategy, and according to the proclamations of 16 and 19 June 1900, if a railway line was attacked or damaged, Boer houses in the vicinity would be burnt.40 Roberts, in due course, became convinced that only ‘severe measures’ would subdue the Boers and that there had to be ‘no mercy’.41 He also made it clear that if burghers did not surrender, ‘they and their families will be starved’.42 What Roberts did in fact admit by issuing these ill-conceived proclamations was that he was unable to find a military solution to the problems his army faced. Soon, the destruction of Boer property became part and parcel of the British military strategy, with its concomitant internment camps, where those Boer (and black) civilians who had been left destitute by the scorched earth policy were kept – and where by war’s end some 28,000 white (and at least 23,000, but probably many more black) civilians had died, leaving a trail of trauma and bitterness. The first official ‘refugee camp’ for whites was established at Mafeking in July 1900, primarily to house Boers who had surrendered voluntarily, plus their families. Before the end of 1900, eight other camps for whites were established.43 So, Roberts’s strategy in South Africa evolved from sporadic farm-burning to a fully fledged scorched earth policy, which Kitchener would later on expand even further.

  Roberts’s assessment of the situation in South Africa when he left in December 1900, also with regard to what remained to be done to end the war, was over-optimistic and did not tally with the situation at grassroots level. By burning farms, Roberts had – ironically – also removed an important reason why many Boers drifted away from commandos; i.e. to look after their property and loved ones. As the guerrilla war intensified, and when the proclamations, and even the resulting destruction of property, did not have the desired effect, Roberts resorted to other forms of ‘psychological warfare’. Boer women and children were sent to the Boer lines in the eastern Transvaal to put pressure on the republican forces to surrender, but to no avail. Roberts sent several letters to Louis Botha (Commandant General of the Transvaal forces), trying to convince him that further resistance was futile. He also offered Boer generals salaries, should they surrender; for example, £10,000 a year to Botha and Koos de la Rey, which was rejected with contempt, and strengthened the Boers’ resolve to continue the struggle.44

  Even Roberts had to admit that ‘the guerrilla aspect that the war has assumed is an infinitely more troublesome phase of war than which has gone before’.45 Eventually it was the British forces that were caught physically and psychologically unprepared for the new kind of warfare that the Boers waged from the end of March 1900 onwards. Roberts underestimated the Boers’ resolve and ability to continue their resistance. But, everything taken into account, it is unlikely that any other general would have fared better.

  On one terrain Roberts had full control. Through the years, he cultivated good relationships with politicians and had the support of his political masters. Writing to the Secretary in the Foreign Department, A C Lyall, from Kabul on 6 August 1880 (i.e. on of the eve of the start of his famous march, but referring to his march to Kabul the previous year), Roberts wrote: ‘When I accepted the command of the Kabul Field Force last September [1879] it was on the understanding that I was to be supreme in political, as well as military, matters.’46 With regard to the war in South Africa, Lansdowne gave Roberts a free hand and protected him from interference by other politicians. When Roberts’s initial moderate policy with regard to the Boers did not produce the envisaged results, Lansdowne assured him that if he adapted a tougher stance, he (Lansdowne) would support and defend him.47

  Roberts’s participation in many battles in India (1857–58), his numerous mentions in dispatches and VC is the material on which a patriotic press and popular magazines feed and from which legends are made. His storybook career in India focussed press attention on him, and when he was a commanding officer, afforded him the opportunity to manipulate the media to suit his own interests. In Afghanistan, Roberts expelled a reporter who was critical of his actions,48 while keeping and rewarding those reporters who were positively inclined towards his work. Roberts’s reputation to a large extent derived from his Kabul–Kandahar march, and was created by the pro-Roberts media. By 1878, the electric telegraph and cable had been in use for some years, which meant that the dispatches of commanders and war correspondents could be transmitted quickly. Roberts used this technology to his own advantage, for example, to ensure that his own dispatches were transmitted before those of anyone else.49 At the end of 1899, a number of reporters accompanied Roberts to South Africa. He was, once again, determined to control and ‘manage’ the press, and was successful, because most of the reports that were published about his campaign by ‘the brilliant band of War Correspondents who accompany this Army’,50 were favourable. Rudyard Kipling’s famous music-hall ballad ‘Bobs’,51 of course, also ensured Roberts public exposure, fame and concomitant endearment and hero-worship – hero-worship that went back all the way to the war of 1878–80 in Afghanistan.

  The Second Anglo-Afghan War, 1878–8052

  On 12 April 1876, Lord Lytton became Viceroy of India. By this time there was growing concern in Britain about the possibili
ty of Russian expansion in Central Asia, especially in the light of the fact that Sher Ali (the Amir of Afghanistan) was (mistakenly) suspected of being an ally of the Russians. While some officials in India believed in a policy of ‘masterly inactivity’ (i.e. non-interference), Roberts and others believed that a ‘forward policy’ (i.e. more militant, pre-emptive action) was the correct approach.53 Lytton bought into the latter; he and Roberts became close friends, and in April 1878 he appointed Roberts as the commander of the Punjab Frontier Force. On 11 August 1878, a Russian mission arrived in Kabul, capital of Afghanistan, but was withdrawn soon after. When in September 1878, Sher Ali refused to allow a similar British mission to take up position in Kabul, an apology was demanded. When no answer was received, Britain declared war on Afghanistan on 21 November 1878.

  During the first phase of the war, three British columns invaded Afghanistan. The smallest column, composed of excellent troops and known as the Kurram Field Force (116 officers and 6,549 men, with 18 guns), was commanded by Roberts. He left Kohat on the Indus River, quickly occupied the Kurram Valley and moved up to the Shutargardan Pass. On 2 December 1878, after a daring night march, Roberts (3,200 men with 13 guns) defeated an Afghan force (about 4,000 men with 11 guns) at the Peiwar Kotal, at the northern exit of the Kurram Valley. The Afghans were in excellent positions on the Kotal heights. Roberts broke the traditional military rules by dividing his small force, and with an excellent flanking movement took the Peiwar Kotal with 2,300 men, while the rest of his force attacked the enemy front. Roberts was successful because he did careful reconnaissance, correctly evaluated the terrain and situation from a tactical point of view, was prepared to take a risk in order to achieve surprise and attacked from an unexpected quarter (as he later did in South Africa, albeit on a much larger strategic scale). This was a dramatic and decisive victory, the first major British victory of the war, and it ensured the success of the British invasion. Sher Ali fled, leaving his son, Yakub Khan, on the throne. After Peiwar Kotal, Roberts started his expedition into the Kost Valley on 2 January 1879 and occupied it. If and when his camp or soldiers were attacked, he had the nearby villages looted and burnt, as was the custom in colonial warfare; a precursor to what happened in South Africa more than two decades later.

  The first phase of the war ended on 26 May 1879, when the Treaty of Gandamak was signed. Roberts returned to Simla, having fought brilliantly against superior forces – his reputation as a national hero firmly established. In the meantime, Major Sir Louis Cavagnari, a friend of Roberts, was sent to Kabul as Britain’s envoy, where he and his entourage were murdered by a mob in the British Residency on 3 September 1879. By that time only Roberts’s Kurram Field Force was still available to be re-activated, and henceforth it was known as the Kabul Field Force (about 6,600 men with 18 guns). Roberts led his force from Ali Khel into central Afghanistan. He planned to concentrate his force at Kushi, some 40 miles from Kabul, from where he would march on the city. Roberts’s military operations during the second phase of the war can be divided into four sub phases:54 (1) The march from Kushi (which started on 30 September 1879) to occupy Kabul (9 October); (2) the attempts to quell the Afghan opposition, which culminated in him being besieged in Kabul; (3) the preparations for a spring campaign; and (4) the march from Kabul to Kandahar (8–31 August 1880) and the battle outside the city (1 September).

  Roberts’s force marched through unsurveyed, mountainous and hostile country. Just before reaching Kabul, Roberts met in battle, on 6 October, a large Afghan force under the command of Nek Mohammed Khan, on the Charasiab heights. Roberts had at least 3,800 British and Indian troops with 16 guns (plus 2 Gatlings) under his command, against probably about 12,000 Afghans with 20 guns. Roberts reached Charasiab village on the evening of 5 October. The next day, he skilfully dislodged the entrenched Afghan force by means of a flank movement, and followed it up with a cavalry pursuit. It was the first time that the British army used the relatively speaking new-technology Gatling guns in action. The road to Kabul was now open, thanks to Roberts’s willingness to take a risk in an effort to ensure surprise. On 9 October 1879, a triumphant Roberts entered Kabul, and Yakub Khan was removed from the throne. This campaign was indeed a turning point in Roberts’s career.

  Roberts made a tactically wise decision not to use the formidable Bala Hissar Fortress overlooking Kabul as his base, but rather the as yet unfinished rectangular military cantonment at Sherpur, a mile north of the city centre. His first task now was to avenge the death of his friend Cavagnari. This he did swiftly and brutally, which led to much controversy, especially because the testimonies were not always very reliable, and since it was clear that a spirit of vengeance influenced the judgements. At least eighty-seven Afghans were executed (others were shot when they resisted being taken into custody), which soon led to an outcry in the British media and caused a political storm back home, raising doubts about Roberts’s political judgement. Lytton, however, had made it clear to him that ‘it is not justice in the ordinary sense, but retribution that you have to administer on reaching Kabul …. What is required is a prompt and impressive example … Your object should be to strike terror, and to strike it swiftly and deeply.’55

  In the meantime, the Afghan forces opposed to British rule, reorganised, and ‘jihad’ was proclaimed. Some 100,000 Afghans answered the call. When Roberts realised that large numbers of Afghan tribesmen were gathering to the north of Kabul, he sent a force to catch those Afghans in a pincer movement. However, due to a lack of effective intelligence, Roberts did not realise how strong the Afghans were. His soldiers fought several days in and around the Chardeh Plain, without any real success; as a matter of fact, on 11 December, the British were nearly defeated and were lucky to be able to fall back to the Sherpur cantonment. The Afghans then re-occupied Kabul. This led to Roberts being besieged in Sherpur (15–23 December 1879). On 21 December, he ordered Brigadier General Charles Gough to speed up his march from Jagdalak to Kabul. This provoked a huge onslaught against Roberts’s force. On 23 December 1879, just before dawn, the Afghan forces (about 50,000) under Mohammed Jan launched an all-out attack. The Afghans stormed the west, south and east walls of the cantonment but were driven back, and Roberts then ordered a counter-attack. The Afghans were thoroughly defeated in the ensuing battle. British and Indian casualties amounted to 33; the Afghans left about 3,000 dead on the battlefield. Roberts used Gatling guns and the new breech-loading Martini and Snider rifles with great effect. After Roberts repulsed the onslaught, he reoccupied the city of Kabul.

  At the beginning of May 1880, Lieutenant General Donald Stewart took overall command in Kabul. While negotiations were underway to find a peaceful solution to the ‘Afghan problem’, a British force was severely defeated at Maiwand by Ayub Khan on 27 July 1880, some 35 miles west of Kandahar, and the garrison in the latter city (5,000 men, commanded by Major General J M Primrose) was then besieged. Roberts was ordered to relieve Kandahar, while another force under Major General R Phayre was ordered to march from Quetta to Kandahar. Of course, Roberts would try his best to get there first, in what was also referred to as the ‘Race for the Peerage’. Consequently, his troops would march with as little kit as possible and only light mountain guns were taken with the force. On 7 August 1880, Roberts moved his hand-picked task force (basically a flying column) of 273 British officers, 2,562 British and 7,151 Indian troops, plus 18 guns, out of the Bala Hissar Fortress to Sherpur, and the next day the march proper began. Instead of taking the direct road via Maidan, the longer route via the Logar Valley was chosen, because it was deemed to be safer. Conditions were difficult: Roberts pushed his men as hard as possible; they marched without a line of communication; days were extremely hot, and nights very cold; there were dust storms, and a scarcity of water; many soldiers fell ill, including Roberts, who suffered from fever, headaches and constant nausea (and had to be carried in a doolie). On 27 August, news was received that Ayub Khan had abandoned the siege, when he heard of Roberts’s approaching fo
rce. Kandahar was reached on 31 August. The march proper took place from 8–31 August; i.e. twenty-four days, during which time only two full days were used to rest the troops. A distance of 324 miles was covered; i.e. on each of the twenty-two marching days, an average of 14.7 miles were covered. There was no fighting during the march, but many casualties due to illness.56

  After Roberts entered Kandahar on 31 August 1880, he resolved, notwithstanding his ill health, to attack Ayub Khan’s force as soon as possible. The next day, 1 September 1880, Roberts moved out with approximately 11,000 men and 32 guns. Ayub Khan had about 13,000 men, also with 32 guns, under his command. The battle of Kandahar commenced at about 0930 at Baba Wali, some 2 miles north-west of the city, where the Afghans had their camp. The British charged the Afghan positions, drove them off and captured their camp and all their artillery. This was the most decisive victory of the Second Anglo-Afghan War. Roberts’s force suffered 35 killed and 213 wounded; the Afghans lost at least 600 killed, but their total casualties were perhaps as high as 3,500. After the battle, Roberts collapsed, and on 8 September 1880, a medical board decided that he needed to go home.