Still, not everyone shared the joyous atmosphere. For Vionnet de Maringoné and his comrades, ‘the night from 6 to 7 September was terrible. We passed it in the mud, without ire, surrounded by the dead and wounded whose cries and moaning tore our hearts.’170 War weary, hundreds of miles away from home and lacking supplies, many soldiers knew that defeat in battle would be tantamount to death. Meerheim and Roos were contemplating such a possibility, as was Vossler, who observed that ‘many a soldier stretched himself out carefree and contented, little thinking that this would be his last night on earth. But the thought was common to us all …’ Similar sentiments are revealed by Le Roy, who had
gloomy reflections on the outcome of a battle fought 2,400 miles from France, and about what would become of oneself if wounded. As for death, we did not give it a thought. As to who would win the battle, we were so vain as to believe it would be to our advantage.
Colonel Boulart of the Guard artillery felt that:
if we are beaten at 750 to 800 leagues from France, what terrible risks will we not run! Can even one of us expect to return to his native country again? If we are victors, will peace follow at once? That is hardly likely in the Russian nation’s unequivocal state of exasperation!
Julien Combe could see that ‘many a mind was anxious, many eyes remained open, many reflections were made on the importance of the drama, which had been announced for the morrow and whose stage, so far from our motherland, allowed us the choice of either winning or perishing’.
Many felt that this was the last evening of their life and they would perish the following day. Biot recalled that Colonel Déshad was overheard remarking to his friends, ‘This will be my last battle.’ The unfortunate Colonel would be one of the first casualties of this battle. Meanwhile, Westphalian Captain von Linsingen was wondering how many of his comrades would survive the battle when:
suddenly I found myself hoping that this time too the Russians would decamp during the night. But no, the sufferings of the past days had been too great, it was better to end it all. Let the battle begin, and our success will assure our salvation!
Fezensac shared this sentiment: ‘Each side had to conquer or perish; for us, a defeat would doom us irrevocably; for them, it would mean the loss of Moscow and the destruction of their main army, Russia’s only hope.’ Napoleon also had no illusions on this account and Dedem overheard him mutter, ‘a big battle […] lots of people […] many, many dead …’ but he then suddenly turned to Berthier: ‘The battle is ours.’171
Some struggled to maintain high spirits since, as Italian Cesare de Laugier lamented, there was ‘not a blade of grass or of straw, not a tree; not a village that has not been looted inside out. Impossible to find the slightest nourishment for the horses, to find anything for oneself to eat, or even to light a fire.’
But the Imperial Guard was relatively well supplied, and as Ségur recounted, Napoleon summoned Bessiéres several times, asking ‘whether the needs of the Guards were all provided for. He had a three-day ration of biscuit and rice, taken out of reserve supplies, distributed to these men.’172 Many ordinary soldiers, meantime, spent their last night miserable, cold and hungry. But a few tried to make the best of it; for Vossler, this meant that ‘a miserable plateful of bread soup oiled with the stump of a tallow candle was all I had to eat on the eve of the big battle. In my famished condition even this revolting dish seemed quite appetizing.’ Meanwhile, for Brandt and his comrades:
the lack of food was bitterly felt that night. We dined on grilled corn and horsemeat. The night was wet and cold and many soldiers and officers, soaked to the skin and prey to forebodings, tried in vain to sleep. They would get up and, like lost souls, walk listlessly before the campfires.173
Dumonceau complained about the sufferings of horses whose ‘misery was great. Apart from a slender ration of oats brought up from Gzhatsk, they had nothing to eat but a few bits of straw or grass, everywhere disputed on all sides.’174
That evening Hubert-Charles Biot, aide-de-camp to General Pajol, was dispatched to receive orders from General Montbrun, commanding the II Cavalry Corps, whom he found ‘leaning over his map deep in thought’. Biot introduced himself and Montbrun asked him if he’d dined. Biot replied in the negative:
whereupon he [Montbrun] added, ‘In that case you shall dine with us.’ Soon afterwards his manservant came in and announced that a certain Verchére, orderly officer on the General’s staff, had returned from accompanying Madame Montbrun as far as Warsaw. ‘Bring him in,’ said the General. The officer in question handed over a letter and a packet and on taking the latter Montbrun exclaimed, ‘I know what this is. You did leave my wife in good health, did you not? As for her letter, we will read it after the battle.’175
Alas, Montbrun would be mortally wounded leading his men and the letter would remain unread.
An artillery officer from Württemberg also left an interesting account of the last day before the battle. At about ten in the morning:
General Beurmann summoned all the officers and made a speech in broken German, in which he informed us that the great battle would begin that very afternoon around 2pm. He stressed that under no circumstances, even if enemy shells tore down whole rows of us, even if Cossacks attacked us in flank and from behind, were we to ‘lose our presence of mind’. He expressly forbade the evacuation of the wounded during the battle, because otherwise too many men would be out of the fighting line. The wounded would be taken care of after the battle. He finished by saying, ‘I shall load you with decorations because such brave men as you are can never be adequately rewarded.’ At 1pm he returned and told us that on account of the thick mist which had only come up at noon, the Emperor had not completed his reconnaissance and therefore the battle would not begin until dawn next day. On receiving this news, we spent the whole afternoon cooking and eating, so that whatever happened we should not have to make the journey into the next world on an empty stomach.176
What was happening in the Russian camp across the field? By late evening of 6 September Kutuzov had already deployed his forces in battle positions, with Barclay’s 1st Western Army on the right flank and Bagration’s troops deployed on the left. On the extreme right were II and IV Corps; behind them were the Cossacks and the 2nd Cavalry Corps. Dokhturov’s VI Corps occupied the high ground between Gorki and Rayevsky’s Redoubt, with Pahlen’s III Cavalry Corps in support. The V Corps and 1st Cuirassier Division were further behind at Knyazkovo. Rayevsky’s Redoubt was defended by VII Corps, with the IV Cavalry Corps nearby. The flèches were defended by VIII Corps while, on the extreme left, Tuchkov’s corps, reinforced with the Opolchenye, protected the Old Smolensk Road.177
Kutuzov set up a convoluted chain of command for the battle. Barclay de Tolly and Bagration continued to command their respective armies, and in a general order Kutuzov stated that: ‘unable to be at all points during the battle, I place my trust in the acknowledged experience of the army commanders [Barclay de Tolly and Bagration] and leave it up to them to act as they see fit in the circumstances to achieve the destruction of the enemy’. But in addition to them, General Miloradovich was given command of the Corps de Bataille of the right flank, which included the II and IV Corps and the cavalry of Uvarov and Korf; while Lieutenant General Gorchakov led the Corps de Bataille of the left lank, consisting of VII Corps and the 27th Division. Finally, Lieutenant General Golitsyn I was given command of the 1st and 2nd Cuirassier Divisions, which were deployed behind V Corps.
The Russian commanders had contrasting conceptions of strategy, and we have already seen some of their arguments on the eve of the combat at Shevardino. In this respect one can easily disallow Soviet attempts to depict Kutuzov as a great strategist, who anticipated Napoleon’s every move and reacted accordingly. Thus, Zhilin and Beskrovny praised Kutuzov’s strategy and called him ‘the strategist of the world signiicance’, while Garnich claimed Kutuzov had a ‘precisely elaborated plan’ and he well understood Napoleon’s designs, ‘seizing the strategic i
nitiative from Napoleon on the eve of the battle, and the tactical initiative during the battle’.178 With all due respect to the old general, Kutuzov made his share of mistakes and the deployment at Borodino was among them.
We have already discussed the initial Russian deployment – parallel to the Kolocha river, with the right wing near Maslovo and the left close to Shevardino. On 5 September Kutuzov wrote to Alexander that: ‘noticing the enemy’s main attack against the left lank, I decided to strengthen it and sought it necessary to bend it back towards previously fortified heights’.179 This ‘second position’ was anchored on the ridge running from Borodino to the Utitsa woods. It was protected by a series of fortifications on the right flank, a major redoubt in the centre and three flèches on the left flank. Thus, the position was seemingly reinforced all along the line. The problem, however, was in disproportionate deployment of troops. Kutuzov and his advisors remained concerned about their right wing, where they anticipated Napoleon’s main attack to cut the New Smolensk Road, which served as the main line of retreat to Moscow. As a result, almost two-thirds of the Russian Army was concentrated in this direction.
Senior officers, including Barclay de Tolly and Bennigsen emphasized the weakness of the left lank. Some officers overheard Bagration arguing at headquarters: ‘Why are you so concerned about the right flank [when] the left flank is threatened?’180 Many shared this view. Captain Alexander Figner told to his comrade-in-arms that ‘Napoleon will throw all his forces on this [left] flank and drive us into the Moscow river.’ Yermolov could see that ‘the left wing was tangibly weak in comparison with other sectors of our position. The fortifications there were incomplete and time was so short that there was nothing we could do to strengthen them.’ Bennigsen suggested moving the II and IV Corps to the left flank, where they would serve as powerful reserves to Bagration’s army. Barclay de Tolly was even more drastic in his call to shift most of his army to the left.181 Listening to this proposal, Kutuzov seemingly approved it but, in fact, was reluctant to implement it. Barclay de Tolly scathingly commented that Kutuzov believed the extreme left flank could be ‘easily defended by irregular forces alone’.
Such belief seems to have faded away as time progressed and Kutuzov decided to deploy additional troops on the Old Smolensk Road. This brings us to the deployment of Tuchkov’s corps at Utitsa. This position was earlier covered by six Cossack regiments, but according to Sherbinin, on 5 September Kutuzov summoned Engineer Captain Folkner and
instructed him to examine terrain behind the left lank in order to ascertain if it was possible to conceal any troops there. ‘When the enemy,’ Kutuzov said, ‘would commit his last reserves against Bagration’s left flank, I will attack with my concealed troops into their flank and rear.’
Folkner soon returned with a report that the location was well suited for such plan: so Tuchkov’s III Corps, supported by the Moscow and Smolensk Opolchenye, was deployed.182 The Official News from the Army bulletin asserted that when the enemy concentration against the left lank became obvious, Kutuzov sought
to enhance the defence of this weak point in our position […] [and] Tuchkov with the III Corps and part of the Moscow Opolchenye was deployed in an ambush [my emphasis] behind thick brushwood on the extreme left flank, with the order to operate along the Old Smolensk Road against the French flank and rear as soon as the enemy starts attacking and seeking to turn our left lank.
Kutuzov’s report to Alexander adds further confusion to this issue, since he claimed that he deployed Tuchkov in the south after he ‘perceived’ Napoleon’s ‘intention to assault our left lank and, by advancing along the Old Smolensk Road, to separate us from Mozhaisk’. Note that unlike the Official News bulletin, there is no mention of the order for Tuchkov to lay in an ambush and attack the enemy and the emphasis lies on the defensive nature of his mission.183
This issue became further complicated by the fact that everything was done in great secrecy. The tense atmosphere at headquarters, where various groups intrigued and competed for influence over the commander-in-chief, had a detrimental effect, since Kutuzov and his confidants concealed information from their rivals. Among those unaware of Tuchkov’s deployment were Bennigsen and Barclay de Tolly. The latter recalled that ‘an adjutant, whom I sent to find the [III] Corps, informed me of what happened. No one knew under whose command this corps should remain, to whom its commanders should report and receive orders? I informed [Kutuzov] on this account and was told that it was simply a mistake and it would not be repeated in the future.’ As for Bennigsen, he examined the Russian left wing during the night of 6/7 September, where he came across Jägers in the Utitsa woods who told him there was a considerable gap between the forces of Bagration and Tuchkov, through which the enemy could drive a wedge. Surprised to hear about troops so far on the left, and unaware of Kutuzov’s plan, Bennigsen went to Tuchkov and ordered him to leave his hidden position for open ground closer to Bagration, as traditional histories of the battle inform us.
Thus, for the next 200 years Bennigsen became a scapegoat, bearing the responsibility for the failure of Kutuzov’s counter-attack at Utitsa. As years passed, participants and historians began to misinterpret or exaggerate Tuchkov’s mission. Sherbinin was convinced that without Bennigsen’s intervention, ‘the sudden appearance of this hidden detachment in the enemy flank and rear, as it was conceived by Kutuzov, would have been disastrous for the French’. His comrade-in-arms, Bolgovsky, claimed that Tuchkov was supposed to turn the French right flank while Platov attacked the left flank, which would have placed Napoleon in-between a double-pincer movement and delivered the battle to the Russians.184 Buturlin, Saint Priest and Eugène of Wurttemberg believed that Tuchkov’s orders called for attack against the French right flank.185 This idea was reflected in the classic work on 1812 by Bogdanovich and then repeated in virtually all subsequent battle histories.
The debate over Tuchkov’s mission often centres on its original and subsequent positions, which some believed held the key to the issue. Official documents failed to clarify whether Tuchkov’s troops were deployed on the Old Smolensk Road itself or south of it. The official battle plan (see image) showed Tuchkov’s troops organized in columns (all other units on the map were in lines) on both side of the road near Utitsa, with Kutuzov’s note ‘deployed concealed’ inscribed nearby. This caused much discussion on whether the position was correctly shown, reflected Kutuzov’s plan and could have effectively concealed the troops at such an open ground. Most Russian/Soviet historians tended to support the official thesis, blaming Bennigsen, since this helped justify Kutuzov’s actions. Still, some tried to suggest alternative explanations. Gerua argued that Folkner, who examined the terrain, and Traskin, who had drawn the map, both made mistakes that misled Kutuzov, who had not reconnoitred the area in person. Toll, who led the troops to the place, then only confounded the problem by failing to ascertain the laws of this position. Gerua suggested that Bennigsen’s actions could be explained as aimed at correcting Tuchkov’s deployment, based on actual terrain.186 After the battle, Gerua argued, persons responsible for these blunders (that is, Toll and others) tried to suppress information to avoid responsibility. A similar view was expressed by Kolyubakin and Pavlenko, who believed that the problem lay in an improperly conducted reconnaissance: Toll, acting in darkness, deployed Tuchkov’s troops south of the Old Smolensk Road, facing northward, and Bennigsen corrected him by redeploying these forces westward, closer to the Utitsa Hill.187 These historians tried to critically assess the mission assigned to Tuchkov and pointed out its limitations, notably the lack of cavalry support for infantry.
‘Kroki’ or official battle plan prepared by Sub Lieutenant E. Traskin for Kutuzov on 6 September. Tuchkov’s troops at Utitsa are shown in columns in lower left corner, with Kutuzov’s note next to them.
Their work was soon forgotten and the official thesis propagated the myth of the well-planned ambush and potentially decisive counter-attack that was undermined by Bennigsen. No one
questioned why the Chief of Staff of the entire Russian Army was kept out of loop on such an important tactical decision. Thus, according to Garnich, ‘Bennigsen ruined Kutuzov’s plan, and if his actions had no substantial effect on the battle, it was only due to Kutuzov who masterly directed military operations and found new solutions to tactical challenges he faced.’188 Zhilin even claimed that had Napoleon attempted a flanking manoeuvre with the corps of Davout and Poniatowski, they would have been destroyed by Tuchkov’s forces, notwithstanding the fact that the French would have outnumbered Tuchkov’s men two to one! As one modern Russian scholar remarked: ‘The imagination of the Soviet “historians’’ truly had no boundaries!’ 189 Even if Tuchkov’s troops remained in their original position, he would not have been able to attack the French right flank because V Corps was marching directly at him and Tuchkov lacked the cavalry and artillery support necessary for any aggressive actions. Furthermore, his force was weakened from the start when Bagration, desperate for help at the flèches, requested one of Tuchkov’s divisions to reinforce his command.
The entire Russian position was about 8km long. The 1st Western Army, deployed from the Moscow river to Rayevsky’s Redoubt, had concentrated some 80,000 men here, while the 2nd Western Army posted about 34,000 men on the left. This produced relatively close deployment of the troops, which was later criticized by many. Clausewitz noted that: ‘the Russian Army fought in so confined and deep a disposition that there is hardly a second example of such’. He disapproved of Colonel Toll, who was:
fond of deep formations, i.e. of a small extension of front and a heavy reserve […] The cavalry stood from 300 to 400 paces behind infantry, and from these to the great reserve the distance was scarcely 1,000 paces. The consequence was that both cavalry and the reserve suffered severely from the enemy fire without being engaged.
The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov Page 13