Indeed, during the battle hundreds of men lost their lives to no purpose because the French artillery had an excellent target in compact masses of Russian troops and the Life Guard Preobrazhenskii and Semeyonovskii Regiments, though in reserve, lost over 500 men without participating in the fighting.190
The Russian positions were reinforced by a series of fortifications constructed between 3 and 6 September. Major General Ivashov, commanding the Russian engineer forces, reported that, in three days, his men built ‘four bridges and 15 descents [into ravines], many clearings and strong abatis on the left flank, 3 flèches in the centre and one redoubt on the right flank’.191 Among the earthworks constructed on the right lank were the Maslovo Flèches, located on the heights between the New Smolensk Road and Maslovo. Starting on 3 September, the Russians built here a pentagon-shaped redoubt and two lunettes that were interconnected and defended through a system of retrenchments and clearings. The main redoubt was relatively large, with over 3,500 square metres of internal space and a 2.5m-high Brustwehr. The fortifications were guarded by the 4th, 11th and 17th Battery Companies. The two auxiliary lunettes were about 150 paces away from the redoubt and the spaces in between blocked with the abates. Several more earthworks were constructed near Gorki. The first group of fortifications, on the northern edge of Gorki, included a three (some sources say 4 ) gun battery and trenches for infantry. The battery, constructed on 4 September, with a 1.3m-high and 3m-wide Brustwehr, protected the approaches to the right centre of the Russian position and was occupied by three guns of Major Ditterix’s Battery Company. The battery is noteworthy because Kutuzov established his command post near it and observed the battle from this vantage point. The trenches – four in total – were dug to protect the northern and western approaches to the battery and Gorki. In the second group of fortifications, the Russians constructed a nine-gun battery south-west of the village. The battery, occupied by the guns from the 17th Battery Company, was, in fact, built, across the New Smolensk Road that cut it in half. After the battle, Barclay de Tolly had assigned some 2,000 militiamen to turn this battery into a redoubt during the night of 8 September but the order was cancelled after Kutuzov’s ordered retreat later that night.
The Maslovo Fortification
Gorki Nine-Gun Battery
The construction of fortifications on the left wing, however, proved a more complicated affair. Kutuzov sought to centralize supervision of such works and ordered to have all regimental tools, including axes, to be placed at the disposal of the main headquarters, where Lieutenant General Trousson was instructed to manage all construction works with his engineer and pontoon companies.192 This only increased confusion, since Trousson’s engineers simply could not handle such an immense task at such short notice and required additional manpower. The regular troops, who had to surrender their equipment to Trousson, soon received Bagration’s counter-order to begin work on the flèches, but were unable to comply without their equipment. On 4 September, Bagration, exasperated by the delay in getting his soldiers’ tools back, instructed his men ‘to take necessary measures to recover all instruments […] by tomorrow morning’. He then assigned 500 soldiers from each infantry division and 400 men of the Opolchenye to construction work, while some 600 men of the 27th Division were ordered to arm themselves with axes to prepare fascines. The 2nd Grenadier Division was assigned to the northern fortification, the 26th Division to the southern, and the Combined Grenadier Division worked on the rear flèche. He instructed his troops to fill in any ravines and ditches between the ‘front and back lines’ so that they caused no difficulties in manoeuvring.193
Cross-Section of the Southern Flèche
Three flèche were eventually built between the Kamenka and Semeyonov-skii brooks. To be specific, the two forward fortifications – also known as the northern and southern flèches – were lunettes that had two projecting shoulders or ‘faces’ and two parallel flanks, while the third fortification, behind the first two, was a flèche: that is a small V-shaped outwork. The lunettes were positioned with their left shoulders facing west and their right shoulders facing north. The shoulders of the northern lunette were each 22m long, with a 1.5m-high parapet or Brustwehr. The southern lunette, with a 2m Brustwehr, was somewhat distorted, its left (western) shoulder being 22m long and its right (northern) shoulder some 63m long. The flanks of both lunettes were about 18m long. The flèche behind them had 18m-long faces and a 2m-high parapet. Its right shoulder was directed westward to cover the gap between the two lunettes, while the left shoulder faced south, in order to prevent any flanking manoeuvres through the Utitsa woods against the southern lunette.194
Although seemingly daunting, the flèches were far from perfect. Working in sagging ground and lacking tools, Bagration’s troops were unable to complete their construction. Thus, the walls were not properly reinforced, while the outer ditch at the northern flèche was left too shallow. A Russian officer later recalled:
I have seen Bagration’s shantsy [flèches] personally [and can tell you that] they were rubbish and it is even shameful to call them shantsy […] the ditch was too shallow […] gun enclosures opened to the ground, which made it easy to scale them and through which every soldiers inside could be seen.195
According to Clausewitz, ‘these works […] were in a sandy soil, open from behind, destitute of all external devices […] None of them could hold out against a serious assault …’
While Bagration toiled over his lèches, construction work had started on another fortification slightly northward, around 5pm on 6 September. It was preceded by a heated argument between Toll and Bennigsen. The former argued that it would be sufficient to construct a simple lunette for eighteen guns, while the latter called for a closed fortification for twenty-four or thirty-six guns, ‘capable of defending itself from every direction, supported by four or five infantry Battalions’. Liprandi, who witnessed this scene, wrote:
The Northern Flèche
The Southern Flèche
The Rear Flèche
Toll argued that the [French] could attack this protruding site and, having captured it, they would command [a dominating] position over the VI and VII Corps, concentrating numerous artillery that would dislodge [the Russian corps]. If, on other hand, the fortification was integrated with the positions of these two corps, the enemy would have to fight both corps simultaneously […] Bennigsen countered that if this was done, the enemy could still capture it and then direct the fire along [‘anfilirovat’] the line of both corps, forcing them to abandon this position due to heavy casualties.
Liprandi noted that Kutuzov, who was also present, initially ‘remained silent, without uttering a word in support or against either of them’. Other generals, probably understanding the futility of their attempts, also remained quiet. Kutuzov eventually sided with Toll, although, as Liprandi admitted: ‘[the] majority [of officers] shared Bennigsen’s view’.196 So the decision was made to construct a relatively small battery on the Kurgan Heights. Bagration was instructed to move Rayevsky’s VII Corps to defend it, which only further weakened the forces at his disposal for the defence of the left wing.
This fortification, later known as Rayevsky’s Redoubt (or the Grand Redoubt), was built by the troops of the Moscow Opolchenye, under the direction of Lieutenants Liprandi and Bogdanov. The redoubt was constructed in the shape of a wide ‘V’ with two 72m-long épaulments (shoulders) converging at a 100-degree angle and reinforced by two 19m flanks. According to Bogdanov, by 11pm on 6 September, the fortification was surrounded by ‘[a] 3.5 sazben-wide [7.3m] and 1.5 sazhen-deep [3.1m] ditch’. Sent to help construct the redoubt, Bogdanov was met by Rayevsky, who told him that ‘due to the open and rolling terrain, the redoubt can be attacked by the cavalry …’So six wolf pits (other sources indicate ten) were dug in a checkerboard formation leading up to the ditch. Bogdanov then spent the entire night working on improving the redoubt’s defences. He recalled that
it was necessary, despite very limited time, to
reinforce both flanks with Brustwehr and ditches while the opening in the rear was to be closed by a double palisade, with two openings on the sides […] We used wood and iron from the nearby villages that were taken apart.
By the time the battle began, Bogdanov’s men managed to reinforce the flanks and put up a double palisade with 8-foot-high outer and 6.5-feet-high inner walls. The redoubt was initially defended by twelve guns of the 26th and six guns of the 47th Light companies, though some sources indicate that six guns of the 12th Battery Company might have been deployed here. A Battalion of the Poltava Infantry Regiment was assigned to defend the guns. Inspecting his redoubt a few hours before the battle, Rayevsky turned to his officers: ‘Now, gentlemen, we can be assured. Emperor Napoleon saw a simple open battery yesterday but his troops will find a true fortress here today.’197
Rayevsky’s Redoubt
Like their foes, the Russian soldiers spent the day also cleaning their muskets and uniforms, sharpening bayonets, and preparing their parade uniforms. The Russian Army was, by now, well provisioned, and as Bogdanovich noted, ‘due to the dedication of the good-hearted Russian people and the proximity of Moscow, our troops had everything in abundance’.198 Yermolov instructed physicians to prepare sufficient bandages and compresses, and reminded the general-proviantmaster to supply each corps with 2 puds [32.8kg] of pepper to spice up meals. Bagration ordered hot meals and alcohol be distributed to his troops but instructed his corps commanders to prohibit setting fires on open places, but rather to prepare meals in ‘ravines and other concealed sites’. The jägers, who spent many hours in the skirmishing line, were allowed ‘to rest for [the] entire night, prepare porridge, drink a goblet of wine, and recover; at dawn, they must again cook porridge, drink another goblet of wine, replenish their cartridges …’199
A series of instructions were issued on the eve of battle. Kutuzov urged his subordinates to commit their forces sparingly and advised them that ‘the general who retains his reserves remains undefeated’. Any attacks were to be conducted in close columns, ‘without firing but quickly using cold steel’.200 In the intervals between infantry columns, Kutuzov instructed to have some cavalry units in chequerboard formation, while others in columns to support infantry. Yermolov’s orders contain an interesting discussion on the use of skirmishers and cautioned commanders that:
high losses among skirmishers cannot be attributed to the enemy’s skilful actions alone but rather to the excessive number of skirmishers deployed against the enemy. In general, avoid skirmishing that will not produce any important results but requires considerable number[s] of men.
Officers were told that, during attacks, the troops should be prohibited from shouting ‘hurrah’ until a distance of ten paces from the enemy, but drums must accompany the charge. The corps commanders had to pay attention that their troops and artillery did not waste ammunition since ‘the enemy might be surprised by the rapid, yet inefficient, fire but it [he?] will soon lose any respect towards it’. Yermolov’s order also specified instructions for artillery commanders:
After deploying artillery in batteries, the remaining artillery in the corps must be kept in reserves with brigades. The artillery in the second line remains in its place. This reserve artillery is commanded by [the] corps commander or the chief of artillery of the entire Army, who will inform only [the] corps commander which battery to deploy and where. The Chief of the Army artillery should not be resisted in his orders, since he is acting on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief and according to the mission assigned to him.201
The eve of the battle was a Sunday, and many participants commented on an unusual calmness that descended on their camp that day. To uplift the morale of his troops, Kutuzov had the icon of the Black Virgin of Smolensk paraded through the ranks of the Army. The sight of the famous miraculous icon, accompanied by the robed priests singing Old Russian prayers and swinging their smoking censers and sprinkling drops of holy water, had a remarkable effect on the soldiers. ‘It reminded us of preparations for the Battle on Kulikovo Field’, noted one officer, referring to the great battle between the Russian and Mongol forces in 1380. Another compared his pious comrades to ‘the Puritans of Cromwell’. Glinka described as ‘acting upon the call of its heart, the hundred-thousand-strong army fell to its knees and bowed its head to the ground, which it was ready to satiate with its blood’. One soldier shared his feelings:
Placing myself next to the icon, I observed the soldiers who passed by piously. O faith! How vital and wondrous is your force! I saw how soldiers, coming up to the picture of the Most Holy Virgin, unbuttoned their uniforms and taking from their crucifix or icon their last coin, handed it over as an offering for candles. I felt, as I looked at them, that we would not give way to the enemy on the field of battle; it seemed as though after praying, each of us gained new strength; the live fire in the eyes of all the men showed the conviction that with God’s help we would vanquish the enemy; each one went away as though inspired and ready for battle, ready to die for his fatherland.202
Soldiers were making the sign of the cross and, in some places, they openly cried. Kutuzov, dressed simply and surrounded by his staff officers, also went to see the icon, bowing low to the ground. Suddenly, as participants recounted, shouts of ‘[an] eagle is soaring!’ were heard, and thousands of soldiers looked up to see the bird gliding through the sky. Kutuzov took off his cap as
The men around him shouted ‘hurrah’ and the yell was carried by the entire Army. The eagle was still in the sky and the seventy-year-old commander, taking it as a good omen, stood with his head bared. It was a remarkable sight! […] A hundred thousand Russians were yelling ‘hurrah!’ – and the fate of the morrow was placing its dice into a secret urn for us to cast …
Later that day, Kutuzov reviewed the regiments and spoke to the soldiers. A shrewd and perceptive man, he knew how to inspire his men. One of them later recalled:
We listened to him, barely breathing and not feeling [the] ground under our feet – What a man the Lord has created! He could sustain us for days with his caring, genuinely Russian and thoughtful words for which he had a ready tongue, he knew well the road to the soldier’s heart.
As he passed his troops, Kutuzov was ‘accidentally’ overheard muttering, ‘The French will break their teeth on us! It will be a pity if, having broken them, we cannot finish them off.’ Then, stopping at another regiment, he told the rank-and-file:
Lads! You have to defend the native land, serve faithfully and truthfully, shedding the very last drop of your blood. Each regiment will be used in this battle and you will be replaced every two hours. I lay my hopes on you and may God help you!203
Sitting in a bell tower of the Church of the Nativity at Borodino, Glinka could see the entire line:
that narrowed in some places and swelled in another; all these masses seemed to combine to the right, towards the Old Smolensk Road. It was a remarkable sight! The fields, still not harvested, wavered as a golden sea of harvest and were coloured by the rays of the setting sun. In the midst of this golden sea was a steel river of bayonets and muskets that glittered under the evening sun. Due to the height and thickness of the harvest, people almost could not be seen …
Bagration toured his positions too, and Mayevsky recalled him showing deep concern for his troops:
I was napping in the courtyard when [Bagration] passed by with his retinue. Seeing troops asleep, he ordered to move quietly and silently as we usually do while approaching the room of a beloved who is asleep. Such attention to his troops […] only strengthened their feeling of loyalty to this commander.
Bagration talked to soldiers, many of whom had served with him in previous campaigns and believed he had ‘not one but a thousand spare lives’. They listened as Bagration spoke: ‘As long as we live – we will be the hope of our beloved Fatherland […] It is thirty years now that with the help of your courage I continue to defeat the enemy. I am always with you and you are with me.’ The soldiers shouted in response: ‘Le
ad us, father! We will die with you!’204
For one artillery officer, the day seemed fleeting as:
the sun shined brightly and glided with its golden rays over the fatal steel of our bayonets and muskets. It sparkled with brilliant light on the copper of our guns. Everything was getting ready for the bloodshed of the morrow: the Moscow militiamen were completing earthworks on the battery, the artillerymen prepared and distributed ammunition. Soldiers sharpened bayonets, cleaned sword-belts and shoulder-belts; in short, 300,000 men in both armies were preparing for the great, terrible day. As the night approached, the bivouacs of the warring forces flared with numerous fires all around […] The fires turned the dark clouds in the sky into a crimson twilight and the flames in the sky only foretold a bloodshed on the ground …
Muravyev claimed that:
there was a remarkable difference in morale between the two sides: the enemy, inspired by the proclamations of its leader, ignited large campfires, revelled in whatever they had and burnt with rage against us; our troops were equally livid about the French and eager to punish them for invading our Fatherland and the destruction they were spreading, but they also abstained from excesses in food and drinking, which they had in abundance […] and prayed to the Lord to give them courage and strength and bless them for the desperate battle ahead.205
As darkness fell, French officer Vionnet de Maringoné could see the Russian fires arranged as an ‘amphitheatre in front of us. The fire of their bivouacs created a unique spectacle and presented a contrast to our own.’206
That night ‘everyone is silent!’ wrote Glinka in one of his letters:
Russians, with clear and untarnished conscience, quietly nap around their smouldering fires. Long shouts can be heard periodically in our skirmisher line and echoes often repeat them. A few stars shine through the cloudy sky […] On the opposite side: bivouac fires shimmer brightly, music, singing and shouts ill the entire camp. Exclamations can be heard at one point! Then more of them! They certainly welcome Napoleon as he reviews them, as it was done before the battle at Austerlitz. What will happen tomorrow? The wind puts the candle out and sleep gently closes the eyes. Goodbye my friend!207
The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov Page 14