The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov

by Alexander Mikaberidze

  As they approached Tuchkov’s position, the Poles – ‘superb men, with genuine martial attitude and excellent horses’ as one oficer described them369 – engaged the Russian skirmishers near Utitsa. Lieutenant General Stroganov reported that:

  as soon as the French columns began to appear out of woods, the first line of the 1st Grenadier Division, deployed behind the village on the Old Smolensk Road and, commanded by Major General Fock, deployed its skirmishers against the enemy. However, the terrain facilitated the enemy advance. Tuchkov then ordered to retreat behind the 2nd line, commanded by Major General Tsvilenev, and set the village on fire.370

  Colonel Yegor Richter, commander of the Pavlovskii Grenadier Regiment, travelled to the front line to direct the skirmishers but was soon wounded and replaced by Major Nikolai Musin-Pushkin.

  ‘At the debouch of the woods, in the plain,’ Poniatowski reported, ‘we saw a strong column of infantry near the village …’ Judging from its size, Poniatowski certainly realized he would face a more resolute resistance than he expected. He ordered up Colonel A. Gursky’s battery to a hill on the left side of the road and engaged the Russians in an artillery duel. ‘After striking upon the [Russian] column for some time,’ as his report described it, Poniatowski sent the 16th Division against the village, which it seized after a brief combat.371 The official Russian report declared that ‘despite a rigorous fire of our artillery’ the Polish tirailleurs, supported by advance elements of the 16th Division, emerged in a valley behind the village, where they came across the first line of the 1st Grenadier Division, which repelled their first attack.372

  Receiving reinforcements, the Poles soon resumed their attack, forcing Tuchkov to withdraw his troops eastward to a more advantageous position near a hillock, known as the Utitsa Kurgan. In his report, Konovnitsyn noted that Tuchkov retreated well before the Polish troops attacked because ‘the terrain was disadvantageous to us’. Stroganov, however, described his division deploying sharpshooters (‘vislala svoikh strelkov’), after which Tuchkov had to beat a retreat because ‘the terrain was advantageous to the enemy’.373 Yet Poniatowski described the terrain as ‘full of woods and thickets, from the small wood to the top of the knoll which dominates the whole plain and which was strongly occupied by the enemy’.374

  Covered by Stroganov’s grenadiers and the smoke of the burning Utitsa, the Russians redeployed to the new position. The Leib Grenadier and Count Arakcheyev’s Grenadier Regiments were moved to the right at the bottom of the mound, with the Pavlovskii Regiment placed in reserve behind them. On the left side of the hill, Tuchkov arranged the Ekaterinoslavskii and St Petersburgskii Regiments, which protected six guns of the 1st Battery Company. The Tavricheskii (Taurida) Regiment was located to the north, where it supported the Jäger regiments of Shakhovsky’s detachment, which protected the Utitsa woods.375 The Opolchenye troops were arranged behind the regular troops on both sides of the road. Tuchkov also appealed for reinforcements to Kutuzov and Barclay de Tolly.

  But Poniatowski did not press his attack. Instead he dispatched ‘three battalions in extended order into the brushes that were full of a great number of Russian chasseurs on foot. A lively fusillade was at once engaged as well as a very strong cannonade, which lasted until noon.’376 Indeed, considerable time was spent in this skirmishing, and hesitation marked Poniatowski’s actions. He could see that the Russian forces exceeded his own and his original mission of turning the Russian left flank could not be easily accomplished without additional forces. After Utitsa was occupied, he dispatched his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Rostworowski, to inform Napoleon of the situation and request his decision on further operations. Rostworoski was seriously wounded on his way and Roman Soltyk saw him arriving

  pale and with his coat covered in blood. He could hardly keep his horse […] He was losing a lot of blood. Yet, he had had the courage to carry out his mission. Scarcely had he arrived at the ambulance to have his wound attended to than he fainted …

  As a result, Rostworowski could not timely and suficiently apprise the Emperor of the situation on the extreme right flank. Almost two hours were wasted in such vacillation, which was of importance, since Poniatowski could not turn the Russian lank and threaten Bagration, who was, by now, heavily engaged with Ney and Davout. Napoleon inally made his decision, ordering Poniatowski to renew his efforts and instructing Ney to divert VIII Corps southward to help the Poles.377

  As VIII Corps progressed southwards, Tharreau’s 24th Division engaged Shakhovsky’s Jägers in the Utitsa woods and was later charged by the Russian cuirassiers. Poniatowski, meantime, prepared to resume his advance and take the Russian-controlled Utitsa Kurgan. The Polish divisions deployed in attack columns and a large battery – estimates vary from twenty-two to forty pieces – was set up near the main road. The artillery duel between the Polish and Russian batteries (Glukhov’s six heavy guns and Ditterix IV’s twelve light guns) continued for some time and participants attested to a relentless cannonade. The Polish artillery did enjoy numerical superiority and used its firepower and skill to suppress the Russian batteries. Stroganov acknowledged that ‘our [six-gun] battery continued to operate until it lost most of its men and exhausted [a] large portion of its ammunition and was compelled to reduce its firing, operating with four guns only.’ After the battle, Stroganov also noted that Colonel Glukhov ‘forced the enemy batteries to withdraw several times’, while Ditterix IV was commended for ‘maintaining an effective fire against the enemy’.378 According to General Karpov: ‘Both sides maintained such a petrifying ire that salvos of guns arranged in line resembled battalion volleys of infantry, while the artillery thunder suppressed any other sounds.’

  The Poles finally launched an assault and in a bitter hand-to-hand fighting, seized the Kurgan. The Russians managed to remove their guns from the hilltop and retreated eastward to regroup. Poniatowski, standing on a hill, could now see the Russian forces, including the Opolchenye troops extending further eastward, and the sight probably further convinced him of the difficulty of his mission.

  The Polish success proved short-lived, since Russian reinforcements were already on their way. In response to Tuchkov’s earlier request, Barclay de Tolly dispatched the 17th Division of Baggovut’s II Corps to the Old Smolensk Road. Passing behind the Semeyonovskii ravine, Baggovut noticed a large number of enemy troops massing in the valley to his right. These were the Westphalians, dispatched to help Poniatowski, but who had became bogged down en route. Baggovut immediately diverted four battalions of the Brest and Ryazan Regiments and the 17th Battery Company to help local Russian forces, and receiving Tuchkov’s message that ‘the enemy was attacking and seeking to seize the hill on his left flank’, he instructed Lieutenant General Olsufiev to hurry there with the 2nd Brigade of Major General Yakov Vadkovsky. For greater firepower, Baggovut replaced the six light guns of the 39th Light Company, which was assigned to Olsufiev’s division, with six heavy pieces of the 17th Battery Company.379 Paskevich also referred to Russian Cuirassiers attacking the Westphalians, who ‘tried to break through between the Russian left flank and Tuchkov’s troops’.380

  Olsufiev arrived just as Tuchkov was rallying his troops after the loss of the Utitsa Kurgan. Taking advantage of reinforcements, Tuchkov launched a counter-attack, personally leading the Pavlovskii Grenadier Regiment up the hill. Olsufiev was told to turn the left lank of Poniatowski while Stroganov, with the St Petersburgskii and Ekaterinoslavskii Grenadiers (supported by the Leib-Grenadier and Count Arakcheyev Regiments), flanked the Polish right. The outcome of this attack hardly could have been surprising since, as Polish historian Kukiel noted, six Polish battalions (of the 16th Division) faced fourteen Russian battalions.381 The Moscow and Smolensk militiamen also took part in the charge.

  As Baggovut reported, the Poles maintained

  a heavy fire on our battery, sending forth skirmishers supported by a strong column which sought to prevent us from [re]capturing the Heights that were of great advantage to them. Canister and c
annon-ball fire, produced by the enemy batteries, could not contain the swiftness of movement with which Lieutenant Shepotiev, acting with remarkable sangfroid, led his artillery company to his location and acted with such incredible skill that rarely was there a round that did not inflict heavy damage on the enemy; in short time, the enemy columns, advancing against our battery, were forced to retreat. However, the enemy battery, despite two of its caissons being blown up by Shepotiev’s actions, continued its powerful fire against our batteries and infantry columns.382

  The Russian infantry assault, meantime, reached its destination on the slopes of the Kurgan.383 Poniatowski dispatched reinforcements – ‘another column, more powerful than the first one’, as Baggovut described it – but Olsufiev directed Lieutenant Colonel Kern with the soldiers of the Belozerskii Infantry Regiment against them. Supported by the Pavlovskii Grenadiers, Kern halted the Polish advance, earning praise from the newly arrived Konovnitsyn, who told him: ‘If it were up to me, I would have taken off my Cross of St George and given it to you!’ The Russian infantry was supported by gunners who ‘hastily pulled six battery guns up the hill and, deploying them at reduced intervals’, opened a canister ire that forced the

  Poles to withdraw towards the woods in the rear. As Stroganov described, the Polish skirmishers, meantime, tried to ‘force their way into the brush-wood that separated our right flank from the left wing of the 2nd Army, but the Tavricheskii Grenadier Regiment, led by Colonel Sulima, was sent against them’.384

  Prior to the attack of the 18th Division, Poniatowski joined the 5th Polish Chasseurs à Cheval south of the road and intended to flank the Russian left. However, Sébastiani prevented him from doing this, telling him: ‘Where are you going, my Prince, do not you know that there are masses of Russian infantry on your left? You will be cut off from the Grand Army and destroyed …’385 Poniatowski then called off his attack and moved some of his cavalry to the left flank. He reported that

  it became impossible for [Polish infantry] to sustain their efforts against a force infinitely superior. We were repulsed from the knoll, but we managed to maintain position in the undergrowth […] I had my batteries continue to strike the summit of the knoll where the enemy had twelve large-calibre pieces.386

  Thus the Russian attack was successful in both recapturing the important height and containing the Polish flanking manoeuvre. However, it cost the Russians the life of their commander, Nikolai Tuchkov, who was seriously wounded on the hilltop when a Polish bullet pierced his chest. Unbeknown to him, his brother, Alexander, had died shortly before, leading a charge near the flèches. Nikolai would live for another two months after the battle before dying in Yaroslavl on 11 November 1812. With Tuchkov wounded, Baggovut assumed command of the Russian troops on the Old Smolensk Road. He regrouped his forces, deployed a battery on the Kurgan and requested reinforcements. In response, the Kremenchugskii and Minskii Regiments of the 4th Division marched to the Old Smolensk Road.

  It was noon already. Poniatowski’s troops remained on defensive for the next couple of hours, although their artillery occasionally engaged the Russians. Back at Shevardino, Brandt of the Vistula Legion met Captain Desaix, who ‘paused briely before us, saying, “I have just come from the right and your Prince Poniatowski is not making any progress. The Emperor is not very pleased with him. Our losses are enormous; the Russians are fighting like madmen.’’’387

  The Battle of Borodino Phase Two (12am to 6pm)

  We left the village of Borodino shortly after the attack by Delzon’s division in the opening act of the battle. The village was recaptured by the counter-attacking Russian troops, who were then ordered to abandon it to the French. For the next several hours, one brigade of Delzon’s division was engaged in intermittent skirmishing with the Russian Jägers along the river, while the second brigade was deployed north of the village. The 21st and 22nd Light Cavalry Brigades were moved to the left bank of the Voina to cover the left flank of the French troops at Borodino. Not far from them was the 84th Line, while two squadrons of the 4th Bavarian Chevau-léger were left behind near the village of Bezzubovo.388 General Anthouard de Vraincourt deployed his and Colonel Millot’s batteries on the heights east of Borodino and maintained fire against the Russian right flank. Sources disagree on the number of French guns involved, estimates varying from twenty to almost 100. Labaume and Laugier indicate that, in addition to his own battery, Anthouard de Vraincourt was also assisted by the reserve artillery of the 15th Division and the Italian Guard. Russian participants agree that the French had set up ‘large batteries’ near Borodino, which waged an efficient fire. Memoirs of Bavarian officers reveal that their cavalry was dismounted until noon and observed the ongoing battle from a distance. By late morning, as the fighting at Semeyonovskoye and Rayevsky’s Redoubt escalated, Napoleon had only about 10,000 men, including some 2,000 cavalrymen, covering his extreme left flank while the majority of his forces were shifted to the centre and the right flank. As a result, his left wing became weakened and, as Pelet noted, ‘attacking with its right shoulder forward [the French] gradually subsided from the New Smolensk Road, which served as their line of communication’.

  Northern Sector – The Cavalry Raid

  Around 7am, shortly after the combat for Borodino ended, Ataman Platov, with the Ilovaisky V, Grekov XVIII, Kharitonov VII, Denisov VII, Zhirov and parts of the Ataman and Simferopol Horse Tartar Regiments, departed his camp and began moving along the right flank of the Russian Army.389 Clausewitz, who was at the Russian headquarters, recalled that Platov

  was astonished where he had expected to find the entire left wing of the enemy to meet with few or no troops. He saw the left wing of [Eugène] moving against Borodino and it seemed to him that nothing would be easier to fall on its left flank, et cætera […] In short, Platoff [sic] dispatched the Prince of HessePhilippsthal who was with him as a volunteer, to General Kutuzov to acquaint him with the discovery he had made and to make the proposal to throw a considerable body of cavalry over the river by the ford and fall on the exposed flank of the enemy.390

  Colonel Ernst Constantine Hesse-Philippsthal was forty-one years old and, although Clausewitz describes him as ‘a young officer without experience’, he did serve in the Hessian Army for many years before enlisting in the Russian military in 1808, fighting the Turks and suffering two serious wounds in as many years. Platov’s idea appealed to him and he presented it to Colonel Toll ‘with so much liveliness that at first it really had a winning appearance’. Clausewitz noted that Hesse-Philippsthal reached headquarters at an important moment, when Toll just returned with an exaggerated report that

  all was going on favourably [on the left wing], Bagration having repulsed every attack. At the same moment arrived an account that in the redoubt of the centre, which had for a moment been regained from the French who had stormed it, the King of Naples had been taken prisoner.

  The reader certainly remembers that situation was far from favourable on the left wing, where Bagration’s troops were in the midst of a bloodbath, and that ‘the King of Naples’ was none other than the unfortunate General Bonnamy. But the truth is in the eye of beholder and, as Clausewitz recalled, ‘the enthusiasm blazed up like lighted straw’ when Toll and Hesse-Philippsthal laid before Kutuzov the idea of attacking the French left lank. Clausewitz was cautious of the idea and he criticized Toll, who was ‘too much carried away by the pervading feeling, believed that a lively diversion with a corps of cavalry on the enemy’s left would strike an effectual blow and perhaps decide the battle’.

  Bennigsen, who was present at this scene, later wrote in his memoirs:

  After the enemy launched an attack, as I predicted, against our left wing, I hurried to Prince Kutuzov and told him the following, ‘If you do not want to have your left wing shattered, you must reinforce it with the troops from the right flank; if only they would arrive in time there.’ Kutuzov listened to me and then ordered to send some troops to strengthen our left flank.

  Bennig
sen then listened to Toll’s report on the cavalry raid and witnessed Kutuzov’s approval of it.391 Löwenstern, Barclay de Tolly’s adjutant, reached headquarters to find Kutuzov

  standing still, surrounded by a large suite. Throughout the day, General Bennigsen and Colonel Toll explored the battlefield on the orders of Kutuzov. Bennigsen briefly stopped to talk to Barclay de Tolly, and when he left, Barclay told me, ‘This man would spoil everything – he is very envious. His self-esteem makes him think that only he is capable to give a battle and conduct it with success. There is no doubt that he is talented but he seeks to use his skills only to satisfy his ambition; he is disinterested in this great and sacred matter [and] I consider his presence with the army as a great adversity. Kutuzov shares my opinion. Let us see now how he would execute a cavalry movement on our extreme right flank, which I count on to move forward with all my reserves. This should deliver a powerful blow to the enemy.’392

  Memoirs suggest that the proposal for launching a cavalry raid came from Platov, via Prince Hesse-Philippsthal and Toll, to Kutuzov. However, subsequent battle histories sought to mitigate the awkward fact that such a ‘great’ idea did not emanate from the Commander-in-Chief. So attempts were made to correct it. Thus, according to Alexander Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, receiving reports on casualties on the left lank, Kutuzov