The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov

by Alexander Mikaberidze

  It should be noted, however, that the Allied cavalry could not hold the redoubt for long and the honour of retaining it belongs to the infantry of Prince Eugène. Eugène reported that his troops ‘attacked the redoubt in front and in the flank, and seized it …’ And Laugier credited one of Eugène’s Italian officers with the capture of General Likhachev, who commanded the defenders of the redoubt. Fezensac de Montesquiou argued that ‘the large redoubt was taken by a regiment of cuirassiers, retaken by the enemy, and then seized anew by the 1st Division of the 1st Corps detached for service with the Viceroy’. Labaume also noted that the cuirassiers’ attack on the redoubt was unsuccessful and credited Eugène’s infantry with its capture. Some participants (Lieutenant Flotow, Almeras, etc.) went even further, ignoring the cavalry charges altogether, simply noting that the infantry of IV Corps seized the fortiication.

  Extreme Southern Sector – The Old Smolensk Road and Utitsa

  By late afternoon, the extreme southern sector remained the scene of active battle as Poniatowski and Baggovut continued to face each other. The first round of fighting ended in a stalemate and both sides spent the next few hours preparing for the resumption of hostilities. The fighting, meantime, was largely limited to an artillery duel. The Utitsa woods, however, proved to be more action-filled, although it is often ignored in studies of the battle.

  As we already discussed, Junot’s VIII Corps was supposed to assist Ney’s troops in the attack on Semeyonovskoye but was diverted south to clear the Utitsa woods and support the Polish V Corps. However, stiff Russian resistance in the woods delayed its advance and, as Borcke noted:

  the first division of General Tharreau was sent forward to attack the woods where the enemy was firmly lodged and fired upon the flank of the seized fortifications [Bagration’s flèches]. Because it took [a] long time to dislodge the Russians from the shrubs, we suffered high losses in defending them […] Simultaneously, the second division under the command of General Ochs was left to cover and defend the fortiications.

  Another author (Linsingen) noted that the 23rd Division (Tharreau) was sent to the right, to make contact Poniatowski, while the 24th Division (Ochs) remained to strengthen Davout’s right flank. As Tharreau’s men advanced, they fought Shakhovsky’s Jägers and Linsingen acknowledged that ‘our division suffered from heavy fire from the woods on the right side. General von Borstel marched there with his 2nd Brigade and seized the woods on the first attempt. Russians, French, Poles and others now became intermingled in this dense forest …

  Sievers reported that:

  When our troops abandoned the two forward flèches, I anticipated the enemy’s intention to proceed with several infantry and cavalry columns under cover of tirailleurs to turn our left flank, threatening the rear of our positions and cutting off Baggovut’s corps. Therefore, I took two heavy and three light guns from the nearby artillery battery and set up a battery on the hill near the wood, slightly ahead of the position of the 2nd Army. Our canister fire had such effect that columns were routed …

  However, the battery soon exhausted its ammunition and attempts to obtain additional caissons proved futile until a clerk of the Lithuanian Uhlan Regiment, ‘through his dedication and enterprise’ managed to bring caissons. So when the French resumed their attack, the Russian battery was able to meet them with a devastating ire, which ‘forced it to hastily retreat in complete disorder’.506

  Yet lack of ammunition limited the effectiveness of the Russian artillery. When Baggovut passed this position on his way to Tuchkov with his II Corps, he diverted some of his troops to support Sievers. Baggovut saw the dire conditions near the flèches, where, according to his report, Sievers’ artillery, deployed on a hill

  was, due to its calibre, too weak to inflict serious damage on the enemy so I replaced it with the 17th Battery Company of Colonel Ditterix II and left the Ryazan Infantry Regiment to defend it. Also, to prevent the enemy from occupying the shrubs on the left side of the battery, I ordered the Brest Regiment to spread its skirmishers and keep the enemy at bay.507

  As soon as the 17th Battery Company began to operate, the French returned ire and ‘moved forward their batteries under cover of three strong infantry columns’. But as Baggovut reported, ‘[the] successful actions of our artillery quickly thwarted their undertaking and the enemy columns and artillery immediately retreated into the woods’. Sievers confirmed this story and noted that ‘the enemy failed in his attempts to seize a battery I deployed near the woods and it, with support of other units, inlicted heavy losses on the enemy battery and the troops’.508 During this battle, Ditterix II was supported by the 33rd Light Company of Bashmakov, who was wounded but ‘skilfully and successfully operated against the enemy batteries and defeated several infantry columns and the French cavalry’. Twelve guns from the 4th and 17th Battery companies were sent to Tuchkov, while the remaining twelve guns stayed near the flèches, where they were supported by the 32nd and 7th Light companies. Later that day, Colonel Taube brought his 2nd Life Guard Battery Company, which was deployed south-east of the lèches and maintained effective ire against the French. Almost all its officers were killed or wounded. Not far from it, Staff Captain Bazilevich commanded the 1st Life Guard Battery Company, deploying his guns northeast from the flèches:

  The company maintained fire from the right side of the lunettes, facing a twice superior enemy battery […] Increasing its fire against the enemy batteries and skilfully directing our guns, [Bazilevich] was able to silence the enemy guns and moved forward, halting the enemy columns with canister fire.509

  Conrady, standing with his Westphalian troops on the receiving end of this fire, confirmed its deadly results as the ‘Russian forces drove us from our positions which we earlier fought hard to seize. Only after retreating across the ravine in our rear did we manage to halt and regroup our battalions.’ General Damas was killed, while Lossberg saw Tharreau being wounded in his stomach and replaced by von Borstel, who was later wounded himself.

  The ravine provided some shelter to the Westphalians since, as Conrady noted, the Russian artillery fired above their heads. The situation improved for the Westphalians when the French forces seized Semeyonovskoye, diverting the Russian attention. According to Lossberg:

  our VIII Corps was ordered to resume its advance to the right flank to support the V Corps. After a tenacious combat, we finally seized the woods, deployed in a line, with a few battalions in the reserve. However, the right portion of the woods, which was more dense, remained in the Russian hands …

  Later that afternoon Soltyk, who was on his way to observe situation on the Old Smolensk Road, encountered the Westphalian Division extended in a line and waging a resolute fight against the Russian infantry. Conrady described the orderly retreat of the Russians (probably Shakhovsky’s troops) and the heavy casualties his Westphalian troops suffered. Finally, about 2pm, the Westphalians established contact with the V Corps and preparations began for a coordinated assault on the Russian position. Meantime, the Russians also received reinforcements as the 2nd Brigade of the 4th Division arrived from the centre and filled the gap between Baggovut’s corps and Sievers’ cavalry in the north-western corner of the Utitsa woods.

  Around 2pm the Poles and Westphalians resumed their attack through the woods, which would have turned Baggovut’s left flank. The 23rd Division [Westphalian] engaged the troops of the 4th Division [Russian], while General Ochs led the 24th Division to secure the plain north of the road, with Major von Rauschenplatt’s 1st (Westphalian) Light Battalion leading the way. The Westphalians barely advanced when they were met with volleys, obliging them to fall back with losses. To silence the Russian artillery, which maintained a devastating ire, a battalion of the Westphalian chasseurs-carabiniers, armed with rifles, was dispatched to approach the Russian battery and kill its artillery crew. However, as one Westphalian soldier (Fleck) recalled, when the Westphalian chasseurs were passing the 1st Westphalian Light Battalion, its commander Major von Rauschenplatt, failed to
recognize them through smoke and confusion and, seeing their green uniforms, assumed they were Russians and ordered his troops to ire. Fortunately for the chasseurs, they were beyond effective range of muskets, although several soldiers were wounded nevertheless. Lossberg and Conrady also described the complete confusion that reigned in the woods, where most of the fighting took place. Officers found it difficult to oversee their troops, who were often fighting in small, isolated groups. This naturally resulted in many deaths and injured due to friendly fire.

  Museum-Panorama ‘Battle of Borodino’

  Located on the Kutuzov Avenue in Moscow, Museum-Panorama ‘Battle of Borodino’ was opened on the 150th anniversary of the battle in 1962. It includes a large panorama displaying Francois Rubeau’s famous painting the Battle of Borodino (1910–21), the Kutuzov watchtower, Kutuzov monument and an obelisk from the grave of the common grave of soldiers killed at Borodino from the Dorogomilov cemetery; the museum also operates the Kutuzov hut, where Kutuzov stayed after the battle of Borodino. The panorama complex has a cylindrical shape with a height of 23 meters and diameter of 42 meters. It contains two wings with various exhibitions, including trophy guns moved from the Arsenal of the Kremlin. At the very heart of the building is a round hall with Rubeau’s enormous painting (15 meters in height, 115 meters in length) of the battle that shows one of the crucial moments of the battle, the French attacks on the Semeyonovskoe village. The museum complex, renovated in 1991–1995, had its display halls expanded and contains over 30,000 items, many of them on display.

  The Russian resistance caused the initial Westphalian advance to falter, but new orders were received as Girod d’Ain delivered Ney’s orders to press forward. While Friederichs complied, Junot seemed reluctant to follow orders, again demonstrating the lack of initiative that had surfaced three weeks previously at Valutina Gora. Instead, Junot forwarded the order to the 5th Division (from Davout’s corps), where General Guyardet, according to his report, received it close to 2.30 p.m. The order required Guyardet to assist the Westphalians troops, who were fighting in the woods. The exhausted soldiers of the 5th Division carried out the order over the next hour or so.

  Around 4pm the Westphalians made a new attack, which proved successful, since the Russian batteries lacked ammunition and retreated. ‘On my orders,’ Sievers reported

  five guns of the battery were withdrawn under cover of the Lithuanian Uhlan Regiment, which charged an enemy column. However, another enemy column, advancing in the ravine on the edge of the woods, forced the Uhlan Regiment to retreat. After passing through the brushwood, the Ulans took up position near the batteries on the left flank of the [2nd] Cuirassier Division.510

  In the meantime, the four companies of the Brest Infantry Regiment, commanded by Major General Ivelich, engaged the Westphalians but struggled to contain their attack. Ivelich was soon wounded and appealed to Baggovut for help, who dispatched Vadkovsky with the Willmanstrand and Ryazan Infantry Regiments and some 500 militiamen of the Moscow Opolchenye. The joint Russian counter-attack succeeded in stopping the Westphalian assault. Conrady tells us that ‘all generals of the 23rd Division were killed or wounded’, and when Ney repeated his order to clear the woods, Ochs requested permission to leave his 24th Division to take command of the 23rd. As the 1st Brigade of the 23rd Division advanced, Ochs led the way with the 6th Line (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jungkurt) and cleared the woods and the hill, where a small Russian battery was set up. ‘The Russians were so consumed by the [Polish] attack from the front, that they noticed our attack only after we charged with yells. Although they resisted […] they were forced to retreat,’ wrote Conrady. To reinforce the 3rd Battalion of the Tavrida Grenadier Regiment fighting the Westphalians, Baggovut dispatched Shakhovsky with his Jägers and the Minsk Infantry Regiment, who halted the enemy advance but suffered heavy losses in process.

  Baggovut was also attacked on his left flank by the Poles. The 13th Polish Hussars flanked the Russians and engaged the 1st Battalion of the Tavrida Grenadier Regiment, which was supported by the Cossacks and a battalion of the Belozersk Infantry Regiment, which Olsuiev hurriedly dispatched there. The Polish cavalry, Baggovut reported, attacked the Russian battery on the Kurgan and was about to seize it when

  the courageous Colonel Pyshnitsky charged with the Kremenchug Infantry Regiment, showing remarkable gallantry […] in a moment, the enemy was driven back from the battery and the Russian bayonets punished him for this audacity as the hill became covered with enemy corpses …

  Baggovut then dispatched a

  strong group of Cossacks of Major General Karpov’s Regiment to assess the enemy on the [extreme] left flank […] where the Cossacks found the enemy troops deployed in several columns and artillery concealed in the woods. The enemy considered this appearance [of Cossacks] an attack and immediately moved his guns forward, dispatched skirmishers and opened fire.511

  Around 5pm Poniatowski launched an attack coordinated with the Westphalians. The 2nd Brigade of the 23rd Division, led by Junot himself, made a frontal attack with the 3rd Line in the front and two battalions of the 7th Line in the second line; the 2nd (Westphalian) Light Battalion of Lieutenant Colonel Bödicker was deployed in a skirmisher line on the left, near the woods. Bödicker later recalled that his battalion lost ten officers and some 340 men, and the rest of the division also suffered heavy losses. As Lossberg described, the 2nd Brigade charged under canister and musket ire but the Russians slowly retreated and Junot halted his men. Ochs, leading four battalions of the 24th Division and the 1st Brigade of the 23rd Division,

  was more successful, as he forced the Russians to abandon the heights to the north of the Old Smolensk Road.

  Baggovut then decided to abandon the Kurgan and retreat along the Old Smolensk Road. As Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky explained, this decision was occasioned by the news that the Russian left wing was moving behind the Semeyonovskii ravine, as well as by the successful advance of the Westphalian Corps, which could cut him off from the main army.512 As Baggovut described, after his guns were removed from the hilltop, Poniatowski, noticing the Russian retreat, attacked at once, forcing Baggovut to deploy his troops on both sides of the road. The Russians took up a new positions ‘near the heights in front of Psarevo’, where they set up a small battery to cover their retreat. When the Poles assaulted it, the Kremenchug and Minsk Regiments counter-attacked but were mown down by Polish canister. They also suffered greatly under the lances of the 12th Polish Lancers of Colonel Józef Rzyszczewski.513 Nevertheless, neither Poniatowski nor Junot pressed further attacks but rather kept their forces at bay, and Baggovut was able to maintain his new position until late that night.

  The role of the Opolchenye in this combat is often overlooked, although Soviet studies tend to exaggerate it. As mentioned above, the Moscow militiamen were directly involved in the fighting against the Westphalians. Morkov also described the 6th Dismounted Cossack Regiment fighting alongside the Pavlovsk Regiment during the assault on the Kurgan, while according to Kutuzov, the 7th Dismounted Cossack Regiment ‘demonstrated exemplary gallantry, being constantly in the midst of relentless ire and ignoring all dangers …’ Battle reports also praise the 1st and 3rd Jäger Regiments, which participated in several charges. The Smolensk Opolchenye seems to have played an auxiliary role. Thus Vistitsky described these militiamen removing hundreds of wounded in the midst of the combat and ‘Kutuzov, with tears in his eyes, [later] thanked the Smolensk Opolchenye for its dedication and gallantry’. After the battle, the militiamen would receive five roubles each, while fifty-two of them would be awarded the Military Order medal.

  The Battle of Borodino Phase Three (6pm to 12pm)

  Around 6pm the battle began winding down. Clausewitz observed that it was

  striking how the action gradually reflected the weariness and exhaustion of the armies. The masses of infantry had melted away so drastically that perhaps less than one third of the original number was still in action: the rest of the troops were dead, wounded
, engaged in carrying away the casualties or rallying in the rear. Everywhere there were wide gaps. The mighty artillery […] now spoke only by sporadic shots, and even these did not seem to ring out in the old strong and thunderous style, but sounded languid and muffled. The cavalry had almost everywhere taken the place of the infantry and it moved up and down in a tired trot.

  Meanwhile, Petrov noted that

  As the day began to wane, the fervour of the Battle of Borodino faded away and the bloodshed ceased; musket fire could be seen occasionally through the darkness of the night. Now and then, artillery guns, as if snorting off their exhaustion, covered the battlefield with the thunder of their fearsome sighs. The moans of those dying from their wounded could be heard among the piles of dead, which covered the entire field and filled up ravines. To us, they were the sacred shadows of our courageous comrades, who bid their farewell after falling in glory defending their Fatherland.

  Wolzogen recalled that:

  Barclay could not understand why Napoleon did not exploit his victory; for he had in fact already gained possession of the principal points of the battlefield […] [and] a fairly general weariness had gripped the Russian Army. Many of the generals were dead or wounded, and almost all the regimental commanders too […] I had met a lieutenant with thirty to forty men behind the front line, and when I ordered him to rejoin his regiment at once, he replied, ‘This is my regiment!’ All the rest of the men were dead, wounded or missing. Nearly all the Russian reserves had already been committed, whereas […] Napoleon’s Imperial Guard had not been seen in any attack. Therefore the Guard could in any case either continue the fight against the Russian centre or reinforce the Emperor’s right wing and, by overthrowing Baggovut’s corps, could attack the Russian Army in the rear. However, neither move occurred.514