Clancy, Tom - Op Center 8 - Line of Control

by Line of Control [lit]

  why he had come up with constructive ways of filling his time.

  Wherever they were going, Honda arranged to patch his personal computer

  into the data files of both Stephen Viens at the National Reconnaissance

  Office and those of Op Center computer chief. Matt Stoll. The NRO was

  the group that managed most of America's spy satellites. Because Viens

  was an old college chum of Stoll's, he had been extremely helpful in

  getting information for Op-Center when more established groups like

  military intelligence, the CIA, and the NSA were fighting for satellite

  time. Viens was later accused of forward-funding two billion dollars of

  NRO money into a variety of black ops projects. He was vindicated with

  Op-Center's help and recently returned to duty.

  Before Striker headed to any territory, Viens set aside satellite time

  to do all the photographic recon that Colonel August needed. That

  imaging was considered of primary importance and was sent on the mission

  in Colonel August's files. Meanwhile, Stoll spent as much time as

  possible collecting electronic intelligence from the region. Police

  departments and the military did not share everything they knew, even

  with allies. In many foreign countries, especially Russia, China, and

  Israel, American operatives were often watched without their knowledge

  by foreign operatives. It was up to Op-Center to pick up whatever

  information they could and protect themselves accordingly. They did this

  by diverging from the agreed-upon routes and time schedules, using

  "dispensable" team members to mislead tails, or occasionally subduing

  whoever was following them. A host nation could not complain if the

  person they had sent to spy on an ally was later found bound and gagged

  in a hotel closet.

  The ELINT Stoll had gathered was composed of everything from fax

  messages and e-mail to phone numbers and radio frequencies. Everything

  that came to or went from official sources or known resistance and

  opposition forces.

  These numbers, frequencies, and encryption codes were then run through

  programs. They were compared with those of known terrorists or foreign

  agents. If there were any possible "watchdogs or impediments" in the

  region, as mission planners referred to them, these scans helped to find

  and identify them. The last thing American intelligence chiefs wanted

  was to have undercover operatives photographed or their methods observed

  by foreign governments. Not only could that information be sold to a

  third party, but the United States never knew which friendly governments

  might one day be intelligence targets.

  "Think Iran," Colonel August reminded them whenever they went on a joint

  mission with allies.

  Honda had brought along a Striker laptop. The computer was equipped with

  a wireless, high-speed modem to download data Stoll was still

  collecting. Honda would memorize any relevant data. When Striker reached

  India, the computer would be left on the transport and returned to the

  base. Colonel August would keep his laptop to download data.

  Where they were going, the less Corporal Honda had to carry the happier

  he would be.

  As the new intelligence was dumped into Honda's computer, an audio

  prompt pinged. It was alerting him to an anomaly that Stoll's program

  had picked up at Op-Center.

  Honda accessed the flagged data.

  The Bellhop program on the air force's "Sanctity" satellite continually

  scanned the cell phones and radios that used police bands. Op-Center and

  the other U. S. intelligence agencies had these numbers for their own

  communications with foreign offices. It was a simple matter to hack the

  computers and look for other incoming calls.

  The Bellhop had picked up a series of point-to-point calls made on a

  police-registered cell phone. It was coded "field phone" in the Bellhop

  lexicon. Most of the calls were placed over a five-month period from

  Kargil to the district police headquarters in Jammu, coded "home phone."

  During that time there was only one call to that field phone from the

  home phone. Stoll's program, which integrated Op-Center intel with NRO

  data, indicated that the call was placed less than one second before the

  Kashmir-focused Cluster Star3 satellite recorded an explosion in a

  bazaar in Srinagar.

  "Damn," Honda muttered.

  Honda wondered if Colonel August or General Rodgers had been informed

  about a possible terrorist attack. The fact that a police cell phone

  made a call to the site an instant before the explosion could be a

  coincidence. Perhaps someone was phoning a security guard. On the other

  hand there might be a connection between the two. Honda unbuckled

  himself from the uncomfortable seat and went forward to inform his

  commanding officers. He had to walk slowly, carefully, to keep from

  being bucked against his teammates by the aircraft's movements in the

  turbulent air.

  August and Rodgers were huddled together over the general's laptop when

  he arrived.

  "Excuse me, sirs," Honda said. He had to shout to be heard over the

  screaming engines.

  August looked up.

  "What have you got, Corporal?" Honda told the two officers about the

  explosion. August informed Honda that they were just reading an e-mail

  from Bob Herbert about the blast. It provided what few details anyone

  had about the attack. Then Honda informed his superiors about the phone

  calls. That seemed to grab General Rodgers's interest.

  "There were two calls a day for five months, always at the same time,"

  Honda said.

  "Like a routine check-in," Rodgers said.

  "Exactly, sir," Honda replied.

  "Except for today. There was just one call and it was made to the field

  phone. It was placed a moment before the explosion that took out the

  temple."

  Rodgers sat back.

  "Corporal, would you go through the data file and see if this calling

  pattern is repeated, probably from field phones with different code

  numbers? Outgoing calls to one home phone and one or none coming back?"

  "Yes, sir," Honda replied.

  Honda crouched on the cold, rumbling floor and raised one knee. He put

  the laptop upon it. He was not sure what the officers were looking for

  exactly and it was not his place to ask. He input the code number of the

  home phone and asked for a Bellhop search. Colonel August's hunch was

  correct.

  He told them that in addition to this series there were seven weeks of

  calls from another field phone in Kargil.

  They were made twice a day at the same times. Before that there were six

  weeks of calls from another field phone, also two times daily.

  Thirteen weeks was as far back as these Bellhop records went.

  "New Delhi must have had civilian agents tracking a terrorist cell,"

  Rodgers said.

  "How do you know that?" August asked.

  "The calls may just have been field ops reporting in."

  "I don't think so," Rodgers told him.

  "First of all, only one of the calls on Corporal Honda's list was made

  from the home phone to the field phone."
r />   "That was the one made at the time of the explosion," August said.

  "Correct," Rodgers replied.

  "That would suggest the officers in charge of the recon did not want

  field phones ringing at inopportune moments."

  "I'll buy that," August said.

  "There's more than that, though." Rodgers said.

  "When Pakistan was knocked out of Kargil in 1999, the Indian Special

  Frontier Force knew that enemy cells would be left behind.

  They couldn't hunt them down with soldiers. The locals would have known

  if strangers were moving through a village. And if the locals knew it

  members of the cell would have known it. So the SFF recruited a shitload

  of locals to serve in their Civilian Network Operatives unit." The

  general tapped his laptop.

  "It's all here in the intelligence overview.

  But they couldn't give the recruits normal militia radios because, that

  close to Pakistan, those channels are routinely monitored by ELINT

  personnel. So the SFF gave their recruits cell phones. The agents call

  the regional office and complain about break-ins, missing children,

  stolen livestock, that sort of thing. What they're really doing is using

  coded messages to keep the SFF informed about suspected terrorist

  movements and activities."

  "All right," August said.

  "But what makes you think the calls on this list aren't just routine

  field reports?"

  "Because CNO personnel don't make routine field reports," Rodgers said.

  "They only report when they have something to say. There's less chance

  of them being overheard that way. I'm willing to bet that there are

  terrorist strikes to coincide with the termination of each of those

  series of calls. A target was hit, the cell moved on, the calls stopped

  being placed."

  "Perhaps," August said.

  "But that doesn't explain the call to the temple right before the

  blast." "Actually, it might," Rodgers told him.

  "I don't follow," August said.

  Rodgers looked up at Honda.

  "Corporal, would you please get the TAC-SAT?"

  "Yes, sir."

  Rodgers turned back to August.

  "I'm going to ask Bob Herbert to check on the dates of terrorist strikes

  in the region," he said.

  "I want to see if reports from field phones stopped coming in after

  terrorist strikes. I also want Bob to look into something else." "What's

  that?" August asked.

  Honda closed his laptop and stood. He lingered long enough to hear

  Rodgers's reply.

  "I want to know what kind of detonator caps the SFF uses for

  counterterrorist strikes," the general replied.

  "Why?" August asked.

  "Because the Mossad, the Iraqi Ala mn al-Khas, Abu Nidal's group, and

  the Spanish Grapo have all used PDEs on occasion," Rodgers said.

  "Phone-detonated explosives."

  CHAPTER THIRTEEN.

  Srinagar, Kashmir Wednesday, 6:59 p. m.

  It was nearly dark when Ron Friday returned to the bazaar.

  Though he was curious to see how the authorities here were handling the

  investigation he was more interested in what he might be able to find

  out about the attack. His life might depend on that information.

  The rain had stopped and there was a cold wind rolling off the

  mountains. Friday was glad he had worn a baseball cap and a windbreaker,

  though the drop in temperature was not the reason he had put them on.

  Even from his room he could hear helicopters circling the area. When

  Friday arrived he found that the two police choppers were hovering low,

  less than two hundred feet up. In addition to looking for survivors, the

  noise echoing loudly through the square helped to keep onlookers from

  staying too long. But that was not the only reason the choppers were

  there. Friday guessed that they were also maintaining a low altitude to

  photograph the crowd in case the terrorist was still in the area. The

  cockpits were probably equipped with GRRs--geometric reconstructive

  recorders. These were digital cameras that could take photographs shot

  at an angle and reconfigure the geometry so they became accurate frontal

  images. Interpol and most national security agencies had a "face-print"

  file consisting of mug shots and police sketches of known and suspected

  terrorists. Like fingerprints, face-print photographs could be run

  through a computer and compared to images on file. The computer

  superimposed the likenesses. If the features were at least a 70 percent

  match, that was considered sufficient to go after the individual for

  interrogation.

  Friday had worn the baseball cap because he did not want to be

  face-printed by the chopper. He did not know which governments might

  have his likeness on file or for what reason.

  He certainly did not want to give them a picture with which to start a

  file.

  The blast sights had been roped off with red tape. Spotlights on

  ten-foot-tall tripods had been erected around the perimeters.

  Physically, the main market area reminded Friday of a gymnasium after a

  dance. The event was over, the place eerily lifeless, and the residue of

  activity was everywhere.

  Only here, instead of punch there were bloodstains. Instead of crepe

  there were shredded awnings. And instead of empty seats there were

  abandoned carts. Some of the vendors had taken their carts away, leaving

  dust-free spots on the ground in the shape of the stall. In the sharp

  light they resembled the black shadows of trees and people that had been

  burned on the walls of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by nuclear fire.

  Other carts had been simply abandoned. Perhaps the owners had not been

  there when the blast occurred and the hired help did not want to stick

  around. Maybe some of the sellers had been injured or killed.

  Militiamen from the regular army were stationed around the perimeters.

  They were carrying MP5K submachine guns, very visible in the bright

  lights. Police were patrolling the square carrying their distinctive 455

  Webley revolvers.

  Apart from discouraging looters--which did not really require exposed

  firearms--there was only one reason to haul out artillery after a

  strike. It was a means of restoring wounded pride and reassuring the

  public that the people in charge were still a potent force. It was all

  so sadly predictable.

  Reporters were allowed to make their news broadcasts or take their

  pictures and then were asked to leave. An officer explained to a crew

  from CNN that it would be more difficult to watch for looters if a crowd

  gathered.

  Or maybe they just did not want cameras recording their own thefts,

  Friday thought. He was willing to bet that many of the goods that had

  been left behind would be gone by morning.

  A few people had come to the marketplace just to stare.

  Whatever they expected to see--broken bodies, the spectacle of

  destruction, news being made--it did not appear to fulfill them. Most

  left looking deflated. Bomb sites, combat zones, and car wrecks often

  did that to people. They were drawn to it and then repulsed. Maybe they

  were disappointed by a sudden awareness of their o
wn bloodthirstiness.

  Some people came with flowers, which they laid on the ground beneath the

  tape. Others just left behind prayers for dead friends, relatives, or

  strangers.

  At the destroyed police station and temple, building inspectors were

  moving through surrounding structures to determine whether they had been

  weakened or damaged in the blasts. Friday recognized them by their white

  hard hats and palm-sized echo meters These devices emitted either single

  or multidirectional sound waves that could be adjusted to the

  composition of an object, from stone to concrete to wood. If the sound

  waves encountered anything that was inconsistent with the makeup of the

  material--which typically meant a breach--an alarm would sound and the

  officials would examine the site further.

  Apart from the engineers there were the usual police recovery units and

  medical personnel working at all three sites.

  But Friday was surprised by one thing. Typically, terrorist attacks in

  India were investigated by the district police and the National Security

  Guard. The NSG was established in 1986 to act as a counterterrorist

  force. The so-called Black Cat Commandos handled situations ranging from

  in-progress hijackings and kidnappings to forensic activities at bomb

  sites. However, there was not a single black-uniformed NSG operative