Eagles in the Dust

by Adrian Coombs-Hoar

  A number of ‘Barbarian’ tribes pledged their support to Procopius, citing his relationship to Constantius and Julian as the pretext for this. The only tribe that gets a specific mention are the Goths, whose kings sent either 3,0009 or 10,000 troops to aid Procopius.10 It appears that Procopius had entered into negotiations with the Goths who had a short time before crossed the Danube and were ravaging Thrace and Pannonia. Procopius used his relationship to the relatives of Constantine to force the Goths to adhere to the treaty agreement of AD 332 and to support his cause with troops. The troops they sent would have no doubt have been of great use to Procopius in his claim to the throne of the East, both in military and political terms.

  Valens was about to leave Caesarea to go to his residence in Antioch when he was brought news of events in Constantinople. He was persuaded to go to Galatia to try and restore the situation whilst he still could. Procopius in the meantime had received embassies from all over the Empire, one such bearing the false news that Valentinian was dead and that the whole empire was his for the taking. Procopius’ forces were increased when some infantry and cavalry units sent by Valens to deal with the Goths in Thrace, joined with the forces in Constantinople supporting Procopius. Procopius in the meantime had duped Julius, commander of the army in Thrace, into coming to Constantinople where he managed to convince Julius’ men to desert and in one fell swoop Procopius gained the forces Julius had commanded. Not everything went Procopius’ way however. He had sent men to bribe the commander and officers of the forces in Illyricum, but the overall commander, Aequitius, remained loyal to Valens. Aequitius’ forces killed the men sent by Procopius and blockaded the passes leading into the Northern provinces.11

  Valens, now in Galatia, descended into the depths of despair and considered stepping down as Emperor. Being persuaded against this action by those still loyal to him, he roused himself to action and sent the Jovii and Victores, both notable Palatine Auxilia units to attack Procopius and his men. These two units found Procopius, with the Divitenses Legion and some deserters at Mygdus by the banks of the Sangarius River. Both sides engaged each other before Procopius personally stood between both forces and gave such a speech that the Jovii and Victores units switched sides and joined the army of Procopius. Procopius then sent a turncoat Tribune called Rumitalca with a fleet to capture Helenopolis and this force then went on to capture Nicaea. Valens responded by sending Vadomarius, a former king of the Alamanni and now a general in Roman service, to recapture Nicaea, whilst Valens went to lay siege to Chalcedon. A sally from Nicaea, led by Rumitalca, burst through Vadomarius’ besieging force and threatened the rear of Valens’ own besieging army that was nearby. Valens, receiving reports of the approach of Rumitalca, retreated swiftly and made a rapid escape to the safety of Ancyra where he learnt that Lupicinus, Magister Militum of the Orient under Jovian, was approaching with reinforcements. Valens despatched Arintheus, the best general who was still loyal to him, to take charge of this new army and to lead it against the forces of Procopius. Arintheus marched against Procopius and whilst en route encountered a force of auxiliary units loyal to Procopius, possibly including the Jovii and Victores who had initially been loyal to Valens, but instead of attacking them, used his authority to persuade them to throw their leader in chains and come over to his side.12

  The region of Bithynia now having fallen into Procopius’ hands, led Procopius to send troops to capture the city of Cyzicus, where Venustus, a state treasury official, had taken refuge with the pay for the troops stationed in the Orient. Procopius’ forces managed to storm the city once the protective chain across the entrance to the port had been broken. Procopius spent the winter in luxury in Cyzicus and this became his undoing for it allowed Valens to regroup his forces for an offensive in the spring of AD 366.13

  The spring of AD 366 saw an invigorated Valens advance with his army into Galatia and thence on to Lycia where he planned to attack Procopius’ forces led by Gomoarius that were now stationed there. Unfortunately for Valens, these forces had with them the daughter of Constantius II, born after his death, and also Constantius’ wife Faustina. These ‘trophies’ spurred Procopius’ troops to fight with stubborn determination; they were after all defending the relatives of a former Emperor who was much admired by those troops. At this point Valens had a stroke of genius. He persuaded the venerable General and ex-consul Arbitio, who had served under both Constantine and Constantius, to come out of retirement and this most respected man railed against Procopius and the troops under him. Arbitio’s arguments against Procopius’ rebellion persuaded Gomoarius to desert to the camp of Valens, using the excuse that he had been captured by some of Valens’ men. Valens, now confident of victory, marched to Phrygia and attacked Procopius’ army. At the height of the battle, at the critical point where victory could have gone to either side, Agilo, one of the commanders of Procopius’ army, without warning, deserted to Valens’ side. Most of Procopius’ army followed suit and that was the end of Procopius’ stab at the purple. He fled with a few followers into the night but the next morning these same companions bound him and took him to Valens’ camp where he was immediately beheaded.14

  There was to be no immediate cause for celebration as Marcellus, an officer of the Protectores Domesticii, the Emperors’ guard unit, who was in charge of the garrison at Nicaea, made his own bid for the purple and captured Chalcedon. However, this new rebellion was short-lived as Aequitius marched swiftly to Philippopolis, where Marcellus had garrisoned troops, including the Goths that their kings had sent to support Procopius. Aequitius sent troops to capture Marcellus, which they had no trouble in doing. Marcellus was taken before Aequitius, scourged and then put to death, along with many of his companions. Thus ended the last serious threat to Valens’ throne from within the Empire itself.15

  It was telling that Procopius and Marcellus only aimed at Valens’ throne, and not that of Valentinian’s. Valens was considered by contemporary historians to be very much in his brother’s shadow and, whilst not militarily incompetent, he was in no way as experienced in military matters as his brother Valentinian was. It was easier therefore for Procopius and Marcellus to take on Valens and strive for the throne of the East than attempt to take on the far more dangerous and able Valentinian.

  Valens wreaked terrible retribution on those who had supported both Procopius and Marcellus, and very soon this retribution would extend to the Goths.

  Chapter Four

  Valens’ Gothic Campaigns AD 367–369

  The threat of the usurper Procopius having been removed, Valens turned his attention to other matters. To this end during AD 366 Valens despatched Victor, now Magister Equitum (Master of the Cavalry) beyond the Danube to the land of the Goths to enquire why they had broken their treaty with the Roman Empire by lending support to Procopius and attacking the armies of the legitimate Emperor. The Goths defended their actions by producing a letter written to them by Procopius stating he had assumed the role of Emperor of the East by virtue of his relationship to Constantine and thereby had elicited their support as per the treaty agreement. When Victor returned with this news Valens became incensed and set about raising an army to exact retribution upon them.1

  By the spring of AD 367 all was ready and Valens moved with his army to the province of Moesia Secunda which was the one closest to the Danube bordering the Gothic lands. It was from here that Valens would launch his attack upon the traitorous Goths. On arriving in that province Valens pitched his camp at the fortress called Daphne on the banks of the Danube. A bridge was thrown over the Danube, it was constructed of boats lashed together on top of which was a planked surface over their decks. Using this Valens and his army crossed over totally unopposed. The reason for this soon became apparent, the Goths were fully aware of both his preparations for war and of his coming.2 This was either due to Roman deserters fleeing to the Goths informing them of what they knew, or it could have been Gothic recruits in the Roman army returning home on leave informing their fellow tribesme
n of what was about to happen. This was unfortunately a fairly common occurrence (see Chapter Eight). Valens, now on the northern side of the Danube, found no armies to vanquish, the Goths having taken themselves to the safety of the mountains. There was precious little Valens could do apart from despatching Arintheus, now promoted to Magister Peditum (Master of the Infantry) with some detachments to scour the land for any straggling Gothic families that could be used as potential hostages. Valens returned back over the Danube during the summer without having achieved anything of note.

  The following year Valens yet again attempted to invade the territory of the Goths. He had moved further East along the Danube and Ammianus had him ‘near a village of the Carpi in a permanent camp which he had made’.3 The campaign came to an abrupt end due to the Danube flooding and he was forced to break camp and make his way to Marcianople where he spent the winter of AD 368.4

  One cannot fault Valens’ persistence and determination to deal with the Goths, because he embarked on yet a third campaign against them in AD 369. This time he had positioned himself much further East, at the town on Novidunum on the banks of the Danube bordering the territory of the Greuthungi Goths. Valens and his army again crossed on a bridge of boats, and on this campaign Valens was much more successful. He engaged Athanaricus, an ‘Iudex’ or King of the Goths.5 Athanaricus gathered an army and met Valens in battle. Valens inflicted a decisive defeat upon Athanaricus, who was forced to flee for his life.6

  Valens, consulting with his advisors, sent envoys in the form of Victor, Commander of the Cavalry and Arintheus, Commander of the Infantry, to negotiate the terms of ending the war. They returned and informed Valens that Athanaricus had agreed to the terms that Valens had proposed and that a new peace treaty was to be entered into between the Goths and the Roman Empire. However, Athanaricus refused to cross the Danube to formally sign it, stating his father had forbidden him to cross the Danube and enter Roman territory under oath. And so it was arranged that both Valens and Athanaricus would meet in the centre of the Danube on boats where the treaty would be agreed and hostages exchanged. Whilst the spin given on this by Ammianus and Themistius was that it was a glorious victory and humbling of the Goths, one cannot help but notice that it was really Athanaricus who determined exactly where the treaty was to be concluded and that Valens had no option but to comply.7

  The terms of this peace treaty had the tributes and gifts paid to the Goths since the treaty of AD 332 stopped, and trade between the Goths and Romans to only be carried out at two designated points on the Danube.8 Valens also would begin the construction of defences along the Danube to prevent any further Gothic incursions. Whilst this at face value appears harsh, after all the loss of the yearly funds from the Romans must have hurt, the reality was that an integral part of the peace treaty imposed upon the Goths in 332 was removed, and this removal harmed the Romans far more. The new treaty did not place a condition upon the Goths to supply manpower to the Romans as and when needed. Whilst this clause ensured it would be impossible for any future usurper to contact the Goths and use any relationship to Constantine or his family as leverage to provide troops, it also would mean that any approach from Valens or any future Emperor would have to include inducements to do so.

  What were Valens’ aims and intentions for his Gothic campaigns? It is far too simplistic to suggest all that he wanted to do was to exact punishment upon them for the support they gave to Procopius. If this were the case then he would surely have not put so much time and effort into undertaking not one but three campaigns against them in so many years. The more reasonable suggestion would be that Valens wanted to inflict a crushing defeat upon the Goths with the intention of then exhorting them to abide by the treaty agreement of AD 332 and provide him with recruits for his Sassanid invasion force. It is patently clear that remaining north of the Danube on a permanent basis was not a part of Valens’ campaign strategy; the fact that he returned back across the Danube each time he crossed it is proof of that. Of course there is always the case that Valens’ campaigns were actually instigated not solely by the Goths’ support of Procopius, but in fact were more to do with destabilizing the Goths to ensure that troublesome race did not take advantage of his moving troops East for his proposed invasion of Sassanid Persia. Even if this was not Valens’ aim his campaigns against the Goths had the effect of weakening Athanaricus’ rule over them and the defeat Athanaricus had suffered would cause problems for that Gothic ruler. An unintended side-effect of the conflict was that the defeat that was inflicted upon the Goths would have weakened their ability to put up a successful resistance against the Huns. In effect Valens’ campaigns against the Goths did far more harm than good.

  A far more reaching side-effect of the conclusion of the war was that sometime between the end of the conflict and the events of AD 376 a revolt appears to have taken place within the ranks of the Goths. A new contender for the King of the Tervingi Goths arose, one who was to become Valens’ nemesis – Fritigern.

  Chapter Five

  Crisis Beyond the Danube AD 369–376

  Whilst very little survives in the histories as to what happened beyond the Danube after the treaty of AD 369, and what does survive is confusing to say the least, there are some very clear indications that things took a turn for the worst for Athanaricus. Socrates Scholasticus wrote that the Tervingi Goths fell into a ‘civil war’ and split into two parts, one under the command of Athanaricus, the other under Fritigern.1 It can be speculated that Athanaricus fell out of favour with at least a portion of the Goths following his defeat at the hands of Valens. The portion of the Goths that were disaffected with Athanaricus’ rule were led by Fritigern, who was another Gothic chieftain. Fritigern took advantage of the unfavourable circumstances in which Athanaricus now found himself. He realized that the time was ripe to challenge Athanaricus, and made a play for the leadership of the Tervingi Goths. However, things did not go to plan as it appears that, much against his expectations, it was initially Fritigern who faced defeat at the hands of Athanaricus. This set-back led Fritigern to take the radical and unusual approach of making contact with Valens with a view to the Romans supporting him against Athanaricus.2 One could see the appeal of this approach from Valens’ side. It would remove Athanaricus as a future threat, and also put someone in charge of the Goths who owed Valens a huge debt in the process. Accordingly Valens despatched the army of Thrace beyond the Danube and with their support Fritigern achieved total victory over Athanaricus, forcing the now usurped former leader to flee with a small band of followers. In gratitude for Valens’ support Fritigern converted to Christianity and persuaded those he led to convert as well.3 The problem with this account, as given by Socrates, is that both Sozomen and Ammianus appear to place this rebellion to the time when Valens had granted leave for the Goths to cross the Danube and settle in Thrace, and in the case of Zosimus, after Valens had been defeated by Fritigern at Adrianople. My view is that the revolt by Fritigern must have taken place before AD 376. The reason for this being that it was Fritigern who arrived with the initial wave of Goths who appeared on the banks of the Danube. Athanaricus arrived with his Gothic contingent some time later at the banks of the same river and he was then initially refused permission to cross according to Ammianus. Athanaricus did not actually cross the Danube until much later, after the death of Valens had removed the potential threat to his life. This is a clear indication that by the time the Tervingi Goths arrived at the Danube in AD 376 they had split into two groups, who were at least allied towards each other.

  The assistance Valens provided to Fritigern, and then the conversion of Fritigern and the Goths under his command to Valens’ brand of Christianity, Arianism, I believe led to Valens viewing Fritigern in a particularly favourable light. I also believe that the esteem Valens held Fritigern in contributed to how Valens interacted with Fritigern from 376 onwards, and in turn directly affected how Valens acted towards the Goths themselves, especially on the eve of the Battle of Adrianople, of wh
ich I will discuss more in the relevant chapters.

  Another evil to beset Athanaricus and the other Gothic chieftains north of the Danube was the troubling appearance of a new enemy, and one that was to cause them to leave their homelands for the perceived safety of what was the territory of the Roman Empire, which was technically another of their enemies.

  The Goths who lived much further East, near the Caspian Sea, had for some time been engaged in low scale warfare against the steppe tribes that lived there, in the main the tribe known as the Halani or Alans. This warfare began to intensify as the Alans increasingly encroached on the Gothic sphere of influence. When this began is not entirely clear, but it could possibly as far back as the AD ‘350s’ when pressure on the Sassanid north eastern frontier led to Sharpur II moving forces to counter a threat coming from that direction. This threat, nomadic tribes moving under external pressure, appears to have been caused by the same threat that had pushed the Alans out of their traditional homelands into the territory claimed by the Goths. And this threat had a name, the Huns.

  Where the Huns came from, and who they were originally known as, is a hotly debated topic. Some of the earliest claims for the origin of the Huns are that they were in fact the Hsiung-nu, a tribe that lived on the vast Eurasian Steppe and that were attacked by another nomadic tribe, the Hsien-Pi, on instigation of the Chinese around AD 93. The Hsien-Pi absorbed many of them, forcing the rest who refused to join them to flee westwards. Other tribes are also mooted as the originators of Huns.4