Dunkirk 1940

by Tim Lynch

  The next morning, iron rations were being distributed when a mobile canteen arrived on the scene. After breakfast, the battalion moved about a mile away into woods alongside the Amiens–Rouen road. No orders were given to dig in but some men managed to scrape some sort of cover with the few tools to hand. The day was spent watching Stuka attacks on Amiens where two more trains were hit as they reached the station during the day. A further move was made after aircraft seemed to be bombing the woods nearby, and the men collected gardening tools from the farms and cottages they passed. As night approached, a group of around 30 mounted Belgian cavalrymen passed the position and warned the guard that the Germans were around 30km away. When the message was passed to Gethen, he ordered the guard commander ‘not to take any notice of rumours’. Later that night, Lieutenant Bowyer was detailed to begin gathering stragglers and ‘by the use of troops with bayonets’, collected around 80–100 French soldiers but found that the only French officer they could find refused to issue orders, saying he had been told to reform his own unit. With that he and the stragglers left. Concerned about the effect on morale, Gethen told his men that the French were untrained recruits and of no use to them.

  That night Gethen, who had been hit in the head during the bombing and appears to have been concussed, became increasingly adamant that he had no orders to go back the way they had come so could only either continue the journey or stay where he was. On the basis of information from the French staff at Amiens, who despite the evidence to the contrary continued to claim that the Sedan breakthrough had been contained, he chose to stay put. His decision doomed the battalion.

  Unable to reach their destination because of line damage outside Lens, the train carrying 6th RS was forced to return along the same line, again passing the 7th and eventually coming to a halt in a siding south of the Somme and about 10 miles from Amiens where its engine was removed. Unsure what to do, it would stay there for two days before the CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Wannup took the decision to take the train back down the line. The only other alternative was an uncertain march westwards and the colonel knew his men were not up to it. They had few rations and their training had not prepared them for the distance they would need to cover. A recce party was able to make contact with a skeleton railway staff at St Just-en-Chausee and arranged a new locomotive. At 2200hrs on the 20th the battalion gathered its kit and set off once again into the darkness. By then, the routes were often blocked and the battalion found itself directed to Paris where, on the orders of the military attaché, it was sent to Nantes to resume the labour work so recently vacated by 137 Brigade. Of all the digging division units, theirs was the luckiest. They would still be working on railway construction as the last ships from the northern ports were heading home but all would safely return to England.

  Behind them, 12th Division’s 35 Brigade – three battalions of the Queens Royal Regiment – were having an equally frustrating time. Its move to Abbeville should have been simple. Its 2/5th battalion were already working on airfield construction in the area and could easily reach the city by road. The other battalions, the 2/6th and 2/7th, were working on the rail hub at Abancourt and were only a short march from the station there. In any case, the two battalions arrived at Abbeville by noon on the 18th. Their role, apparently, was to act as a reserve with confusingly contradictory orders to take up position ‘within four miles of Abbeville. The positions are not to be tactical, but areas to be allotted with regard to the fact that the brigade may have to defend Abbeville.’27 This last was a surprise since the Germans were still widely thought to be over 100 miles away. Unsure of whether they were to prepare defences or not, they set to work building roadblocks east of the Somme in line with the plan for a hollow square with, they believed, 37 Brigade working west of the river.28 Perhaps the worst equipped of all, 35 Brigade could muster just five Boys rifles and a total of 35 rounds per battalion.

  In its panic, GHQ had been issuing orders to various units and calling them forward piecemeal. For the already overworked railway transport officers (RTOs) this added yet another layer of confusion to that already caused by the lack of radio contact and reliance on a telephone system that had been temperamental even before the bombing and saboteurs started their work on it. Air strikes on the lines constantly meant changes of plans and perhaps the local RTO at Abbeville mistook the brigade for elements of 46th Division. Certainly the risk of mistaking 12th Division’s 37 Brigade for 46th Division’s 137 Brigade – also expected through at any time – was all too real. Whatever the truth of the matter, Abbeville’s RTO issued new orders for the 2/6th and 2/7th to ‘proceed to Lens’. The order was questioned but he remained insistent. A call to Arras over a very poor line confirmed it. With the Brigade commander travelling by road with the 2/5th and not yet arrived, without radio contact with anyone at Divisional HQ (who themselves knew nothing of either the divisional commander’s whereabouts or indeed those of any of their brigades) and completely unaware of 37 Brigade’s earlier movements, 12th Division’s senior officer on site saw no alternative but to send them on their way. Having been so close to Abbeville, the men had not brought any rations and there were none now to be had as they began the long journey to Lens, arriving there at 1900hrs only to find nothing in place for their reception. After angry scenes in the RTO’s office, contact with GHQ was made. The order ‘proceed to Lens’ had been a mistake. It was actually that they should ‘proceed to Doullens’ to join 36 Brigade’s right flank.29

  By now it was too late for them to reach Doullens and instead the tired and hungry men were forced to camp out in a local park until 0600hrs the next morning when they began a slow journey back to their starting point. A move south brought them to Arras where, by chance, Petre heard of their plight and arranged a train to take them back via St Pol, the direct line having already been bombed, but he could do nothing about finding rations. By the time they finally reached Abbeville at 2000hrs that night, they had not eaten for two days. Meanwhile the 2/5th had been spared a nightmare rail journey but had faced instead a long, hot march when their transport failed to arrive. Reunited, the three battalions took up position as a screen northeast of the Somme around the villages of Drucat, Vauchelles and Bellancourt.

  Sunday 19 May had been a frustrating day for HQ 12th Division. Petre and his senior staff officer had been called forward to Arras late on the 17th, arriving there at 0030hrs only to be given some information but no orders. He returned to his HQ as it prepared to move forward and set up in the village of Fressenville as they had been directed to do. Reaching Fressenville at 0900hrs, Petre had just forty-five minutes to settle in before he received another summons to Arras. This time, he was given command of Petreforce and so stayed at Brassard. Unfortunately, the fact was not communicated to his own HQ so that by Sunday afternoon, 12th Division had literally lost its commander and seven of its nine battalions – only the whereabouts of the 2/6th East Surreys at Le Havre was certain and the 2/5th Queen’s were known to be in the area of Abbeville but the rest had simply disappeared.

  Farthest away and last to be called forward, 137 Brigade did not begin their move until late in the afternoon of the 18th. The previous evening, Brigadier Gawthorpe was dining in the mess of the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment when a call was put through from General Curtis at Arras. Soon afterwards a signal arrived confirming that the brigade was to move forward the following day, collecting the 2/4th KOYLI en route. The 2/6th DWR would set out from St Nazaire whilst two trains would collect the 2/7th DWR and the 2/5th West Yorkshires from their camp at Blain. The DWR history claims that Gawthorpe was told that the brigade was to be used as a defensive screen30 but, in keeping with the general air of confusion, Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor of the 2/7th DWR reported later that he knew they were ‘untrained and practically unarmed … [and] understood that the Division was to undertake work in L of C in continuation of the pioneer tasks which we had already been employed upon in Nantes Sub Area.’31

  In fact, the brigade had been earmarked a
s part of the proposed ‘Polforce’ being set up under 46 Division’s commander in the vicinity of the town of St Pol. Whatever the truth, the brigade busied itself in preparing for the move. One vehicle per company was to be loaded onto the trains. These were to be driven to Nantes for loading. The remainder of the transport was to set out by road as soon as possible. The West Yorkshires’ vehicles, under Second Lieutenant Richard Camrass, a former solicitor from Dewsbury, set out as planned. It would be many weeks before he was seen again, having had the unnerving experience of finding his own obituary in the local evening papers.32

  After frantic preparations the 2/7th DWR and West Yorkshires paraded at 1700hrs on the 18th and, led by the DWR band, marched to the station where the locals turned out to cheer them on ‘in spite of the misery and apprehension one could see in their faces.’33 Whilst the DWR managed to have a train to themselves, the West Yorkshires were to share their packed train with Brigade HQ and attached engineer, pioneer and ordnance units as the three train convoy headed north. Their train finally pulled out of Blain station at 2100hrs and was followed an hour later by the Dukes. ‘As darkness fell’, wrote Major J.K. Parks of the West Yorkshires, ‘it was noticed that cars, with headlights burning, were travelling in large numbers along the main roads southwards, though it is doubtful whether the full significance of this was realised by the men bumping along in the famous “hommes 40. Chevaux 8.”’34 At 0430hrs on the 19th, the two battalions reached Le Mans and halted for breakfast. As they ate, the men watched trains crammed with refugees pass by in the opposite direction.

  About the same time as the Dukes and West Yorkshires set out, the 2/4th KOYLI set out in pursuit of the rest of its brigade. Their journey from Rennes was so slow that men jumped off the train to answer the call of nature and then caught up and climbed back aboard, the KOYLI had little idea what awaited them although Lieutenant-Colonel Hodgkinson had heard through unofficial channels that they were en route to Arras, possibly for airfield defence.35 Rex Flowers and a few friends had found a small map of France torn from a diary and were able to follow their progress via Laval and Argentan before finally reaching Rouen after 20 hours on the train. There, the KOYLI train was to join 137 Brigade’s convoy north.

  With dusk approaching, Amiens was already under attack and when the train carrying the 2/6th DWR was forced to pull back into Rouen it was realised that the main line north was now blocked. Without informing the battalions, RTOs made the fateful decision to change their destination from St Pol via Amiens to Bethune via Abbeville. The trains were switched to the coast line. They would travel via Dieppe, which had been designated a Red Cross port under the terms of the Geneva Convention. It was to act as the main medical centre and, protected under international law, there were no anti-aircraft defences. The decision to re-route troop trains violated its neutrality. German reconnaissance aircraft had spotted the movements of troop trains. Dieppe was now a legitimate target.

  In the marshalling yards of Rouen, 137 Brigade and the KOYLIs made themselves as comfortable as possible for another night on the train. To the north, their sister battalions of 138 and 139 Brigade dug in as part of Macforce. Along the Canal du Nord, 69 Brigade were in position. To their right, 70 Brigade had received orders to begin to pull back to a line closer to Arras. 20 miles away, two battalions of 36 Brigade were heading for their new positions around Doullens. HQ 12th Division was desperately trying to establish some sort of contact with its brigades but failing. Barely equipped, poorly trained and with no news of the war, no direct communication with HQ or even between their own companies, the men of the digging divisions tried to make sense of what was going on.

  And then the Germans blitzkrieg hit them full force.

  Notes

  1 Beauman p 121

  2 Freiser, The Blitzkrieg Legend p256

  3 Gawthorpe, Ca Ira Vol XII June 1948 p223

  4 Churchill, The Second World War Vol 2 p50

  5 Ibid p56

  6 Beauman p123

  7 War Diary of 7RWK. WO 167/765

  8 Beauman p124

  9 War Diary 2/5th West Yorkshires. WO 167/853

  10 Report on Macforce. WO197/118

  11 Beauman papers. Report on L of C dated 25 June 1940

  12 Rissik, The DLI at War p35

  13 Sebag-Montefiore, p129

  14 Report on Petreforce. WO197/118

  15 Tyneside Scottish, Harder than Hammers 1947 p7

  16 Ibid p8

  17 Baggs, C.H. Imperial War Museum documents 94/49/1

  18 Swinburne report in Sebag-Montefiore p133

  19 Laidler, J. A Slice of my Life. Account held at Wakefield Local Studies Library p3

  20 Believed to be 2759795 Private James Smith, whose age is given by the Commonwealth War Graves Register as 20 years old. Laidler states that he had lied about his age and was, in fact, just sixteen when he was killed on 20 May

  21 War Diary 7RWK. WO 167/765

  22 Blaxland p116

  23 War Diary 7RWK. WO 167/765

  24 Report on Petreforce. WO197/118

  25 War Diary 7th Royal Sussex. WO 167/837

  26 Estimates vary between 60 and as high as 100 according to sources. These figures are taken from the War Diary WO 167/837

  27 Karslake p70

  28 Glover p50

  29 Karslake p69

  30 Barclay, The History of the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment 1919–1952 p249

  31 Taylor Report dated 2 Jun 1940 to Commander, X Brigade L of C in Gawthorpe papers IWM Document 78/44/1

  32 Ca Ira Vol X No1 Sep 1940 p44

  33 Barclay p249

  34 Major Parks. Original manuscript in West Yorkshire Regiment Archive and edited account in Ca Ira Vol X No.4 June 1941 p181

  35 Wylly, Col. H.C. History of the King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry Vol V 1919 through to 1942, subtitled ‘Never Give Up’ 1950 p114

  Sketch map of the German advance, 20 May 1940.

  Chapter Eight

  ‘Very brave, but very, very stupid’

  0500hrs

  As dawn broke on the morning of 20 May, a small truck belonging to the French 513th Battalion drove steadily along the road between the villages of Beaurains and Agny, just south of Arras. Corporal Marcel Binet and his three men, Victor Duquesnoy, Rene Ducrocq and Noel Odent, had all made the trip many times since the previous October. Mounted in the truck was a Hotchkiss machine gun and their role each night was to travel these roads as a mobile anti-aircraft patrol. As the sun rose, they began to head for home. They never made it. Tanks of the 7th Panzer Division found them and all four died in a hail of fire.1

  As Binet and his men died, a few miles to the south the men of 70 Brigade were beginning yet another move. Petre had decided to pull his units back to form a stronger line north and west of Arras with the intention of falling back behind the La Bassee Canal line to the north. After days of marching, countermarching and attempting to dig in without tools, wire or effective weapons, the men had had little sleep and were exhausted. Their orders were now to head for the village of Thelus, north of Arras and a long night march began but Brigadier Kirkup then arrived with new orders. The situation was thought to have improved. Instead, they were now to head the other way, south to the village of Saulty, where they would be able to make contact with 36 Brigade, but since this meant another 20-mile march the Brigadier decided that they should rest up and send the battalion stores ahead of them. Then, using the trucks in a shuttle service, they could leapfrog each other to their destination. For the time being, 10DLI stopped at Mercatel, 11DLI at Wancourt and 1Tyneside Scottish at Neuville-Vitasse, all places well known to older members of the regiment from the previous war. In Neuville-Vitasse, the Tynesiders found a group of 140 Pioneers and Ordnance Corps troops under the command of Staff Sergeant Perkins. The group had not seen an officer for over twenty-four hours and had not been told what they were expected to do. Between them, they carried 28 rifles and another 20 men carried boxes of Bren gun magazines but had no way to use
them. They were taken under command. At around 0300hrs, the men finally had chance to grab some sleep.2

  0600–0700hrs

  The 7th RWK, having been given the option of choosing their own position, had established an anti-tank locality outside Albert. They then received orders to go back into the town because, HQ insisted, the situation had ‘materially improved’ although when asked how, no answer was forthcoming. Having seen the effects of bombing in a built up area, Colonel Clay had his doubts but began the move at the insistence of his brigade commander, Brigadier Roupell. At 0200hrs they set out again, arriving around 0600hrs in the centre of town and parked in the cover of some trees. Within minutes, Stukas appeared and began their attack as the men ran to take up position.

  Lieutenant Colonel R. Gethen, 7th Battalion Royal Sussex Regiment.

  To the north, the remainder of 36 Brigade had arrived in their positions around Doullens in the early hours and were now scraping out fighting holes along the railway line and putting up temporary roadblocks. To the west, 35 Brigade were still trying to find orders and the 12th Division’s last two battalions, 4th Buffs and 2/6th Queen’s – again without reference to divisional HQ – were told to prepare for a move by truck via Abbeville to Boulogne.3 To the south, Colonel Gethen and his men of the Royal Sussex sat tight, waiting for instructions. Below the Somme, 137 Brigade had resumed its seemingly interminable trek north and was approaching the outskirts of Dieppe, where bombing attacks directed against the railway yards had already begun during the night.

  0700–0800hrs