Dunkirk 1940

by Tim Lynch

  Colonel Recknagel, commander of Infanterie Regiment 54, 18th Infantry Division, whose men fought through the rearguard action of 139 Brigade, 46 Infantry Division on the Dunkirk perimeter.

  Colonel Bohnstedt of Infanterie Regiment 51, the sister unit of Infanterie Regiment 54, also involved in the action on the perimeter.

  Also moving north that day were the remnants of those units by-passed by the Arras attack. Elements of the British 2nd, 44th and 48th Divisions were all beginning to arrive in the Bethune–La Bassee area and by nightfall, Gawthorpe’s command had expanded with the allocation of troops from two Royal Engineer Chemical Companies, two RE Field Companies, three Belgian anti-tank guns, one company each of 9RNF and the Don Detail battalion, some artillery and a mixed group of RASC and anti-aircraft gunners reassigned as infantry. As he left a conference at Polforce HQ to head for St Omer that evening, his car came under fire from a German reconnaissance armoured car on the far bank. At St Omer, he heard that German tanks had been seen in the woods between the town and the port of Boulogne. The order went out to demolish the bridges. At ‘D’ Company’s position outside Robecq, 33-year-old Private Robert Fenwick became the battalion’s first fatal casualty – killed by a piece of flying masonry as the bridge exploded at 1945hrs. The company had been due to hand over their positions to ‘B’ Company at 2000hrs and there had been no warning that the bridge was about to be blown.8 A few hours earlier, a patrol of six men had been sent out under Sergeant Wilbey and Lance Corporal Poller to bring in the pilot of a German aircraft shot down over the south bank. They had not returned. Then, at around 2100hrs, the first probing attacks began.

  Treading more carefully after the counterattack of the previous day, the SS-VT were also in position near Aire. Hauptsturmführer (Captain) Johannes Muhlenkamp’s 15th Motorcycle Infantry Company equipped with motorcycles and machine guns on side cars had reached the canal by that afternoon and were quickly followed by an artillery battalion and the division’s three infantry regiments, the ‘Deutschland’, ‘Der Führer’ and ‘Germania’. Once there, General Hausser ordered them to prepare for a defence to the north-east, with Germania providing defence in depth.

  Orders now went out to 23rd Division’s 69 Brigade to begin a move from their positions at Seclin south of Lille to the canal line from St Omer to Gravelines on the coast. After a long wait, they set out after dark but GHQ then decided that the need was greater in their old positions than at their destination. Frantic efforts by staff officers managed to find the convoy at Estaires, just behind the canal line at around 0300hrs and turn it around but by then brigade HQ had disappeared and was not seen again until after the evacuation. The 6th Green Howards never received the message and continued on their way with the divisional engineers, being placed under the command of Rustyforce when they alone reached Gravelines. After a six-hour journey that served only to further tire the exhausted men, 69 Brigade found themselves back where they started.

  They were, though, luckier that their erstwhile colleagues of 9RNF. Late in the evening it had been decided to send a company into St Omer to bolster the French garrison. Armed with the best weapons that could be found for them, the trucks were waved into the burning town only to find themselves surrounded by the Germans. The entire company was captured without a chance to send a warning back across the canal. A convoy of five RASC trucks had also been sent with vague instructions to pick up troops for an anti-tank patrol which included the instructions to ram any tank they encountered. They too had disappeared.9

  Shortly after midnight, isolated shots rang out along the line of the canal as SS patrols probed forward on either side of the West Yorkshires’ line. As yet, only the lead elements of the 3rd Panzer Division were at the southern bank opposite them. To the north, Untersturmführer (Second Lieutenant) Schulze approached the outskirts of Aire at the head of a small motorised column containing his reinforced platoon of the SS-VT and a few anti-tank guns. He had been tasked with securing the Aire bridge and in the pitch darkness he took his troops into the town. About halfway along the street, Schulze found his path blocked by a vehicle and realised it was part of a column stretching down the road and creeping forward. Assuming that they were tanks of 3rd Panzer outside their sector he tagged along behind as they made their way through the town. The stop/start movement of the tanks infuriated him and, impatient to get on with his mission, he climbed aboard the nearest tank and rapped on the turret with his pipe only to be greeted by a torrent of French.

  Wisely keeping quiet, he dismounted and ordered his men to unhitch the anti-tank guns and move them to the side of the street. They opened fire at point-blank range and gunned down the crews as they tried to seek shelter in the houses lining the street. Recovering well, the French fought back and destroyed Schulze’s vehicles but without inflicting any German casualties. Leaving a trail of 20 burning tanks along Aire’s main street, Schulze withdrew.10

  Even as Aire came under attack, orders were issued to lift the anti-tank mines so that the British and French troops still on the far bank could withdraw, but it was too late. During the night, attacks were made against all the bridges along the brigade front. Inexperience showed as defensive positions were set up on the north bank of the canal but with few among the support troops now thrust into the front line appreciating the importance of placing defences on the far bank and approaches. Fear of being trapped when the bridges were blown was understandable, but the alternative meant the Germans had to launch only one attack to get across instead of encountering a defence in depth. It was a problem Gawthorpe had tried to tackle but with limited success.11 All along the line, footbridges had been left standing to allow the last of the men trapped on the far bank to rejoin their comrades. It was these that the Germans now targeted, one being blown even as German engineers attempted to remove the charges.

  At around 0500hrs on the 23rd, an unidentified officer of the West Yorkshires called to the house of the Durand family in the village of Busnes and told them to leave as they were in imminent danger from an expected German crossing of a nearby footbridge. As he prepared to leave, the family watched bemused as he placed his helmet on a broomstick and held it at the window before deciding it was safe to leave. He then borrowed their bicycle and pedalled off.12 A short time later, a patrol led by Lieutenant McLean of HQ Company soon established that the enemy were in the village of Busnes opposite the West Yorkshire positions. By early afternoon, an armoured car was spotted approaching the now demolished bridge. It had been followed more armour and motorcycle troops and an attack developed on the right of the West Yorkshires as the armoured column advanced towards the Busnes–St Venant bridges held by HQ Company. At the same time, the defenders came under artillery, mortar and machine gun fire from their right rear. Also under heavy fire, the French holding the railway bridge on their right flank had fallen back and been followed by German infantry who clambered over the ruins of the partly destroyed bridge. In danger now of being outflanked, HQ Company began to withdraw towards the line St Venant–Calonne, suffering around ten killed or missing and two wounded.

  German troops wait to cross the La Bassee Canal at Robecq.

  German troops crossing the La Bassee Canal near Robecq.

  British casualties after the battle for Robecq.

  Map of the situation on 23 May sketched by Brigadier Gawthorpe.

  Further east, ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies stayed in position. Although they were not yet under fire, they were acutely aware of the canal traffic still on the waterway and filled with people. Some were still occupied by their owners, others taken as temporary lodgings by refugees but any of these apparent civilians could be fifth columnists intent on using the barges to help the Germans cross the canal. All smaller boats had been systematically smashed but even as the engineers attempted to move the larger craft they had been driven back by machine gun fire.

  Having advanced against only very light resistance, Eicke and his men were regaining confidence and he became determined that th
ey would cross the canal and redeem themselves. The overall German plan was to push across the canal before the British could firmly establish their defence line and the Totenkopf had been assigned the limited objective of advancing to Bethune on the 23rd to reconnoitre potential crossing points to the north of town, but no more than this. Reaching the southern outskirts of Bethune that afternoon and without bothering to attempt any reconnaissance of the far bank, Eicke instead ordered an immediate crossing in battalion strength. It was only when his men reached the far side that they discovered how strongly the British were dug in. Just beyond the West Yorkshires’ left flank were the regular troops of the Royal Irish Fusiliers from 25 Brigade who were able to force the Germans back under heavy fire. Only now did Eicke follow his instructions and order a reconnaissance in force along the southern bank with engineers stood by to throw a bridge across the canal if an opportunity arose.

  By evening, troops of the SS-VT had penetrated into the Forest of Nieppe and were working their way into the villages of St Floris, St Venant and Robecq. Among the advancing Germans, a soldier named Homann later described ‘a hail of fire’ meeting them as they approached Robecq. Nearing the cemetery on the outskirts of the village, he recalled a ‘furious barrage’ from the tree line. Taking cover, one of his men found an abandoned machine gun lying on the ground:

  ‘The dogs are perched in the trees’, said my comrade. ‘Wait? We will indeed.’ Advancing, he calmly pulled the trigger, firing into the trees in the cemetery. A brown silhouette fell among the graves. ‘Did you see’, he asked with a hard laugh, ‘he fell like a rotten apple; he won’t bother us again.’13

  By nightfall, the West Yorkshires were in danger of being surrounded. Enemy forces were in the woods to the west and pushing towards both brigade HQ at Morbecque and GHQ at Hazebrouck with some reports that they were already on the outskirts of the town. To the east, the Totenkopf were preparing an assault near Hinges. For now, ‘B’ Company in the middle were asked to hold as long as possible as the other companies tried to establish themselves in new positions near the airfield at Merville, where the only British planes left in France were evacuating. It was easier said than done – 10 Platoon were half a mile from HQ Company’s old position and three quarters of a mile from 11 Platoon and Company HQ. They had fifteen men to hold a half-mile front. Lieutenant Moor sent five men out on a roving patrol all night but there was no further contact before the next morning.

  During the day and into that night, Gawthorpe’s command had grown. By midnight he was told that 2nd and 44th Division troops would reach him late the next day but that the Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards and 9RNF would be there before dawn. The 4th/7th Dragoons should be with him sometime during the day and 138 Brigade with the few surviving elements of 70 Brigade would come under command shortly. With those forces at his disposal, Gawthorpe decided he could use his reserves to counterattack at dawn before the Germans could consolidate their crossing, the Inniskillings would lead with 9RNF occupying each position as it was taken. Equipped only with armoured cars, Gawthorpe praised the willingness of the Irishmen to attack as if they were the lead elements of a tank force despite being massively outgunned by the enemy, but warned them not to stay in any one position for more than three minutes to avoid drawing fire.14

  French Char B1 tanks. Confidence in French military power was high, largely as a result of public displays of massed tanks like these. Capable of withstanding German anti-tank fire, in combat the B1 was hampered by a small fuel tank which frequently put it out of action before the enemy could.

  At 0430hrs, just before the attack began, Polforce was alerted by a message that the French 5th Motorised Division’s positions east of Aire from Isbergues to Guardebecque had been overrun and that the division was no longer in any state to mount a defence. This left the West Yorkshires even more vulnerable to encirclement. Behind them, the 250 men of the 6th York and Lancasters from 138 Brigade who had managed to complete their move as a formation, began a sweep through the area west of Merville but were unable to prevent a tank from entering Hazebrouck itself. A scratch GHQ defence force had been created using the few troops to hand and a number of 1917 vintage light tanks15 but the motley collection of clerks and batmen managed to operate a 25mm anti-tank gun effectively enough to force a withdrawal by around 1030hrs.

  Around the partly demolished Busnes–St Venant bridge, German motorcycle troops had begun pushing forward. ‘B’ Company’s 10 Platoon attempted to move into position to cover the flanks but came under fire from three sides at ranges less than 75 yards. Almost immediately half the platoon became casualties and the remainder crawled under fire to Company HQ, itself now taking fire from the Robecq road running parallel to the canal. The acting Company Commander, Captain Wilkins, then sent two groups to try to reinforce 12 Platoon at the Bethune–Robecq bridge. The second got through to where 12 Platoon, a handful of French stragglers and the three light tanks now formed the strongest position they could. Having now lost contact with Company HQ, Second Lieutenant Oversby and Sergeant Munton crawled back to try to find them, only to see Second Lieutenant Stansfield of 11 Platoon attempt to lead a party of men through a deep tributary of the canal. Caught in the water by a burst of fire, only one man made it across. There was no sign of Wilkins and the rest of Company HQ. The enemy were by now in Robecq and two of the French tanks made for the village. ‘They had hardly reached the nearest houses when they both went up in sheets of flame’ wrote Lieutenant Moor, describing how ‘B’ Company’s exposed position ‘became untenable only when half a dozen medium German tanks emerged from the village of Robecq and pounded down on the defenders with all guns blazing’.16 Private Ken Dyson suddenly found himself ‘looking at the wrong end of a double-barrelled machine gun mounted on a half-track’. Not far away, nineteen-year-old Douglas Fletcher, his mouth bleeding after the loss of his front teeth in hand to hand fighting, was lined up against the wall of a cafe with six others. An SS trooper was setting up a machine gun tripod when an officer arrived and took charge. He asked Fletcher his age and laughed at the reply. ‘Now they are sending schoolboys’ he said, adding ‘but you are soldiers.’17 Dyson and Fletcher were marched off to captivity in Poland.

  The rest of ‘B’ Company fell back through ‘C’ Company’s positions and together they closed around HQ Company at Calonne. Meanwhile, ‘D’ Company had inflicted five casualties on a motorcycle detachment and recovered a number of documents from a nearby pond where the German officer had thrown them before being hit. The Company Commander, Captain Wood, was satisfied with the action but couldn’t help thinking about his close shave – a bullet was lodged in the respirator slung across his chest.

  An intense air attack had started against the now abandoned airfield at around 0900hrs and, expecting an airborne landing, HQ Company deployed along the Hinges–Calonne road at the airfield perimeter. For around two-and-a-half hours they had been subjected to repeated strafing attacks and, at approximately 1500hrs, three light tanks appeared and began to fire into Battalion HQ on the road between Calonne and Merville. Attached anti-tank guns under the command of Captain Christopher replied and the three tanks were destroyed. One officer and two gunners had been wounded in the exchange but only then was it discovered that the attackers were, in fact, the French tank support they had been waiting for.

  Early that morning, Eicke’s men had managed to throw a bridge across the canal and were across. ‘With the bravado of a reckless amateur’, writes historian Charles Sydnor, ‘Eicke – pistol in hand – led the attack.’18 Despite being pinned down Eicke ordered three more companies to join the attack and began directing artillery fire support. Within an hour he had established a firm bridgehead on the north bank but found himself ordered back across the canal. Instructions had reached XVI Panzer Corps to break off its attack and prepare for an enemy armoured assault. The orders came as part of the controversial halt order intended to ensure that the rapidly advancing tanks did not overstretch themselves and leave the supply
lines vulnerable to counterattack as well as preparing for the second phase attack south of the Somme.

  Infuriated, Eicke began to pull his men back only to find British fire intensifying as they recognised the withdrawal. Artillery fire was brought in from north of Bethune and it soon became clear that an orderly operation was out of the question. Abandoning their kit, his SS troopers were thrown into a headlong race for the canal where they simply jumped in and swam for the safety of the far bank leaving behind 42 dead, 121 wounded and 5 missing men.19 Once back across, Eicke found his Corps Commander waiting for him, having witnessed the debacle. Hoepner’s already low opinion of the SS had only been confirmed by what he had seen and he is alleged to have called Eicke a ‘butcher’ to his face in front of Eicke’s own staff.20 For two days, a furious Eicke and his men sat in pouring rain south of the canal line waiting for the order to be lifted as British mortar and artillery fire kept up a steady bombardment. On his own initiative, he decided to send small teams across the canal to locate and destroy the mortar positions. One such team, led by Obersturmführer Harrer, crossed the canal and encountered a British dispatch rider on a quiet road. He was knocked off his motorbike with a shot to the shoulder. Harrer, barely able to speak English, asked if the wounded man spoke French. When the prisoner failed to answer, Harrer shot him in the head and the body was pushed into a ditch.21