Warriors of God

by Nicholas Blanford

  He recalls one occasion when he and some fifty other recruits had marched for several hours and were passing through a narrow valley when they were ambushed by a group of instructors hidden in the rocks above. “They set off a roadside bomb close to us. Some of the recruits were in shock. The guys in the middle of the column ducked down while the guys at either end charged up the hillside to flank the instructors who were shooting past us with live ammunition.”

  In addition to fitness and stamina, the recruits are taught how to use the basic weaponry standard to the Hezbollah fighter—the AK-47 and M-16 assault rifles, the PKM 7.62 mm light machine gun, the .50 caliber heavy machine gun, the RPG-7—until they can strip, reassemble, and load each weapon blindfolded. They practice firing during the day and at night using tracer rounds. Each recruit is handed a limited amount of ammunition and told the importance of conserving rounds. Fire aimed single rounds, they are told, and avoid switching the rifle to automatic: you lose accuracy and waste ammunition.

  The recruits learn how to plant roadside bombs and land mines. They study the different types of armored vehicles used by the Israeli army and how to fire RPGs at their more vulnerable spots.

  The instructors ram home the need to maintain constant vigilance no matter how tired the recruits. Rifles must be kept in hand at all times, including when sleeping, eating, or praying. Recruits are taught to be fully awake and combat ready within five seconds of being woken in the middle of the night. Radio communications must be answered at once. Failure to comply with these basic rules results in punishment, such as being forced into stress positions for a prolonged period.

  They learn the art of camouflage and stealth, various kinds of crawl, and the ability to lie in position on observation duty without moving for hours on end. The recruits are taught navigation using map and compass and GPS instruments before embarking upon five-day orienteering treks across the mountains. They learn how to find their direction from a simple sundial consisting of a stick planted in the ground, or determining north using a wristwatch. Occasionally, one group of recruits will be ordered to launch a sneak raid against another group camped a few miles away in the mountains or to keep them under observation without being spotted.

  The “Rebellion Against Fear”

  Military training is obligatory for every Hezbollah recruit even if he does not intend to serve in the ranks of the Islamic Resistance afterward. Still, not all recruits aspiring to become combatants pass the military training program. Those who cannot cope with the punishing schedule but still believe in the cause can drop out and are allotted jobs in Hezbollah’s administrative apparatus.

  Every Hezbollah fighter is trained in medical support and carries a first aid pack into combat. In an average-sized combat unit of five fighters, two will be medics. Hezbollah places great importance on battlefield medical treatment, partly to ensure that months of training are not wasted and that combatants live to fight another day, and partly for purposes of morale—a Hezbollah fighter may ultimately seek martyrdom in battle, but no one welcomes a lingering death in the mud of some frontline valley because his comrades lack either the kit or the knowledge to cope with wounds. Furthermore, any corpse left on the battlefield could be retrieved by Israeli troops and become a card in Israel’s hands during any future prisoner swap negotiations.

  Hezbollah even provides a nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare training course, in which fighters learn how to cope with the difficulties of combat in thick protective suits, boots, and gloves and with vision obscured by gas masks.

  Nor is it all physical work; the recruits undertake written and practical exams in the field under the watchful eyes of their trainers.

  Although the training areas are located in dense undergrowth and under cover of trees, “sky watchers” constantly look out for approaching Israeli jets or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Each training area is protected by air defense units armed with antiaircraft guns and shoulder-fired missiles.

  The initial training phase is only the first of many in the course of a combatant’s career. As a university student—Hezbollah pays some of the tuition fees—Khodr can choose when to attend fitness training sessions and refresher courses in the Bekaa Valley even after opting for specialized training in antiarmor weapons.

  By the time the recruit has completed the initial stages of religious instruction and military training to the satisfaction of his superiors, he will have earned a greater level of trust and can then join specific units or pursue certain advanced military disciplines such as sniping, antitank missiles, communications, or explosives. While there is flexibility in allowing recruits to select their area of specialization, Hezbollah commanders will sometimes steer them toward units that are experiencing a manpower shortage, or will encourage them to follow certain disciplines in keeping with the recruit’s education and character.

  “We have a gradual training course. It’s variegated according to specialization,” says Maher, the sector commander in the Islamic Resistance. “We study each of the recruits’ strengths, physically and mentally. If he’s good at physics, then he will study trajectories [for artillery]. If he’s good at chemistry, then he will study explosives. In line with their basic training, they also receive training in their skills.”

  The military training program undertaken by each recruit in the Islamic Resistance not only prepares them for future combat operations but also helps build esprit de corps, an important asset on the battlefield aside from deep commitment to the Islamic faith. Hezbollah’s military successes, especially during the 1990s, helped convey among the cadres a sense of fraternal and communal pride, achievement, and empowerment, sentiments that also inspire new generations of volunteers to join the party.

  Specialized training usually takes place in Iran, or sometimes Syria. The Bekaa Valley is too small and too easily accessed by Israeli reconnaissance aircraft for training on larger-scale weapons systems such as artillery rockets and air defense systems. Those undergoing training in Iran usually travel to Damascus, then board flights to Tehran before being bused to one of several training camps run by the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard near Karaj, Isfahan, Qom, or Tehran. Fighters can attend multiple courses in Iran lasting several weeks each. The trainers are full-time Hezbollah instructors, veterans who have proven themselves in combat in south Lebanon and share the same cultural background and Arabic language as the recruits.

  Recruits into Hezbollah’s Special Forces unit, the top combat element in the Islamic Resistance, endure an intensive three-month course split into two forty-five-day programs with a five-day break in between. While most Hezbollah combatants are part-timers holding down day jobs or attending college, the Special Forces cadres are full-time combatants who train relentlessly. Not only are they highly motivated combat fighters, they are also the embodiment of the religious and cultural values that make up the way of Hezbollah. Even within the generally homogeneous ranks of the Islamic Resistance, Special Forces fighters tend to stand out. In person, they are usually polite and modest with a quiet sense of humor while maintaining a level of reserve and distance before strangers.

  Hezbollah believes that the unremitting religious and ideological instruction creates a combatant far superior to his opposite number in the Israeli army and helps overcome the organization’s material shortcomings in technology, weapons, and funds compared with Israel. Never mind that Israel has Merkava tanks, F-16 fighter-bombers, and Apache helicopter gunships; the Islamic Resistance fighter is taught that God is on his side, an unrivaled affirmation of the sanctity of the cause and the supreme guarantor of eventual triumph over one’s enemy. Furthermore, Hezbollah believes that its culture of martyrdom—this “rebellion against fear,” as Sayyed Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah once put it—bestows upon the individual fighter an unmatched level of bravery, at least in the secular sense of the word.7 After all, how can you defeat an army of fighters who believe their struggle is sanctioned by God and none of whom are afraid of dying in ba
ttle?

  Hezbollah’s leaders maintain that it is the psychological dimension of the individual fighter, rather than the equipment and arms at his disposal, that lies at the heart of the party’s battlefield triumphs. “This group of fighters does not go to war in order to flex their military muscles, score a publicity coup or to achieve material advantages; they fight and do jihad with serious intent and a deep conviction that the only way to regain their usurped territory is by waging war on the enemy,” Nasrallah explained.8

  While other Islamist militant organizations operating around the world also draw direction from the Koran and pursue jihad, Sheikh Naim Qassem insists that it is the quality of the resistance fighter’s faith that is the foundation for Hezbollah’s “exceptional particularity.”

  “First, [it is] faith in Islam and what this means in connection with God, the exalted, and attaining a moral state that gives one self-confidence, strength, hope for the future, readiness to sacrifice [oneself] … development, and self-improvement. This is something essential that we have,” he told me.

  The second component, Qassem continues, is “readiness for martyrdom” and an understanding that “martyrdom neither shortens nor prolongs life because the timing of death is predestined by God.… Since the outcome of this martyrdom is a divine reward in Heaven, this is something quite important when it comes to mobilization, especially that we have historic leaders who have presented this example, such as the Prophet Mohammed, Imam Ali, and Imam Hussein and others.”

  The third advantage is the quality and integrity of Hezbollah’s leadership, Qassem adds, citing the martyrdom of Sayyed Abbas Mussawi in 1992 and of Nasrallah’s eldest son, Hadi, in combat in 1997 as examples of the leadership’s willingness to stand in the same trench as the rank-and-file fighter.

  The combination of these three assets—faith in Islam, readiness for martyrdom, and “honest, confident … enlightened” leadership—ensures that the “limited [material] capabilities or potentials [of a nonstate actor] become of value.”

  “Imagine the single machine gun with a faith in God and readiness for martyrdom and a faith in, and interaction with, the leadership, and then you have a person of great power who does not fear death,” Qassem explains. “This differs from the enemy on the other side that does many calculations [to protect itself]. Then our machine gun becomes more powerful than their artillery. This moral issue is quite essential.”

  “The Enemy’s Main Point of Weakness”

  Of course, it takes more than a well-trained and motivated fighter to wage a successful campaign of resistance. By 1992, with Hezbollah’s resistance priority assured, the Islamic Resistance commanders drew up a more focused campaign against the Israeli occupation. They understood the need to develop flexible tactics to fulfill a fixed strategy: namely, to expel Israeli forces from south Lebanon through force of arms—no negotiated settlement, no compromises, no conditions. Israel was to be humiliated and chased out of Lebanon by the Islamic Resistance.

  To achieve that goal, Hezbollah would apply the tactics of attrition, capitalizing on the IDF’s Achilles’ heel: the Israeli public’s aversion to casualties. All the Islamic Resistance had to do was to remain patient, stay one step ahead of the IDF’s offensive and defensive measures, and keep sending Israeli soldiers back across the border in body bags. “We organized ourselves to serve that foremost priority, which is to resist the enemy and expel the troops of the occupation from Lebanon,” Nasrallah told me in 2003. “We focused on striking at the enemy’s main point of weakness, which is his inability to bear extensive human losses.”9

  A document captured by Israeli troops, entitled “The Principles of Warfare,” reportedly compiled by Khalil Harb, from 1995 the head of military operations in the western sector of south Lebanon, illustrates Hezbollah’s understanding of the elements of asymmetrical warfare:

  1. Avoid the strong, attack the weak—attack and withdraw!

  2. Protecting our fighters is more important than causing enemy casualties!

  3. Strike only when success is assured!

  4. Surprise is essential to success. If you are spotted, you’ve failed!

  5. Don’t get into a set-piece battle. Slip away like smoke, before the enemy can drive home his advantage!

  6. Attaining the goal demands patience, in order to discover the enemy’s weak points!

  7. Keep moving, avoid formation of a front line!

  8. Keep the enemy on constant alert, at the front and in the rear!

  9. The road to the great victory passes through thousands of small victories!

  10. Keep up the morale of the fighters, avoid notions of the enemy’s superiority!

  11. The media has innumerable guns, whose hits are like bullets. Use them in the battle!

  12. The population is a treasure—nurture it!

  13. Hurt the enemy, and then stop before he abandons restraint!10

  Gone were the costly human wave operations of the 1980s, when dozens of fighters bravely but recklessly charged well-defended hilltop outposts. Instead, Hezbollah operated in small units, staging hit-and-run raids against Israeli and SLA patrols. Field security was tightened, and a much greater emphasis was placed on intelligence gathering, both through observation and reconnaissance and by establishing spy cells among the civilian population of the occupation zone—and even by penetrating the ranks of the SLA.

  The military wing was separated from the main body of the organization, with the secretary general, as nominal head of the Islamic Resistance, providing the only link between the two. The tabbiyya, the part-time combatants in the village guard units, were also split from the Islamic Resistance. Separation served the dual purpose of compartmentalizing the Islamic Resistance for security considerations, and also granting greater autonomy to the military commanders in directing the reinvigorated resistance campaign.

  Nasrallah admitted to me in a 2003 interview that he played an indirect role in military affairs, with operational decisions left in the hands of the Islamic Resistance commanders, including Imad Mughniyah, who became Hezbollah’s chief of staff sometime around 1993 or 1994. “The one who is in charge of all the resistance is the secretary general of Hezbollah. And under his command are a number of officials who assume different responsibilities,” he explained. “Therefore, there are not one, two or three [but many]. Of course, our experience teaches us that we cannot centralize our actions within one person, because this is a very sensitive and dangerous issue and we are confronting the Israelis in a real battle.”

  As for his own leadership, Nasrallah said his role was one of “politics and guidance.” He continued,

  The real credit in the development of the resistance is for its military cadres, and these people had their experiences under constant development. When I became secretary general in 1992, that was ten years after the launching of the resistance, and those cadres had become more experienced and their knowledge was greater. My job was to strengthen the ties between these brothers.… It was quite natural for the improvement in the resistance and had nothing to do with me.

  “Killing Israelis Is a Duty, Not a Joy”

  There was no tangible barrier marking the front line of Israel’s occupation zone. The roads leading into the zone were sealed with earth berms and land mines except for five crossing points guarded by SLA checkpoints. The approximate perimeter of the zone followed the forward positions of the IDF and SLA. The compounds for the most part were separated by an inhospitable terrain of deep wadis smothered in a thick undergrowth of stubby Mediterranean oak trees and thorn bushes, which could only be traversed by foot and even then with difficulty. The rugged terrain and absence of barriers and defending troops allowed Hezbollah fighters to slip between the outposts into the enclave with relative ease, often to a considerable depth, to meet with agents inside the zone, stash weapons, plant IEDs, or carry out lengthy reconnaissance missions.

  Usually, three or four fighters at a time would carry out reconnaissance, creeping close to I
DF and SLA outposts, often using darkness or poor weather conditions to mask their approach. They set up small surveillance posts, usually hidden in bushes camouflaged with netting. Using binoculars, SLR cameras, and, by the mid-1990s, video cameras and military-grade night vision goggles, they would monitor the positions, looking for routine and assessing troop numbers, armaments, and potential avenues of approach for bomb-laying missions on the supply routes. All information was diligently written down in notebooks. It was dangerous and uncomfortable duty, and often very boring. Fighters tucked copies of the Koran and other religious books into their backpacks so that they could continue their studies in the field. They had to contend with the blazing heat of summer and the bitter cold of winter nights, especially at the higher altitudes in the northern sector of the zone. One valley was known as “the wadi of the snakes” because of the large number of poisonous vipers; each fighter carried antivenom shots in his first aid kit.

  “It takes a very special person, very religious and strong to stay there a month with the wild animals in the bush,” says Abu Khalil, a tall, shaven-headed unit commander who organized reconnaissance missions. “Observation was a very big weapon for us against the Israelis.”

  Hezbollah fighters like to recount a tale from the 1980s about a colleague who had spent days monitoring an SLA-defended outpost on a rocky mountain in the northern sector. After his food and water ran out, he sneaked up to the outpost and scrambled over the ramparts. Seeing no one around, he dodged into a kitchen area and began helping himself to eggs, tins of tuna and sardines, and mugs of water. As he ate, an SLA militiaman walked into the kitchen and in a surprised voice asked him who he was. The quick-thinking Hezbollah fighter said he was part of an SLA intelligence unit visiting the outpost. Furthermore, the fighter added, what the hell was the militiaman doing wandering around the kitchen when he should be watching out for Hezbollah fighters? The chastened militiaman apologized and walked away.