Saladin

by A R Azzam

  recognised as a sufi shaykh with many blessings. Ibn Marzuq himself was a

  Hanbali and was also associated with al-Jilani, with whom he was in corres-

  pondence.^' Baffingly, Ibn Marzuq asked Ibn Naja if he loiew of a man

  called Shirkuh, and then proceeded to tell him the same story that al-Jilani

  had related: that Shirkuh's approach would fail and that this was not the

  opportune time. Ibn Naja then proceeded to Damascus to inform Nur

  al-Din about his conversation with Ibn Marzuq, and Nur al-Din ordered

  him to keep this information quiet. Clearly, Ibn Marzuq was acting in some

  capacity for Nur al-Din and messages were being passed - via Ibn Naja -

  between Damascus and the Sunni elements in Egypt, who were acting as his

  informants. Ibn Marzuq's warning therefore has to be viewed in this light -

  that the political situation in Egypt was not yet favourable - and it is in the

  same light that one needs to view al-Jilani's message, for it was clear that

  those in Baghdad as well as those in Damascus were preoccupied with the

  affairs of Egypt. The very fact that Ibn Marzuq asked about Shirkuh is proof

  that he knew of the approaching Sunni army.

  There is no doubt that Ibn Naja's success in infiltrating the highest eche-

  lons of the Fatimids, where he gained the direct audience of the caliph, can

  lead to only one conclusion - that he was acting as an informant for Nur al-

  Din. And for Saladin as well, for Ibn Naja would quickly establish himself as

  one of his closest advisers in Egypt. Saladin kept Ibn Naja close to him and

  constantly asked his advice. He used to address him as Amr Ibn al-As, afiier

  the companion of the Prophet who conquered Egypt, thereby viewing Ibn

  Naja's endeavours in restoring Sunnism to Egypt in the same fight as those

  of Amr. To be compared to one of the companions of the Prophet demon-

  strated how highly Saladin viewed Ibn Naja. As we shaU see, in the moment

  of his greatest triumph Saladin did not forget him. In addition to Ibn

  Marzuq, and also based in Fustat, was Abu Abdallah al-Kizani, who was a

  respected sufi and a recognised poet. He was also a charismatic preacher and

  had a following, based around the Mosque of Amr Ibn al-As. Al-Kizani

  maintained close contact with Shirkuh and Saladin, and it is said that his

  poetry found favour with Saladin. What was clear to Nur al-Din was that it

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  SALAD I N

  was imperative to win over the support of men like Ibn Marzuq and

  al-Kizani, who were capable of generating massive popular support within

  the country, and Shirkuh made a point of visiting both men during his first

  campaign. Of al-Kizani we shall hear once more, but this time in the most

  macabre of circumstances.

  Shirkuh's campaign

  It was against this background of furtive messages and travelling informants

  that Nur al-Din despatched Shirkuh to Egypt. The details of the three expe-

  ditions which Shirkuh would lead into Egypt over the next four years are

  well documented''^ and, salient facts apart, need not concern us greatly.

  Although we assume that Saladin accompanied his uncle on this first foray

  into Egypt, we have no evidence that he did. Surprisingly, Saladin himself

  makes no mention of it and Ibn al-Athir - who was notoriously anti-Saladin

  - hints that he remained behind in Syria. Given the senior role that he

  played in the future campaigns, it seems highly likely that Saladin did travel

  to Egypt, though he was probably not given an independent command.

  No matter, over Saladin's early life the mist clung stubbornly. As Shirkuh's

  army departed Damascus, two men stood aside watching it take its leave

  while reciting aloud from a text of Ibn Batta, a Hanbali jurist who died in

  997, in which the virtues of the Prophet are extolled. The two jurists were

  • Muwaffaq al-Din Ibn Qudama and his cousin Abd al-Ghani. The elder

  of the two, Muwaffaq al-Din, had recently returned to Damascus from

  Baghdad, where he had been personally initiated by al-Jilani, who had

  invested him with his sufi cloak. In Damascus Muwaffaq al-Din established

  himself as the city's greatest Hanbali jurist and became one of Saladin's

  closest advisers, riding with him on his military campaigns, including the

  battle of Hattin in I I 8 7 .

  As for the campaign itself, it is best labelled as a frustrating success. Nur

  al-Din had sent Shirkuh at the head of a small exploratory force rather than

  a large army, and this alarmed Shawar, who accompanied Shirkuh. 'You

  have tricked us!' he railed, for the Egyptian army that blocked their path was

  much larger, but Shirkuh dismissed his worries, for he had litde faith in the

  fighting capabilities of the Egyptians: 'Most of them are peasants who are

  gathered together by the beating of a drum and are scattered by that of a

  stick.' And Shirkuh was proven correct, for having departed Damascus in

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  4; T H E BATTLE F O R EGYPT

  April 1164, Shawar was within a month reinstated as vizier. He had,

  however, no intention of fulfilling his promise to Nur al-Din, and he now

  offered Shirkuh 30,000 dinars to return home. One imagines Shirkuh

  snarling at such an offer and demanding that Shawar pay one-third of the

  country's revenue, as had been agreed. Seeing that Shirkuh was not going

  to budge, Shawar then took an action that would ultimately spell his doom:

  he invited Amalric and the Latin Kingdom to come to his aid. Amalric,

  already alarmed by Shirkuh's presence in Egypt, wasted no time, and

  marched with his army with haste. In the meantime Shirkuh had moved to

  Bilbais, where in July 1164 he was besieged by a combined Fatimid-

  Frankish force. How seriously Amalric pressed the siege is not clear, and

  perhaps he was distracted by Nur al-Din, who had taken advantage of

  Amalric's move into Egypt. To distract the Franks and relieve the siege of

  Bilbais, Nur al-Din captured the casde of Harim which lay between Antioch

  and Aleppo, and in August 1164 crushed a Frankish army and captured

  Bohemond 111 of Antioch, Joscelin III of Edessa and Raymond 111 of

  Tripoli, who were all thrown into a prison in Aleppo. Nur al-Din continued

  to press and in October 1164 he besieged Banias, which fell. This greatly

  alarmed Amalric, who was troubled by its loss and that of Harim, and who

  wished to retire from Egypt. In any case it appears that Shirkuh did not

  suffer unduly during the siege and, since his army was not a match for

  Amalric's, a setdement was reached and by October he was back in

  Damascus.

  Shirkuh returned to Syria smarting by what had taken place. He now

  plotted revenge on Shawar and his duplicitous behaviour, and for two years

  he prepared his forces and tried to convince Nur al-Din of the merits of a

  second campaign. Nur al-Din, however, still hesitated and Shirkuh, know-

  ing the man he served, wrote to the Abbasid caliph, requesting him to urge

  Nur al-Din to restore Sunnism to Egypt. The caliph's enthusiastic response

  naturally found favour with Nur al-Din, as Shirkuh had expected.®^ But it

  was not revenge that motivated Nur al-Din but the fear that Egypt would

  fall to the Franks. As for Saladin, it was d
uring this period, in 1165, that

  he was appointed by Nur al-Din to the post of shihna (police-chief) of

  Damascus. However he did not remain in that position for long: he appears

  to have resigned out of frustration at the interference and stubbornness of

  the qadi, with whom he had to work closely and who was none other than

  Zengi and Nur al-Din's favourite Kamal al-Din al-Shahrazuri. Saladin was

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  SALAD I N

  clearly not the first or last to be so frustrated, since the satirist and poet

  al-Wahrani pictures angels complaining on the Day of Judgement that

  Kamal al-Din was insisting on a day for himself'

  In 1167, with Saladin definitely by his side, Shirkuh was finally ordered

  to move. A vicious sandstorm greeted them on the way, which nearly laid

  Shirkuh's plans to waste, but disturbing news also greeted them: Amalric's

  army was already in Cairo, for the king had been informed of Shirkuh's

  advance and had written to warn Shawar. In return, he had been offered

  400,000 dinars to defend the Fatimid caliphate from Syrian encroachment.

  The news of Amalric's presence alarmed Shirkuh and he turned to the one

  city of whose loyalty he could be certain: he wrote to Alexandria asldng for

  their help. The response was immediate and positive, and the Alexandrians

  threw off any nominal Fatimid loyalty they may have had and, placing the

  city in the hands of Najm al-Din Ibn Masai, who was the son of a previous

  vizier, they rose up in rebellion. Arms were gathered, as was money, ready

  to be used in Shirkuh's service. The message of support was delivered to

  Shirkuh by Sharif al-Idrisi of Aleppo, who happened to have been in

  Alexandria at the time, and who one assumes Imew Shirkuh personally.

  Leaving a regiment of Franks in Cairo - to the scandal of the Sunnis

  who were shocked by the fact that infidels now protected them - Amalric

  set off immediately in pursuit of Shirkuh, who had retired as far south as

  Ashmunain, and it was there, at Babain in March 1167, that the two armies

  clashed. A war veteran, Shirkuh had studied his enemy well and had calcu-

  lated that Amalric would employ his main strength, which was the cavalry

  charge, for it had been used previously against the Fatimid armies with

  devastating success. But Shirkuh had noted that the charge went only in one

  direction and could not be easily reversed and surmised that, confronted by

  the light Turkish cavalry, it would have problems. The key was to get out

  of the way of the charge and then attack it from the flanks, and for that to

  succeed it was necessary to employ one of the favourite Muslim tactics - the

  feigned retreat to suck in the charge. To succeed, it had to be well executed,

  for the timing was crucial; if the retreat was too quick there was the danger

  that the enemy could drive through the Muslim army, while if the retreat

  was delayed for too long the flanks could themselves be sucked into battie.

  As commander-in-chief it was Shirkuh who would give the signal for the

  flanks to attack, but, above all, he needed a commander who could control

  the centre and time the feigned retreat correctiy. In the heat of battie it

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  4: T H E BATTLE F O R EGYPT

  would be necessary to keep a cool head, and Shirkuh now turned to Saladin

  to assume that responsibility. For the first time, Saladin emerges as an

  individual in his own right.

  On the eve of the battle men firom Alexandria arrived to fight with

  Shirkuh, though they were clearly not of the same quality as Shirkuh's own

  men, since sources claim that many died in the ensuing battle. As far as the

  batde itself was concerned, Shirkuh's tactics had been well worked out for,

  as he had expected, Amalric charged the centre and Saladin, on his uncle's

  instructions, made the feigned retreat. The Muslim cavalry closed in, and

  the army, led by Shawar and Amalric, suffered many casualties. The day

  belonged to Shirkuh, who proved why he was regarded in such high esteem,

  but the victory had not been a decisive one and neither army suffered major

  losses. Shirkuh then headed north, where he was welcomed by Alexandria

  and its governor, al-Rashid Ibn al-Zubayr. There he was certain of a base,

  arms and money. Ibn al-Zubayr is an intriguing character whose story is

  worth telling. Originally from Aswan, he went to Alexandria, where he

  studied under al-Silafi. He was clearly a man of many talents, especially

  poetry, and this brought him to the attention of the Fatimids who, in 1144,

  sent him to the Yemen as ambassador and religious propagandist. This ap-

  pears strange, as it is likely that since he had studied under al-Silafi he was a

  Sunni, though this is nowhere explicitiy stated. The reaction of the Yemenis

  adds to this confusion. When Ibn al-Zubayr arrived in the Yemen, some of

  the poets there wrote a verse to the Faimid caliph with the line, 'You sent

  to us the banner of the Rightiy Guided, but he is a black banner'. This verse

  could be interpreted literally, since Ibn al-Zubayr, who was originally from

  Aswan, could have had black sldn. But there is a deeper interpretation,

  which was that their banner was white (the colour of the Fatimids) and that

  the black banner was of course that of the Abbasids. This implies that Ibn

  al-Zubayr was a Sunni, but the mystery remains: could the Fatimids have

  despatched a Sunni to propagate their religion? On his return from the

  Yemen, he was placed in charge of the diwans of Alexandria, but when

  Shirkuh invaded Egypt, he openly supported him - support which would

  ultimately cost him his life.

  While in Alexandria Shirkuh pondered what his next step would be.

  Amalric and Shawar were closing in fast on the city and it was clear what

  their strategy was: they would starve it out, for the Prankish fleet was already

  blockading the port. Despite his military victory at Babain, Shirkuh found

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  SALAD I N

  himself in a precarious position. If he remained in Alexandria then the siege

  of the city would be gradually tightened until it fell, but if he abandoned it

  and retreated to Syria he would lose his only loyal base and with it any hopes

  of ever capturing Egypt. The people of Alexandria had stood by him bravely

  and he Icnew that Shawar would show them no pity. Retreat was therefore

  not an option. The choice that he finally settled on was brave and daring:

  he would split his already small force and he would slip out of Alexandria,

  while there was still time, in order to challenge and distract Amalric's

  army - even if he was incapable of defeating it. The other part of his army

  would remain in Alexandria and hold the city until he or Nur al-Din could

  come to its aid. To hold Alexandria for him, a task which would certainly

  entail severe hardship, he turned to Saladin, in whom he had the utmost

  confidence.

  The emergence of Saladin and the siege of

  Alexandria

  'What I went through in Alexandria,' Saladin later recalled, 'I shall never

  forget.' Aged 30 and in charge of 1,000 men, Saladin now endured his

  sternest challenge. Of the loyalty of his and Shirkuh's men he had no doubt,

  but wou
ld the people of Alexandria hold firmi' Admittedly they had rallied

  to the cause and had fought with enthusiasm, but would their resolve

  remain strong once the food ran out!' Of what stuff were the Egyptians

  made? Despite their willingness, the Alexandrians were by nature traders,

  desperate to resume their trading, and not fighters, and Saladin knew that

  he could not rely on them. Enthusiasm - no matter how well intended -

  could never compensate for lack of military discipline. No matter, Saladin

  was determined to hold the city. Equally determined that it should fall

  was Shawar, for he could not afford to tolerate an open rebellion of such

  magnitude - Alexandria and its people needed to be taught a painfial lesson.

  And so the siege tightened and orchards were cut down to construct siege

  engines, which towered over the city. Catapults capable of throwing large

  stones over great distances were now used, and they wreaked great damage.

  William of Tyre writes that Amalric ordered that all messengers leaving the

  besieged city be intercepted and thoroughly questioned. For three months,

  from April to July 1167, the people of Alexandria endured hunger, but they

  held firm, since many of them were themselves refixgees from Ascalon and

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  4: T H E BATTLE F O R EGYPT

  they understood what was at stake. Shawar then tried to test the city's

  loyalty and despatched a message: 'Surrender Saladin', he urged, but the

  response was swift and reflected the mindset of the besieged city: 'God

  forbid we surrender Muslims to the Franks and Ismailis'. Meanwhile fresh

  Christian forces, accompanied by Ai'chbishop Frederick of Tyre, set sail for

  Egypt, and so the city was invested totally by sea as well as by land. It was

  during this painful siege that Saladin first came into contact and forged deep

  friendships with those who supported the Sunni cause in Egypt. 'I shall

  never have another friend like him', said Saladin of Ibn Masai, and it was

  during this period that their friendship was born.^^ Ibn Masai had been

  quick to throw in his lot with Shirkuh and his loyalty would shortly be

  severely tested. It was also during this period that the Alexandrians got to

  Icnow Saladin, and they approved of what they saw. In the years to come,