Saladin

by A R Azzam

  his grip on Syria. A more aggressive policy needed to be adopted to tiy to

  break him urgently before it was too late. The key remained Egypt, which

  the Franks recognised as the hub of Saladin's p o w e r s o in pursuance of his

  father's policy Baldwin planned a full-scale attack. Indeed one of Baldwin's

  first acts was to renew the grant of land in Egypt to the Knights of

  St John and promise their master Jobert an additional 30,000 bezants of

  revenue for his support. Any assault on Egypt naturally required naval

  support, and for that Baldwin turned to the Byzantines. He dispatched

  Reynald to Constantinople, where it was agreed on a joint attack. In return

  the Byzantine protectorate over the Latin Kingdom would be recognised

  and the orthodox patriarch of Jerusalem would be restored. The emperor

  Manuel was particularly receptive to the Franks' approach, as he sought to

  avenge the calamitous defeat at the hands of Kilij Arslan at Miriokephalon,

  a battie in which Reynald's son had been among those Idlled. In addition,

  part of Manuel's interest in Egypt was his desire to prevent the Sicilians

  gaining a foothold there and so controlling the Egyptian ports - and

  thereby offering attractive terms to Italian merchants.

  It was during this period that the appeals of the Franks to Western

  Europe appeared to have produced a result, with the arrival of Philip of

  Flanders to the Holy Land. The son of Count Thierry and Sybilla of

  Anjou, Philip came from an excellent crusading pedigree, for his father had

  gone on four crusades and his mother was the daughter of King Fulk of

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  Jerusalem. So it was natural that hopes were raised that the arrival of

  Philip would lead to a new burst of campaigning. The reception that Philip

  received must have surprised him; he had set out on crusade in the expec-

  tation of undertaldng some military operation which would make the

  Christian position more secure and increase his own prestige. Instead, he

  found himself greeted as the solution to the Idngdom's problems.' Despite

  his illness, Baldwin, carried in a litter, travelled to greet his cousin and

  offered Philip the regency. Philip, however, turned down the offer, as the

  situation in Flanders did not allow him to absent himself for a lengthy time.

  He then made it clear that he was prepared to lead an attack on Egypt, but

  was not prepared to take the blame if it went wrong or, in the case of a suc-

  cessful campaign, to hand over the conquests to Jerusalem and Byzantium

  before returning home.^ Searching for excuses for not joining the campaign,

  he first argued that the autumn season made the Nile floods a perilous

  time to invade Egypt, then declared his intention to join in any campaign

  elsewhere, though clearly the Byzantine fleet was redundant anywhere else.

  Philip's prevarication put the Franks in an awlcward position, since they felt

  obliged to honour the agreement with Constantinople. Yet when they

  declared their intention to embark on the campaign without Philip, he

  refused to accept this since it would be a taint on his honour to remain in

  Jerusalem in winter while the army attacked Egypt. He himself only had a

  small army and he needed support from the local Franks to engage in any

  campaign. The problem was that if any of those local Franks participated

  with him, they would have been unable to join in the Egypt expedition.

  With frustration mounting on both sides, the Byzantines broke off negoti-

  ations and returned to Constantinople while the sea-lanes were still open

  before winter set in. Wlien pressed for the purpose of his visit, Philip finally

  admitted that it was not war that was on his mind but marriage; to be

  precise the marriage of his two cousins, for whom he sought suitable

  suitors. This admission provoked an angry reaction: 'We thought you had

  come to fight for the Cross' cried Baldwin of Ibelin. 'Instead you talk of

  marriages.'

  Eventually, in late summer 1177 when the opportunity to attack Egypt

  had passed, Philip departed to campaign in northern Syria and marched

  with Raymond on the city of Hama. The delays had paralysed any attack

  on Egypt and the Franks failed to seize the best opportunity they were ever

  to have of breaking Saladin's power.® Although success was by no means

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  guaranteed, there is no doubt that the combination of the Byzantine fleet,

  the crusader states and Philip of Flanders' army would have caused Saladin

  serious concerns in Egypt and would, at the very least, have prevented him

  from acting in Syria while Egypt was threatened. Certainly it would have

  alleviated the pressure on Aleppo. What in fact occurred was that Byzantium

  was alienated and Saladin strengthened without having to fight. Philip's

  crusade to the Holy Land also gives us an opportunity to remark at how dif-

  ferent the Christians from Europe had become from those who lived in the

  Holy Land. Those crusaders who continued to travel to Outremer, the crusader

  states, in the twelfth century found in the east a people whom they barely

  recognised. Admittedly they spoke the same language but they barely even

  shared the same culture any more. For example, when Usama Ibn Munqidh

  was invited to eat at a Christian house, his host reassured him that no pork

  was ever served at his table. Another incident with Usama reveals the extent

  of the difference: 'When I was in Jerusalem', he wrote, 'I used to go to the

  al-Aqsa mosque . . . which was in the hands of the Templars who were

  friends of mine.' Usama continues to say that the Templars would arrange

  for him to do his prayers in a corner. 'One day I had gone in, said the Allahu

  Alcbar and risen to begin my prayers, when a Frank threw himself at me from

  behind, lifted me up so that I was facing east. "That's the way to pray!" he insisted.' Some Templars then intervened and took the man away and Usama

  resumed his prayers, only for the man to reappear and to force Usama to

  tlirn east again. Again the Templars took him away and apologised to

  Usama, and their words show us how different they had become from those

  who travelled from Europe: 'He is a foreigner who has just arrived today'.

  Over 80 years had passed since Jerusalem had become Christian and the

  generations which followed were not born in Europe. Most spoke Arabic

  and for them the defence of Jerusalem was less a defence of a holy city and

  more a defence of the only land which they had known - a situation not dis-

  similar to that of the pieds noirs'm 1950s Algeria. By the second generation.

  Christians from the West were foreigners, and not just to the Muslims.

  Saladin's defeat at Mont Gisard

  Saladin must have been forewarned about a possible attack on Egypt, for

  he spent most of the winter of 1176 strengthening the fortifications of

  Alexandria and Damietta. It is hard to know how he interpreted the actions

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  of Philip, but clearly he must have been amazed by what seemed to be his

  good fortune. Not only had the joint attack on Egypt been scuppered by

  squabbl
ing, but he now discovered that a considerable number of the

  Franldsh knights had gone with Philip to attack Hama, leaving the road to

  Jerusalem open. At once he began to move his forces. The news greatly

  alarmed the young Baldwin, who had no military experience. Normally he

  would have relied on Humphrey of Toron, but he was gravely ill and indis-

  posed, and as Baldwin marched to Ascalon to confront Saladin, accompa-

  nied by the Bishop of Bethlehem who carried the Holy Cross, the situation

  was so desperate that he issued the arriere ban, which obliged all able-

  bodied men to serve. This was seldom invoked and only in the most critical

  of circumstances.® Although he drew up his troops outside Ascalon, Baldwin

  was advised not to engage Saladin. Consequently, after some sldrmishing,

  he retreated within the shelter of the city walls. It was at this point that

  Saladin made a serious error of judgement and allowed his troops to go off

  plundering, for he did not think his main force would be seriously threat-

  ened. But he had not accounted for tlie bravery of Baldwin - who was no

  more than 15 years old. With the 'courage of despair','' the king marched

  out of Ascalon, where he was joined by some Templars, and attacked

  Saladin's forces at 'Mont Gisard' - probably Tell Gezer, which is about

  40 kilometres (25 miles) from Ascalon. Saladin was caught unawares; his

  troops, who had scattered, were even without weapons or armour. The

  Muslim army tried to rally and Taqi ul-Din disdnguished himself that day

  with his bravery. Taqi ul-Din's son, Ahmed, also fought bravely and charged

  the Franks. He was then sent back on a second charge by his father, where

  he was slain. As the fighting raged, the Franks pushed the Muslims back

  until they scattered and were defeated. Saladin's own life was in danger, and

  he had to be rescued by his guards when three Prankish horsemen charged

  at him. He now retreated in short stages, hoping to rally his fleeing army,

  and was relieved to hear that Baldwin was content with his victory and had

  returned to Ascalon. For the next ten days Saladin found himself without

  provisions and enduring a fraught retreat under the most inclement

  weather, for the rain and cold did not cease. Upon reaching the desert his

  army had to overcome the problem of a lack of water and the death of their

  overworked horses. It was thanks to al-Qadi al-Fadil, who hired Bedouins

  and himself went into the desert to find Saladin, that a safe return to Cairo

  was negotiated. Others were less fortunate, for the Bedouin betrayed Isa

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  al-Hakkari and his brother to the Franks, and the two were taken prisoners.

  When the kingdom seemed about to be lost, the courage of the young leper

  Idng had resulted in a great victory.

  It was after his return from the defeat of Mont Gisard that Saladin went

  to pay humble homage to al-Khabushani. However, spiritual matters had to

  take second place, for the priority for Saladin was to re-equip his army and

  to do so with utmost haste. At this stage a few words need to be said about

  the Muslim armies. A basic factor in the military history of Syria during this

  period was that any campaign that aimed at expelling the Franks was an

  ambitious undertaldng, requiring a large composite army.® For routine

  duties or limited raids a standing force (askar) of slaves and freedmen was

  sufficient; but any ambitious campaign demanded the participation of the

  provincial governors with their contingents. In addition, warfare was sea-

  sonal. Once the winter rains had set in, the ground became unsuitable for

  movement, and the winter months afforded the amirs an opportunity to

  return to their lands. For these reasons armies that were large enough to

  threaten the existence of the Latin states never remained in the field for

  more than a campaign season and this was a factor of which the Franks were

  obviously aware. There was no pressure on them to engage the enemy, so

  for them a successftil campaign was one in which they avoided anything

  more than sldrmishes until the Muslim forces broke up. A third factor

  weighing heavily on a commander's mind was his men's desire for plunder.

  Noble appeals to fight the holy war may have attracted some, but the

  prospect of booty was the more powerfial inducement. Saladin was defeated

  at Mont Gisard precisely because his forces, attracted by the loot, lost any

  cohesion. To bring together the disparate elements that formed a Muslim

  army and to keep them in the field required a commander of exceptional

  ability and unlimited patience. To the limitations mentioned above a

  dilemma and paradox need to be added. The dilemma was that the defeat

  of the Franks demanded a force larger than the one Syria could provide.

  Saladin Icnew that the forces of Egypt and Damascus were in themselves not

  enough to obtain victory; the manpower of Aleppo and Mesopotamia

  needed to be added. The paradox was that the larger the army, the greater

  the limitations. The more the number of amirs, the greater the chance of

  disputes; the fiarther they had to travel meant the sooner they had to leave

  to be home for winter; and the larger the number of fighters, the less the

  proportion of booty.

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  Nevertheless the speed with which Saladin re-equipped his army - by

  February 1178 he had set out from Cairo - was a salutaiy lesson for the

  Franks. Baldwin's victory at Mont Gisard had been decisive but it had also

  been the exception. The Franks understood that the Muslims could never

  be defeated completely and they appreciated that the rewards of victory

  were not a sufficient inducement to risk a defeat that would be calamitous.

  The Muslims, in short, could afford to suffer many defeats, but the Franks

  Icnew that batdes were simply not worth fighting, for the consequences of

  defeat could be immense.' Battle was best avoided, and for that to happen

  the army needed to be disciplined and ignore provocations such as feigned

  retreats, and attacks on flanks and rear. Above all the success of the Christian

  army depended upon effective co-operation between cavalry and infantry.

  It was incumbent on the infantry to maintain a human fortress from which

  the cavalry could launch charges and into which the cavalry could then

  withdraw.'® Failure to maintain discipline and protect the cavalry could

  lead to disastrous consequences. As long as the Franks remained disciplined

  and maintained a passive solidity,'' the Muslim armies could achieve litde

  success, for the array of contingents which had been brought together

  for the spring and summer campaigns dispersed with the winter months.

  This was the cardinal lesson of warfare and it was one that the Franks could

  not afford to forget. Saladin of course knew this, and he also Icnew that the

  Franks needed their whole military strength to face his main army, so he

  took advantage by launching other raids to cause damage in territories that

  they were unable to defend. The aim of these attacks was always to destroy

  food crops and the harvest, since Saladin was well aware that the Franks


  regarded such activity as a prime cause of their own poverty and consequent

  inability to organise sufficient military resistance.'

  Philip of Flander's siege of Hama had been lifted when the Kurd al-

  Mashtub, who had once vied for the vizierate of Egypt, had come to its

  rescue, but in the meantime Saladin's uncle Shihab al-Din had passed away.

  Philip and his forces then moved to besiege the castle of Harim, which lay

  60 kilometres (37 miles) west of Aleppo and only 30 Idlometres (18 miles)

  east of Antioch. The castie had been captured by Nur al-Din and its recap-

  ture would prove to be a great boost to Antioch. Given its proximity to

  Antioch, Harim should have fallen, but it resisted and the siege dragged on

  through the winter. Saladin's move at the head of his reassembled army into

  Syria altered the picture, for neither the Aleppans nor the Franks wanted

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  him to seize Harim for himself, and consequently terms were arranged

  by al-Salih in Aleppo and the Franks were bought off. Philip of Flanders

  then visited Jerusalem as a pilgrim, before sailing back to Europe. He had

  achieved nothing and his crusade was an anti-climax. But one cannot doubt

  his sincerity, for he had brought an army to the Holy Land at great finan-

  cial cost and in the laiowledge that he was neglecting his affairs at home.

  Nor can one doubt his courage, for he returned to Palestine as part of the

  Third Crusade, where he died during the siege of Acre.

  Saladin arrived in Damascus from Egypt to discover rumblings of dis-

  content over the conduct of Turan Shah, whom he had left as his deputy.

  Turan Shah had proven to be an incompetent administrator and a spend-

  thrift, and Saladin had no option but to remove him. Turan Shah was

  the kind of soldier who came alive and stood firm in the heat of batde, but

  in times of peace became dissolute and dissipated and he now exacerbated

  Saladin's problems by insisting that he be given Baalbek, for he was not, in

  the words of Humphreys, to accept docilely such an insult from his younger

  brother. Saladin apparentiy felt unable to oppose him without a serious

  conflict.^' The problem was that Baalbek was already in the hands of none

  other than Ibn al-Muqaddam, the man who had served Nur al-Din loyally