Saladin

by A R Azzam

  of Aleppo, than he began to gather his forces. Baldwin's health meanwhile

  had deteriorated to the extent where he was confined to bed, though

  when news reached him that Saladin had mustered his army to the south

  of Damascus, he urgendy summoned all the senior members: Raymond

  of Tripoli, Reynald of Chatillon, Baldwin of Ibelin. And of course Guy of

  Lusignan, who was the heir apparent, having married Baldwin's sister

  and whom Baldwin designated as regent and commander-in-chief, even

  though he was deeply unpopular among the barons. Such was the perceived

  danger from Saladin that help was called from the Genoese and Pisan

  colonies on the coast, who responded by sending troops. Even the pilgrims

  were summoned, and all able-bodied men were prepared for combat. On

  29 September Saladin crossed the Jordan and attacked Baisan, which he

  found deserted. For the next eight days the two armies watched each

  other. The Muslims continued to harass and provoke the Christian army

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  into charging, but Guy kept a tight rein on his forces and they would not

  be provoked. The Muslims were limited to archery assaults, while the Franks

  kept their cavaliy screened by their infantry in order to protect their horses

  from Muslim arrows. Patiently Saladin probed and waited for his opponents

  to make a mistake and to charge; Imad al-Din al-Isfahani noted 'everyday we

  expected them to charge, rushing into battle as was their custom', but the

  Franks stubbornly refused to take the bait and maintained their discipline.

  When after a week of sldrmishing Saladin's amirs approached him and told

  him that provisions were running low, Saladin ended the campaign.

  At first sight it appears that litde that was substantial had occurred, but

  in fact a precedent had been set which would have profound and ultimately

  disastrous repercussions for the Latin Kingdom. With Baldwin incapacit-

  ated, Guy had led the army - the largest army, as William of Tyre noted,

  that the Franks had ever gathered — and he had remained on the defensive

  and allowed Saladin to devastate the Christian territory with impunity. This

  strategy of containment provoked criticism from some of the Franks, who

  accused him of cowardice and who insisted that he should have launched

  an attack. However, these accusations were driven by jealousy and not

  sound military judgement. To his critics, Guy was a handsome but arrogant

  fool and a debauchee,^ but the truth was that Guy had acted competentiy.

  For the fact was that a huge Muslim army had invaded Christian territory

  but had made no territorial gains, while the Franks had suffered no losses.

  Guy's problem was that he could not count on the support of the other

  lords, who were prepared to see him fail because they feared that any

  success would strengthen his position. Admittedly there had been severe

  logistic problems which had nearly left the army starving, but on the whole

  Guy had conducted a text-book campaign, pursuing a successful defensive

  strategy with minimum risk.^ For Guy to win, all he had to do was to remain

  disciplined. Even Saladin accepted that the Franks had adopted a successful

  military strategy, which he had been unable to break down. And had the

  same defensive strategy been adopted four years later, then the devastating

  defeat of Hattin would have been avoided.

  Having crossed back over the Jordan, Saladin returned to Damascus,

  where he instructed al-Adil to leave Egypt and take command of Aleppo,

  while he sent Taqi ul-Din to assume his position in Egypt. In the meantime

  Baldwin had recovered slightly and returned to Jerusalem, where he dis-

  missed Guy as regent and resumed his position in authority. Although Guy

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  had been criticised for his military campaign, the dispute between him and

  tlie long was unrelated to this matter. No matter, the dismissal and humiliation

  of Guy by Baldwin was deliberate and public, and the Idng now installed his

  nephew, the young Baldwin V, as heir. Raymond of Tripoli - who was vehe-

  mently opposed to Guy - was appointed as regent. The relations between

  Guy and Baldwin continued to deteriorate, until Baldwin tried to annul his

  sister's marriage to him. Several times Baldwin summoned Guy as his vassal to

  attend him in Jerusalem and each time Guy excused himself on the grounds

  of ill health. In accordance therefore with Jerusalem custom, the ailing Idng

  was carried in his litter to Ascalon to ask for Guy's attendance,^ only to find

  the city gates closed against him. Baldwin was forced to be carried to the

  gates himself and Icnock and demand admission, but Guy defied him and the

  gates remained bolted. A furious Baldwin now sought to dispossess Guy,

  since such a public defiance could not be tolerated, but it appears he took

  no further action and Guy remained undisturbed in his possession of Ascalon.

  At the end of October 1183, Saladin left Damascus. This time his desti-

  nation was Kerak, for it was there that the wedding of Humphrey IV of

  Toron and Baldwin IV's half-sister was being held. Saladin was certainly

  aware of this, and his attack on the stronghold of Kerak was planned to

  coincide with the festivities. Together with Shaubak, which lay about

  100 Idlometres (60 miles) to the south, Kerak - the stronghold of Reynald

  of Chatillon - made the crossing between Syria and Egypt hazardous unless

  accompanied by a strong military escort. Soon Saladin had surrounded

  the castle and seven mangonels kept up a day and night bombardment.

  Surreally, inside the castle a wedding was taking place, and the castle was

  full of minstrels and actors. The story goes that Humphrey of Toron's

  mother sent out food from the wedding banquet to Saladin. Not to be out-

  done in gallantry, Saladin asked where in the castle the wedding was taldng

  place and then gave strict instructions that it should not be bombarded

  so that the newly married couple would not be disturbed. In fact Saladin

  did not press home his advantage and soon called off the siege. In any

  case he was at Kerak for another reason, for he was waiting for a caravan

  from Egypt led by al-Adil, who was on his way to assume his responsibil-

  ities in Aleppo. However, Baldwin, who was too ill to ride and was carried

  on a litter, immediately led his army from Jerusalem to relieve Kerak. By

  then, however, Saladin had retreated to Damascus, which he reached in

  December 1183.

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  By the spring of 1184 Saladin was once again on the offensive, and for

  the first time we begin to see the benefits of his endless campaigning in the

  north, for he was joined by the forces of Aleppo under al-Adil and also by

  the Egyptian army under the command of Taqi ul-Din. He was also joined

  by amirs from the east of the Euphrates, most notably another brother

  of Izz al-Din of Mosul. Not to be outdone, Mardin and Sinjar also sent

  forces. Saladin was clearly not in a hurry and it was not until the beginning

  of July that he reached Franldsh territory, where he ravaged territory
until

  the army finally gathered at Kerak in the middle of August 1184. Nine man-

  gonels were ranged against the walls of the casde and they caused immense

  damage. When news reached Jerusalem, an army was gathered and the

  Idng, unable to ride, was carried in a litter. The approach of the Franks

  forced Saladin to fift the siege of Kerak, and he then moved 65 kilometres

  (40 miles) north to Hisban, where he had a commanding position to

  block any Frankish advance. He then waited to see if the Franks were pre-

  pared to engage him in batde, but when they showed no sign of doing

  so, and knowing that all their forces were at Kerak, he knew that he could

  plunder the Franldsh lands unchallenged. Nablus, Jenin and Sebastea were

  raided in quick succession, with booty and prisoners being taken. Soon

  aft:er, in mid-September 1184, Saladin returned to Damascus and dis-

  banded his army.

  t h e death of Baldwin IV

  By the beginning of 1185 it was clear that Baldwin IV was dying. The suc-

  cession had been arranged, for his nephew Baldwin V - laiown affection-

  ately as Baudouinette - had been anointed co-king in the same year. On the

  day he died, Baldwin IV gathered his vassals for the last time to bid them

  adieu. By now, the illness had taken its terrible toll and he had become

  blind, deformed and crippled. He was just 23 years old and had ruled for

  11 years. On 16 May 1185, after enduring unimaginable pain, Baldwin IV

  died, and was buried near his father in the chapel of the Latin Kings in the

  Church of the Holy Sepulchre at the foot of Mount Calvary, the most holy

  place of Christendom, which he had striven to defend throughout his

  reign.'' Despite his terrible illness, Baldwin had conducted himself with

  tremendous fortitude, and as long as he had lived he had kept Saladin in

  check. Every Muslim attack had been met by a Christian army, and under

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  his leadership the Franks had frustrated Saladin's attempts to encircle them.

  Not only at the scene of his great victory at Mont Gisard but throughout

  his brief and pain-ridden reign, Baldwin had proved himself to be a match

  for the great Saladin. The regent chosen for the young Baldwin V was

  Baymond of Tripoli, who at once sent a message to Saladin requesting a

  truce. Somewhat surprisingly Saladin agreed, for he was anxious to cross the

  Euphrates, where Izz al-Din of Mosul was up to his old tricks and had allied

  with al-Pahlawan of Azerbaijan and the Shah Arman of Akhlat and was

  threatening his recendy gained lands. In 1182 Saladin had crossed the

  Euphrates without bothering with a truce, but this time caution prevailed

  and a general truce was arranged. One of the reasons for his caution was that

  he was aware that the patriarch Heraclius - a cleric who openly paraded his

  mistress, laiown as the patriarchess® - had been sent from Jerusalem to the

  West, urgendy seeking military help. In the spring of 1185 Saladin left

  Damascus on a campaign expected to last a few weeks; he did not return

  undl May 1186, during which time his life reached its nadir.

  As mentioned above, a new embassy left Jerusalem to implore aid from

  Europe. The envoys were of the highest order; apart from the patriarch

  Heraclius of Jerusalem, the embassy also contained the masters of the

  Templars and Hospitallers. The embassy travelled first to the Pope and then

  on to France, where they offered Philip Augustus the keys of the city of

  Jerusalem and the Holy Sepulchre. Philip quicldy refused this offer, and as

  soon as was diplomatically possible shipped them to England. Often por-

  trayed as a figure of mockery, openly flaunting his mistress, Heraclius came

  to England displaying much gold and silver and heavily perfumed - to the

  English not signs of austerity. But he was not a fool. As soon as he landed

  he performed the pilgrimage to the tomb of Thomas Becket. This was a

  deliberate gesture meant to embarrass Henry, for 13 years had passed since

  Becket's murder and what had Henry done for Jerusalem to atone for his

  sins? Even in his opulent adornment Heraclius had a deliberate message.

  Over the years Henry made very large payments to the Latin Kingdom

  but it seems he did not permit anyone to spend it. Indeed he reserved

  the right to recall all his money from the East at any time. By 1187 his

  Eastern account was said to have reached 30,000 marks of silver. He kept

  promising a crusade, he kept sending money, but it remained frozen - for

  Henry's parsimony was as notorious as Saladin's generosity. By 1182, when

  Henry made his will at Waltham, his Eastern account had grown to such a

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  magnitude that measures had to be taken to ensure its proper management.

  In that sense Heraclius' adornment was calculated: 'We want a prince not

  money', he railed, when his patience at Henry's prevarications finally

  snapped. 'From everywhere we receive money, but no prince.' The failure

  of Heraclius' mission came as a big blow to Jerusalem, but it had one salu-

  tary effect: it had been final proof that Henry was not going to take up the

  Cross. But what of the immense wealth which he had accumulated in

  Jerusalem? And what was to be done with it?

  Saladin's march on Mosul

  In the meantime Saladin had crossed the Euphrates in another attempt to

  subdue Mosul. He was initially encouraged by the death of the Shah Arman,

  but as long as Mosul resisted and received support from al-Pahlawan of

  Azerbaijan, Saladin was unable to break the stalemate. It was during this

  period when we detect visible signs of a distancing between al-Qadi al-Fadil

  and Saladin. It was clear that al-Qadi al-Fadil did not approve of Saladin

  returning to besiege Mosul - he had once written to him praising the waters

  of the Nile to that of the Euphrates, but Saladin had chosen to ignore his

  words. In al-Qadi al-Fadil's mind, Saladin had allowed himself to become

  distracted and had lost sight of the holy war. In one letter he wrote crypti-

  cally to Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, 'There remains what I have not indicated

  and what I cannot mention of the fact that the means fall short of the

  desired end'. From Egypt he warned Saladin not to pester the caliph with

  letters and appeals: 'The water in the spring must be allowed to fill up' - a

  sign of his frustration and growing disillusionment. When he wrote saying

  that he intended to go on pilgrimage and received a reply discouraging him,

  he had even contemplated resigning and leaving Saladin's service. What

  could have brought on al-Qadi al-Fadil's extraordinary decision? For over

  15 years he had stood by Saladin and served him to the point where he had

  become perhaps the second most important man in the land. 'I have not

  conquered the lands with my sword, but with al-Qadi al-Fadil's pen',

  Saladin had repeated on several occasions, and he listened carefiilly to al-

  Qadi al-Fadil's advice not just on political and administrative matters but

  on military ones as well. And yet disenchantment had set in on al-Qadi al-

  Fadil's part and there can be no doub
t that Saladin's adventure in Mosul

  was the cause.

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  What exactly was Saladin doing in Mosul? Even those closest to him

  were uncertain. He himself continued to insist, in letters to the caliph, that

  he needed the troops of Mosul in order to fight the holy war, but his words

  did not convince. Personal and dynastic ambitions were certainly at play;

  Saladin was carving out an empire for himself and for his family. His ter-

  ritories already exceeded those conquered by Nur al-Din, and who Icnew

  what lay behind Mosul - Georgia, Constantinople, Anatolia, even Baghdad?

  At the same time he may have felt more comfortable in the confines of

  Mosul; he was; after all, Kurdish and not Syrian or Egyptian. It is interest-

  ing to note that the two men who insisted he pursue his ambitions towards

  Mosul were Isa al-Hakkari and al-Mashtub, both of whom were Kurds from

  the nearby Haldcari region. We simply do not know what was in Saladin's

  mind, but we can be certain that for Saladin personal and family ambition

  co-existed with moral and religious goals. In Egypt he had endeavoured to

  establish the foundations of the Sunni Revival with great sincerity, and in

  doing so had proven that he was a man of his age. Now, to the frustration

  of the ulama, his ambitions east of the Euphrates were confirming that he

  truly was a man of his age.

  Saladin's illness

  Then on 3 December 1185 Saladin fell ill and withdrew to Harran. As a

  result the siege of Mosul had to be lifiied and his army disbanded. At first,

  al-Qadi al-Fadil did not appreciate the seriousness of the matter and made

  an excuse not to travel to see Saladin. But rapidly it became clear that the

  illness was grave and shortly after there came a time when Saladin's life hung

  in the balance. Al-Qadi al-Fadil now wrote urgently to Imad al-Din al-

  Isfahani to move Saladin to Aleppo as soon as possible, for he feared the

  unrest that would follow if he were to die. In January 1186 Saladin's wife,

  Ismat al-Din, died and strict instructions were given to keep the news away

  from him. Urgently physicians were despatched to Harran, but by February