Saladin

by A R Azzam

  from the Muslim camp about the fulfilment of the terms of the agreement,

  but when none was forthcoming he acted in a way which horrified

  the watching spies. Numbering around 3,000, the garrison of Acre was

  marched out on to the plain, roped together, men leading men, their hands

  bound. Then the massacre commenced. By the time night fell, so had the

  3,000. Ibn Shaddad wrote that:

  Our spies had informed Saladin of the enemy's manoeuvres, and he sent

  some reinforcements; but by then the slaughter had already taken place . . .

  The . next morning the Muslims wanted to see who had fallen, and found

  their martyred companions lyin^ where they fell; and some they recognised.

  It is impossible to determine who was to blame for the massacre. Richard

  may genuinely have believed that Saladin had broken the terms of the agree-

  ment. In any case Richard was determined to march south from Acre and

  the delays were both frustrating and dangerous, for it was clear that Saladin

  was rapidly calling up reinforcements. At the same time the massacre - chill-

  ing in its severity - would have had a salutary effect on the Muslim popu-

  lace, for no garrison would now resist Richard's advance. As for Saladin,

  his natural prevarications may have contributed to the massacre, but the

  truth was that neither side trusted the other. Ibn Shaddad's commentary is

  probably the fairest analysis of Richard's actions. He believed that only two

  possibilities could explain the massacre: 'One was that they had Idlled them

  as a reprisal for their own prisoners Idlled before then. Another was that the

  king of England had decided to march on Ascalon and did not want to leave

  behind a large number of enemy soldiers.' AVhat was certain was that with

  the arrival of Richard, Saladin was faced with a foe the calibre of which he

  had previously not encountered. He had suspected that the capture of

  Jerusalem would unleash a terrible storm from Europe and now, on the

  plains of Acre, the corpses of the 3,000 Muslims was a bloody proof of how

  severe this storm would be.

  On hearing of the massacre Saladin was moved to fury, which was unlike

  him. For the next few days - and until his natural benevolence was restored

  - few Christians who crossed his path were spared. In this manner, a day

  after the massacre a knight - 'his appearance announced that he was a lead-

  ing man among them' - was captured and brought to Saladin. Through an

  interpreter, he was asked about the state of Richard's army and then as to

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  13: T H E ARRIVAL O F R I C H A R D

  why the massacre of the Muslims had taken place. The Icnight replied that

  it had been the will of the king of England. Saladin then ordered that the

  knight be put to death, and when this was translated to him, he visibly

  blanched and requested that he would free a Muslim prisoner in his place

  instead. Normally this was standard practice, for the release of a high-

  ranldng Muslim was invaluable for Saladin. The Icnight was fettered and

  judgement on his fate deferred as Saladin rode out to look over his army.

  On his return, however, he ordered that the Icnight be put to death. Later

  that afternoon two Franks were brought in as prisoners and were executed

  on Saladin's orders. The following day two further prisoners were captured

  and were executed, and that night 14 Franks and a Frankish women were

  brought in. With them was a Muslim captive, a woman who clearly served

  the Franldsh woman. Saladin ordered the release of the Muslim woman and

  the execution of the Franks.

  The march towards Jaffa

  A few days after the massacre Richard's army was ready to move, though we

  read that he had great difficulty clearing the inns and brothels in order to

  get his men on the road. But by 25 August 1191 the Muslims witnessed the

  Franks lighting fires and the army began its move. Richard's strategy was to

  take control of the entire coastline, thereby ensuring supremacy at sea. By

  sticking to the coast his army would also gain constant replenishment from

  the fleet. Then when Jaffa had fallen, he aimed to march inland to cap-

  ture Jerusalem. The journey from Acre to Jaffa is around 130 kilometres

  (80 miles). August was of course the height of summer and the heat would

  have been intolerable. In addition, Richard Icnew that the Muslims would

  harass his men at every stage. Above all an iron discipline was required;

  the army could not allow itself to be dragged away from the coastUne, nor

  could the knights be tempted to break away and charge the Muslim raiding

  parties. The marching army clung to the coastline, but the reality was that

  the Franks were an invading army with barely a toehold on the coast, while

  the hinterland was overwhelmingly Muslim. There was little sense of hurry

  as the army set off in three divisions, while the fleet sailed alongside. In each

  division the cavalry was flanked by two columns of infantry, one between it

  and the Muslim forces and the other marching along the shore. In that way

  Richard alternated his infantry; those on the march faced the enemy raids

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  SALAD I N

  and those on the shore carried the baggage and tents due to the lack of

  transport animals. The discipline of the army gready impressed the watch-

  ing Muslims. Ibn Shaddad noted that the infantry surrounded the cavalry

  like a wall. Wearing solid iron corslets and full-length chain mail, they

  appeared impervious to the Muslim arrows. 'I saw', wrote Ibn Shaddad,

  'Franks with ten arrows fixed in their backs, pressing on in this fashion quite

  unconcerned.' Meanwhile the cavalry waited for opportunities to charge

  and then retreat behind the infantry. So disciplined was the Christian army

  under such severe conditions that Ibn Shaddad could not but be impressed

  and wrote of the 'endurance of these people, bearing exhausting tasks with-

  out any pay or material gain'. As for Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, he wrote that

  the marching infantry resembled hedgehogs brisding with arrows.

  The heat was intense and the pace was accordingly slow. Marching

  was only in the mornings and rest was on alternate days. Countless men

  fainted and many dropped dead. Richard ordered the dead to be buried

  where they fell and the sick to be transported on to the ships. And from the

  high ground Saladin watched the slow inexorable march. He Icnew that

  as long as the Christian army maintained its discipline and ignored the

  skirmishes and harassment, he could do little. But he could bide his time

  and wait for the moment when the Crusaders would surely tire and lose

  their discipline. Then he would strike, and a second Hattin would be his. In

  the meantime he even enrolled 300 robbers from among the Bedouin to

  infiltrate the enemy and steal their property and horses. But Saladin had not

  reckoned with Richard. To march an army in the height of summer and to

  maintain such an iron discipline elevated him to the ranks of the great mil-

  itary commanders. And on the march he seemed to be everywhere. Furious

  assaults were launched against the marching army with Saladin at the heart.

  'I saw him [Saladin] actually riding among
the sldrmishers as the enemy's

  arrows flew past him', wrote Ibn Shaddad. 'He was attended by two pages

  with two spare mounts and that was all, riding from division to division and

  urging them forward.' But when the Muslim raids attacked the rearguard

  trying to separate it from the rest of the army, Richard himself rushed to

  its defence, and in the words of a chronicler landed on the Muslims 'like a

  thunderbolt'. To the watching Saladin this was evidence of a great warrior

  and a formidable presence, but he was also shrewd enough to know that it

  was foolhardy for kings to take such risks, for surely an army that relied on

  its king to intervene personally would be lost without him. Nevertheless

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  Saladin was impressed. This was an army that maintained a discipline the like

  of which he had not seen previously. Yes, the Turldsh cavalry could continue

  to harass the crusaders, but as long as they stayed out of reach of the

  Christian crossbowmen they were unable to inflict casualties and if they

  came too close they were picked off by the crossbowmen.

  The two armies now marched down the coast in parallel, sometimes only

  3 Idlometres (2 miles) apart. Daily Saladin kept up the raids, and the cru-

  saders, too, must have wondered at this enemy that never seemed to flag.

  To slow them down the Muslims targeted the horses which the laiights

  depended on, and it was not long before many laiights were marching

  shoulder to shoulder with the infantry, their lances carried on their backs.

  As for the numbers on the march, it is hard to estimate with great accuracy

  but a combination of the English and French crusaders of Richard, the

  remaining crusaders of Phillip, the German remnants of the Barbarossa

  crusade, and the forces of Guy, along with the Templars and Hospitallers

  would probably have numbered in the region of 20,000-30,000 infantry,

  with a cavaliy force not likely to exceed 4,000-5,000 men. Saladin would

  have fielded an army roughly the same size as Richard's, 20,000-30,000

  men, though with considerably more cavalry. As the armies moved south,

  more prisoners were captured and some revealed usefial information. On

  one occasion Saladin was told that the Bedouin had approached Richard

  and had informed him that the Muslim army was not as numerous as he

  feared. The following day, however, a Muslim assault, which was so severe

  that it left hundreds of Christian soldiers wounded, convinced Richard other-

  wise and he had two of the Bedouin Idlled as a consequence. There was no

  doubt that the Christian army was suffering heavy casualties and around

  5 September contact was made which requested that talks between the two

  camps be held. Saladin immediately welcomed this proposal and delegated

  al-Adil to be in charge, but he was motivated by factors other than peace

  talks: 'If you are able to spin out the talks with the Franks', he wrote to his

  brother, 'then perhaps they will remain where they are today' - for Saladin

  Icnew that reinforcements were arriving daily to strengthen his army. Al-Adil

  then met with Richard, but neither side truly wanted peace for there was still

  much fighting to be done. When al-Adil told Richard to elaborate on his

  offer, the king replied that the basic condition was that Saladin restored all

  the lands to him. Ibn Shaddad diplomatically wrote that al-Adil gave a harsh

  answer to that demand and the meeting broke up.

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  Saladin's defeat at Arsuf

  On 3 September 1191 Saladiii moved to the forest of Arsuf, for he decided

  that if he were to prevent Richard reaching Jaffa, then it was here - where

  the wooded terrain helped conceal his movements - that the battle had to

  take place. A few days later news reached him that the Franks were maldng

  for Arsuf; he now drew his army in parallel to the Franldsh columns and,

  when the Christian vanguard reached the orchards, he committed his

  army to attack. His plan was to cut off the rearguard commanded by the

  Hospitallers from the rest of the army, and to destroy it before Richard

  rushed to its aid. On the morning of 7 September 1191 the Muslims began

  their attack. The Bedouins and Nubians launched arrows and javelins into

  the enemy lines, before parting to allow the mounted archers to advance,

  attack and wheel off - a well-practised technique to tempt the crusaders to

  charge them. At several points along the line the two armies were engaged

  in close hand-to-hand combat. As the fighting became more and more

  ferocious, there were times when the Christian forces were forced to fight

  while marching backwards through the thickets, and throughout the day

  the Muslim cries of 'Allahu Akbar' clashed with the Christian army's cries of

  'Sanctum Sepulchrum adjuva'. No matter how ferocious the attacks were,

  the Hospitallers maintained their discipline and refused to take the Muslim

  bait and charge from the centre of the column. Several times messages were

  sent to Richard, but each time the reply was the same: they must resist the

  urge to charge the enemy. The furious nature of the Muslim assault and the

  tactics adopted were striking, for they were completely out of character

  for Saladin. This was not the cautious Saladin who carefully planned his

  actions and the consequences of those actions. In contrast to Hattin, where

  he had meticulously planned his victory, at Arsuf Saladin knew that the

  sea prevented him from surrounding his enemy, and by pressing them

  so closely while they were still unbroken he was exposing himself to a

  counter-attack.

  Although the Hospitallers suffered few losses, they were losing horses at

  an alarming rate. Several times they begged Richard to launch a full charge

  but Richard refused each request, waiting for Saladin to overreach himself

  and thereby be vulnerable to a counter-charge. Increasingly, however, as

  the day of 7 September wore on, and as the Muslim attacks intensified, the

  cohesion of the Hospitallers began to erode and gaps in the Christian

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  13: T H E ARRIVAL OF R I C H A R D

  army appeared. Ibn Shaddad, who was an eyewitness, noted how intensely

  Saladin was participating in the batde itself: 'I met his brother in a similar

  state, while the arrows were flying past them both.' The battle of Arsuf had

  entered a critical stage. When a request by Gamier of Nablus (master of the

  Hospitallers) to Richard to attack had been turned down, the Hospitaller

  patience snapped, and with a cry of 'St George' the Hospitallers, followed

  by the French, charged the Muslim ranks. It was precisely what Saladin had

  hoped for: finally a break in the disciplined Christian army. But that day

  fortune favoured Richard, since at the same time the Hospitallers charged,

  Saladin's archers had dismounted to direct their arrows more accurately, and

  were overwhelmed by the unexpected onslaught. Quicldy aware of events,

  Richard ordered a general attack all along the line, so breaking Saladin's

  army, which was pursued across the hills of Arsuf Ibn Shaddad writes that

  he fled in confusion to the left wing but found that it, too, had b
roken and

  was in retreat. He then fled to the right wing, to discover that it also had

  been routed. Frantically he searched for Saladin, and made his way to the

  banners which were stiU upright and the drums which were beating, to

  find him surrounded by only 17 horsemen - the rest had fled - desperately

  trying to rally his troops. 'I was in attendance on him', wrote Ibn Shaddad,

  'offering consolation, which, however, he was unable to accept. He was

  protected from the sun by a kerchief and we asked him to take some food.

  Something light was brought to him, from which he took only a littie.'

  It was a victory for Richard, but not as conclusive as at first thought. He

  was wary of the Muslims rallying and the Christian army overextending

  itself, and with the forest ahead the risk of ambush was high. Consequently

  the order was made to call the pursuit off. Nevertheless, although the defeat

  could have been more severe, Arsuf was a bitter blow for Saladin. At Acre

  Saladin had come to realise that he could not fight an entrenched Christian

  army; now at Arsuf he learned how dangerous it was to attack one that

  was on the move, especially one commanded by as formidable a leader as

  Richard. 'Never have we seen the like of him', an admiring Aleppan amir

  told Saladin. As far as casualties were concerned, the defeat could have been

  worse, but psychologically Richard's victory was almost total. As Ibn

  Shaddad ruefiilly wrote: 'All our men were wounded, if not in their bodies

  in their hearts'. And yet, though after Arsuf it became clear that the Muslim

  army could not win, the Franks could still lose.^^ Admittedly the morale

  was low, but Saladin could call up reinforcements, and if Richard could

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  SALAD I N

  be tempted to turn inland and make a dash for Jerusalem, then the tables

  would turn once again. But Richard was not prepared to risk heading inland

  just yet, for he needed Jaffa as his base for the conquest of Jerusalem.

  And so the Christian army resumed its march down the coast, and Saladin

  - taldng care not to show any signs of wealaiess - continued his tactics of

  harassment and sldrmishes.

  As Richard made his way to Jaffa - it took just under 20 days to march

  the 130 kilometres (80 miles) from Acre - Saladin was deep in thought