Stilwell the Patriot

by David Rooney

  He remained highly critical of Roosevelt, considering that he was a complete amateur on all military issues and dangerously impulsive. Once again his views on the British are clear-cut. He considered that they had far too much influence on Roosevelt. ‘It took the disaster in Hawaii to stop the flow of all our stuff to the Limeys … We’ll do this, we’ll do that. Blow hot, blow cold. And the Limeys have his ear, while we have the hind tit.’ Amid a welter of discussion about what America should do and where its first efforts should be directed, Stilwell was seriously critical about the lack of a general strategic plan and of a top-level decision on what should have the highest priority.

  Urgent discussions continued in Washington through January 1942, and it gradually emerged that Stilwell was being considered, not for a command in North Africa, but in China. He reacted adversely. He felt that Chiang and his entourage would remember him as a ‘small fry colonel that they kicked around’. In mid-January Stimson, the Secretary of War, interviewed him and asked him what he thought of the possibility of commanding the Chinese venture. With a notable lack of enthusiasm he replied that he would go where he was sent. On 23 January he was offered the appointment of Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-Shek and Commander of American forces in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theatre. His previous experience with Chiang stood him in good stead, and he immediately demanded to know his exact powers. T.V. Soong, who was to play a key role in the tortured relationship between America, Stilwell, Chiang and the Chinese, cabled Chiang and received firm, clear promises. Stilwell was to receive many such promises.

  Before his appointment was officially confirmed, Stilwell continued to take part in high-level discussions on the general strategy of the war. In the brief jottings in his diary his strong feelings about the British constantly recur. He saw a copy of the notes of a meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill and commented: ‘It demonstrates the tremendous hold the Limeys have on Our Boy … We must keep up the Lend–Lease torrent to our British cousins, even though our people go without.’ At another conference in January 1942: ‘All agreed on their disgust at the way the British were hogging all the material.’ In contrast to his official worries, he told his wife in a letter that he had seen the movie How Green Was My Valley and that it was one of the best he had ever seen.

  Early in February 1942 Roosevelt called Stilwell to the White House. Of tins encounter Stilwell wrote:

  F.D.R. very pleasant and very unimpressive. As if I were a constituent in to see him. Rambled on about his idea of the war … ‘a 28,000 mile front is my conception,’ etc., etc. ‘The real strategy is to fight them all,’ etc., etc. Just a lot of wind. After I had enough I broke in and asked him if he had a message for Chiang Kai Shek. He very obviously had not, and talked for five minutes hunting around for something world shaking to say. Finally he had it – ‘Tell him we are in this thing for keeps, and we intend to keep at it until China gets back all her lost territory.’ He was cordial and pleasant and frothy

  After the White House interview, Stilwell went to his old friend Marshall to discuss the serious problems that would have to be faced in the CBI theatre. His experience in China, and above all his observations of Chiang, had already alerted him to the latter’s methods and plans. Stilwell demanded that all the supplies and weapons for the proposed thirty Chinese divisions should be sent through him and be placed under his control. Expecting more advances by the Japanese, he obtained the agreement that if they captured Rangoon the Lend–Lease supplies would be diverted through Calcutta but remain under his control. At the same time he asked for large-scale provision of transport aircraft so that, if necessary, supplies could be flown up to Kunming or Chungking. At this stage his main aim was to oversee the training and equipping of the thirty Chinese divisions in preparation for a major ground offensive against the Japanese.

  Stilwell left for the Far East on 14 February 1942 and travelled via South America and West Africa. In Lagos, Nigeria, he heard that Singapore, with its 60,000 British troops, had surrendered. ‘Christ. What the hell is the matter?’ At another stop he added: ‘Usual Limey stories everywhere. Apathetic and snooty.’ He continued his journey, passing through Cairo, Jerusalem, Baghdad and Karachi before stopping in Delhi.

  By this time General Archibald Wavell, the British commander in the Far East, had met Chiang in Chungking and had grossly offended him. Reflecting the long-standing fear in Burma of Chinese occupation, Wavell tactlessly refused the offer of Chinese help when discussing the defence of Burma. This blunder exacerbated Chiang’s seething resentment about control of the huge amounts of Lend–Lease material piled up in Rangoon and infuriated the Americans, who feared that Chiang might pull out of the war. Stilwell, now in Calcutta, met Wavell, ‘a tired, depressed man, pretty well beaten down’. He added, ‘When I think how those bowlegged cockroaches have ruined our calm lives it makes me want to wrap Jap guts around every lamp-post in Asia.’

  Stilwell’s prolonged journey continued. He flew from Calcutta to Lashio, on the southern part of the Burma Road, where Chiang gave him a cordial welcome. After a brief stop he went on to Kunming, where he met Chennault. His comment, ‘He’ll be OK,’ he may later have regretted since Chennault gained great influence with Chiang and, equally significantly, with Madame Chiang Kai-Shek (subsequently ‘Madame’). Chennault, with his powerful ambition, had persuaded them of the fanciful notion that a vast bomber force, provided by America, flown by American pilots and based in southern China, could knock Japan out of the war. From Kunming Stilwell flew on to Chungking, where he met Chiang and held the first serious discussion about his exact responsibilities. Chiang was incensed by the British retreat and their lethargy, and he suspected their motives. He appeared relieved when he was assured that Stilwell and not the British would command the American-Chinese forces in Burma. In this first crucial interview the translator proved inadequate and Madame took over. She made caustic remarks about the British and then discussed the role of Chennault and the American Volunteer Group (AVG), which she supported.

  During the next few days Stilwell urgently sought information and intelligence on Japanese plans. He wondered why they had not attacked Rangoon and if they were too weak. He was soon to have the answer. He felt that if all the Chinese warlords, who generally commanded divisions as if they were a personal fiefdom, could be persuaded to pool their resources it could create a respectable force. Once again, Stilwell could not resist a dig at the British. He recounted how, after a state visit to India, Chiang and Madame were more impressed by Gandhi and Nehru than ‘the whole damn British Raj’. The next day Stilwell had a further long discussion with Chiang and Madame, who appeared to have the sharper mind. Chiang dominated this frustrating session by explaining why China could not attack and continued with more bitter criticism of the British, during which he threatened to pull the Chinese divisions out of Burma. Stilwell felt that at least he had made some progress because he, a foreigner, had been given command of Chinese troops in Burma – something that had never happened before – but in a letter to his wife he wrote, ‘My job is just endless grief.’

  After Pearl Harbor and the capture of Hong Kong and Singapore, the Japanese attacked Burma in January 1942. This physically inhospitable country, with its long eastern border with China, stretched in the north into the foothills of the Himalayas. From here the great rivers, the Irrawaddy and Chindwin, flowed south through dense tropical forest, dominating the terrain and ensuring that all communications ran from south to north. The rivers, which joined near Mandalay, flowed into the sea west of the capital Rangoon. The main railway, built by British engineers in earlier years, ran almost due north from Rangoon, past Mandalay and up to Myitkyina (pronounced Mich-en-ar) near the northeast border with China.

  During the 1930s the British administration had neglected defence issues, and there was no overall defence plan. The 1st Burma Division – thus called in the hope that an enemy might imagine there was a second – was trained for little more than internal security. The 17th Indian Divi
sion, now also stationed in Burma, had been trained for action in the sands of North Africa and was made up of only two brigades. It had been hurriedly diverted to Burma in the face of the sudden Japanese threat, as was 7 Armoured Brigade, which had already gained fame in the Desert Campaign in North Africa. In contrast, the Japanese attacked with two experienced and battle-hardened divisions – 33 and 55 – and very soon added three more. Certainly Britain was to suffer a humiliating defeat, but it should be remembered that the defence of Burma was placed in the hands of two inadequate, understrength divisions, one of which had been trained for a totally different theatre of war.

  General Slim arrived in Burma in the same month as Stilwell, March 1942, and like him had no responsibility for the dire situation they faced. He took over what was called Burcorps, though this consisted of substantially less than two divisions and there was no corps headquarters or staff. Slim, like Stilwell, had briefly met Wavell when he passed through Delhi, and it had been stressed that above all he should not allow his forces in Burma to be cut off. Should it prove necessary, he should retreat northwards to defend the approaches to India and to maintain contact with the Chinese–American divisions in northeast Burma. By the time Slim reached the front, 17 Division had suffered a grave defeat at Sittang bridge and, on 6 March 1942, Rangoon had fallen to the Japanese. By the middle of March the Japanese 55 and 33 Divisions had driven north and had been joined by three more – 18, 56 and 213 – which were brought in as soon as Rangoon was captured. As the five divisions moved north they faced the badly mauled 17 Indian Division, 1 Burma Division and the Chinese 200 Division from the Chinese Fifth Army.

  By 12 March Stilwell was at Maymyo, a pleasant hill-station that was the British military HQ just northeast of Mandalay. Here he started his long and frequently acrimonious relationship with the British in Burma. On his arrival he met the Governor of Burma, Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, of whom one critic remarked that his powers of self-deception were almost infinite. Stilwell was not impressed. The next day he met the British Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Harold Alexander, who was later to command the British forces in the Desert Campaign. Stilwell wrote of Alexander:

  Rather brusque and stand-offish. Let me stand around while waiting for Shang Chen to come. Uninterested when Shang did come. Astonished to find ME – mere me, a goddam American – in command of Chinese troops. ‘Extrawdinary.’ Looked me over as if I had just crawled out from under a rock.

  Later that night a British major came to Stilwell’s bedroom and told him to report to Flagstaff House at 10 a.m. He was furious and made a significant comment, ‘It’s just the superior race complex, for which they will pay dearly.’ When Stilwell explained that he was the independent commander of the Chinese–American forces, Alexander said, ‘That makes my position impossible from the start.’ Stilwell wrote: ‘So I gave him a dirty look and said I wasn’t exactly on a bed of roses myself. He just stared blankly at me as much as to say, “I wonder what that bounder means.”’

  After tense meetings with Alexander, during which he learnt about the latest Japanese advances, Stilwell radioed for two Chinese divisions – 22 and 96 – from the Chinese Fifth Army to come south to help 200 Division, which was defending Taungoo. This message illustrates the problems over the powers of command that had been so readily promised him by Chiang. As Chief of Staff he had direct access to Chiang, but during the fighting in Burma his orders went through General Lo, who was commander of the Chinese Expeditionary Force. When Stilwell gave orders in the field General Lo, as well as the army and divisional commanders, would pick and choose which to accept. In addition, Chiang had a personal representative at Lashio who decided what information should be passed on to Chiang, who, significantly, was referred to as ‘Generalissimo’. Stilwell discovered later that Chiang, with his philosophy of refusing to attack, was in the habit of directly countermanding orders he had given so as to conserve his divisions.

  Chiang’s chicanery and double-dealing are further illustrated by a conversation Dorman-Smith had with the Chinese General Tu, who said, ‘The American general only thinks he is commanding. In fact he is doing no such thing. You see, we Chinese think that the only way to keep the Americans in the war is to give them a few commands on paper. They will not do much harm as long as we do the work.’

  After his visit to Maymyo, Stilwell was able to assess his real situation. He had been given command of two Chinese armies, the Fifth and the Sixth. The Sixth, with three divisions, occupied an area in the Shan states along the eastern border of Burma with Thailand and the Chinese province of Yunnan. The Fifth Army also had three divisions – 96, 22 and 200 – which were stretched more widely. 200 Division faced the Japanese at Taungoo, 22 Division was based on Lashio, and 96 Division was stationed further north in Chinese territory east of Myitkyina. A Chinese division consisted of about 8,000 men, but this included one-third who were porters and carriers. The troops were armed with rifles and light machine guns, with a few mortars but almost no artillery. There were no medical services and motor transport was non-existent.

  Having been briefed as fully as possible at Maymyo, Stilwell flew back to Chungking on 18 March for discussions with Chiang, ‘the stubborn bugger’, who appeared to give approval to Stilwell’s proposal to move two divisions of the Fifth Army – 22 and 96 – southwards to assist 200 Division, and also to move part of the Sixth Army towards Maymyo. He left this interview feeling ‘It’s pretty bad but maybe it will get better. All I can do is try.’ He added, ‘The Chinese accept my Status, which is close to a miracle, since it is the first time in modern history that a foreigner has commanded Chinese troops.’ After these discussions he wrote a memo. He had argued that if the three divisions of the Fifth Army were concentrated at Taungoo, the Japanese could be halted or even defeated. Chiang had strongly countered this, arguing that Mandalay was the key to the defence of Burma. Two divisions must be held back for its protection, and if necessary 200 Division must be sacrificed at Taungoo. Chiang stated clearly that five Chinese divisions were needed for a successful attack. In a significant comment Stilwell wrote:

  This was the doctrine that the Chinese Army was saturated with: with the G-mo [Generalissimo] giving such a lead, the fearful and the incompetent always had a good reason for retreat … The G-mo gave me further instructions in psychology and tactics, and told me that if I would observe him and listen for only six months, I could myself learn something of both arts.

  He returned to Maymyo on 22 March to take command of the Chinese forces that faced the rapidly advancing Japanese.

  CHAPTER 4

  The Retreat from Burma

  By 23 March 1942 Stilwell was back in Maymyo, desperately trying to organise the defence of Taungoo against a strong Japanese attack. He was attempting to arrange for 22 Division from the Fifth Army and 55 Division from the Sixth Army to advance and support 200 Division fighting effectively around Taungoo, but by the next day the Japanese had already advanced north of the town.

  As the fighting continued around Taungoo, Slim was carrying out a similar rearguard action near Prome, almost directly to the west. Slim, like Stilwell a tough fighting commander, sent a strong force from 17 Indian Division and 7 Armoured Brigade – which he could ill afford to do without – to assist Stilwell at Taungoo. These suffered heavy losses without achieving much, but Slim never complained. He became the one British commander whom Stilwell liked and respected. When things were going badly for Slim in the fighting around Magwe, Stilwell sent the Chinese 38 Division under General Sun to assist. This division had hurriedly come down the Burma Road from Yunnan and, under the command of Sun, who had been trained at the Virginia Military Institute, proved itself to be one of the best Chinese divisions in the campaign.

  During these frantic days of trying to stem the Japanese advance Stilwell, who remained convinced that the concentration of three divisions at Taungoo could have halted the Japanese, was constantly frustrated by the attitudes and the dithering of the Chinese army and its divisi
onal commanders. General Tu, GOC of the Fifth Army, made one excuse after another. He was highly temperamental, and in a fit of depression he would shut himself away and refuse to speak to anyone. General Liao, commander of 22 Division, which could have saved the day at Taungoo, made one trivial excuse after another to prevent his division from advancing. Stilwell later discovered that these commanders had secretly corresponded with Chiang, who advised them not to commit their divisions too heavily. Stilwell’s seething frustration shows up in his comments:

  The basic cause is Chiang Kai Shek’s refusal to let me concentrate at Pyinmana [a village just to the north of Taungoo]. Everything trails from that and the delay by Chiang Kai-Shek of the 22nd at Mandalay. Some bastard at Pyinmana stopped the move … to think that a victory can be compromised by a goddam slip on the railroad … Christ. The mental load on a commander who has strings tied to him.

  At Taungoo 200 Division continued to fight bravely until 30 March, and for the last three days of fighting Stilwell suffered even further frustrations as the Chinese generals prevented any effective movement. Every day they came up with new excuses for not attacking. Stilwell considered resigning because he could not command troops that would not attack. He had a showdown with Chiang about General Tu, but this achieved nothing. On the 28th he went back to Maymyo to meet Alexander and to communicate with Chiang, who had now agreed to Alexander having overall command in Burma. In Maymyo Stilwell learnt that the few remaining Royal Air Force units, which were heavily outnumbered by the Japanese, had withdrawn from Burma altogether, and the rest of the retreat from Burma was conducted with no air support at all. In Maymyo he got hold of Tu and once more tried to force some action. Tu agreed to attack the next day but thought they had lost the opportunity! The next day came: