Stilwell the Patriot

by David Rooney

  Very sincerely your friend,

  HENRY L. STIMSON

  6 January 1943

  Stilwell’s overall frustration can be seen in his comment when Roosevelt replied to the news that Chiang had refused his support for a Chinese advance from Yunnan. ‘F.D.R. comes back at Peanut. “Why didn’t you wait. I told you I was about to dicker with Churchill. For Christ’s sake hold your horses.”’

  CHAPTER 7

  1943: More Frustration

  During the Christmas break and into the New Year of 1943 Stilwell had a little time to ponder over the wider issues which were likely to impinge upon him. He knew that Madame was in Washington criticising him and supporting Chennault, and he knew that preparations were being made for a high-level conference early in the New Year – and he worried. Stuck in Chungking in the suffocating atmosphere of the manure pile, he eagerly sought news from the outside world.

  After seeing a Russian war film with shots of Stalingrad he wrote:

  What a fight the Russians have made … Tough physique; unity of purpose; pride in their accomplishments; determination to win Rugged young soldiers. Tough women. Every last man, woman and child in the war effort.

  Compare it with the Chinese cess-pool. A gang of thugs with one idea of perpetuating themselves. Money, influence, position, the only considerations. Intrigue, double-crossing; lying reports. Hands out for anything they can get; their only idea to let someone else do the fighting.

  He went on by observing that the indifference, cowardice, ignorance and stupidity of the leaders continued because of the dumb compliance of the common people. And America supported ‘this rotten regime and glorifies its figurehead, the all-wise great patriot and soldier – Peanut. My God.’

  Madame had arrived in the USA in November 1942 where, urged on by the missionary and China lobby, she quickly created a wave of emotional and sentimental support. She stayed at the White House. She addressed Congress and emphasised that it was more important to defeat Japan than Germany and that it would be achieved by the two great allies together. Listening to her tough Congressmen were nearly reduced to tears, but the British ambassador was slightly concerned when, in the emotional atmosphere, she expressed the hope that after the war all the lost territory would be returned to China – including Hong Kong. She came from a patrician family and objected to the term ‘Madame’, knowing that it could refer to the manager of a brothel. Her hosts quickly reassured her that it was how Queen Elizabeth (the wife of George VI) was addressed. This she accepted, gulping down flattery as usual. However, her arrogant and autocratic attitude, hidden at first, gradually disenchanted her generous hosts, and after several months they were eager for her to leave, which she did in May 1943.*

  The impact she made was useful to Roosevelt, who, at the end of 1942, was considering his global strategy before meeting Churchill at Casablanca in January 1943. Roosevelt based his policy on keeping China in the war and co-operating with her as one of the Big Four in the post-war world. Reflecting the deep American distrust of Communism, Roosevelt hoped that after the war Chiang Kai-Shek would be strong enough to defeat the Communists under Mao Tse-Tung and to curb any Russian intrusion in eastern Asia. In American eyes, Chiang was the only leader likely to be able to unite China and should in the future become a major ally of America in Asia and the Pacific. Roosevelt wanted to believe this and to some extent deluded himself since, apart from Stilwell’s, there were other reports from China that painted a realistic picture of the corruption, graft and general rottenness of Chiang’s Kuomintang regime.

  The Casablanca Conference in January 1943 was one of the most significant of the wartime meetings between Roosevelt and Churchill, though today it is not so well remembered as as the film Casablanca with Humphrey Bogart and Ingrid Bergman, which was being made at the same time. The two leaders agreed on the demand for unconditional surrender from Germany and Japan, on a second-front attack on fortress Europe in the summer of 1944 and on continuation of the massive bombing of Germany.

  After these decisions were made, attention centred on South East Asia. In the high policy discussions there was strong support for Anakim, the amphibious assault on Rangoon that was much favoured by Chiang. Linked to this was the belief that if Japan could be attacked from airfields in southwest China, and if that was backed up by a large-scale Chinese military attack, this would be the most effective use of American power. Even Marshall went so far as to suggest that, if Anakim did not go ahead, the USA might transfer its main thrust away from Europe to the Far East. The change in the general slant of top-level opinion boded ill for Stilwell and favoured Chennault. It was embarrassing for the Washington administration that, although Roosevelt saw China as one of the Big Four, Chiang was not present at Casablanca.

  To mollify Chiang, a very high powered delegation that included General Hap Arnold and Field Marshal Sir John Dill left for Chungking as soon as the Conference was over. They went first to Delhi, where they met with Wavell and Stilwell. It was agreed that in the proposed 1943 attack Stilwell’s forces would initially come under Wavell’s command, but that when they linked up with Yoke Force – which was to be led by Chiang himself – all Chinese troops would come under his command. Before Stilwell came to this meeting he had an interview with Chiang, of which he wrote: ‘Date with G-mo at 5. He was sour as a pickle. Never one word of gratitude to the U.S. Just what he can get out of us.’ Stilwell returned with the delegation to Chungking. Chiang was difficult and withdrew to what Stilwell called ‘Peanut’s Berchtesgaden’. He was pleased to record that Arnold and Dill had had their eyes opened and said that he, Stilwell, should be awarded a laurel wreath. Arnold promised Chiang a generous increase in supplies over the Hump. Central to this issue was the fundamental clash between Stilwell and Chennault and Chiang’s demand for Chennault to be independent of Stilwell. The Chinese airforce was in absolute chaos, yet Chiang and Chennault merely demanded more and more supplies. Chiang’s reaction to Arnold’s promises was uncompromising. ‘Tell your President that unless I get these things I cannot fight this war and he cannot count on me to have our army participate in the campaign.’ Afterwards Arnold said to Stilwell, ‘I’ll be God-damned if I take any such message back to the President.’ Stilwell too stepped up the tension when he asked Chiang whether he would attack with Yoke Force even if the naval forces he had stipulated were not available in the Bay of Bengal. Chiang was furious with Stilwell for embarrassing him publicly, but Stilwell merely wrote: ‘He can go to hell. I have him on that point. Arnold and Dill got a faint idea of conditions here and it made them sick.’

  After the visit by the top brass to Chungking, a further conference was held in Calcutta in February 1943, with Soong, Stilwell, Arnold, Wavell and Dill in attendance. This achieved little except for the agreement that a major campaign in north Burma – with the British advancing from Imphal, Stilwell and his Chinese divisions from Ledo and Yoke Force from Yunnan – would start in November. At the same time on the diplomatic front, agreements were published which dealt with old treaty rights and the recovery of China’s lost territory Chiang made much of this, claiming that it put China on an equal footing with the USA and Britain. Stilwell soon began to realise that these conferences had weakened his position and gave considerable encouragement to Chennault and those who supported him in Washington. Roosevelt tended to listen to highly coloured reports by people who had made a brief visit to Chungking, and he had been taken in by Madame’s charm and determination. Some of the reports were highly critical of Stilwell as an old infantryman bogged down in outdated attitudes who could not conceive of the significance of air power. It was argued that he had committed America to a difficult and dangerous campaign of ground attack in Burma when there was a brilliant and easy option in the form of attack from the air under Chennault. It is not difficult to see which option would appeal to a politician.

  In the lengthy discussions on China policy that were held at this time, although Marshall, Arnold and Stimson remained loyal to Stilwel
l, a pro-Chennault group, which included Wendell Willkie and Roosevelt’s adviser Harry Hopkins, had the ear of the President and he overruled the decision of his military advisers. In a lengthy letter of 19 February 1943 he maintained that Stilwell was tackling Chiang in the wrong way and that one could not speak sternly to the leader of 400 million people. The main thing to consider was the strategic significance of Chennault’s air forces. Roosevelt insisted that Chennault should have complete control over his operations and tactics. Marshall replied to the President point by point and reiterated his faith in Stilwell’s judgement. In particular he gave a serious warning that if Chennault’s raiders really started to hurt the Japanese there would be swift retaliation from Japanese ground forces, who would quickly overrun the Chinese airfields, and the Chinese army – ‘underfed, unpaid, untrained, neglected, and rotten with corruption’ – would be powerless to stop them. These words had ominous significance for the future.

  After the President’s letter Stilwell’s difficulties increased. The supplies transported over the Hump averaged 3,000 tons per month, and this led to constant disputes with Chennault. One achievement of this period was the establishment of artillery and infantry training schools and the appointment of General Chen to command Yoke Force. Even here the rivalry of local commanders could obstruct and sometimes sabotage progress, and when the schools were established the Chinese soldiers were in such a deplorable state that they could not undertake the training, divisional commanders sent only half the officers they had promised, and those officers who did attend rarely took the training seriously. The only progress during this period came in the construction of airfields, which Chiang gave vigorous support in the hope that his airforce would enjoy a rapid build-up.

  As the wider strategic issues were considered, two significant statements were made in January 1943. Stilwell sent Chiang a memorandum stressing that there was now an opportunity to make China strong and safe and that it should be seized enthusiastically while the supply of American weapons was available. If the plan to equip and train thirty divisions went ahead successfully, it would provide the basis for a further request for another group of thirty. It should only take a few months to turn the first thirty divisions into an efficient field force. Stilwell concluded that without such a scenario it would be difficult to ensure continuing support for the supply of weapons.* This general statement was backed up by detailed plans to step up the training of two divisions at Ramgarh; to prepare the base at Ledo and push on with the start of the road from there to Myitkyina; to establish training schools especially for artillery; and to hasten the establishment of Yoke Force.

  While Stilwell was trying to build up the Chinese forces, Chiang sent a letter to Roosevelt which, essentially, undermined all Stilwell’s efforts. While emphasising the importance of defeating Japan on the mainland of Asia, Chiang argued that a part of any attack by the Allies must be an amphibious assault on Rangoon, and he added significantly that ‘if the navy is unable to control the Burma seas it would be better to wait a few months longer’. Knowing that there was growing support in Washington for Chennault’s thesis – notably from Harry Hopkins – Chiang wrote of the significance of air power fitting in with the grand strategy of the United Nations.

  While these discussions took place, and while Stilwell fulminated against the Chinese and the British for letting him down and pulling back from action, a small and hardly noticed event took place which ultimately was to impinge dramatically on Stilwell and the whole campaign in northern Burma. A few months previously a remarkable British officer, Colonel Orde Wingate, had put forward the idea of long-range penetration, a revolutionary idea that depended on control of the air in the battle area.

  Wingate had arrived in Burma just before the retreat, and he had met Mike Calvert at the Bush Warfare School at Maymyo near Mandalay. This school had been established to train guerrilla fighters not for the British army, but to go into China and assist Chiang’s fight against the Japanese. As the retreat started Wingate flew up to Chungking to discuss guerrilla issues with Chiang, and then he returned to GHQ in Delhi. Wingate was a brilliant but difficult and abrasive character who, before the war, while serving as a captain in Palestine, had antagonised much of the British army establishment by setting up the Jewish Night Squads and passionately supporting the Zionist cause. After the war started, and strongly backed by Wavell, then commanding in the Middle East, Wingate was appointed to lead a guerrilla-type force in the campaign to restore Haile Selassie in Abyssinia. Wavell was then posted to India, and that was when he called Wingate, as a colonel, to organise guerrilla groups behind the Japanese lines.

  Thus, in July 1942 at GHQ Delhi, Wingate addressed a conference of senior officers, including representatives of Chiang Kai-Shek and the Kuomintang, and put forward his theory of long-range penetration. The idea was simple: to infiltrate a unit of up to brigade strength behind Japanese lines and supply it entirely by air. The unit, organised in columns of about 200 men and operating independently, would range widely through the jungle destroying railways, roads, telegraph lines, stores and ammunition dumps and ambushing enemy transport. These units, later known as the Chindits, would have to be trained to a very high standard of physical fitness and jungle fighting and would need top class map-reading skills and wireless communication since their very existence would depend on accurate supply drops in the jungle.

  Among the senior officers at GHQ a few thought Wingate was brilliant, most thought his scheme would not work, and some – nurturing their antagonism – said he was insane, but Wavell supported him, and in August 1942 a Chindit training base was established. We have seen how the plans to recapture north Burma fluctuated wildly depending on the influence of pressure groups in Washington or Chungking or on the capricious decisions of Chiang, but the basic plan remained: that at the earliest opportunity the British would advance from Imphal, Stilwell and his Chinese divisions would advance southwards from Ledo towards Myitkyina, and Yoke Force would move in from Yunnan. It was on this assumption that the first Chindit expedition was organised, so that as the Japanese faced three assaults from west, north and east their supplies and communications would be attacked and destroyed by the Chindits operating in an area up to 100 miles east of Imphal. Their main target would be the rail, road and telegraph communications running north to the Japanese divisions facing Ledo and those facing British positions in Imphal.

  While final preparations were being made for the launch of the Chindit: operation, code named Longcloth, Stilwell went through a period of acute frustration. He wrote almost despairingly about conditions in China. He believed that the Sixtieth Army, which would be crucial to Yoke Force, would not accept orders to move because the senior officers were heavily involved in the lucrative opium trade. To make matters worse, huge stocks of petrol, clothing and weapons were being hoarded or sold on a thriving black market, the Chinese Red Cross was just a racket, with rampant theft and sale of medicines, and thousands of soldiers were suffering from malnutrition because senior officers kept their pay and the money provided for their food. ‘A pretty picture,’ wrote Stilwell.

  The first Chindit campaign may not appear directly relevant to Stilwell’s situation, but the Chindits were later to feature largely in his final campaign, and the story of how they emerged from the jungle and were catapulted to the attention of Marshall and Arnold, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Trident Conference in Quebec is a colourful illustration of the amazing fortunes of war.

  Wingate and his ideas were fiercely opposed by most establishment figures in the British and Indian armies, and especially at GHQ in Delhi. This did not deter him. He set up a fearsome training programme, such that one Chindit officer commented later that after Wingate’s training the campaign was a piece of cake. Thus, in the face of immense difficulties Wingate had the Chindits ready for action by the end of 1942, He was supported by General Scoones, the corps commander at Imphal, and in January 1943 77 Brigade, personally commanded by Wingate, moved up to Imph
al ready for operation.

  On 5 February, when the Chindits were all keyed up and ready to go, Wavell went to see Wingate in Imphal to tell him that the British were not ready to advance from Imphal, Stilwell and his Chinese divisions were not ready in Ledo, and Chiang had announced that Yoke Force was not going to move. Wavell pointed out that if the Chindits went ahead with their operation the Japanese, instead of defending themselves against three large-scale attacks, would be able to bring their whole power to bear on destroying the Chindits. Wingate had brought his force to a high pitch of readiness and he knew that his detractors, sitting at their desks in Delhi, would be pleased if the whole thing was cancelled, and he therefore convinced Wavell that despite the increased danger the operation should go ahead. This was a good example of how high-level decision – or lack of it – can impact on troops in action. Fully aware of the considerable risk Wingate, supported by all his officers, completed his final preparations and on 13 February 1943 the first Chindit units infiltrated into the jungle, achieving almost total surprise.

  In spite of their rigorous training, the Chindits were embarking on a totally new form of warfare and had to learn costly lessons. They had practised river crossing, but they were ill-prepared for rivers like the Chindwin and the Irrawaddy, which were nearly a mile wide. Their mules were inadequately trained, and the burden imposed by intelligence and signals was overwhelming. Two columns under Mike Calvert and Bernard Fergusson made successful attacks at Nankan and Bonchaung gorge, which destroyed the railway from Mandalay to Myitkyina. These attacks, together with others on roads and bridges and the ambush of military convoys, wrecked the supply line to the Japanese divisions that faced Stilwell in the north and those facing Imphal. In addition to these successes, the Chindits learnt valuable lessons about every aspect of long-range penetration and the problems of supplying large mobile units behind enemy lines in the jungle.