Alexanders Heirs

by Edward M. Anson

  42 Determining rates of inflation from the fifth through the fourth centuries is mostly guesswork, and while there are certain indications that it was high in the very early Hellenistic period, mercenary pay appears to have remained remarkably constant over the years (Loomis 1998: 241–2; Trundle 2004: 91–8). Of course, there were additional forms of remuneration besides regular pay, such as bonuses and plunder (Trundle

  2004: 42–4, 166).

  43 For the date, see Beloch 1967: 139–40; Sealey 1960: 185–6.

  44 Even though the charge of bribery appears clear, Demosthenes had and has his defenders.

  See Paus. 2.33.2, Worthington 1985: 229–33.

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  Alexander’s Heirs

  45 On the chronology, see Mitchel 1964: 16. Worthington (1984: 142–4) argues, however, that Diodorus has confused the chronology (certainly always a possibility, see Anson 1986; 2002/3) and that Leosthenes’ first approach to the Aetolians came only after the failure of their embassy to Alexander regarding Samos (142). His argument is that secret diplomacy was impossible in Athens (see following note).

  46 Worthington (1984: 141–2) argues that such “secret” diplomacy was illegal and consequently did not take place. However, Cloché (1921) concluded that the council on

  occasion did engage in just such diplomacy. The Boulé controlled the access of foreign ambassadors to the assembly and most often selected the envoys who departed to

  foreign states on behalf of the Athenian government (Briant 1968).

  47 Alexander once, when wounded, proclaimed that it was blood, not ichor, that flowed from his body (Plut. Alex. 28.3).

  48 Later, Perdiccas in the name of the kings would confirm Alexander’s decision (Diod.

  18.18.9).

  49 The authenticity of this letter has been challenged (Rosen 1978: 20–5), but see Hamilton (1953: 151–5), who presents a convincing argument for acceptance.

  50 On the Rhodians’ often precarious independence, see van Dessel and Hauben 1977: 316–39; Berthold 1984: 36–199.

  51 In a later battle, in which the Aetolian contingent was not present, the allied army consisted of 22,000 infantry (Diod. 18.15.2).

  52 Two battles: Habicht 1997: 39; three battles: Morrison 1987: 93–6; Walek 1924: 28.

  53 The Parian Marble, however, is not always accurate in its datings: see Anson 1986: 211–12; Bosworth 2002: 226.

  54 Bosworth insists that Diodorus is not summarizing the entire war at sea, but only the hostilities “in a single area at a single time.” He accepts Diodorus’ placement of these battles in the Ionian Sea off the Echinades islands, arguing that these involved another theater of the war that to secure Oeniadae from the Aetolians. This is unlikely.

  Everything points to a naval war in the Aegean. The inscriptions refer to the Hellespont, Antipater was trapped in Thessaly; all the land battles occur in eastern Greece; there is an attack on Attica carried out by Antipater’s admiral (Plut Phoc. 25.1–4); the major sea battle of the war is at Amorgus in the eastern Aegean.

  55 On Eumenes’ early career, see Anson 2004: 35–49.

  56 Ariarathes in 322 is found in total control of Cappadocia (Diod. 18.16.1–3; 22.1; Arr.

  Succ. 1a.11; Just. 13.6.1–3; Plut. Eum. 3.4).

  57 5000 talents amounted to 30 million drachma. If a mercenary was paid at a rate of even 2

  drachma per day, 40,000 could be employed for a full year. Cyrus paid in 401 what then appeared an exorbitant sum of 30 drachma (1½ darics) a month (Xen. Anab. 1.3.21), which is about twice the average during the Hellenistic age (Griffith 1935: 296–301).

  58 The treasury at Pasargadae in Media contained 6000 talents (Curt. 5.6.9); that in Cyinda, perhaps 20,000 (cf. Diod. 19.56.5); that in Susa, almost 50,000 (Arr. Anab. 3.16.7); that in Persepolis, 120,000 (Curt. 5.6.9; Diod. 17.71.1). Additional y, there were similar resources in Babylon and Ecbatana.

  59 See Anson 1992: 40 for this conclusion. Carney (1995: 372–4) and Meeus (2009b: 301–2) believe that she was given the “regal status” (their interpretation of prostasia in this context) she had enjoyed during Alexander’s lifetime, but the term used is the formal prostasia.

  60 Of course, if the letters from Cleopatra had arrived very early, then the acquisition of Hellespontine Phrygia would have been desired as the springboard for an invasion

  The Death of a Conqueror

  45

  of Macedonia. However, the distribution of the satrapies occurred so soon after

  Alexander’s death that it would have been impossible for the offer from Cleopatra to have arrived in time. Under the circumstances in the end it was an unforeseen boon.

  61 Triremes were three-banked, rowed, warships, while quadriremes, although only two-decked, contained more rowers and were heavier ships. See Morrison (1987),

  who argues for the lower number of effective ships and the overwhelming majority

  quadriremes; Ashton (1977) for the higher figure for the total and a predominance of triremes. Diodorus (18.2.2) cal s all 110 of Antipater’s vessels triremes. The records of the Athenian naval curators, who each year presented an accounting of the ships

  available for service, show that in 324 there were available more than 400 warships of various sizes ( IG II2 1629.783–812). However, there were insufficient crews to man al of these (Bosworth 2003: 14–15).

  62 Including myself (Anson 2004: 74).

  63 The Athenian navy was apparently even after its defeat still a formidable force, since it was still able to engage the Macedonian fleet under Cleitus later in the eastern Aegean.

  64 Bosworth (2003: 17) believes that the Aetolians left to defend Oeniadae from a Macedonian naval assault, but see the following note.

  65 Morrison (1987: 95), while postulating that Diodorus’ reference to Echinades islands meant those off the northern coast of the Malian Gulf and not those in the Ionian Sea, inaccurately places this engagement before those in the Hellespont or at Amorgus.

  66 That Antipater sent these colonists to Thrace should not be seen as evidence that Antipater enjoyed supervisory authority over Lysimachus in Thrace. See Meeus (2008: 65–6) for a refutation of such assumptions. It is also unknown how many actual y

  accepted the offer of new homes in Thrace. Williams’ (1985: 112) claim that Athens now lost one-third of its population, followed by Green (2003: 2), seems much inflated (Tritle 1988: 133; Habicht 1997: 44–5).

  3

  The Funeral Games Begin

  These rebellions by Greeks both in the homeland and in the outer reaches of the

  empire were but preliminaries for the coming struggles between Alexander’s

  former lieutenants. The empire had been built out of war and would splinter in

  the wars of Alexander’s Successors, the Diadochs. Alexander was reported to have

  said, when asked to whom did he leave his empire, “To the strongest” (Arr. Anab.

  7.26.3; Diod. 17.117.4).1 This is clearly one of those prophecies issued after the events have occurred, but like so many such after-the-fact, apocryphal utterances it summarizes the events that followed Alexander’s death quite accurately. Mary

  Renault titled her novel based on the death of Alexander and its aftermath Funeral Games (1981), and, indeed, these years do seem to be a long-drawn-out sacrifice to the memory of the dead conqueror.

  While Craterus was moving north to go to the aid of Alexander’s old regent in

  Macedonia, Perdiccas, with the col apse of his proposed Cappadocian campaign,

  gathered the bulk of the royal army and prepared to march west to install Eumenes in his satrapy. Leonnatus had moved to Macedonia where, instead of kingship, he

  found death. Antigonus, apparently without explanation, simply failed to provide

  assistance to Eumenes. The exact reasons for this refusal can only be surmised. It has been suggested that Antigonus may not have accepted the decisions in Babylon

  as binding (Billows 1990: 57); he may not have wished to help esta
blish a potential rival in Asia Minor, or, he may have believed that Ariarathes’ power had been

  seriously underestimated. Ariarathes in 322 was able to field an army of 30,000

  infantry and 15,000 cavalry (Diod. 18.16.2), and in the final analysis it took

  Perdiccas and the grand army two battles to defeat this force (Arr. Succ. 1a.11).

  This new satrapy could also be seen as limiting the power of Antigonus in Asia

  Minor,2 as it was hoped the association of Cleomenes with Ptolemy would

  accomplish with respect to the latter in Egypt (Anson 1988a: 476; Billows 1990:

  57). During the period from the Battle of Issus and the Persian attempt to retake Asia Minor in 333 to Alexander’s death in 323, Antigonus and Ariarathes maintained at least a de facto peace. There is no record of open hostilities between

  them, and the two may have simply agreed to leave one another alone. The creation Alexander’s Heirs: The Age of the Successors, First Edition. Edward M. Anson.

  © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2014 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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  Alexander’s Heirs

  of Eumenes’ satrapy would certainly upset what had been for ten years the status

  quo in Asia Minor. It is still remarkable that Antigonus would not have at least put in the semblance of an appearance. Perdiccas represented the legitimate authority as the regent for the kings, and had control of the royal army. It would have taken omniscience to know that there would be in the future a breach between Antipater

  and Perdiccas that would save the reluctant satrap. It may simply be the case that Antigonus’ pride was hurt (Billows 1990: 56–8). He had not been consulted in any

  of the major decisions reached in Babylon. He was simply to accept the decisions

  and implement orders from Babylon. One of the great testimonies to Alexander’s

  ability as a leader was his skill in keeping control of what was an elite corps of aristocrats whose class prior to Philip II had most often controlled Macedonia.

  It is very likely that without Alexander many of these individuals began dreaming of that previous age.

  Back in Babylon, Eumenes was made a member of Perdiccas’ council (Plut.

  Eum. 3.12), and with the regent he returned to Asia Minor in the summer of 322.3

  In Cappadocia, Ariarathes waited with his considerable forces; many of these

  troops were mercenaries (Diod. 18.16.2), perhaps Greeks, who had served Darius

  and who had escaped from the defeat at Issus (cf. Curt. 4.1.34–5). The presence

  of these mercenaries certainly made the task more difficult than Perdiccas had

  imagined, for it took two battles before the Cappadocian king was defeated (Arr.

  Succ. 1a.11).4 Ariarathes was captured and, along with numbers of his relatives, tortured, and executed (Diod. 18.16.3; App. Mith. 2.8).5 After the second victory Neoptolemus, a former hypaspist commander, was dispatched with part of the

  grand army to pursue the eastward-escaping Cappadocians and to take charge of

  his province of western Armenia (cf. Plut. Eum. 4.1).6

  After Cappadocia was subjugated, Eumenes was given full authority by the

  regent to appoint his friends ( philoi) to positions of authority in the cities, as judges, garrison commanders, and treasurers (Plut. Eum. 3.14). The administration of the satrapies under the Diadochs continued many of the practices of Persian

  administration which had likewise been followed in the main by Alexander (Briant

  1972: 44–5; 2002: 66–7). Alexander often divided responsibilities within the satrapy between the administrative office of satrap, garrison commanders, and treasurers.

  An example of Alexander’s policy is seen in the case of Lydia. Alexander assigned the satrapy to Asander, while Pausanias was left in charge of the citadel of the capital Sardis with a garrison, and Nicias was to supervise the finances and the collection of tribute (Arr. Anab. 1.17.7–8). While Alexander may have made these distinc-tions more pronounced than had his Achaemenid predecessors, it appears likely

  that the Persians had also practiced such separation of responsibilities, although, perhaps, with the satrap exercising greater supervisory authority (Anson 2013b:

  142–3). Perdiccas apparently retained many of these separate jurisdictions estab lished by Alexander. For example, Xenophilus was appointed commander of the citadel of

  Susa by Alexander (Curt. 5.2.16), and he was still in command of the citadel in 316

  (Diod. 19.17.3). However, as in the case of Eumenes, Perdiccas may also have given broad authority to the satraps currently being appointed to regions outside of

  The Funeral Games Begin

  49

  Alexander’s conquests, or to those who were to supervise areas that had rebelled

  and were now being reacquired. Eumenes was left entirely in charge of his satrapy, while Perdiccas and the royal army proceeded to Cilicia.

  It would have been fall before Perdiccas left Cappadocia for Cilicia (Plut. Eum.

  3.14–4.1; Diod. 18.22.1). While in Cilicia Perdiccas secured the allegiance of

  Alexander’s former infantry guard, the 3000 hypaspists/argyraspids. These troops

  had been separated by Alexander from the main force at Opis and sent west with

  Craterus in 324. When Craterus departed Cilicia to join Antipater in Macedonia

  (Diod. 18.16.4), he had left these troops behind along with others to maintain

  order and to guard the treasury at Cyinda.7 Here, Perdiccas spent the winter of

  322/1.8 In winter quarters, Perdiccas and his advisors began to make plans for the coming year. The regent’s presence in Cilicia gave him access to the royal treasury and a prosperous land in which to refresh his troops (cf. Xen. Anab. 1.2.22). At this time Perdiccas’ intentions were to secure unquestioned control of Asia Minor for

  the empire. Neoptolemus was campaigning in Armenia, and the regent planned

  to attack the rebels in Pisidia in the spring. While Perdiccas certainly wished to achieve greater cohesion in the empire, there is no evidence that he contemplated challenging Ptolemy in Egypt or Antipater in Europe at this time. Indeed, Perdiccas demonstrated no apparent interest in the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia. If he

  had expected to invade Macedonia or to be attacked from Europe, he would

  have paid closer attention to this province. Since the departure of Leonnatus for Macedonia, there had not been a satrap in this region. At this point in time there was no movement to break up the empire or to divide it into a European part and

  a non-European one (Meeus 2008: 80–1).

  Perdiccas, as part of his general campaign in Asia Minor, in the spring moved

  to secure Pisidia, where two cities continued to resist Macedonian authority,

  those of the Larandians and of the Isaurians (Diod. 18.22.1). These people had

  murdered the Cilician satrap Balacrus sometime late in Alexander’s reign (Diod.

  18.22.1; cf. Arr. Anab. 2.12.2). There were, indeed, many regions in Asia Minor that had resisted Macedonian conquest and that remained independent during

  the long wars among Alexander’s Successors. By 302, much of the area along the

  southern Black Sea coast had become the kingdom of Pontus under Mithridates

  Ktistes, a descendant of a noble Persian family (Diod. 20.111.4; Plut. Demetr. 4; App. Mith. 9; McGing 1986: 15). Armenia remained under the control of the family of Orontes, another prominent Persian (Heckel 2006: 185), in spite of

  Neoptolemus’ activities in the region. Whatever Neoptolemus’ authority was

  and however much of the region was ostensibly under his control, this authority

  ended with Neoptolemus’ death in 320. Zipoetes maintained his power in

  Bithynia also throughout this period, even though he was likely forced to enter

  into an alliance with Antigonus and surrender hostages during the ca
mpaign of

  Antigonus’ nephew, Polemaeus,9 in 314 (Diod. 19.60.3). His kingdom remained

  independent for two centuries (Memn. FGrH 434 F-1 12.4–5; Billows 1990:

  440–2). Cappadocia, while made part of the Macedonian sphere in 322 after the

  defeat of Ariarathes and the installation of Eumenes as satrap, would also later

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  Alexander’s Heirs

  emerge as another independent principality under a descendant also named

  Ariarathes in the mid-third century bc (Diod. 31.19.5).10

  As noted, Neoptolemus had been sent to western Armenia with a sizable force

  of Macedonians immediately after the defeat of Ariarathes (Plut. Eum. 4; cf. Diod.

  18.29.4). The pacification of this region was critical to the security of Cappadocia, controlling as it did the main lines of communication, including the Royal Road,

  the great Persian highway connecting Persepolis and Susa in the east to Sardis

  in Lydia (Cook 1983: 26, 108). While the sources report Mithrenes, a Persian

  nobleman, was appointed satrap of Armenia by Alexander (Arr. Anab. 3.16.5; Diod. 17.64.6; Curt. 5.1.44; Str. 11.14.15), and Curtius (6.3.3) reports that Armenia was acquired by the Macedonians, Justin (38.7) has a later ruler of the area proclaim in a speech that Armenia was never conquered by the Macedonians. Since Orontes,

  the holder of that office under Darius III (Bosworth 1980b: 315; Heckel 2006: 185), is later found in lawful possession of Armenia in 316 bc (Diod. 19.23.3), and

  Mithrenes disappears from the historical record, it is possible that Mithrenes was never able to take possession (Anson 1990: 125–6). He may have died in the attempt.

  Indeed, it appears that at some point after Alexander’s victory at Gaugamela in 331, Orontes made his submission to the Macedonian king, who later reassigned him

  to Greater Armenia (Bosworth 1980b: 315; Anson 1990: 125–6). Western Armenia

  in all probability remained outside of both Orontes’ and Macedonian control (see

  Anson 1990: 127), and may even have been annexed by Ariarathes.