Alexanders Heirs
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and Arrhidaeus abdicated in favor of Antipater, who was not present, but near
(Arr. Succ. 1a.31–2; Diod. 18.39.1–2). The new arrangement worked for a short period of time, but not for long. When Antipater final y arrived, agitation had
broken out anew. Eurydice was again at its center, but various Perdiccan elements were also present, notably Attalus recently arrived from Tyre (Arr. Succ. 1a.33, 39; cf. Diod. 18.39.3–4). The troops were upset over arrears in pay (Arr. Succ. 1a.32; Polyaen. 4.6.4). In the rioting Antipater was almost killed, but was saved through the intervention of Antigonus, himself only recently returned from Cyprus,
and Seleucus (Arr. Succ. 1a.32–3, 39; Diod. 18.39.4; Polyaen. 4.6.4). Antigonus convinced the soldiers to be patient and that their money would be forthcoming
(Polyaen. 4.6.4). This concern with money is one more example of the increas-
ingly mercenary tendencies of the army serving in Asia. With order restored, an
assembly of the army was called, in which Antipater’s regency was ratified (Diod.
18.39.4; cf. Arr. Succ. 1a.33). The new regent, in concert with the other leaders, distributed the satrapies anew and organized a campaign against the surviving
Perdiccans (Arr. Succ. 1a.35–8; Diod. 18.39.6). Antigonus was given the command of the royal army, consisting of most of Perdiccas’ old forces, the possession of the
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kings, and was to operate in Asia against the remaining Perdiccans (Arr. Succ.
1a.38; Diod. 18.39.7–40.1; Just. 14.1.1). Certain deletions were made from the
force given to Antigonus. Antigenes and 3000 “rebellious Macedonians” (clearly
the argyraspids; see Anson 1981: 118–19) were sent to convey treasure from
Susa to Cilicia (Arr. Succ. 1a.38), ostensibly to help finance the coming campaign, but likely to separate them from the rest of the army; Arrhidaeus was given 1000
Macedonians (cf. Diod. 18.51.1), and presumably certain other commanders
received troops as wel .
Many scholars have questioned Antipater’s grant of such powers to Antigonus
given the latter’s later actions, especial y in light of Antipater’s own suspicions (Diod. 18.39.7) and those of his son Cassander (Arr. Succ. 1a.43). But Antigonus had proven to be loyal, capable, and – at Triparadeisus – a life-saver (Arr. Succ.
1a.33). He had served Antipater well and had requested the command against
Eumenes. Antipater did initial y place certain checks on Antigonus’ authority.
Antigonus’ friend Menander was not reinstated in Lydia (Arr. Succ. 1.37; Diod.
18.39.6), and Cassander was made chiliarch, or second-in-command and attached
to Antigonus (Arr. Succ. 1a.38, 42; Diod. 18.39.7). It is even possible, now with the death of Craterus, that the new regent wished to designate Antigonus as his
successor (Billows 1990: 69–70). Antipater was 76 years old (Suda s. v. Antipater) at this time and did die the very next year. Moreover, initial y the kings were put in Antigonus’ possession (Arr. Succ. 1a.38). While Antipater had many sons, when it did come time to pass on his power, none of them received the regency from their
father. While so many of Alexander’s Successors followed the Conqueror’s lead
and put their personal ambitions ahead of their homeland, Antipater and Craterus
remained loyal Macedonians, their homeland first, their interests second (Anson
2012a; 2013b: 129).
With Perdiccas’ death, their own condemnation by the Macedonian army in
Egypt, and the charge to Antigonus to use the royal army to eliminate them, the
remaining supporters of the former regent faced a very precarious future. While
little is known of the actions of other Perdiccans, Eumenes’ activities are described rather ful y. When he learned of the calamity in Egypt, he informed his men.
Those wishing to leave were given permission (Just. 14.1.1–2). Eumenes, and
likely all who still remained of Perdiccas’ associates, maintained that the regent had been murdered and that the kings had been seized by those disloyal to
Alexander’s family and memory; in short, the remaining Perdiccans were the true
loyalists to the Argead house (cf. Plut. Eum. 8.5, 12). Such a belief was essential to retain the loyalty of their Macedonian troops. In Aeolis, near Mount Ida,
when Eumenes took the horses he needed for his cavalry from the royal herd, he
presented his request as from a legitimate royal official, and gave the overseers a receipt for the number taken (Plut. Eum. 8.5). In the winter of 320/19, again likely reflecting what was occurring elsewhere, when letters were sent into Eumenes’
camp offering a reward of 100 talents and various other honors to whomever
would carry out the death sentence enacted by the army in Egypt, Eumenes’
Macedonians became incensed and designated a thousand of the leading soldiers
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Alexander’s Heirs
as a bodyguard for their commander (Plut. Eum. 8.11; cf. Just. 14.1.9–10).39
Eumenes rewarded his loyal Macedonians by distributing to them “purple caps
and military cloaks,” gifts usual y bestowed by kings on their favorites (Plut. Eum.
8.12). Personal and unit loyalty to a popular commander, along with lingering
ethnic identity and residual ties to the Argead monarchy, would for a time save
the day for the remaining Perdiccans.
Eumenes, however, was careful not to rely exclusively on his legitimist claims.
Soon after the news of the disaster in Egypt reached him, Eumenes had moved
his troops to the Hellespont where he forced the local population to pay them
(Just. 14.1.6; cf. Plut. Eum. 8.5). Later, he plundered territories loyal to his enemies to remunerate his troops.40 Eumenes’ various actions had the desired effect;
his army stood by him in the immediate crisis and he now confidently prepared
for the coming struggle. Eumenes even plundered Hellespontine and western
Phrygia while Antipater and Antigonus were present, but the latter two remained
inactive ( Gothenburg Palimpsest fo. 72r 14–73v 11;41 Plut. Eum. 8.9–11). Eumenes’
operations here brought him into great esteem even among the soldiers of his
enemies, who began to despise their overall commander, Antipater ( Gothenburg
Palimpsest 72r14–73v8), who was reluctant to confront Eumenes.42 Eumenes, on the other hand, actively sought an engagement with Antipater on the plains of
Lydia, where he could use his cavalry to good advantage. His activity, along with the inactivity of his enemies, raised his standing among his Macedonians, but a
victory over the new regent would have not only solidified this standing even
further, but likely would have brought most of Asia Minor under his authority,
with his legitimacy confirmed by victory.
Without a victory, such as that achieved against Craterus and Neoptolemus,
Eumenes had to seek legitimacy elsewhere. Eumenes went to Sardis to try to gain
Cleopatra’s active support (Arr. Succ. 1.40; Plut. Eum. 8.6; Just. 14.1.7–8). But, with Antipater so near, Cleopatra requested that Eumenes withdraw (Plut. Eum. 8.7; Arr.
Succ. 1a.40; Just. 14.1.7). Eumenes had hoped to use Cleopatra to strengthen the loyalty of his soldiers to him (Just. 14.1.7–8). Given that some of these Macedonians may have been among those who supported Eurydice’s marriage to King Philip, this
would have been a smart move. The support of any member of the royal family at
this point would have been beneficial (Carney 2000: 126; Anson 2004: 121 n. 18).
While Eumenes may not have achieved his overall aim, Cleopatra may have
empowered him to distribute those items associated with royalty, “the purple h
ats and military cloaks,” to his troops (Hornblower 1981: 162). He did give out such
items (Plut. Eum. 8.12), but even if Cleopatra was connected to the event, it is far more likely that Eumenes simply made the claim of her endorsement of the act
(Bosworth 1992b: 72–3; Schäfer 2002: 101–2), or that Perdiccas or even King Philip himself had so empowered him, prior to their departure for Egypt.
While not actively engaging the surviving Perdiccans personal y, Antipater did
detach a force under the command of Asander to invade Pisidia, but these troops
were defeated by Alcetas and Attalus, who had joined Alcetas after the riot at
Triparadeisus (Arr. Succ. 1a.41). Asander subsequently rejoined Antipater and
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Antigonus, and continued on to his recently reassigned satrapy of Caria (cf. Diod.
18.39.6; 19.62.2). This reluctance to face Eumenes was due to two factors: Eumenes’
superior cavalry (Plut. Eum. 8.6) and the questionable loyalty of the newly acquired royal army. These troops had rebelled against Antipater at Triparadeisus (Arr.
Succ. 1.32–3, 39), and later at Abydus, just prior to their return to Europe with Antipater, they rebelled again (Arr. Succ. 1a.44–5). The trouble at Abydus was, as it had been at Triparadeisus (Arr. Succ. 1a.32; Polyaen. 4.6.4), over pay. While at Triparadeisus there were other issues involved, including devotion to the royal
family in the person of Eurydice and King Philip (Arr. Succ. 1a.32–3; Polyaen.
4.6.4; Diod. 18.39.2–4), and, perhaps, even a lingering loyalty to their previous Perdiccan commanders (Errington 1970: 70), still the overriding issue in both of
these incidents, the unifying theme, was money. Besides, Antipater clearly had no long-term interest in Asia. His invasion had been to forestall Perdiccas’ contemplated assault on Macedonia. He was apparently in a great hurry to return home.
All indications are that Antipater did not wait for spring, but departed for
Macedonia before the end of winter (Bosworth 1992a: 59). He left for Europe as
soon as he could and did not involve himself further in the affairs of Asia. He died in the summer of the following year (Diod. 18.48.1, 4, 50.1; Plut. Eum. 12.1).
In response to Cleopatra’s entreaty, Eumenes had left Lydia, ultimately retiring
to southern Phrygia where he would be in close proximity to the other Perdiccans
in Pisidia. Here, after his campaign of harassment in Hellespontine and western
Phrygia (Plut. Eum. 8.9–11; Gothenburg Palimpsest fo. 73v 1–10), Eumenes spent the winter of 320/19 at Celaenae (Plut. Eum. 8.7–9), Antigonus’ satrapal capital (Arr. Anab. 1.29.3; Diod. 18.39.6). Prior to the new regent’s return to Macedonia, Antigonus and Antipater had camped separately, although not at too great a
distance from one another (cf. Arr. Succ. 1a.42–3). There had apparently been growing friction between the two commanders. Even though Antipater showed
a great reluctance to engage the remaining Perdiccans in Asia Minor himself
( Gothenburg Palimpsest fo. 73v 4–10), Antigonus was apparently criticized for following the lead of the regent for doing likewise ( Gothenburg Palimpsest fo.
73v 10–14). He had requested the command against the forces still loyal to the
former regent (Arr. Succ. 1.38), but had done little against them. Further conflict was provided by Antigonus’ chiliarch, Antipater’s son, Cassander, who warned his
father against the new general in Asia (Arr. Succ. 1.42). Antipater summoned Antigonus, and after consultation new arrangements were made. Antigonus would
remain as royal general in Asia (Arr. Succ. 1a.43), but the kings and Cassander would accompany Antipater to Macedonia; 8500 Macedonians from Antipater’s
original infantry force and a substantial cavalry contingent as well would be
exchanged for the bulk of the remaining veterans from Alexander’s expedition
now serving Antigonus (Arr. Succ. 1.44).43 It is unknown how many of the veterans returned to Macedonia with Antipater, even though the exchange of forces was
likely roughly equal (Billows 1990: 72–3). Of the roughly 13,000 Macedonian
infantry and 2000 cavalry that were in Babylon at the time of Alexander’s death
plus as many as 4000 additional Macedonians left in Cilicia by Craterus when
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Alexander’s Heirs
he returned to Macedonia, the argyraspids had been sent with Antigenes to Susa, and it is known that at least 3000 additional veterans likely from Perdiccas’ invading force had remained with Antigonus after Antipater’s departure. During the winter of
320/19, 3000 Macedonians under Holcias deserted Antigonus, possibly seeking
to join Alcetas in Pisidia (Polyaen. 4.6.6). From a base in the mountains these
troops engaged in pil aging raids throughout Lycaonia and Phrygia. The incident
is not dated by Polyaenus beyond stating that it occurred in the winter, but this must have been the winter of 320/19. This appears clear since Alcetas was stil
present in Asia Minor. The following year he would be assassinated (Diod.
18.44.1–46.7). Moreover, the incident was resolved only after Antipater had
returned to Macedonia. Antigonus’ subordinate Leonidas after the capture of the
renegade force took them to Macedonia (Polyaen. 4.6.6). If Antipater had been
still in Asia, he would have had these troops added to the force of veterans that the regent was ready to return to Macedonia. After the departure of Holcias and his
3000 Macedonian veterans, the number of remaining soldiers from the grand
army of Alexander left in Asia would have been smal .
The revision in the arrangement between Antipater and Antigonus strength-
ened the latter militarily. In the first place, the kings, Eurydice, and most of the soldiers who had brought them to power would no longer be able to intrigue with
the Perdiccans. Secondly, the troops brought in 320 to Asia from Macedonia by
Antipater and now given to Antigonus were not the jaded, independently minded,
often insubordinate, and occasional y murderous veterans of Alexander’s cam-
paigns. Of course, they were not the expert warriors that had served the great
Alexander either. These Macedonians gave Antigonus a considerable advantage
over all of his rivals. Many of these soldiers had fought with Craterus, and after their defeat and surrender to Eumenes had nevertheless returned to Antipater,
displaying a fidelity to their overall commander. Antigonus was now in a position to pursue his goal of ridding Asia of former Perdiccans without serious concerns
regarding the loyalty of his own forces to their former commanders.
For Eumenes the winter did not bring such welcome results. While in winter
quarters, Eumenes had sent envoys to Alcetas and to the other Perdiccan leaders
who had joined that commander in Pisidia, suggesting strongly that they unite
their forces and make war on Antigonus in common ( Gothenburg Palimpsest fo. 73v 11–F72v 6; Arr. Succ. 1a.41; Plut. Eum. 8.8). As noted, after Perdiccas’ assassination, Attalus had initial y fled to Tyre, which served as a collecting point for many
supporters of the former regent (Arr. Succ. 1a.39; Diod. 18.37.3–4). He joined in the short-lived agitation at Triparadeisus (Arr. Succ. 1.32–3), and later, with the other Perdiccans who joined him, and with additional forces recruited in
Phoenicia, mounted an unsuccessful attack on Rhodes before joining Alcetas
(Arr. Succ. 1a.39; cf. Diod. 18.45.3), bringing with him an army of 10,000 infantry and 800 cavalry (Arr. Succ. 1a.39), along with the 800 talents acquired in Tyre (Diod.
18.37.4). Docimus, who at Triparadeisus was replaced as satrap in Babylon by
Seleucus, and Polemon, Attalus’ brother, also joined
Alcetas in Pisidia (Arr. Succ.
24.3; Diod. 18.39.6, 45.3; cf. Plut. Eum. 8.8). Clearly the Perdiccan forces were stil
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formidable. From Plutarch ( Eum. 8.8), it would appear that the various commanders came together in Celaenae to discuss the situation. In the end, however, the negotiations proved fruitless; neither Eumenes nor Alcetas was willing to concede the
chief command. Apparently Alcetas himself did not exercise authority without
difficulties being raised by his fellow commanders in Pisidia. Plutarch ( Eum. 8.8) reports that in their negotiations with Eumenes, Alcetas, Polemon, and Docimus
all sought the chief command. This jealousy and rivalry had divided the Perdiccans at the time of Antipater’s invasion and it now divided them again. This contentious-ness was endemic and would prove disastrous. Later, in 317 (cf. Diod. 19.16.1), a number of imprisoned Perdiccans, including Attalus and Docimus, overpowered
their guards, and while Docimus urged that they escape into the countryside imme-
diately, others counseled that since the fortress was strong and well supplied, they remain and await aid from Eumenes (Diod. 19.16.1–3).44 Indeed, these same commanders spent so much time disputing what action to take in this instance that
the option of escape disappeared, and they remained trapped in their prison by
Antigonus’ troops (Diod. 19.16.3). Docimus, who had wished to escape into the
countryside all along, did escape by a secret route, which he then betrayed to
the besieging troops. His former prison companions were subsequently killed, while he passed into the service of Antigonus, apparently through the intervention of the latter’s wife Stratonice (Diod. 19.16.4–5). The united Perdiccan armies would have been much superior in numbers to the forces of Antigonus; they would also have
been more experienced. In 319, Eumenes possessed 20,000 infantry and 5000
cavalry (Diod. 18.40.7; cf. Plut. Eum. 9.3), and Alcetas 16,000 foot and 900 horse (Diod. 18.45.1). Antigonus must have had roughly two-thirds as many infantry as
his opponents’ combined forces, and was much inferior in cavalry.
The failure of the Perdiccans to cooperate emboldened Antigonus. He left