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ened his allies were at the sight of the Ptolemaic fleet sailing with impunity, and he now accelerated the construction of his fleet with a sense of urgency and commitment. He promised his allies that “in that very summer” he would take to sea with 500 warships (Diod. 19.58.5). Seleucus’ naval expedition was seen by Antigonus as so serious that he wrote to Polemaeus ordering him to gain control quickly of the coast of Asia Minor (Diod. 19.60.3). After his failure to acquire Erythrae, Seleucus proceeded to Cyprus to join the Ptolemaic forces there (Diod. 19.62.4).
By the close of the campaigning year of 314, with the major exception of Caria,
whose satrap Asander, even though related in some fashion to Antigonus (Arr.
Succ. 25.1) and previously his al y in the war against Perdiccas, was becoming increasingly anxious over Polemaeus’ operations in nearby Lydia, Antigonid forces were in nearly complete control of Asia Minor, and with the exception of Tyre,
which remained under siege, Antigonus controlled the eastern seaboard of the
Mediterranean from Cilicia to Gaza.
In Greece, likewise, all proceeded successful y for Antigonus. Aristodemus sailed to the Peloponnesus and there hired 8000 mercenaries. He met with Polyperchon
and his son Alexander and established an alliance between them and Antigonus
(Diod. 19.60.1). After the debacle in Macedonia and Cassander’s successful inva-
sion the previous year, the invitation from Antigonus must have appeared as a gift from the gods. Even though Polyperchon had proven himself by the standards of
his day to be a poor commander, indecisive and often dilatory, and unfortunately
for Antigonus these traits were shared by his son Alexander, there was a dearth
of possible allies in Greece who commanded armies. In Greece, there was just not
a host of options. In the new alliance, Polyperchon was to be the general of the
Peloponnesus, and Alexander was to sail to Antigonus at Tyre to ratify the agreement formal y (Diod. 19.60.1).
Cassander learned of Aristodemus’ arrival in the Peloponnesus only after the
latter had collected his large army of mercenaries and made the alliance with
Polyperchon (Diod. 19.63.3). Cassander’s first reaction was to attempt to lure
the former regent away from his alliance with Antigonus by means not specified in our surviving sources, but these incentives may have been similar to those later
offered by the new ruler in Macedonia to Polyperchon’s son, including military
assistance and alliance (cf. Diod. 19.64.2–3). When these overtures were refused, Cassander brought his army from Macedonia, through Thessaly, and into Boeotia,
where he spent some time helping the resettled Thebans rebuild the wal s of
their city, and final y, in the fall of 314, he moved into the Peloponnesus (Diod.
19.63.3–4). Here, he enjoyed great success. While not acquiring Corinth itself,
he did take Cenchreae, the Corinthian port on the Saronic Gulf, and from there
moved into Arcadia, where he captured Orchomenus through treachery.
He installed a garrison there and permitted his supporters in the community to
butcher Polyperchon’s adherents, even though they had taken sanctuary in
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the Temple of Artemis (Diod. 19.63.5). Somewhere in the Peloponnesus, perhaps
in Orchomenus, Cassander spent the winter of 314/13. Diodorus unfortunately
takes no notice of this winter.
In Phoenicia, Alexander arrived at Tyre in the fall of 314 (Anson 2006b: 232) and formal y entered into a pact of friendship on behalf of himself and his father with Antigonus (Diod. 19.61.1). Shortly after Alexander’s arrival, Antigonus summoned
a “general assembly” of the soldiers and “the people dwelling there.” Here he accused Cassander of the murder of Olympias and excoriated his ill treatment of King
Alexander IV and Roxane. Additional y, Antigonus declared that Cassander had
taken Thessalonice in marriage by force, and that he was undermining Macedonia
by undoing Alexander the Great’s destruction of Thebes and Philip II’s obliteration of Olynthus by his creation of Cassandreia and peopling it with many displaced
Olynthians (Diod. 19.61.1–2). When the assembled, as Antigonus had hoped,
reacted with rage, he introduced a decree that Cassander should be considered an
enemy unless he destroyed the two cities, returned Alexander IV and Roxane to the Macedonians, and acknowledged Antigonus as the rightful regent. The decree
continued that all Greek cities were to be free and autonomous and without foreign garrisons (Diod. 19.61.3). He then put these proposals, commonly known as the
“Tyre Proclamation,” to a “vote of the soldiers,” who approved them overwhelm-
ingly. Antigonus now sent out messengers carrying copies of the decree far and
wide, in the hope that, as Polyperchon before him had attempted to do, ultimately unsuccessful y, through his decree of 319/18, the promise of freedom and autonomy would lead to the active participation of the Greeks in the war on Antigonus’ behalf.
Apparently many island cities decided to break free, primarily from their association with the Athenians. Lemnos (cf. Diod. 19.68.3), Delos, and Imbros likely took
advantage of the proclamation to declare their independence (O’Sullivan 1997:
112). They were encouraged by the appearance of an Antigonid fleet provided by
the Rhodians (cf. Diod. 19.61.5, 62.7, 64.5). Rhodes, an independent city since the death of Alexander (Diod. 18.8.1), was allied with Antigonus and very supportive of his proclamation of Greek freedom (cf. Diod. 19.77.3; van Dessel and Hauben 1977: 326–7; Berthold 1984: 61). A Lemnian decree, dated by reference to the Athenian
archon Nicodorus (314/13) ( IG XII. 8, 18), honoring the Antigonid admiral Dioscorides for his actions, likely refers to this liberation. This particular Antigonid nephew had joined his uncle in Tyre in the summer of 313, bringing with him
eighty warships from the Hellespont and Rhodes (Diod. 19.62.9). It would appear
that after these ships were constructed they had begun to implement Antigonus’
policy of “freedom” for the Greeks even before their rendezvous with Antigonus
at Tyre. Antigonus’ support of King Alexander IV, it was hoped, despite all the
evidence to the contrary, would convince the satraps that Antigonus was not a
threat to the monarchy and hence to their positions, or to the freedom and
autonomy of the Greek cities. He would be the one true savior of all Greeks from
the rapaciousness of his fellow Diadochs (Diod. 19.61.4–5).
Perhaps the most interesting part of the proclamation is Antigonus’ claim to be
the new regent. It has been argued very plausibly that Polyperchon conveyed this
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authority to Antigonus as part of their agreement (Heuss 1938: 149 n. 1; Rosen
1967b: 78–81; Billows 1990: 114). This is also the implication of the now former
regent receiving the title of general of the Peloponnesus from his new al y in Asia (Diod. 19.60.1). It has been noted that in his actions since the demise of Eumenes, Antigonus acted as if he were for all intents and purposes, at least in Asia, the regent for the young Alexander (Billows 1990: 114). However, since he was seeking an effective alliance with Polyperchon, Antigonus certainly would not have publicly seized the regency from him. Moreover, this official transfer of authority
would give Antigonus some quasi-legal claim to the office. After al , it had been handed on to Polyperchon, likely in the name of King Philip, by Antipater, who
had received it at Triparadeisus ostensibly from the assembled Macedonian army
(Diod. 18.39.4; cf. Arr. Succ. 1a.33). Alexander was now given 500 tale
nts and sent back to the Peloponnesus to rejoin the fight (Diod. 19.61.5). While it is nowhere stated, it appears clear that Antigonus spent the winter in the vicinity of Tyre.9
This would then be the same winter that Cassander spent in the Peloponnesus
after his operations in Arcadia.
Receiving no help from outside, in the summer of 313 Tyre was forced by
starvation to capitulate. The siege had lasted a year and three months (Diod. 19.61.5).
The Ptolemaic soldiers present in the city were given a safe conduct to depart with their possessions. The response of Ptolemy to Antigonus’ activities in this area
could, with understatement, be described as passive. He sent no reinforcements to Tyre. The troops freed were those who had been placed there before the siege began.
Similarly, he did not intervene to protect Gaza. He did, however, respond to the
Antigonid proclamation at Tyre, publishing a similar decree of his own, indicating that he too was in favor of Greek freedom and autonomy (Diod. 19.62.1).
This claim of support for the freedom and liberty of the Greeks had echoed
through the past and would continue to do so through almost the next 200 years.
Promised by the Spartans to the members of the Athenian empire during the
Peloponnesian War, guaranteed in the King’s Peace of 387, and endorsed by
Philip II in his Peace of Corinth, the Romans were later to “free” the Greeks right into their expanding empire. Ptolemy, while proclaiming his desire to maintain the freedom and liberty of the Greeks, had taken over Cyrene and had garrisoned
that city and also many of the surrounding communities (Diod. 19.79.1). While
the general Greek public probably did take these proclamations somewhat seri-
ously, it is difficult to believe that their leaders truly did so. The latter simply took advantage of whatever benefits might be forthcoming as the result of playing along with the charade. But the charade could not be avoided. For the proclaimer of
“freedom,” it gave an excuse to attack any city in alliance with the enemy in
the name of freedom. For the Greek cities, it gave different groups within these
communities powerful allies in their struggle for internal control. “Freedom and
autonomy,” then, was a slogan whose meaning was clear. It was a “sound bite” to
excuse war and revolution in the name of a broad philosophical ideal. For a time, however, Antigonus ordered his commanders in Greece to be scrupulous in the
application of Greek freedom (Diod. 19.74.1), so that he might be able to stand out
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135
in stark contrast to Cassander. By not imposing garrisons in the cities, Antigonus sought to gain his immediate aim in the early stages of this war to spark strife in Greece to occupy Cassander and to forestall any interference from that quarter
in Asia. Antigonus also wished to gain access to the many mercenaries and poten-
tial mercenaries in Greece to fill the ranks of his army (Billows 1990: 189). While he was the most consistent in his propaganda supporting Greek freedom and
autonomy, he was in fact reestablishing Alexander the Great’s strategy with respect to the Greek cities, borrowed in the main from that of the Persians. This form of independence was in reality “a sign of belonging to a sovereign” (Ruzicka 1997:
131). As with Alexander, the grantor of freedom and autonomy could and often
did interfere. While letters were sent from Antigonus to Scepsis and other Greek
cities promising their “freedom and autonomy” (Austin 1981: 58 [ OGIS 5]), he later forced, against their wil , eight cities in the Troad, including Scepsis, to form the new community of Antigoneia Troad (Str. 13.593, 597, 604; Cohen 1995: 146),
and when, nine years later in 305, Rhodes refused to supply Antigonus with ships
for an attack on Egypt, his son Demetrius began the famous siege of Rhodes (Diod.
20.82.1–88.9, 91.1–100.1; Paus. 1.6.6; see Berthold 1984: 61–77). The freedom
game was played in the context of the usual combat within almost every Greek
city between those wanting a more open franchise (the “democrats”) and those
wishing for a limitation on voting rights based on the ownership of property
(the “oligarchs”). Philip II, whose great opponent was democratic Athens, favored oligarchies; his son Alexander, favored oligarchy in the mainland of Greece,
but democracy in those cities formerly under Persian supported oligarchies or
tyrannies (Anson 2013b: 130–1). The autocrat proclaiming democracy may seem
paradoxical but it made great political sense. My enemies’ enemies are my friends.
Cassander, like his father Antipater, favored oligarchies; Antigonus in consequence became a champion of democracy.
While the siege of Tyre was still ongoing, Cassander, leaving winter quarters in
the vicinity of Orchomenus the following spring, led his army into Messenia, but
finding Messene, at the foot of Mount Ithome, still garrisoned by Polyperchon,
he returned to Arcadia and his allied city of Megalopolis. Diodorus concludes his account of Cassander’s operations in the Peloponnesus with Cassander presiding
over the Nemean Games (Diod. 19.63.3–64.1) in August 313, after which he
returned to Macedonia (Diod. 19.64.1).
Once Cassander and his army had withdrawn from the Peloponnesus and
returned to Macedonia, Alexander and Aristodemus launched a campaign to
drive out the garrisons loyal to their enemy in the Peloponnesus, proclaiming
their desire to restore freedom to these communities (Diod. 19.64.2). Cassander
typical y garrisoned his erstwhile Greek allies. Antigonus’ commanders made a
point of not following suit. Having left Alexander to continue the campaign in the south, Aristodemus moved north into Aetolia with his force of mercenaries, where
he secured an alliance for Antigonus with the Aetolian League (Diod. 19.66.2).
This federated collection of cities had long been hostile to Macedonia.10 While
they had not joined the coalition that opposed the Macedonians at Chaeronea in
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338 (Dem. 18.237; Paus. 10.3.3; Tod 1950: 231–2; Arnush 2000: 300), the relation-
ship between the two peoples had soured after the death of Philip II. The Aetolians had joined in the rebellion against Macedonian hegemony sparked by the Thebans
in 335 (Arr. Anab. 1.7.4, 10.2), and the Aetolians were a major player in the Lamian War (Diod. 18.8.17, 11.1, 13.3; 9.1; and see Chapter 2 above). They had also
attempted to block Cassander’s march south at the pass of Thermopylae in 315
(Diod. 19.53.1).
When Cassander learned of the renewed activities in the south, he sent
Prepelaus, one of his military commanders, to Alexander, the son of Polyperchon,
offering an alliance, stating that he would give him command of the Peloponnesus, and supply him with troops (Diod. 19.64.2–3). In the late summer of 313,
Alexander made the alliance. Our source Diodorus (19.64.5) states that what
Cassander had now given him was what the son of Polyperchon had long sought.
Aristodemus, when he learned of Alexander’s desertion of the Antigonid cause,
moved back to the Peloponnesus from Aetolia. Here he relieved the siege of
Cyllene, a community on the border of Achaea and Arcadia, which Alexander
was conducting. Departing from proclaimed policy, Aristodemus left a garrison
“to protect the town.” From there the Antigonid commander advanced into Achaea
where he also enjoyed success, including freeing the city of Patrae, without leaving a garrison (Diod. 19.66.2). After the Antigonid commander returned t
o Aetolia,
Alexander, while attempting to restore his control in the region, was assassinated (Diod. 19.67.1). In one of the more interesting sequels to a commander’s death,
Alexander’s wife, Cratesipolis, took control of her husband’s army and established her rule over the city of Sicyon (Diod. 19.67.1–2), and later over Corinth as well (Diod. 20.37.1), both of which she held until 308 (Diod. 20.37.1; Polyaen. 8.58), when she surrendered both cities to Ptolemy, perhaps in hopes that he would add
her to his many wives (Mahaffy 1895: 48; Carney 2000: 229). Macedonian women,
such as Cynnane, Olympias, and Eurydice, unlike their sisters in southern Greece, were often powerful forces in the course of political and military events.
With Aristodemus occupied in the south dealing with the defection of
Alexander, Cassander took advantage of a border war between the Aetolians and
their western neighbors the Acarnanians to inflict some damage on his enemies
in Aetolia and also strengthen Macedonia’s borders. Forging an alliance with the
Acarnanians, he persuaded them to abandon their separate vil ages as too vulner-
able to attack and to settle the population in three of the larger Acarnanian communities, Stratus, Sauria, and Agrinium. Having succeeded in strengthening
his new al y and leaving an “adequate force” to defend them, Cassander moved his
campaign to the Adriatic to secure his western flank. These lands that bordered on the Ionian Sea and the Adriatic served as a bridge between the Successors’ world
and the Greek cities of Sicily and southern Italy. They included a number of Greek city-states, but also the tribal peoples of Illyria, the northern neighbors of the Epirotes, and the indigenous peoples of Sicily and Italy. Not long before Cassander’s campaign in the northwest, the Illyrians had attempted to capture Apollonia, but
the city was rescued by an unlikely savior, Acrotatus, the son of one of the Spartan
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137
kings, Cleomenes.11 This individual had made himself unpopular in his native
land by vigorously protesting a decree that granted those who had been defeated
along with Agis in his battle against Antipater and the Macedonians in 331 full