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War (322) the Athenians regained their freedom (20.46.3), a statement repeated
by Plutarch ( Demetr. 10.3). Diodorus (20.69.2), moreover, in his description of the escape of Agathocles after the col apse of his Libyan expedition, notes that the Sicilian tyrant sailed to Sicily “in the season of the setting of the Pleiades” (early November). Diodorus’ archon year 307/6, then, is clearly the solar year 307.
Diodorus begins his year 306/5 with Antigonus’ burial of his son Philip and
that king’s preparations for his attack on Egypt (20.73.1). He has then omitted all reference to events occurring east of the Adriatic until the late fall of 306. The invasion of Egypt is dated by another reference to the setting of the Pleiades (Diod.
20.74.1), but this time in 306. From this point, Diodorus provides very few clear dating referents, other than his archon, consular, and Olympiad dates, and nothing after 302, when his work survives only in secondary fragments.
Notes
1 Heracleitus 22 F-B53.
2 Roisman (2012: 236) argues that the argyraspids may not have been as distrusted by Antigonus as the sources suggest. He notes that they were to perform important
functions keeping dangerous local populations under control. However, as Roisman
notes, this was the “end of the road” for these troops as a powerful and influential unit.
3 On their careers, see Heckel 2006: 161, 165–6.
4 Appian ( Syr. 55) cal s Nicanor the satrap of Media, but Diodorus, likely following Hieronymus, always refers to him as general.
5 On the death of a monarch his successor carried out a lustration (Just. 13.4.7; cf. Curt.
10.9.11–12), conducted funeral games, and performed sacrifices (Diod. 18.28.4, 19.52.5; Just. 9.7.11, 11.2.1; Athen. 4.155A). The body would then be formal y laid to rest in the royal tombs at Aegae (Borza 1990: 167, 256–60). However, Cassander had disposed of Olympias without burial (Diod. 17.118.2).
6 The text reads Lycia, but emending the text to Lydia seems justified (Wehrli 1968: 43–8; contra: Billows 1990: 109 n. 36). Tarn (1969 [1953]: 484) wishes to emend to Cilicia, but this is highly unlikely. Lycia does appear a strange request, but Lydia does not.
Cleitus, who was defeated by Antigonus in the Bosporus, had been satrap of Lydia, and it is possible that Antigonus in his haste to pursue Eumenes had not adequately secured this region. Cassander may have been there securing this satrapy for the coalition.
7 Richard Billows, in his Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hel enistic State (1990), has assembled in a most useful appendix biographies of the various “friends, officers, and diplomats” associated with Antigonus.
8 Antigonus’ nephew had been sent to Eumenes as a hostage back in 319 during the negotiations after Eumenes’ entrance into Nora (Plut. Eum. 10.3).
9 See the chronological discussion at the end of this chapter.
10 On the Aetolian League in this period, see Mendels 1984; in general, see Larsen 1968: 78–80, 195–215.
11 On the Spartans’ government and its dual monarchy, see Powell and Hodkinson 2002; Kennell 2010.
12 According to Xenophon ( Resp. Lac. 9.4–6) this would include exclusion from all social activities, being unable to gain a wife or to marry off a daughter, being unable to attend
“War, both the King and Father of Al ”
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the assembly, deferring to one and al , and even having to submit to beatings by one’s
“betters.”
13 On the Sicilian tyrant see the dated, but still informative, Til yard 1908, and Meister 2008.
14 For the date, see Bickerman 1968: 120. The connection of this honorary decree with an attack on Samos is questioned by many scholars. However, see O’Sullivan 1997: 110–12.
15 Diodorus describes these actions as taking place after the issuance of the Proclamation of Tyre by Antigonus.
16 On Demetrius’ early years, see Wheatley 1999.
17 Much of this region never came to be under the control either of the Persians or of the Diadochs (Mitchell 2003: 43–4).
18 Billows (1990: 123) regards Diodorus’ statement that Antigonus intended to invade Macedonia as doubtful. He suggests rather that this was a feint to draw Cassander from southern Greece. This is certainly possible, since this is exactly what did happen, but the overtures to Byzantium and the previous attempt suggest that Antigonus meant to invade his homeland at this time.
19 The first two were still held by Alexander’s widow, and the last, without any evidence to the contrary, likely still loyal to Cassander.
20 For detailed accounts of this battle, see Devine 1984, 1989; Billows 1990: 125–8; Sabin 2009: 151–3.
21 Plutarch ( Demetr. 5.2) lists 5000 as slain. Since Demetrius only had in total 17,500
troops, and 8000 were captured, only 4500 troops would have escaped with Demetrius and yet he was able later to defeat a Ptolemaic general in northern Syria (Plut. Demetr.
6.2–3). While Diodorus’ report does appear low, the 5000 appears too great.
22 Pausanias (1.6.5) remarks that in this victory Demetrius killed “a few Egyptians.”
23 Alexander Meeus (2009a: 236) notes that our sources only describe the fate of two of these marriages and that these authors’ silence “cannot be used to argue that apart from Seleucus all Macedonians subsequently divorced [their wives].”
24 Mehl 1986: 19; Bielman Sanchez 2003: 45–6; Müller 2013: 206–9; Olbrycht 2013: 170–1, 178.
25 For this campaign, see Wheatley 2002.
26 While there is some doubt raised about the precise number of war elephants, 500 has recently been convincingly defended (Yardley, Heckel, and Wheatley 2011: 295–6).
27 Justin (15.2.3) states that at this time he was 15.
28 Billows (1990: 145) suggests that the initiative for this plan came from Antigonus.
29 Justin says that Ophel as approached Agathocles.
30 The Suda (s.v. Demetrius) states that at this time there was an alliance in existence between Demetrius, the son of Antigonus, and Ptolemy. See Seibert (1969: 180–3)
for a well-argued refutation of this claim.
31 Some of these honors may be related to a subsequent and even more elaborately honored visit by Demetrius to Athens (Habicht 1970: 44–8).
32 On the Helepolis, see Marsden 1971: 84–5.
33 Plut. Demetr. 18.1; [Parian Marble] FGrH 239 B 23; Just. 15.2.11; App. Syr. 54; Yardley, Heckel, and Wheatley 2011: 244–5; Gruen 1985: 258; cf. Diod. 20.53.3.
34 On this aspect of traditional Macedonian royal informality, see Errington 1974: 20; Anson 2013b: 20; Introduction above.
6
The End of the Diadochi
After so much success, Antigonus decided to cap this most successful year of 306
with a full assault on Egypt (Diod. 20.73–6; Paus. 1.6.6). The year had only one
setback for him. Philip, Antigonus’ youngest son, had unexpectedly died and
was buried with royal honors. Summoning Demetrius from Cyprus, Antigonus
collected his forces in Antigoneia-on-the-Orontes, a city recently founded by him, well situated for any campaign south to Egypt, east to Babylon, or northwest to
Asia Minor (Diod. 20.47.5). He would command a land army of 80,000 infantry,
8000 cavalry, and 83 elephants. Demetrius was to parallel the army’s movements
with a fleet of 150 warships and 100 transports. The expedition reached Gaza eight days before the setting of the Pleiades, which occurred in early November 306
(Diod. 20.73.3; cf. Bickerman 1968: 143), making the time of the arrival late
October. The setting of the Pleiades was the customary end of the sailing season in the eastern Mediterranean and the start of the winter storm season. Demetrius’
pilots advised against the invasion based on the lateness of the season, but
Antigonus pushed ahead. While the fleet was still passing along Sinai, a storm
came up, resulting in the loss of
three warships. Antigonus’ timing could not have been worse. In addition to the difficulty facing his fleet due to the season, it was also a time when the Nile was not at its lowest level, which would not be reached until May. Antigonus and his forces attempted to find a crossing near Memphis,
but Ptolemy had occupied the other side of the river at every possible crossing
point. With all points of access blocked, Antigonus and his army returned to
Syria (Diod. 20.73–76.6; Plut. Demetr. 19.1–5). Both Antigonus and Demetrius have been criticized for the failure. Antigonus has been charged with faulty
strategy (Seibert 1969: 222; contra: Billows 1990: 164 n. 2); Demetrius, for the poor performance of the fleet (Billows 1990: 164). Neither appears a viable criticism.
It should be noted that Ptolemy, as before against Perdiccas, had prepared Egypt
well for this invasion. This preparation, along with the natural barriers that had long protected Egypt, and the season of the year, provide a more than adequate
explanation for the failure. Antigonus, according to Diodorus (20.76.5), contem-
plated another invasion the following year during the season when the Nile was
Alexander’s Heirs: The Age of the Successors, First Edition. Edward M. Anson.
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2014 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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at its lowest level. The only bad planning was, perhaps, the attempt to invade Egypt at al . The Nile was in flood stage from late May/June through September, with
the flood not ful y dissipating until more than a month later. These factors, along with the problems involved in the sailing season, with the eastern Mediterranean
general y regarded as dangerous from November into March, and the shoals that
protected the Egyptian coastline making coastal landings difficult at best, created few ideal opportunities for an invasion. The truth is that a determined defense
made Egypt a virtual y impregnable fortress at all seasons.
The true failure for Antigonus was in what might have been. By recalling
Demetrius from Europe, Antigonus probably lost his best chance to gain control
of Greece and Macedonia. Cassander, in addition to his losses in Greece due to
the activities of Demetrius, also saw in 307 Glaucias, the Illyrian, place Pyrrhus, the son of Cassander’s former enemy Aeacides (Just. 17.3.16–21), on the throne of Epirus. The previous monarch, Alcetas, Pyrrhus’ uncle and Cassander’s al y, was
murdered by his own people probably in the fall of 307 (Diod. 19.89.3; Paus.
1.11.5). The time of Pyrrhus’ accession is determined by the various references
to his age at particular points in his life. Pyrrhus was 2 years old when is father was driven from the throne (Just. 17.3.17), in the spring of 316. He was either 11
(Just. 17.3.21), or 12 (Plut. Demetr. 3.5) when he acquired the throne. Five years later, at 17 years of age, he was again forced to flee (Plut. Pyrrh. 4.1). He joined Demetrius prior to that commander’s departure for Asia in response to the cal
from his father in 302, the year before the climactic Battle of Ipsus (Plut. Pyrrh.
4.2; cf. Plut. Pyrrh. 2.1).
Perhaps out of frustration at the failure of the Egyptian invasion, Demetrius
in the next year, 305 ([Parian Marble] FGrH 239 B F-23), was ordered not back to Greece, but rather to the island of Rhodes. While the island had been allied
with Antigonus during the Third Diadoch War, it had failed to join in the attack
on Cyprus or the abortive invasion of Egypt, proclaiming that the Rhodians were
at peace with all parties (Diod. 20.81.2, 4). They did, however, incline towards
Ptolemy because of close trade connections with Egypt (Diod. 20.81.4). Antigonus
was not content with their response to his request for an alliance, and sent Demetrius with a well-equipped force, including numerous siege engines, to bring the
Rhodians to heel. Given the threat, the Rhodians sent ambassadors to Demetrius,
agreeing to join in a war against Ptolemy, but Demetrius insisted upon receiving
100 hostages from the most prominent families and being allowed to enter the
harbor of Rhodes with his entire fleet (Diod. 20.82). The Rhodians refused.
They now prepared to withstand a siege. For the siege Demetrius had 40,000
troops, 200 warships, and over 170 transports carrying siege equipment. After
arriving, Demetrius set up his camp just out of missile range of the wal s, while his forces thoroughly ravaged the island. At first, Demetrius launched an assault on the main harbor, using two four-story towers and two large penthouses containing artillery, all mounted on cargo ships. Also, a number of smaller craft were decked over and equipped with artillery and archers. The Rhodians responded by
increasing the height of the harbor wal s and by placing their own penthouses and
The End of the Diadochi
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artillery on cargo ships and on the mole that extended out from the harbor.
Demetrius’ forces seized the end of the mole, only 500 feet from the city wal , and fortified it. The large-scale assault on land and sea was effectively countered by the Rhodians, and in the end Demetrius withdrew, his forces having suffered heavy
losses. Not much later his forces on the mole were captured (Diod. 20.81–8).
With this lack of success, early in 304 Demetrius concentrated his forces on the
city’s land wal s. In order to overtop these, he again built the “Helepolis,” that had been used effectively on Cyprus. Additional y, troops were dispatched to fill the moat surrounding the wal , to undermine the wal s themselves, and to build
tunnels into the city. The besieged discovered the tunnels and built an interior
wall just inside the threatened one. Despite repeated general assaults on breaches created in the exterior wal , Demetrius was again unable to capture the city.
Demetrius’ assault was hampered by the skill of the Rhodian sailors, who exited
and entered the harbor almost at will and wreaked havoc on their enemies.
Moreover, Demetrius was unable to stop supplies and reinforcements – periodical y sent by Lysimachus (Diod. 20.96.3, 100.2), Cassander (Diod. 20.100.2), and in
particular Ptolemy, who contributed substantial y to the Rhodian defense (Diod.
20.88.9, 94.3–5, 96.1–3, 98.1, 100.2) – from reaching the besieged. Indeed, it was often Rhodian raiders who interfered with the supplies destined for the attackers.
After the passage of a year, both Antigonus and Demetrius were seeking an
excuse to end the long siege, and it came from the Athenians who, with Demetrius’
departure from Athens, had become involved in a war with Cassander (Habicht
1997: 74–7). Now they were under serious pressure and requesting assistance.
Early in 304 Cassander had captured the island of Salamis and had begun to
besiege Athens itself, having captured the Attic fortresses of Phyle and Panactum (Plut. Demetr. 23.1–2; Habicht 1997: 74–6). With all concerned seeking an end to the Rhodian siege, after a year of fighting (Diod. 20.100.1), a compromise was reached between the respective parties. The Rhodians would retain their autonomy
and remain ungarrisoned. They would support Antigonus and Demetrius against
all enemies, except Ptolemy. The most important result of this unsuccessful
siege was the proclamation by Ptolemy of his kingship (Gruen 1985: 257–8).1 His
effective assistance to Rhodes, in combination with his successful resistance of
Antigonus’ Egyptian invasion, gave him the personal confidence to join Antigonus
as a king. Seleucus, who had a number of triumphs to his credit in the east and was already acknowledged as king by the Babylonians, followed suit. Lysimachus, with
; far fewer accomplishments, but perhaps also basking in the glow of the successful resistance of his al y Rhodes, also accepted a crown.2 Indeed, the Rhodians, in
addition to the honors they showered on Ptolemy (Diod. 20.100.3–4), also set
up statues to “King Cassander” and “King Lysimachus” (Diod. 20.100.2). Other
than convincing Ptolemy, and perhaps the other Diadochs, that it was time to
become kings with respect to their Greek and Macedonian supporters, the results
of the siege were modest. As noted earlier, Ptolemy had been given the title of soter (savior) by the Rhodians, a name that would become a commonly applied epithet
to the Egyptian ruler from then on. Moreover, with the acquiescence of the Oracle
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of Zeus at Siwah, Ptolemy henceforth would be worshiped as a god by the Rhodians
(Diod. 20.100.3–4). One consequence of the failed attack was that Demetrius
rather ironical y received the epithet “Poliorcetes,” or city-besieger (Diod. 20.92.2, 103.3). It should also be noted that the Rhodians used the money realized from
the sale of Demetrius’ siege train in part to build one of the seven wonders of the ancient world, the Colossus of Rhodes (Maryon 1956: 68). Otherwise, the siege
was a wasteful interlude in the war (on the siege of Rhodes, see Diod. 20.81–8,
91–100.4; Plut. Demetr. 21–2; Polyaen. 4.6.16; Berthold 1984: 66–80).
Demetrius, having abandoned the siege, arrived in the western Aegean in the
late spring of 304, with 330 warships and a great many infantry. His appearance
forced Cassander not only to abandon his siege of Athens, but to retreat rapidly
back to Macedonia. In his pursuit of the fleeing Cassander, Demetrius acquired
6000 Macedonian troops who had deserted the Macedonian ruler (Plut. Demetr.
23.1–2; Diod. 20.100.6). Halting his chase at Thermopylae, he began his return to Athens. He landed his fleet at Aulis in Boeotia and formed an alliance with the
Boeotians, who renounced their ties to Cassander, and from there he continued
south, where he “freed” the city of Chalcis on the island of Euboea from its garrison (Plut. Demetr. 23.3; Diod. 20.100.5–6). The Parian Marble ( FGrH 239 B 24) places Demetrius’ freeing of Chalcis in the archon year 304/3. It is also likely that at this time he renewed his alliance with the Aetolians (Diod. 20.100.6). Arriving back in Athens, he recaptured Phyle and Panactum from their Cassandrean garrisons and