Alexanders Heirs

by Edward M. Anson

  Antiochus to withdraw rapidly from the battlefield to draw Demetrius away.

  Antiochus’ light cavalry had been placed in opposition to the more dominant

  heavy cavalry of Demetrius. It would appear only logical that this arrangement

  was designed to draw this wing away from the battlefield (Tarn 1930: 68–9;

  Wheatley 2010: 87). The delay in returning to the battle gave Seleucus time to

  move his elephant reserve to a position blocking Demetrius’ return to his father

  and the phalanx (cf. Plut. Demetr. 29.5–6). In the son’s absence, his father’s enemies virtual y surrounded their opponents. The weaker Antigonid cavalry on the left

  was overwhelmed by the superior enemy’s right. This cavalry under Seleucus’

  command never actual y engaged the opposition’s phalanx but kept feigning an

  attack. Fearing such an assault, large numbers of the Antigonid force surrendered and the rest took flight (Plut. Demetr. 29.7–8). Antigonus, pierced by numerous arrows, lay dead on the field of conflict; the battle was over. The old warrior’s enemies gave the dead dynast a funeral suitable for a king. Demetrius and Pyrrhus, who had fought in the engagement alongside his older companion (Plut. Pyrrh.

  4.3), escaped the debacle with 4000 cavalry and 5000 infantry, and fled to Cilicia, where Demetrius joined his mother and, with all their valuables, sailed to Salamis in Cyprus (Diod. 21.4b). The victorious Lysimachus and Seleucus divided Antigonus’

  Asian territories between them, with Lysimachus receiving western Asia Minor and

  Seleucus most of the rest (on the battle and its immediate aftermath, see Plut.

  Demetr. 28–30.1; Pyrrh. 4.4; Diod. 21.2, 4b; App. Syr. 55; Just. 15.2.16–17, 4.21–2; Polyb. 5.67.8).

  The Battle of Ipsus was a turning point. The death of Antigonus removed the

  successor whose ambition and ability had brought him, to this point in time,

  closest of all the Diadochs to reuniting Alexander’s empire. It was most often

  his ambition and actions that called forth a response from his fellow Diadochs.

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  Of course, at the time of his death he was in his eighties ([Hieronymus of Cardia]

  FGrH 154 F-8; 260 F-32; Plut. Demetr. 19.4), and his aggression had slowed since his failed attempts to regain Babylonia and the upper satrapies in 310 or to conquer Egypt in 306. Ipsus would likely have been his swan song even if he had

  been victorious. While his son Demetrius possessed much of his father’s talent,

  he clearly was not his father. Ipsus may only have cut short a brief wait for the inevitable. Ipsus, or more precisely the events leading to the battle, also mark a decisive moment in the history of the Successors for another reason besides

  the death of the most active of the Diadochs. Diodorus’ narrative, except for the briefest of fragments or long paraphrases, most of which come from late Byzantine anthologies, breaks off shortly before the Battle of Ipsus. Plutarch and Justin now become the principal sources for the remainder of the Diadoch period.

  In returning to the historical narrative, true to form, no sooner was this war

  over than disagreements broke out among the allies. The triumphant Seleucus

  journeyed south to Phoenicia only to find that Ptolemy had occupied the region.

  Ptolemy claimed that this region had been made subject to himself and was not

  part of Antigonus’ holdings when he met his death. Additional y, he stated that he had been an al y in the recent war, and deserved some reward. Seleucus responded

  that to the victor belonged the spoils, that the victors in the actual battle were himself and Lysimachus, and that Ptolemy had not even been present (Diod. 21.1.5).

  But the Egyptian dynast further claimed that, in the negotiations that had created the alliance to oppose Antigonus, he had been promised Phoenicia (Polyb. 5.67).

  Seleucus final y stepped back, stating that on account of their former friendship he would not push the issue (Diod. 21.1.5). The quarrel was in truth over who would

  have the option of obtaining two of the major Phoenician cities, for Sidon and

  Tyre remained under Demetrius’ control (cf. Plut. Demetr. 22.9). Fearing Seleucus’

  future activities, Ptolemy now arranged marriage alliances with both Cassander

  and Lysimachus. While Antigonus was dead and his vast empire was now being

  divided up, his son Demetrius was still very much alive. While his land forces had been seriously diminished (Plut. Demetr. 30.2), his fleet, the largest in the Aegean, was still intact. Cyprus (cf. Plut. Demetr. 25.6), the Phoenician cities of Tyre and Sidon (Plut. Demetr. 32.10), and his League of Islanders remained steadfast.7 It is difficult to know how much of his father’s vast treasure he retained, but given the loyalty of the fleet and his army, it was probably a fair share. After al , charisma only goes so far. Demetrius at first fled to Ephesus (Plut. Demetr. 30.2), but planned on moving back to Greece and basing himself in Athens, but while he was in the

  Cyclades an Athenian delegation arrived informing him that the Athenians had

  determined that they would be neutral with respect to the “kings,” and would

  admit none of the Diadochs into their city. The Athenians moved to cement rela-

  tionships with the other Diadochs, with envoys being sent to both Cassander ( IG

  II2 641; Habicht 1997: 82) and Lysimachus ( Syl .3 362; IG II2 657; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 204).8 Demetrius was further informed by the Athenians that his

  wife Deidameia had been moved from Athens to Megara, but her journey into

  exile had been accompanied by appropriate pomp and circumstance (Plut. Demetr.

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  30.4–6). Elsewhere in the Greek peninsula “his garrisons” were being expelled, as the cities began to make accommodations with Cassander (Plut. Demetr. 31.1).

  While Plutarch speaks of Demetrius’ garrisons, it is more likely that what was taking place was that exiles sympathetic to Cassander were being readmitted to the cities.

  It would appear that Demetrius had garrisoned very few cities. The situation in

  much of Greece was likely reflected in the unrest in Athens itself. Here a popular demagogue, Lachares, an al y of Cassander (Paus. 1.25.7; Ferguson 1929; Habicht

  1997: 82–3), took control of the city through his command of the mercenaries in

  Athenian employ, probably in the spring of 300 ( P. Oxy. 2082 = FGrH 257a F-1). He did, however, lose control of Piraeus to those opposed to his usurpation of power ( P. Oxy. 2082 = FGrH 257a F-2–3; Polyaen. 4.7.5). It is likely that much of the Greek world was now convulsed by similar internal political divisions.

  Demetrius left Pyrrhus behind in charge of his dwindling possessions in Greece

  and proceeded to the Chersonese, where he ravaged lands belonging to Lysimachus

  (Plut. Demetr. 31.2–4; Pyrrh. 4.5; Polyaen. 4.12.1). None of the latter’s erstwhile allies came to the Thracian dynast’s defense. Plutarch ( Demetr. 31.4) relates that, while he was no more objectionable than Demetrius, Lysimachus was currently

  more powerful and hence to be left on his own. Pyrrhus likely used Corinth, where an Antigonid garrison was in place (Diod. 20.103.3), as his base of operations.

  That Demetrius still regarded himself as a king and was so regarded by others is

  testimony to that interesting aspect of this new age. Demetrius was a king without a country. Nothing could more plainly speak to the truth of Diadoch kingship.

  Demetrius, more than any other of the contenders, is the epitome of the nature of political power at this time. Why after the debacle at Ipsus was he still a contender?

  Of course, an equal y interesting question is: why did the death of Antigonus bring about the col apse of his empire and its division among the victors? Armies were

  the true basis for power. Antigon
us’ attempt to secure a power base among the

  Greek cities is a case in point. While he was powerful and helped particular factions overcome their enemies, he was a savior and a god. The loyalty did not often transcend the power. Most were all too willing to al y themselves with the winners.

  Power was military strength and the wealth to pay one’s soldiers and reward one’s allies. Troops responded to charismatic and successful leadership, and, in particular, to well-financed charismatic leadership. Kingdoms were turf. Everything was

  spear-won or spear-lost land. Land, troops, treasure – all were simply the spoils to be won or lost in war.

  In 300, with Demetrius at large in the Aegean and Seleucus a special concern,

  Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Cassander formed a new alliance. This one was cemented

  through marriage. Lysimachus divorced his wife and married Arsinoë, the young

  daughter of his new partner in Egypt. His eldest son, Agathocles, also married

  a daughter of Ptolemy, Lysandra (Plut. Demetr. 31.3–5; Just 15.4.24). Seleucus, seeing that a coalition was forming that could easily turn on him, sent to Demetrius asking for the hand of Stratonice, his daughter by Phila, in marriage. Demetrius, elated by this bolt from the blue, immediately sailed with his daughter and fleet to Syria. On his way he stopped in Cilicia, where he harassed the new satrap,

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  Pleistarchus, the brother of Cassander, and stopping at Cyinda he emptied that

  treasury of its last 1200 talents. He and Seleucus met at Rhosus in Syria with much royal pomp, after which Seleucus departed for Antioch with his new bride. This

  marriage has a peculiar history. In 293, Antiochus, Seleucus’ son by Apama, fell

  in love with his stepmother, Stratonice. His obliging father now in a very public ceremony, in which he also declared his son to be king of the upper satrapies, gave the young woman to his son in marriage, declaring her now to be the queen of

  the upper satrapies (Plut. Demetr. 38; App. Syr. 59–61; Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993: 24–5).

  Demetrius returned to Cilicia and took possession of that region, sending his

  wife Phila to her brother Cassander to try and smooth things over with respect to the expulsion of Pleistarchus. Seleucus next arranged an alliance between Ptolemy and Demetrius, with Demetrius becoming betrothed to another of Ptolemy’s

  daughters, Ptolemais (Plut. Demetr. 31.3–32.7). The marriage, however, would not take place until 287. Why Seleucus would be arranging an alliance between

  these two individuals is unclear, especial y since he was soon to make rather

  pointed requests of Demetrius regarding lands under the latter’s control, lands

  that were contested between Seleucus and Ptolemy. Perhaps these alliances were

  aimed at Lysimachus, who had emerged from the shadows as a major player in

  Diadoch affairs.

  Pyrrhus was sent to Egypt as a hostage for Demetrius’ good behavior. Here, he

  both impressed his host and his host’s young wife Berenice (Plut. Pyrrh. 4.6–7).

  She was the cousin of Ptolemy’s wife Eurydice, the daughter of Antipater, and had served as a lady-in-waiting for her cousin before catching the eye of Ptolemy

  (Carney 2000: 173–4). While in Egypt, Pyrrhus had married Berenice’s daughter

  by a previous husband, Antigone (Plut. Pyrrh. 4.7). Both Ptolemy and Demetrius were polygamists, as was Pyrrhus later (Plut. Pyrrh. 9.1). Ptolemy married at least three times. He had married Altacama in the famous marriages that took place in

  Susa in 324 (Arr. Anab. 7.4.6), but this wife disappears from the record, and may have been divorced. Probably in 321, he had married one of Antipater’s many

  daughters, Eurydice, and later he married Berenice (Paus. 1.6.8). The alliances

  supposedly cemented by these marriages arranged by Seleucus broke down almost

  as soon as they were formed. Seleucus requested that Demetrius sell to him the

  newly conquered Cilicia, and when the latter refused, he demanded the surrender

  of Tyre and Sidon instead (Plut. Demetr. 32.10). Demetrius, in 298 or 297, secured his possessions in Asia with garrisons and sailed to Attica to overthrow Lachares’

  tyranny (Plut. Demetr. 33.1).

  Demetrius’ first attempt to secure the ouster of Lachares failed due to the

  destruction of most of his fleet and the deaths of a great many of his men in a

  storm off the coast of Attica. Without his fleet and with the loss of much of his army, his attack on Athens failed (Plut. Demetr. 33.2). While the date of the attempt is disputed, if the attack occurred in 297, then Demetrius was likely

  encouraged to retrieve Athens by the death of Cassander in the spring of 297

  ([Euseb. Chron.] FGrH 260 F-3.4; P. Oxy. 2082 = FGrH 257a F-3). There is no

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  reference to any interference from Cassander in Demetrius’ attack on Attica.

  The ruler of Macedonia and the son of Antipater died of disease,9 having pre-

  viously designated his son Philip, now Philip IV, as his heir (Plut. Demetr.

  36.1; Just. 15.4.24).

  After his initial failed assault on Athens, Demetrius ordered his shipyards in

  the Phoenician cities and in Cyprus to prepare a new fleet, while he traveled to the Peloponnesus, where he attacked the city of Messene. Here he was wounded,

  receiving a bolt from a catapult that struck his jaw. After recovering and apparently failing to achieve his goal against Messene, he regained the allegiance of other

  communities in the Peloponnesus that had revolted from him. Following these

  operations he returned to Attica, and having seized both Eleusis and Rhamnous,

  proceeded to besiege the city itself (Plut. Demetr. 33.4–5; Polyaen. 4.6.5). To ensure a successful siege, he interdicted all grain ships heading for the city, bringing famine to the inhabitants. Due to the arrival of Demetrius’ new fleet, a relief force from Ptolemy failed to break the stranglehold Demetrius had on the city. With this failure Lachares fled the city, escaping to Thebes, and Demetrius “freed” the city for a second time in April of 294 (Plut. Demetr. 33.1–34.1; Polyaen. 3.7.1–3, 4.7.5; IG II2 646, lines 1–5; Thonemann 2005: 64–6). However, in a variation on an old theme Demetrius had chased out another tyrant but one who had risen as a

  popular leader, and the restored freedom was under a mildly oligarchic government (Shear 1978: 52–5; Habicht 1979: 28–30). Garrisons were also installed on the

  hill of the Muses in Athens and in Piraeus (Plut. Demetr. 34.4–7; Paus. 1.25.8); so much for Greek freedom and the new league’s constitution. Having secured

  Athens, Demetrius now returned to the Peloponnesus, where he invaded Laconia,

  enjoying great success. He defeated the Spartans in two battles and apparently was near the conquest of Sparta itself. But news from the north was going to pull him away from his Spartan campaign (Plut. Demetr. 35.1–3).

  In Macedonia, after the death of Cassander, his son Philip (IV) had succeeded to

  the throne only to die four months later of the same malady that had afflicted his father ( P. Oxy. 2082 = FGrH 257a F-3; [Euseb. Chron.] FGrH 260 F-3.4; Plut. Demetr.

  36.1). The result was a struggle for the throne between his two younger brothers, Alexander and Antipater. The boys’ mother, Thessalonice, insisted that the two

  brothers share the rule. The kingdom was partitioned, with Alexander receiving

  the western part and Antipater the east.10 The mother’s preference was for the

  younger Alexander, over the 16-year-old Antipater. This particular dual monarchy

  lasted only two and a half years ( FGrH 260 F-3.4). The crisis was precipitated by Antipater’s murder of his mother. The young Alexander then, fearing for not only

  his share of the kingdom but also for his life, sent letters both to Deme
trius and to Pyrrhus, who was once again king of Epirus (Plut. Demetr. 36.1–2; Pyrrh. 6.3; Paus.

  9.7.3; Diod. 21.7; Just.16.1.5). Given the distances involved and Demetrius’ engagement in the Peloponnesus (Plut. Pyrrh. 6.2), which even though Demetrius ended it, still delayed him, Pyrrhus, coming from Epirus, was the first to respond.

  That Pyrrhus was in Epirus was the result of those excellent relations he had

  established with his host in Egypt. Ptolemy even came to address his correspondence

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  to Pyrrhus as “the father to the son, greetings” (Plut. Pyrrh. 6.8). Ptolemy, in 297, sent the young man and his new wife to Epirus with treasure and an army to enable him to regain his throne (Plut. Pyrrh. 5.1; Paus. 1.11.5). Ptolemy, who still had designs on Greece, hoped to create an al y whose prior history made him less likely to join with Macedonia. Pyrrhus, instead of engaging Neoptolemus, his rival and

  the present king, in battle to secure the throne, formed an alliance with him, and they reigned jointly. Plutarch suggests that Pyrrhus made this bargain because he was afraid that Neoptolemus would appeal either to Macedonia or to Lysimachus

  for assistance. If this was the case for the former seeking to avoid conflict, it was an even stronger incentive for the latter. Pyrrhus had come with forces sent by

  Ptolemy and he was the al y also of Demetrius. As one would expect, the pairing

  did not last long: the two individuals plotted each other’s demise. Neoptolemus

  was party to a plot to poison his rival, but Pyrrhus struck first, inviting the former to dinner and there murdering him (Plut. Pyrrh. 5).

  With the appeal from Alexander, Pyrrhus moved immediately, offering his

  assistance in return for large sections of western Macedonia, including the upper Macedonian province of Tymphaea,11 and the neighboring Macedonian dependencies of Ambracia, Acarnania, and Amphilochia. Alexander, without much

  choice, acceded to these demands. Pyrrhus, true to the bargain, moved with his

  army against Antipater (Plut. Pyrrh. 6.4–5; Demetr. 36.3). This brother, now faced being driven from his own fast-diminishing kingdom, appealed to his