Nietzsche, Friedrich
(1873) “Über Wahrheit und Lüge in außermoralischen Sinn,” unpublished fragment. English translation “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,” in Nietzsche (1954), 42-47.
(1954) The Portable Nietzsche (trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann) (New York: Penguin).
Oddie, Graham
(2008) “Truthlikeness,” in E. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 ed.) ‹‹http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/truthlikeness/››.
Parsons, Charles
(1974) “The Liar Paradox,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 3: 381-412, reprinted with a Postscript in Parsons (1983), 221-267.
(1983) Mathematics in Philosophy: Selected Essays (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
Patterson, Douglas
(2008) (ed.) New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Price, Huw
(1989) Facts and the Function of Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Priest, Graham
(2006) Doubt Truth to Be a Liar (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Putnam, Hilary
(1978) The 1976 John Locke Lectures, in Meaning and the Moral Sciences (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), 7-77.
Quine, W.V.O.
(1990) “Truth,” in Pursuit of Truth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 77-88, reprinted in Lynch (2001), 473-481.
Rahman, Shahid, Tero Tulenheimo, and Emmanuel Genot
(2008) (eds.) Unity, Truth, and the Liar: The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox (Berlin: Springer).
Ramsey, Frank P.
(1927) “Facts and Propositions,” Aristotelian Society Supplement 7: 153-170, reprinted in Blackburn and Simmons (1999), 106-107.
Rayo, Augustin, and Philip Welch
(2007) “Field on Revenge,” in Beall (2007), 234-249.
Richard, Mark
(2008) When Truth Gives Out (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Russell, Bertrand
(1910) “William James's Conception of Truth,” in Philosophical Essays (London: Longmans), 127-149, reprinted in Blackburn and Simmons (1999), 69-82.
Schantz, Richard
(2001) (ed.) What Is Truth? (Berlin: De Gruyter).
Scharp, Kevin
(2007) review of Priest (2006), Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 13: 541-545.
Schmidt, Frederick F.
(1995) Truth: A Primer (Boulder: Westview).
Shapiro, Stewart
(1998) “Truth and Proof: Though Thick and Thin,” Journal of Philosophy 10: 493-521.
(2003) “The Guru, the Logician, and the Deflationist: Truth and Logical Consequence,” Nous 37: 113-132.
Simmons, Keith
(1993) Universality and the Liar: An Essay on Truth and the Diagonal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Smith, Nicholas
(2008) Vagueness and Degrees of Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Soames, Scott
(1984) “What Is a Theory of Truth?” Journal of Philosophy 8: 411-429.
(1999) Understanding Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
(2008) “Truthmakers?” Philosophical Books 4: 317-327.
(2010) Philosophy of Language (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
Strawson, Peter F.
(1950) “Truth,” Aristotelian Society Supplement 24: 129-156, reprinted in Blackburn and Simmons (1999), 162-182, also in Lynch (2001), 447-471.
Stoljar, Daniel, and Nic Damnjanovic
(2009) “The Deflationary Theory of Truth,” in E. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 ed.) ‹‹http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/truth-deflationary/››.
Tappenden, Jamie
(1993) “The Liar and Sorites Paradoxes: Toward a Unified Treatment,” Journal of Philosophy 90: 551-577.
Tappolet, Christine
(1997) “Mixed Inferences: A Problem for Pluralism about Truth Predicates,” Analysis 57: 209-210.
Tarski, Alfred
(1935) “Der Wahrheitsbegriff in die formalisierten Sprachen,” Studia Philosophica 1: 261-405, English translation “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages,” in Tarski (1956), 152-278.
(1956) Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923 to 1938 (trans. J. H. Woodger) (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Visser, Albert
(1989) “Semantics and the Liar Paradox,” in Gabbay and Guenthner (1989), 617-706.
Walker, Ralph
(1989) The Coherence Theory of Truth: Realism, Anti-Realism, Idealism (London: Routledge).
Walton, Kendall
(1990) Mimesis as Make-Believe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).
Welch, Philip
(2009) “Games for Truth,” Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 15: 410-427.
Wright, Crispin
(1992) Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).
Yaqub, Aladdin M.
(1993) The Liar Speaks the Truth: A Defense of the Revision Theory of Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Young, James O.
(2008) “The Coherence Theory of Truth,” in E. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 ed.)‹‹ http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/truth-coherence/››.
Index
The index that appeared in the print version of this title does not match the pages in your eBook. Please use the search function on your eReading device to search for terms of interest. For your reference, the terms that appear in the print index are listed below.
A-notions
abbreviation
abstract particulars, see features
Aczel, Peter
alethic notions
Alexinus of Elis
Alston, William
antirealism see also Dummett, Michael
approximate truth
Aristotle and Aristotelianism
arithmetic Armour-Garb, Bradley
Armstrong, David
assertion see also A-notions
atomic sentences and formuals
Austin, J. L.
axiomatic theories of truth
bald one (phalakros) paradox
Barker, John
Bar-On, Dorit
Barwise, Jon
Beall, J. C.
beliefs; see also disqualification strategy
Belnap, Nuel D., Jr.
Berry's paradox
biconditionals
bivalence
Blackburn, Simon
Blamey, Stephen
Blanshard, Brand
blind assertion
Boghossian, Paul
bound vs free variables
Brandom, Robert
Bryan, William Jennings
Burali-Forti paradox
Burge, Tyler
Burgess, A. G.
Burgess, J. P.
Candlish, Stewart
Cantor, Georg; his paradox
categorical vs hypothetical use of rules
causal theories
Chihara, Charles
Church's theorem
code numbers
coextensiveness
coherence theory coherent partial valuation
color, see vagueness
complexity
composition laws
conceptualism
conditionals
congruence theories
conjunction
consistency strength
context of assessment, see truth relativism
contextualism
contradiction, see inconsistency
correctness of nonlinguistic representations
correlation theories
correspondence theories,
Curry's paradox
Damnjanovic, Nic
David, Marian
Davidson, Donald, and Davidsonianism
Dedekind, Richard
defeatism
definition and definability; see
also recursive vs direct definition
deflationism vs inflationism
denial strategy
denotation see also reference
dependency strategy
Descartes, René
descriptive vs demonstative conventions
determinateness
deviance strategy
Devitt, Michael
Dewey, John
dialethism, see paraconsistency
direct definition, see recursive vs direct definition
disjunction
disjunction introduction and disjunctive syllogism, rules of
disqualification strategy
disquotationalism
Dodd, Julian
domain of quantification variance of
doublespeak strategy
Dummett, Michael, and Dummettianism
Eklund, Matti
elimination rules, see introduction and elimination rules
endorsement, speech act of
equivalence principle
Escher, M. C.
Euclidean vs non-Euclidean geometry
extension vs intension
external vs internal logic
Epimenides paradox
epistemicism
equivalence principle
Escher, M. C.
Etchemendy, John
Eubulides of Miletus
Euclid of Alexandria
Euclidean vs (hyperbolic) non-Euclidean geometry
excluded middle, see intuitionism
facts and states of affairs
fallacy of many questions
falsehood
falsehood-teller vs untruth-teller
features
Feferman, Solomon
Field, Hartry
fictionalism
Fitch's paradox of knowability
fixed points; maximum intrinsic minimum
formal correctness
Frankfurt, Harry
free vs bound variables
Frege, Gottlob
Friedman, Harvey
functionalism
fuzzy logic
Gaifman, Haim
games
gaps and gluts; see also trivalent logic
Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel
geometry
Glanzberg, Michael
Gödel, Kurt; his completeness theorem his incompleteness theorems
Greenough, Patrick
Grelling (or heterological) paradox
Grover, Dorothy
Gupta, Anil
Haack, Susan
Habermas, Jürgen
Hajek, Peter
Halbach, Volker
heap (sorites) paradox
Herzberger, Hans
heterological (or Grelling) paradox
Hill, Christopher
holism
homorphism vs isomorphism
horned one (keratines) paradox
Horsten, Leon
Horwich, Paul
hypothetical vs categorical use of rules
I-notions
idealism
identity theory
“iff” abbreviation
immanence vs transcendence
inconsistency, absolute vs negation
inconsistency theories
indeterminacy
indexicals and indexicality
ineffability
inference, see I-notions, rules of inference
insolubles
instantiation
internal vs external logic
interpretation
intrinsic truth
introduction and elimination rules see also T-introduction, T-elimination
intuitionism
James, William
Joachim, H. H.
jump operation
Kant, Immanuel
Ketland, Jeffrey
Kirkham, Richard
Kleene, S. C., see trivalent logic
knowledge: of truth-conditions; of meaning; tacit vs verbalizable see also manifestation
Kölbel, Max
König's paradox
Kremer, Philip
Kripke, Saul
language: first order; interpreted vs uniterpreted; object vs meta-, of thought see also arithmetic geometry
Leeds, Stephen
Leibniz
Lepore, Ernest
Lewis, David
liar (pseudomenos) paradox see also paradoxes
linguists and linguistics; see also metalinguistic negation
logic, see deviance strategy
logical atomism
logical pluralism
logical positivism
logical truths
Löwenheim-Skolem theorem
Ludwig, Kirk
Lynch, Michael
MacFarlane, John
manifestation argument
Martin, Robert
material adequacy
Maudlin, Timothy
McGee, Vann
McGinn, Colin
meaning; see also semantics
Menedemus son of Cleisthenes
Merricks, Trenton
metalanguage vs object language
metalinguistic negation
metaphysical theories of truth see also correspondence theories, truthmaker theories
Millgram, Elijah
minimalism
model theory
Molière (J.-B. Poquelin)
monotonicity
Moore, G. E.
negation; metalinguistic see also trivalent logic
negative existentials
Nietzsche, Friedrich
Nixon-Dean example
nominal vs real definition
normativity
numerals
object language vs metalanguage
Occam's Razor and Eraser
Oddie, Graham
open vs closed terms and formulas
ordinals
orthographic types or tokens
paraconsistency vs paracompleteness
paradigms and foils
paradoxes bald one Berry's Curry's; heap hetero-logical; horned one; liar; postcard; Russell's ; Socrates-Plato
Parsons, Charles
partial valuations and interpretations
Patterson
Peirce, C. S.
performative vs constative speech acts
phlogiston, see presupposition
phonological types or tokens
physicalism
Pilate, Pontius
platitudes or truisms and the truth role
pluralism: alethic; logical
Poincaré, Henri
Truth (Princeton Foundations of Contemporary Philosophy) Page 18