Truth (Princeton Foundations of Contemporary Philosophy)

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Truth (Princeton Foundations of Contemporary Philosophy) Page 19

by Burgess, John P. ; Burgess, Alexis G.


  postcard paradox

  postmodernism

  pragmatism

  prereflective vs reflective stages

  presupposition and presupposition failure, see also strategies of response

  Price, Huw

  Priest, Graham

  Prior, Arthur N.

  properties, pleonastic vs substantive

  prosentences

  prosententialism and neoprosententialism

  propositions see also disqualification strategy

  propositionalism vs sententialism

  pseudomenos (liar) paradox

  Puritan syllogism

  Putnam, Hilary

  quadrivalent logic

  quantification, grammar-defying

  quasi-deflationism

  Quine, Willard Van Orman

  quotation; direct vs indirec marks of

  radical vs moderate deflationism

  Rahman, Shahid

  Ramsey, Frank P.

  Rayo, Augustin real vs nominal definition

  realism usage of the term

  recursive vs direct definition

  redundancy theory

  reference see also causal theories, denotation

  refutation by reductio, rule of

  reiteration, rule of

  rejection, strong vs weak

  relativity and relativism legal; local vs global; moral; see also truth relativism

  revenge

  revision theories

  Richard, Mark

  Richard's paradox

  Ripley, David

  Rorty, Richard

  rules of inference see also introduction and elimination rules

  Russell, Bertrand his paradox

  satisfaction

  Schantz, Richard

  Scharp, Kevin

  schematic reasoning

  self-effacement self-reference in formal languages

  semantic types or tokens

  semantics see also truth-conditions, verification-conditions

  sentences of a formal language see also propositionalism vs sententialism

  set theory and set-theoretic notions

  Shapiro, Stewart

  Sheard, Michael

  Simmons, Keith

  situations

  smidgets

  Smith, Nick

  Soames, Scott

  Socrates-Plato paradox

  sorites (heap) paradox

  speech acts, see doublespeak, performative vs constative

  stable truth and falsehood

  Stoljar, Daniel

  strategies of response, see: defeatism, denial, dependency, deviance disqualification, doublespeak

  Strawson, Peter F.

  strong vs weak affirmation, entailment, rejection, and veracity

  strong trivalent logic, see trivalent logic

  structual description

  subscripts

  supervaluations supervenience of truth on being

  syntax and syntactic notions

  T-biconditionals and T-scheme

  T-introduction and T-elimination

  tacit vs verbalizable knowledge

  Tappenden, James

  Tappolet, Christine

  Tarski, Alfred

  Tarski hierarchy ghost of see also subscripts

  that-clauses

  thick deflationism

  three-valued logic, see trivalent logic

  transcendence vs immanence

  translation and transposition

  trivalent logic (strong)

  tropes, see features

  truisms or platitudes defining the truth role

  truth-conditions and truth-conditional semantics hardcore

  truth predicate

  truth preservation

  truth primitivism

  truth relativism

  truth values see also gaps and gluts

  truthbearers fundamental or primary vs derivative see also propositionalism vs sententialism

  truthmakers

  truth-teller

  types vs tokens

  types, theory of

  under- and overdetermination

  ungroundedness

  universals

  use vs mention

  utility untruth-teller vs falsehood-teller

  vagueness, see also strategies of response

  valuations

  value of truth see also utility

  Van Fraassen, Bas, see super-valuations

  variables

  verification-conditions and verification-conditional semantics

  virtus dormitiva

  Visser, Albert

  Walker, Ralph

  Walton, Kendall

  warranted assertability

  Welch, Philip

  winning a game

  Wittgenstein, Ludwig

  Woodruff, Peter

  Wright, Crispin

  Yablo, Steve

  Yaqub, Alladin

  Young, James

  Содержание

  Preface

  Acknowledgments

  CHAPTER ONE

  Introduction

  1.1 Traditional Theories

  1.2 Contemporary Theories

  1.3 Paradoxes

  1.4 Plan

  1.5 Sentences

  1.6 Propositions

  CHAPTER TWO

  Tarski

  2.1 “Semantic” Truth

  2.2 Object Language vs Metalanguage

  2.3 Recursive Definition

  2.4* Direct Definition

  2.5* Self-Reference

  2.6* Model Theory

  CHAPTER THREE

  Deflationism

  3.1 Redundancy

  3.2 Other Radical Theories

  3.3 Disquotation

  3.4 Other Moderate Theories

  3.5 Sloganeering

  3.6 Reference

  CHAPTER FOUR

  Indeterminacy

  4.1 Presupposition

  4.2 Vagueness

  4.3 Denial, Disqualification, Deviance

  4.4 Doublespeak, Dependency, Defeatism

  4.5 Relativity

  4.6 Local vs Global

  CHAPTER FIVE

  Realism

  5.1 Realism vs Deflationism

  5.2 Correspondence Theories

  5.3 Truthmaker Theories

  5.4 Physicalism

  5.5 Utility

  5.6 Normativity

  CHAPTER SIX

  Antirealism

  6.1 Meaning and Truth

  6.2 Davidsonianism

  6.3 Dummettianism vs Davidsonianism

  6.4 Dummettianism vs Deflationism

  6.5 Holism

  6.6 Pluralism

  CHAPTER SEVEN

  Kripke

  7.1 Kripke vs Tarski

  7.2 The Minimum Fixed Point

  7.3 Ungroundedness

  7.4* The Transfinite Construction

  7.5* Revision

  7.6* Axiomatics

  CHAPTER EIGHT

  Insolubility?

  8.1 Paradoxical Reasoning

  8.2 “Revenge”

  8.3 Logical “Solutions”

  8.4 “Paraconsistency”

  8.5 Contextualist “Solutions”

  8.6 Inconsistency Theories

  Further Reading

  Bibliography

  Index

 

 

 


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