The Dictator's Handbook

by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita

  Acknowledgments

  The Dictator’s Handbook is the culmination of nearly two decades of research into the motivation and constraints of leaders. We owe a huge debt of gratitude to friends, colleagues, coauthors, and critics who have helped sharpen our understanding of what makes the world tick and given us insight into how it can be made to tick more smoothly.

  In academic circles, our work has become known as selectorate theory. Together with two other founders of this way of thinking, Randolph Siverson and James Morrow, we published a comprehensive exposition of the theory, The Logic of Political Survival, in 2003 with MIT Press. That massive 500-plus page tome was full of mathematical models and complex statistical tests. Although we readily admit it is not an easy read, it is the most comprehensive statement of the theory. However, it was not the origin; nor was it the finale.

  The genesis of selectorate theory was Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randy Siverson’s foray into examining what happens to leaders after they fight wars. Surprisingly, no one had systematically looked at how winning or losing wars affects leader survival. Given their background in international relations, Bruce and Randy continued to pursue warrelated topics, and brought in James Morrow and Alastair Smith—and the collaborative team of BdM2S2 was born. In 1999 the four of us published “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace” in the American Political Science Review. This paper offered a solution to what at the time was the dominant question in international relations: why don’t democratic nations fight each other? Many of the existing theories relied on asserting different normative motivations for democrats and autocrats. Unfortunately, all too often democrats act contrary to these alleged higher values. In contrast, selectorate theory assumed leaders had the same objective, to stay in power, and what differentiated democrats from autocrats was that the former’s dependence on a large coalition of supporters means democrats direct state resources to winning wars. Autocrats enhance their survival by hoarding resources to pay off cronies, even if this means losing the war. What started off as a desire to know why democracies don’t fight each other ended up telling us how nations fight and what they fight over. As science is supposed to do, the answer to one problem provides answers to other problems and ends up posing a new set of questions.

  In 2002, BdM2S2 published a mathematical representation of the selectorate theory, “Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders,” in the British Journal of Political Science. We further refined this model and then tested its predictions. This material became the basis for The Logic of Political Survival. Since its publication we have continued to advance the theory. In articles in the Journal of Conflict Resolution in 2007 and International Organization in 2009, we examined how nations trade aid for policy concessions. Recent extensions of the mathematical model incorporate revolutionary movements and have been published in the Journal of Politics in 2008, Comparative Political Studies in 2009, and the American Journal of Political Science in 2010.

  Selectorate theory offers a powerful, yet simple to use, model of politics. It forms the basis for the models in Punishing the Prince, for instance. That book, by Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith, examines how leaders sanction leaders in other states. By targeting punishments at leaders rather than the nations they represent, a leader leverages the effectiveness of their state’s policies in three ways. First, such mechanisms provide an explicit means through which to restore relations between states. Second, they encourage the citizens in targeted nations to remove their leaders in order to restore cooperation. Third, since leaders fear removal, the threat of such targeted punishments encourage leaders to abide by international norms in the first place. By focusing on the interactions of leaders instead of thinking of international cooperation as only between nations, Fiona enriched our understanding of interstate relations. As was characteristic of her scholarship, she asked questions that no one else had thought to ask and provided elegant answers that pushed scholarship in new directions. For instance, she examined how the dynamics of trade flows between nations depend upon the turnover of their national leaders. She found that the replacement of autocrats systematically altered trade flows in predictable ways.

  Punishing the Prince was published in 2008, just a few days before Fiona died. She is missed every day by everyone who knew her, but most especially by Alastair and their three children, Angus, Duncan, and Molly. She was both our greatest supporter and harshest critic. Fiona endured a long and terrible illness, but her humor and spirit never failed even in her darkest hour. She died waiting on a transplant list. Please sign your donor card. The doctors and nurses at Columbia-Presbyterian hospital and elsewhere, and especially Erika Berman-Rosenzweig and Nazzareno Galiè gave us extra time with her; they have our profound thanks. Although she ruled Alastair’s life with a rod of iron, Fiona was the embodiment of a benevolent dictator.

  Developing selectorate theory and writing this book have been a huge undertaking that we could never have done without the assistance of others. Randolph Siverson and James Morrow have been our collaborators from the start and many of the ideas presented here are as much theirs as ours. Financial support is also vital for any research and early developments of selectorate theory benefited from generous grants from the National Science Foundation. We also wish to thank Roger Hertog for his support through the Alexander Hamilton Center for Political Economy at New York University.

  Hans Hoogeveen, formerly Chief Economist for the World Bank in Tanzania, commissioned a study applying the selectorate framework to help explain why the World Bank’s efforts in Tanzania had not been as successful as they had hoped. The opportunity to do that study helped sharpen our own understanding of selectorate theory and proved essential to advancing our views on the formation of blocs of interests, whether ethnic, linguistic, geographic, or occupational. The work undertaken at Hans’s request was a great stimulus for us and we are most appreciative of his support and the opportunity he gave us. Our current employer, New York University, is a superb organization that has never hesitated in supporting our research and teaching. We are also grateful to the Hoover Institution, Yale University, and Washington University in St. Louis for their support. The generosity of such organizations has allowed us to benefit from superb research assistance. Alexandra Bear and especially Michal Harari greatly assisted us in preparing materials for this book.

  Colleagues, students, and friends always improve any endeavor, especially when they are critics as well as supporters; and this book is no exception. We are truly fortunate to be connected to such a wonderful network of scholars and friends from whom we learn everyday. Conversations with Neal Beck, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, George Downs, William Easterly, Sandy Gordon, Mik Laver, Jim Morrow, Lisa Howie, Jeff Jensen, Yanni Kotsonis, Alex Quiroz-Flores, Shinasi Rama, Peter Rosendorff, Harry Roundell, Shanker Satyanath, John Scaife, Randy Siverson, Alan Stam, Federico Varesse, James Vreeland, Leonard Wantchekon, and many others helped shape this book.

  Much of our previous work has been aimed at an academic audience. Writing a “readable” book is a very different enterprise. Fortunately Eric Lupfer, our agent, took us under his wing. He worked tirelessly with us on structure, style, and presentation, and he fixed us up with a phenomenal press. PublicAffairs has been superbly supportive throughout the process. Their entire team has helped us and supported us every step of the way. We thank Brandon Proia who made the book more readable, clearer, and more tightly argued than it would otherwise have been; and, in alphabetical order, Lindsay Jones, Lisa Kaufman, Jamie Leifer, Clive Priddle, Melissa Raymond, Anais Scott, Susan Weinberg, and Michelle Welsh-Horst, each of whom contributed mightily to improving our book. Alas, we cannot hold them responsible for its continued failing, for which Alastair and Bruce acknowledge that the other is responsible.

  Of all the organizations we study, the ones we care most about are family. These are the people that brighten our world: Ethan and Rebecca and Abraham and Hannah; Erin and Jason and Nathan and Cl
ara; Gwen and Adam and Isadore; Angus, Duncan and Molly. And most of all, we thank Arlene and Fiona, to whom we dedicate this book and ourselves.

  Our fondest hope is for the well-being and success of those who imperil their lives to keep dictators in check.

  Notes

  Mobutu Sese Seko quote, p. vi: “Mwalimu Nyerere: ‘How I Weep for Arusha Declaration!’” Arusha Times, October 8, 2005, 390.

  Introduction

  1 For information on Bell, California, houses and residents, see http://www.city-data.com/housing/houses-Bell-California.html.

  2 “Bell Council Seeks Resignation of 3 City Officials,” Los Angeles Times Local section, July 21, 2010. Available at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-721-bell-20100721,0,3475382.story.

  3 The coach of Army’s football team makes substantially more than the president despite Army’s up and down record on the football field in recent years!

  4 See http://www.coacheshotseat.com/JeffTedford.htm.

  5 See http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/07/bell-paid-huge-salariesresidents-paid-huge-tax-bills-records-show.html for the details.

  6 They, in turn, could target benefits to their essential voters. We can only wonder whether the people receiving housing grants, for example, made up the bulk of the city council’s supporting voters. With a secret ballot there is no way to know, although if Bell’s votes were reported by neighborhood we probably could come close to seeing the pairing of electoral support and the prospects of receiving special rewards, like housing grants.

  7 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (New York: Cambridge University Press,1996 [1651]), 131.

  8 Nicoló Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses, ed. Max Learner (New York: The Modern Library, 1950 [1532]), 256.

  9 James Madison, “Federalist 10,” in The Federalist, ed. Jacob Cooke (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 62.

  10 Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, The Spirit of Laws, ed. Edward Wallace Carrithers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977 [1748]), 176.

  11 Robert Woodward, Obama’s War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010); Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969).

  12 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).

  Chapter 1: The Rules of Politics

  1 Those interested in seeing rigorous proofs for the logic behind the claims made here should see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), and subsequent works cited throughout this volume.

  2 John Cloud, “The Pioneer Harvey Milk,” Time, July 14, 1999, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,991276,00.html.

  3 The sources for the fate of Castro’s close allies are Volker Skierka, Fidel Castro: A Biography (Polity Press: Cambridge, 2004), 68–91; Georgie Anne Geyer, Guerrilla Prince (Kansas City: Little Brown and Co., 1991), 191–315; Frank Fernandez, Cuban Anarchism: The History of a Movement, translated by Charles Bufe (Tucson, AZ: Sharp Press, 2001), 75–93; George Dominguez, “Cuba Since 1959,” in Cuba: A Short History, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 95–149; and PBS http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/castro/filmmore/fr.html.

  4 Emma Larkin, Everything is Broken: A Tale of Catastrophe in Burma (New York: Penguin Press, 2010).

  5 Alexandros Tegos, “To Leave or Not to Leave? On the Assumption of Political Survival,” Working Paper, Alexander Hamilton Center for Political Economy, New York University Department of Politics, April 15, 2008.

  Chapter 2: Coming to Power

  1 We draw heavily on the following accounts: Ryszard Kapuscinski, The Shadow of the Sun (New York: Vintage books, 2001); Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005), chapter 29; and http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,924057-2,00.html.

  2 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, talk given to a large investment group’s portfolio committee, May 5, 2010, New York, New York.

  3 Lawrence K. Altman, “The Shah’s Health: A Political Gamble,” New York Times Magazine, May 17, 1981, pp. 5–17.

  4 Meredith, The Fate of Africa, 150.

  5 S. E. Finer, The History of Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

  6 Sources for the analysis of Pope Damasus I include Michael Walsh, Butler’s Lives of the Saints (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), 413; Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. 1 (New York: Modern Library, n.d.), 866, n84; “Pope St. Damasus I,” Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1913), Letter of Jerome to Pope Damasus, vol. 2, 376; Henry Chadwick, The Pelican History of the Church—1: The Early Church (London: Penguin Press, 1978); Williston Walker, A History of the Christian Church (New York: General Books, 2010); Diarmaid McCulloch, History of Christianity: The First Three Thousand Years (London: Viking, 2009).

  7 Averil Cameron and Peter Garnsey, eds., The Cambridge Ancient History: The Late Empire, A.D. 337–425 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 103.

  8 Ryszard Kapuscinski, The Soccer War (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), 113–114.

  9 The discussion of Gorbachev’s fall and Yeltsin’s rise is based on the analysis in Kiron Skinner, Serhiy Kudelia, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and Condoleezza Rice, The Strategy of Campaigning (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2007).

  10 See Ernesto Dal Bó, Pedro Dal Bó, and Jason Snyder, “Political Dynasties,” Review of Economic Studies 76, no. 1 (January 2009): 115–142.

  11 The champion for winning the presidency with little popular support was John Quincy Adams, who received less than 31 percent of the popular vote. He won in a multiparty race by clever maneuvering in America’s odd system, in which popular votes, especially in the country’s early days, did not translate directly into support in the electoral college or, when no one wins there, in the House of Representatives.

  Chapter 3: Staying in Power

  1 Italo Calvino, Under the Jaguar Sun (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1986), 36.

  2 See, for instance, Andrew Ward, Karen Bishop, and Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, “Pyrrhic Victories: The Cost to the Board of Ousting the CEO,” Journal of Organizational Behavior 20 (1999): 767–781; see also Joann Lublin, “CEO Tenure, Stock Gains Often Go Hand-in-Hand,” Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2010. Accessed at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703900004575325172681419254.html.

  3 The chairman and CEO in 1999 was Lewis Platt. His board included Philip M. Condit, Patricia C. Dunn, Thomas E. Everhart, John B. Fery, Jean-Paul G. Gimon, Sam Ginn, Richard A. Hackborn, Walter B. Hewlett, George A. Keyworth II, David M. Lawrence, Susan P. Orr, David W. Packard, and Robert P. Wayman.

  4 Carly Fiorina, “The Case for the Merger,” Speech at the Goldman Sachs Technology Conference, Palm Springs, California, February 4, 2002.

  5 See Bay Fang, “Saddam’s Secret to Survival” at http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthreat.php?17319-Saddams-secret-to-survival-kill-your-foes-real-or-imagined.

  6 See Edward Mortimer, “The Thief of Baghdad,” New York Review of Books, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1990/sep/27/the-thief-of-baghdad/?page=2. See also Fuad Matar, Saddam Hussein, the Man, the Cause and the Future (London: Third World Centre, 1981).

  7 See Patrick Cockburn, “Chemical Ali: The End of an Overlord,” The Independent, June 25, 2007. Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/5n4hnapFg. Part of Saddam Hussein’s mercifulness was manifested in his allowing al-Bakr to resign rather that executing him, probably seen by Chemical Ali as a show of weakness.

  8 http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/12/iraqs-security-and-intelligence-gutted-in-political-purges-new-cables-show/67431/.

  9 S. E. Finer, The History of Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 643.

  10 Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa (New York: PublicAffairs Press, 2005), 546.

  11 Martin Meredith, O
ur Votes, Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe (New York: PublicAffairs, 2002).

  12 Ibid., 69.

  13 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Report on Tanzania’s Economic and Political Performance: Helping Tanzania Do Better,” Study prepared for the World Bank, April 20, 2009.

  14 Alastair Smith and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Contingent Prize Allocation and Pivotal Voting,” British Journal of Political Science, 2012, forthcoming.

  15 See Richard L. Park and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, India’s Political System, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1979); and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Strategy, Risk and Personality in Coalition Politics: The Case of India (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

  16 See Bueno de Mesquita, Strategy, Risk and Personality, 75.

  17 Milton K. Rakove, Don’t Make No Waves, Don’t Back No Losers: An Insider’s Analysis of the Daley Machine (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1975), 16.

  18 Waikeung Tam, “Clientelist Politics in Singapore: Selective Provision of Housing Services as an Electoral Mobilization Strategy,” University of Chicago, 2003, typescript.

  19 The figure is based on leader time in office from Archigos. Winning coalition measure is based on Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), with large coalitions coded as 1, the highest category.

  Chapter 4: Steal from the Poor, Give to the Rich

  1 Several scholars have examined how institutions affect transparency and the availability of data. See, for instance, James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff, and James Raymond Vreeland, Democracy and Transparency, Working paper, 2010; also see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).