The Wizards of Langley

by Jeffrey T Richelson

  110 . Ibid., pp. 16–17.

  111 . Nicholas R. Garofalo, “Present and Future Capabilities of OTH Radars,” Studies in Intelligence 13, 2 (Spring 1969): 53–61 at 55.

  112 . Ibid.; “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran,” August 25, 1965, in Nina D. Howland (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXII: Iran (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), pp. 166–167.

  113 . “The Indian Connection,” India Today, December 31, 1983, p. 10; Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998. “The Indian Connection” and other sources have reported this device to be aimed at monitoring Chinese nuclear tests. Wheelon and McMahon recalled that the Himalaya project was to monitor telemetry.

  114 . Interview with a former CIA official; Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998.

  115 . Interview with a former CIA official; Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos, Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir of My Years at Lockheed (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994), p. 182.

  116 . Interview with Richard Bissell, Farmington, Connecticut, March 16, 1984.

  117 . Chris Pocock, Dragon Lady: The History of the U-2 Spyplane (Shrewsbury, England: Airlife, 1989), p. 98.

  118 . Ibid.

  119 . Ibid., p. 100; Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954–1974 (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1992), p. 282.

  120 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 282; Pocock, Dragon Lady, p. 100.

  121 . Pocock, Dragon Lady, p. 100.

  122 . Ibid., pp. 100–101; R. E. Lawrence and Harry W. Woo, “Infrared Imagery in Overhead Reconnaissance,” Studies in Intelligence 11, 3 (Summer 1967): 17–40 at 23.

  123 . Pocock, Dragon Lady, p. 111.

  124 . Ibid., pp. 102–103, 111; Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998.

  125 . Ledford interview. An undated, but clearly pre-1963, “Inspector General’s Survey of Air Activities: Summary of Recommendations” (NARA, RG 263, 1998 CIA Release, Box 45, Folder 5), contained the recommendation that the CIA explore “with the U.S. Navy the feasibility and arrangements necessary for staging of missions from aircraft carriers whenever the target lies beyond the range of U.S.-based U-2s.”

  126 . Ledford interview; Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 247–248.

  127 . Pocock, Dragon Lady, pp. 107–109; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 407; interview with a former CIA official.

  128 . Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998.

  129 . David Reade, The Age of Orion: Lockheed P-3, an Illustrated History (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer Military/Aviation History, 1998), p. 104; interview with Robert Singel, Great Falls, Virginia, February 25, 1999.

  130 . Singel interview; Reade, The Age of Orion, p. 105; Wheelon interview, June 14, 1999.

  131 . Reade, The Age of Orion, p. 105.

  132 . Ibid., p. 106.

  133 . McMahon interview; Wayne Mutza, Lockheed P2V Neptune: An Illustrated History (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer Military/Aviation History, 1996), p. 115; Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998; telephone conversation with Albert Wheelon, January 28, 2000.

  134 . Singel interview; Wheelon interview, June 14, 1999.

  135 . Reade, The Age of Orion, p. 106. By November 1965, the CIA was involved in another program to modify P-2V7 aircraft for intelligence purposes. That month, representatives from ORD and OSA visited E-Systems at Greenville, Texas, to explore the possibility of using the planes as multi-sensor platforms. A memo noted that the CIA would likely be able to use such an aircraft for reconnaissance of undefended areas where conventional photography was limited because of dense foliage. A March 1966 memo noted that ORD had been directed to run the program and that “the continuation of any OSA program to achieve a low-altitude multi-sensor capability depends directly on the success or failure of this [effort].”The reference to dense foliage and the fact that the NRO was not providing funds for the program suggest that its primary focus was reconnaissance of Southeast Asian territory in support of CIA covert operations. (“Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Visit to [deleted], Project [deleted], November 22, 1965; Memorandum for: see Distribution, Subject: [deleted] Meetings, March 23, 1966, NARA, RG 263, 1998 CIA Release RG 263, Box 45, Folder 5 [both memos]).

  136 . Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998; Wheelon interview, March 21, 2000.

  137 . Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998.

  138 . Thomas P. McIninch, “The OXCART Story,” Studies in Intelligence 15 (Winter 1971): 1–34 at 17.

  139 . Ibid.

  140 . Ibid., p. 19.

  141 . Ibid., p. 20; Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 300–301.

  142 . McIninch, The OXCART Story, p. 20.

  143 . Ibid., p. 21.

  144 . Ibid.

  145 . Ibid., p. 23.

  146 . Ibid.; Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 301–302.

  147 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 302.

  148 . Ibid., p. 307.

  149 . Ibid.

  150 . Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998.

  151 . Interview with a former CIA official.

  Chapter 4: Space Reconnaissance Wars

  1 . Interview with a former CIA official.

  2 . Interview with Albert Wheelon, Washington, D.C., April 9, 1997.

  3 . Interview with Albert Wheelon, Montecito, California, November 11–12, 1998; Robert Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5: Management of the National Reconnaissance Program, 1960–1965 (Washington, D.C.: NRO, 1969), pp. 123–124n. in NRO CAL Records, 2/A/0066.

  4 . Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, DDCI, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Meeting with Dr. Brockway McMillan, July 23, 1963.

  5 . Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5, p. 120.

  6 . Office of Public Affairs, Secretary of the Air Force, “General Lew Allen Jr.,” September 1981; interview with Gen. Lew Allen Jr., Pasadena, California, June 10, 1999.

  7 . General Lew Allen Jr. interview.

  8 . Roswell Gilpatric, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Mr. McCone’s Concerns Regarding NRO, August 22, 1963.

  9 . Office of Special Projects, 1965–1970, Volume One, Chapters I-II (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1973), pp. 105–106.

  10 . Letter, Albert D. Wheelon, June 17, 1999.

  11 . Jonathan McDowell, “Launch Listings,” in Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell (eds.), Eye in the Sky: The Story of the CORONA Spy Satellites (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998), pp. 235–246 at p. 238.

  12 . Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Director, National Reconnaissance Office, Subject: Policy Guidance on Management Control over Reconnaissance Programs, October 22, 1963, NRO CAL Records, 1/A/0043.

  13 . Brockway McMillan, Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Management of the CORONA Project, October 28, 1963, NRO CAL Records, 1/A/0044.

  14 . Wheelon letter.

  15 . John A. McCone, Memorandum for: General Carter, Dr. Wheelon, September 20, 1963.

  16 . Brockway McMillan, Director, National Reconnaissance Office, Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Management of CORONA Project, December 10, 1963, NRO CAL Records, 1/C/0062; Brockway McMillan, Director, National Reconnaissance Office, Memorandum for Director, NRO Program A, Director, NRO Program B, Subject: Responsibility for Operating Management of the CORONA Project, December 10, 1963, NRO CAL Archives, 1/A/0045.

  17 . Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5, p. 134.

  18 . John A. McCone, Director, to Dr. Brockway McMillan, Director, National Reconnaissance Office, December 13, 1963, NRO CAL Records, 1/A/0047.

  19 . Albert D. Wheel
on, Deputy Director (Science and Technology), Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Recommendation re Fubini’s proposal, February 3, 1964, NRO CAL Records, 1/C/0067.

  20 . Brockway McMillan, Director, National Reconnaissance Office, to John McCone, February 4, 1964.

  21 . Albert D. Wheelon, Deputy Director (Science and Technology), Memorandum for: DCI, DDCI, Subject: Dissolution of CORONA Project Office, March 13, 1964, NRO CAL Records 1/C/0070.

  22 . Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, DDCI, August 28, 1964, NRO CAL Records 1/A/0063.

  23 . Cyrus R. Vance to John McCone, October 15, 1964, NRO CAL Records; [Deleted] to Albert Wheelon, October 22, 1964, NRO CAL Records, 1/C/0064.

  24 . Brig. Gen. Jack Ledford, USAF Assistant Director, Special Activities, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Unsolved Management and Relationship, November 9, 1964, NRO CAL Records, 1/C/0087.

  25 . John A. McCone, Memorandum for: Honorable Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Subject: CIA Program B Participation in CORONA, November 17, 1964, NRO CAL Records, 1/A/0079.

  26 . Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Deputy Director, to Dr. Brockway McMillan, Director, National Reconnaissance Office, November 17, 1964, NRO CAL Records, 1/A/0080.

  27 . Directorate of Science and Technology, CIA, CORONA Program History, Volume II: Governmental Activities, May 19, 1976, pp. 1–19, in NRO CAL Records, 2/A/0089.

  28 . Brockway McMillan to [Deleted], June 14, 1965, NRO CAL Records, 1/A/0010.

  29 . “Examples of the Air Force Impacts on the CORONA Program,” March 31, 1965, NRO CAL Records, 1/C/0010.

  30 . Marshall S. Carter, Lt. Gen. USA, Deputy Director, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Meeting with Mr. Vance and Dr. McMillan, on Thursday, 25 March, March 26, 1965, NRO CAL Records, 1/A/0096.

  31 . Ibid.; Jackson D. Maxey, Chief, Special Projects Staff, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Fact Sheet Regarding the Allegation That Since August 1964 CIA Has Been Withholding Payload Data from the Air Force in the CORONA Program, March 25, 1965, in NRO CAL Records, 1/C/0099.

  32 . Carter, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Meeting Mr. Vance and Dr. McMillan.

  33 . Ibid.

  34 . “Robert Harry Mathams—Hands-on Intelligence Analyst,” n.d.

  35 . Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998.

  36 . Ibid.

  37 . Interview with Roy Burks, North Potomac, Maryland, May 10, 1999; Sayre Stevens, “The Soviet BMD Program,” in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz (eds.), Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984), pp. 182–220 at 192.

  38 . United States of America, Plaintiff v. William Peter Kampiles, Defendant, United States District Court, Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division, Testimony of Leslie Dirks, November 13, 1978, p. 4.

  39 . Burks interview; Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998.

  40 . Public Affairs Staff, “Biographical Information on William J. Perry,” April 15, 1999; Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998; CIA Public Affairs Staff, “DCI Tenet Presents Dr. William J. Perry with Prestigious R. V. Jones Intelligence Award,” April 15, 1999. In presenting him with the award, DCI George Tenet noted Perry’s “leadership in promoting, modifying, and upgrading our national SIGINT capabilities are legendary.” (CIA Public Affairs Staff, “DCI Tenet Presents Dr. William J. Perry with Prestigious R. V. Jones Intelligence Award,” April 15, 1999.)

  41 . Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998; Desmond Ball, Pine Gap: Australia and the U.S. Geostationary SIGINT Satellite Program (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988), p. 13; Desmond Ball, A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1980), p. 73; Philip Klass, “U.S. Monitoring Capability Impaired,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 14, 1979, p. 18; telephone conversation with Albert Wheelon, February 8, 2000. Wheelon later recalled how some subordinates told him they were going to establish a committee to pick a code name for the project. Wheelon told them that by the time the name was chosen, the system would be built. Wheelon later noted that he was “impatient, intolerant” with regard to such ”traditional time wasters.” (Albert Wheelon, Washington, D.C., April 9, 1997.)

  42 . Wheelon interview, June 14, 1999.

  43 . McMillan interview; Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998, Christopher Anson Pike, “CANYON, RHYOLITE, and AQUACADE: U.S. Signals Intelligence Satellites in the 1970s,” Spaceflight 37, 11 (November 1995): 381–383; Wheelon telephone interview, April 2, 1997; interview with John McMahon, Los Altos, California, November 17, 1998; Brockway McMillan, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Comments on NRO and NRP, September 30, 1965, pp. 8–9. Both CANYON and RHYOLITE satellites were to orbit the earth once every twenty-four hours—which is what made them geosynchronous. RHYOLITE, but not CANYON, was geostation-ary because with virtually a zero-degree inclination, it essentially hovered over a single point at an altitude of 22,300 miles, whereas CANYONs traced a figure eight—drifting from about ten degrees below the equator to ten degrees above. In addition, the perigee and apogee of the orbit were approximately 19,000 and 24,000 miles.

  44 . Buzard interview.

  45 . Desmond Ball, Pine Gap, p. 55; interview with a former CIA official.

  46 . Desmond Ball, Pine Gap, p. 56.

  47 . Wheelon interview, April 9, 1997; telephone conversation with Albert Wheelon, October 12, 1999.

  48 . President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Memorandum for the President, Subject: National Reconnaissance Program, May 2, 1964, p.2, NRO CAL Records, 6/B/0044.

  49 . Ibid., p. 2.

  50 . Ibid., p. 3.

  51 . Cyrus Vance, Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, Subject: Memorandum for the President, by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, re National Reconnaissance Program, June 2, 1964, LBJ Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, NRO, Box 9.

  52 . J. Patrick Coyne, Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, Subject: National Reconnaissance Program, June 15, 1964, LBJ Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, “NRO,” Box 9.

  53 . Spurgeon M. Keeny Jr., Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, July 2, 1964, LBJ Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, “NRO,” Box 9; telephone interview with Spurgeon Keeny, July 10, 2000; Peter Jessup, “Some Borborygmous Rumblings from the Innards of the NRO,” n.d., LBJ Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, “NRO,” Box 9. Jessup also noted that the CIA-appointed NRO deputy director, Eugene Kiefer, “is even excluded from the NRO communications routing. When the Air Force has wind that McCone will issue a blast at a USIB meeting, McMillan absents himself and sends Kiefer. The tragicomedy then ensues of McCone blasting his own man.”

  54 . McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: National Reconnaissance Program, n. d., LBJ Library, Intelligence File, NRO, Box 9.

  55 . John A. McCone, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Discussion at the NRO Executive Meeting, Attended by McCone, Vance, Fubini, and McMillan, August 12, 1964, NRO CAL Records, 1/A/0062.

  56 . Directorate of Science and Technology, CORONA Program History, Volume II: Governmental Activities, p. 1–18; NRO, Program Directors of the NRO: ABC&D (Chantilly, Va.: NRO, 1999), n.p.; Wheelon interview, April 2, 1997. Wheelon recalled that he established the SPS in fall 1963, shortly after he became Deputy Director for Science and Technology. A CIA listing of DS&T staff and office heads gives July 1964 as the official beginning of the staff. The CORONA Program History cites September 1 as when the existence of SPS became official.

  57 . Albert D. Wheelon, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Memorandum for: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Establishment of a Satellite Office Within the Science and Technology Directorate, February 26, 1965, NRO CAL Records, 2/A/0078.

  58 . Ibid.

  59 . Ibid.

  60 . Office of Special Projects, 1965–1970, Volume One, Chapters I-II (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1973), p. 116.
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  61 . Ibid., p. 118.

  62 . Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5, pp. 186–187.

  63 . Ibid., p. 187.

  64 . Ibid., p. 188.

  65 . Ibid.

  66 . Ibid., p. 189.

  67 . Ibid., pp. 174–175, 189.

  68 . Wheelon letter.

  69 . John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA, from Wild Bill Donovan to William Casey (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), pp. 413n, 730–731; Office of Special Projects, 1965–1970, Volume One, Chapters I-II, p. 120.

  70 . Office of Special Projects, 1965–1970, Volume One, Chapters I-II, p. 6.

  71 . Albert D. Wheelon, “A Summary of the National Reconnaissance Problem,” May 13, 1965, p. 5, NRO CAL Records, 1/D/0008.

  72 . Ibid., pp. 5–6.

  73 . Ibid., p. 6.

  74 . Ibid., pp. 7–10.

  75 . Ibid., pp. 19–21.

  76 . Ibid., p. 21.

  77 . Ibid., pp. 21–22.

  78 . Ibid., pp. 22–23.

  79 . Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5, p. 195; W. F. Raborn, Director, to Honorable Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense, August 13, 1965, NRO CAL Records, 2/A/0078.

  80 . Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and William F. Raborn, Director of Central Intelligence (signatories), “Agreement for Reorganization of the National Reconnaissance Program,” August 13, 1965.

  81 . Ibid.

  82 . Ibid.; W. F. Raborn, Director of Central Intelligence, to Honorable Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense, August 13, 1965, NRO CAL Records, 2/A/0078.

  83 . Raborn to Vance, August 13, 1965.

  84 . Ibid.

  85 . Ibid.; Office of Special Projects, 1965–1970, Volume One, Chapters I-II, p. 122.

  86 . McMillan interview; telephone interview with Albert Wheelon, May 19, 1997; letter from Frank Buzard to author, January 16, 1997; Brockway McMillan, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Comments on NRO and NRP, pp. 4–5.

  87 . Directorate of Science and Technology, CORONA Program History, Volume II, Governmental Activities, p. 1–20; Frederic C.E. Oder, James C. Fitzpatrick, and Paul E. Worthman, The CORONA Story (Washington, D.C.: NRO, November 1987), p. 108; Burks interview.