The Wizards of Langley
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83 . Lundberg, “The SS-9 Controversy,” p. 2; Prados, The Soviet Estimate, pp. 209–210.
84 . Lundberg, “The SS-9 Controversy,” p. 3; Anne Hessing Cahn, Killing Détente: The Right Attacks the CIA (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), p. 93; Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 208.
85 . Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-8-68, Soviet Strategic Attack Forces, in Donald P. Steury (ed.), Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950–1953 (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1996), pp. 239–251 at pp. 249–250.
86 . Lundberg, “The SS-9 Controversy,” p. 5.
87 . Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 208.
88 . Extracts from David S. Brandwein’s Personal Notebook, provided to author.
89 . Ibid.
90 . Lundberg, “The SS-9 Controversy,” pp. 5–6.
91 . Ibid., p. 7.
92 . Ibid., pp. 7, 11.
93 . Ibid., p. 13; Cahn, Killing Détente, pp. 93–96.
94 . Extract from Brandwein diary, June 6, 1969.
95 . Peter Grose, “U.S. Intelligence Doubts First-Strike Goal,” New York Times, June 19, 1969, pp. 1, 10.
96 . Extract from Brandwein diary.
97 . Cahn, Killing Détente, p. 97; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, Book I: Foreign and Military Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 78; extract from Brandwein diary. Helms, however, dropped a paragraph from the memo that reemphasized the view that the Soviet Union was not seeking a first-strike capability. An assistant to Laird objected to the paragraph, noting that it was a direct contradiction of Laird’s position and he was about to make a speech claiming that an ABM system was essential. Helms complied by dropping the paragraph from the main text, only to have it restored as a footnote by the director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. (Russell Jack Smith, The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency [New York: Berkley, 1992], p. 243; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, Book I: Foreign and Military Intelligence, p. 78.)
98 . Lundberg, “The SS-9 Controversy,” p. 13.
99 . Ibid., p. 14.
100 . “Statement by the Director, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” June 23, 1969, NARA, RG 263, 1998 CIA Release, Box 182, Folder 8.
101 . U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Intelligence and the ABM (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 3, 13; Lundberg, “The SS-9 Controversy,” pp. 16–17.
102 . Extract from Brandwein diary.
103 . Lundberg, “The SS-9 Controversy,” pp. 17–18.
104 . Ibid. p. 18; Cahn, Killing Détente, p. 98.
105 . Nicholas R. Garafalo, “Present and Future Capabilities of OTH Radars,” Studies in Intelligence 13, 1 (Spring 1969): 53–61 at 55.
106 . Ibid., p. 56.
107 . Ibid.; Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), p. 362.
108 . Desmond Ball, Pine Gap: Australia and the U.S. Geostationary Signals Intelligence Satellite Program (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988), p. 57.
109 . Interview with Roy Burks, North Potomac, Maryland, May 10, 1999; interview with John McMahon, Los Altos, California, November 17, 1998.
110 . Ball, Pine Gap, pp. 57–58, 61.
111 . John Noble Wilford, “A Secret Payload Is Orbited by U.S.,” New York Times, August 7, 1968, p. 7; Air Force Eastern Test Range, Eastern Test Range Index of Missile Launchings, July 1968–June 1969 (Patrick AFB, Fla.: AFETR, 1969), p. 3; Christopher Anson Pike, “CANYON, RHYOLITE, and AQUACADE,” Spaceflight 37, 11 (November 1995): 381–383.
112 . Pike, “CANYON, RHYOLITE, and AQUACADE”; interview with a former CIA official; Ball, Pine Gap, p. 18; Philip J. Klass, “U.S. Monitoring Capability Impaired,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 14, 1979, p. 18.
113 . Ball, Pine Gap, p. 16.
114 . Interview with a former CIA official.
115 . Ibid.
116 . Interview with Henry Plaster, Vienna, Virginia, September 30, 1999.
117 . Interview with a former CIA official.
118 . Ibid. A third camera was carried on five HEXAGON missions. The film of this twelve-inch mapping camera was fed into the final film capsule and returned at the end of the mission. A secondary experimental system was used on some early missions to transmit pictures by radio signals—essentially the same system that had failed when it operated on SAMOS. The results were no better this time, and the system was eventually jettisoned.
119 . Ibid.; “Space Reconnaissance Dwindles,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 6, 1980, pp. 18–20.
120 . Interview with a former CIA official.
121 . Curtis Peebles, “The Guardians,” Spaceflight, November 1978, pp. 381ff.
122 . William Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York: Random House, 1986), p. 239.
123 . Warren F. Carey and Myles Maxfield, “Intelligence Implications of Disease,” Studies in Intelligence 16, 1 (Spring 1972): 71–78 at 71.
124 . Ibid., pp. 71–72.
125 . Ibid., pp. 74, 76.
126 . Ibid., p. 76.
127 . Ibid., pp. 76–77.
128 . Ibid., p. 77.
129 . Ibid.
Chapter 6: Empire
1 . “Introduction: Producing National Intelligence Estimates,” in Donald P. Steury (ed.), Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950–1983 (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1996), p. xvi.
2 . Telephone conversation with Sayre Stevens, November 11, 1998; undated, untitled, CIA summary of functions of selected offices, circa 1975.
3 . The Reminiscences of Arthur C. Lundahl, Columbia University, Oral History Research Office, 1982, p. 302.
4 . Ibid.. p. 303.
5 . Ibid., p. 305.
6 . Telephone interview with Dino Brugioni, May 21, 1996.
7 . Ibid.
8 . Interview with R. M. Huffstutler, Falls Church, Virginia, March 23, 1999; Brugioni interview; telephone interview with Edward Proctor, March 16, 1999. According to R. M. “Rae” Huffstutler, there was some opposition to the transfer of NPIC. Dino Brugioni recalled that this opposition included Edward Proctor, the Deputy Director for Intelligence. Proctor recalled that he recommended the transfer.
9 . John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA, from Wild Bill Donovan to William Casey (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), pp. 545–546, 732; William Colby and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), p. 332.
10 . Colby and Forbath, Honorable Men, pp. 333, 335–336.
11 . Interview with John McMahon, Los Altos, California, November 17, 1998; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination of John N. McMahon (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 18.
12 . McMahon interview.
13 . Ibid.
14 . Fred Emery, Watergate: The Corruption of American Politics and the Fall of Richard Nixon (New York: Times Books, 1994), pp. 52–53; Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), p. 253.
15 . McMahon interview; Ranelagh, The Agency, pp. 552–553.
16 . McMahon interview.
17 . H. Keith Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment: Spy Devices of the Cold War (New York: Sterling Publishing, 1994), pp. 16, 21, 28, 30, 48.
18 . Ibid., pp. 64, 66, 68, 70, 72–77, 78–79, 87, 92–93, 96–97.
19 . Ibid., pp. 107–109, 110–111. Not all CIA officers were enthralled by every creation of the technical services unit. John Stockwell recalled being handed a slender notebook that included a pad of soluble rice paper, which he could supposedly gobble dow
n if captured. He wrote that “like many OTS gimmicks this was a classroom toy which had little use in the field,” explaining that a case officer would not want to make irreplaceable notes on a pad that would dissolve “at the slightest touch of rain or sweat.” (John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story [New York: Norton, 1978], p. 98.)
20 . U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Intelligence Costs and Fiscal Procedures, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 543; Memorandum for: Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Subject: Functional Relationships Between the Office of Research and Development and the Office of Development and Engineering, July 18, 1973, NARA, RG 263, 1998 CIA Release, Box 66, Folder 4.
21 . United States of America v. Christopher John Boyce, Reporter’s Transcript, Volume 5, District Court, Central District of California, Hon. Robert J. Kelleher, CR-77-131-RJK, April 20, 1977, pp. 971–972; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination of John N. McMahon, p. 18.
22 . Jonathan McDowell, “US Reconnaissance Satellite Programs, Part I: Photoreconnaissance,” Quest 4, 2 (Summer 1995): 22–31 at 31.
23 . Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-8-71, Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack, October 21, 1971, p. 10; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-8-70, Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack, November 24, 1970, pp. 4–5; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-8-72, Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack, October 26, 1972, p. 22; Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982), pp. 106–107.
24 . Philip J. Klass, “U.S. Monitoring Capability Impaired,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 14, 1979, p. 18.
25 . Ibid.
26 . [James Cunnningham], DD/OSA, Memorandum for: Deputy for Technology/OSA, Subject: A Covert Reconnaissance Satellite, April 17, 1963.
27 . Ibid.
28 . Interview with a former CIA official.
29 . Merton E. Davies and William R. Harris, RAND’s Role in the Evolution of Balloon and Satellite Observation Systems and Related U.S. Space Technology (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1988), p. 75.
30 . Interview with Albert Wheelon, Montecito, California, March 21, 2000.
31 . Interview with a former CIA official; telephone conversation with Albert Wheelon, February 12, 2000.
32 . Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Point Paper for Luncheon with President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,” June 5, 1970.
33 . Donald Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days That Changed the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), pp. 201–202; Ze’ev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army: 1874 to the Present (New York: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 127, 130.
34 . Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army, pp.133, 134.
35 . Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem, pp. 203–204; Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army, p. 140.
36 . Interview with a former CIA official; interview with Robert McNamara, January 20, 1989, Washington, D.C.
37 . [Leslie Dirks], Chief, Design and Analysis Division, Office of Special Projects, Subject: Briefing to General Maxwell Taylor on Photographic Satellite Support to Middle East Crisis, 31 August 1967, September 8, 1967.
38 . [Leslie Dirks], Chief, Design and Analysis Division, Office of Special Projects, Memorandum for: Director, NRO Staff, Subject: General Maxwell Taylor’s Inquiries Concerning the Application of Photographic Satellites in Crisis Situations,” September 5, 1967.
39 . John N. McMahon, Acting Director of Special Projects, Memorandum for: Director for Science and Technology, Subject: Assessment of KH Information in Light of the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia, August 30, 1968.
40 . Interview with a former CIA official; Cynthia Grabo, “The Watch Committee and the National Indications Center: The Evolution of U.S. Strategic Warning,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3, 3 (Fall 1989): 363–386.
41 . Interview with a former CIA official.
42 . Roland S. Inlow, “How the Cold War and Its Intelligence Problems Influenced CORONA Operations,” in Robert A. McDonald (ed.), CORONA: Between the Sun and the Earth, the First NRO Reconnaissance Eye in Space (Bethesda, Md.: American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, 1997), pp. 221–229 at p. 228; remarks of W. Y. Smith at Conference on “Piercing the Curtain: CORONA and the Revolution in Intelligence,” May 23–24, 1995, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
43 . Interview with a former CIA official. A dissenting view came from the Office of Strategic Research of the Directorate of Intelligence. OSR was asked to assess what its analysts would have predicted if they had access to the photography throughout the period leading up to the invasion. According to OSR, even access to photography on a daily basis from July 1 to August 19 would not have enabled them to say “with any reasonable certainty that the Soviets were going to invade.” (John N. McMahon, Acting Director of Special Projects, Memorandum for: Director for Science and Technology, Subject: Assessment of KH Information in Light of the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia, August 30, 1968.)
44 . Ibid.
45 . Ibid.
46 . Ibid.
47 . Bruce C. Clarke Jr., Special Assistant to the DDI for Special Projects, Memorandum for: Mr. Borel et al., Subject: DDI Requirements in Connection with New Reconnaissance System, August 11, 1966; interview with Albert Wheelon, Montecito, California, June 14, 1999.
48 . Interview with a former CIA official.
49 . Ibid.
50 . Ibid.
51 . Ibid.; Memorandum for President’s File, Subject: President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Meeting with the President, June 4, 1971.
52 . Interview with a former CIA official.
53 . Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954–1974 (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1992), p. 257.
54 . U.S. Air Force, “Biography, Brigadier General Wendell L. Bevan Jr.,” July 15, 1970, with updates.
55 . Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Management of the U-2R Fleet, n.d.; Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 257.
56 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 256; Chris Pocock, Dragon Lady: The History of the U-2 Spyplane (Shrewsbury, England: Airlife, 1989), p. 119.
57 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 257; Pocock, Dragon Lady, p. 120.
58 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 257; Pocock, Dragon Lady, p. 120; Memo B/Gen Wendell L. Bevan to [deleted], June 26, 1974.
59 . CIA Inspector General, Inspector General’s Survey of the Office of Research and Development, October 1972, pp. 5–6, 74, NARA, RG 263, 1998 CIA Release, Box 66, Folder 2; Sayre Stevens remarks, “DS&T 35th Anniversary: Celebrating 50 Years of CIA History,” July 24, 1997, videotape.
60 . CIA Inspector General, Inspector General’s Survey of the Office of Research and Development, pp. 16, 42.
61 . Interview with Sayre Stevens, Springfield, Virginia, March 18, 1999; interview with James Hirsch, Fairfax, Virginia, February 12, 1999; Sayre Stevens remarks, “DS&T 35th Anniversary.” Not everyone saw the approach of Stevens’s predecessor as sterile. Gene Poteat noted that research is always controversial, especially if it is not directed—that is, not targeted on fulfilling a requirement specified by a consumer. But in his view, ORD’s search for technological breakthroughs before identifying specific customers led to important discoveries, such as large-scale integrated circuits. (Interview with Gene Poteat, McLean, Virginia, April 25, 2000.)
62 . Hirsch interview; Stevens interview; National Foreign Assessment Center, CIA, The Soviet Earth Resources Satellite Program, June 1980, p. 8; “Project UPSTREET,” CIA Public Affairs Fact Sheet, n.d.
64 . Stevens interview; Bob Preston, Plowshares and Power: The Military Use of Civil Space (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994), pp. 55–56; James B. Campbell, Introduction to Remote Sensing (New York: Guilford, 1987), pp. 118–122.
65 . Campbell, Introduction to Remote Sensing, p. 135.
66 . Stevens interview; “Project UPSTREET”; “History Biological Sciences Division—1963 Through 1968,” NARA, RG 263, 1998 CIA Release, Box 66, Folder 5.
67 . National Foreign Assessment Center, CIA, The Soviet Earth Resources Satellite Program, p. 8; “Project UPSTREET.”
68 . Hirsch interview.
69 . Ibid.
70 . Stevens interview; CIA Inspector General, Inspector General’s Survey of the Office of Research and Development, p. 80.
71 . Stevens interview, March 18, 1999.
72 . Jim Schnabel, Remote Viewers: The Secret History of America’s Psychic Spies (New York: Dell, 1997), pp. 86, 120; “Harold E. Puthoff,” www.firedocs.com/remoteviewing/oooh/people/puthoff.html; “Russell Targ,” www.firedocs.com/remoteviewing/oooh/people/targ.html; Martin Gardner, “Distant Healing and Elizabeth Targ,” Skeptical Inquirer, March/April 2001, pp. 12–14.
73 . Schnabel, Remote Viewers, p. 87.
74 . Martin Gardner, “Zero-Point Energy and Harold Puthoff,” Skeptical Inquirer, May/June 1998, pp. 13–15, 60; Harold Puthoff, “To Whom It May Concern,” May 31, 1970.
75 . Kenneth A. Kress, “Parapsychology In Intelligence: A Personal Review and Conclusions,” Studies in Intelligence 21, 4 (Winter 1977): 7–17 at 8.
76 . Ibid.; H. E. Puthoff, “CIA-Initiated Remote Viewing at Stanford Research Institute,” Journal of Scientific Exploration 10, 1 (1996): 63–76 at 64–65.
77 . Schnabel, Remote Viewers, p. 97.
78 . John D. La Mothe, Controlled Offensive Behavior—USSR (U), (Washington, D.C.: DIA, July 1972). The paper was actually authored by a member of the Medical Intelligence Office, Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, and approved and issued by DIA. La Mothe clearly believed in paranormal phenomena, considered the National Enquirer a legitimate research resource and felt it worth quoting the opinion of astrologer Sybil Leek that “there is great danger that within the next ten years the Soviets will be able to steal our top secrets by using out-of-body spies.” (p. 30.; also see P. T. Van Dyke and M. L. Juncosa, Paranormal Phenomena: Briefing on a Net Assessment Study [Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, January 1973]).