Accidental State

by Hsiao-ting Lin

  Washington’s new national security policy paper certainly generated a strong impact on the reconfiguration of its policy toward East Asia, including Taiwan. According to NSC 68, Europe was the center of Soviet aspiration, with Moscow hoping to bring all of Europe under its domination. Yet, as the paper warned, it was in Asia that Moscow had the greatest opportunities.3 Many in Washington started to believe that, since the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet treaty, the exploitation of Beijing-Moscow tensions had now become a long-term rather than immediate project. More significantly, by committing Mao to a close alliance with Stalin, the 1950 treaty dissolved the key factor working against American intervention in Taiwan.4 The new alliance between Beijing and Moscow, as John W. Garver puts it accurately, also strengthened the geopolitical significance of the island in countering the new Sino-Soviet bloc.5 The 360-mile gap between Okinawa and Taiwan and the 100-mile gap between Taiwan and the Philippines would be very difficult to seal if Soviet air forces operated out of Taiwan, providing an umbrella for Soviet submarines heading for the open Pacific. With Taiwan under U.S. control, Soviet submarines could be bottled up in the East China Sea. With Taiwan in Communist China’s hands, the cork was out of the bottle. Even American leaders who had previously advocated the sacrifice of Taiwan in order to better encourage Chinese Titoism now agreed that maintaining the integrity of the barrier chain of offshore islands was highly important to U.S. security interests.6

  With the NSC 68, the spirit of the defunct “trans-Pacific highway” idea seemed to reappear, and Taiwan’s (not necessarily Chiang Kai-shek’s) geo-strategic significance was confirmed in the designing of U.S. official policy. What Washington needed now was perfect timing and justification to interfere with the security of Taiwan, as well as a feasible way to solve the problems surrounding Chiang Kai-shek and his group.7 Around May 1950, when Paul Nitze advanced his “hypothetical plan” to remove Chiang and place the island under U.S. or UN control, the plan was essentially in line with NSC 68 and its new strategic thinking vis-à-vis Communist China. MacArthur’s reluctance to oust Chiang had been critical in preventing Nitze’s (and perhaps the State Department’s) scheme from being carried out.

  The outbreak of the Korean War provided just the needed timing and justification. At dawn on Sunday, June 25, Kim Il Sung ordered his forces to cross the 38th parallel behind artillery fire. Fighting began on the strategic Ongjin Peninsula in the west; within an hour Kim’s troops were attacking all along the 38th parallel. Within the first few days, the South Koreans were routed, forcing Syngman Rhee and his government officials to evacuate Seoul; this was the contingency that would thoroughly change the military and political landscape of East Asia. On June 27, three days after the North Koreans launched the surprise attack, President Truman announced that he had ordered the Seventh Fleet to the waters between Taiwan and the mainland to prevent offensive operations against and from the island. He meanwhile specified that the “determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.”8 The statement contained no reference to his January pronouncement. But when affirming that a determination of Taiwan’s status would have to await appropriate international action, the president had pulled away from the earlier position taken by him and Acheson that the island was for all intents and purposes Chinese territory. As fully exemplified in Acheson’s personal explanatory letter to MacArthur dated July 24, 1950, only on the premise that the island’s legal status was unsettled could Washington claim that its intervention did not constitute interference in Chinese internal affairs and was intended only to freeze its political status until a suitable international agreement had peacefully decided the island’s future. Such an “interim intention,” as Acheson described it to MacArthur, surely presented difficulties vis-à-vis the Nationalists on Taiwan and might not be the only, or even the best way, of clarifying the new American position. But the secretary of state was convinced that every effort should be made as soon as possible to arrive at a common understanding with America’s allies, particularly with the British, and he sought the SCAP chief’s support and understanding.9

  If Acheson’s rationale was understandable to MacArthur, it was categorically unacceptable to Chiang Kai-shek. On receiving Truman’s official announcement, delivered by Robert Strong, the U.S. chargé d’affaires in Taipei, Chiang was furious at Truman’s statement about Taiwan’s unsettled legal position, which he perceived as a humiliating downgrade of the island to “a mere piece of American colony.”10 And yet pragmatic considerations soon came to the fore. As long as Nationalist governance in Taiwan remained virtually unaffected, Chiang was ready to tolerate a neutralized Taiwan Strait (at an official level he ordered his government to fulminate against such an arrangement “at any cost”).11 Perhaps Chiang was being a bit too optimistic about the “unaffectedness” of his leadership and governance in Taiwan. As a “client-patron relationship” was created between Taiwan and the United States as a result of the Korean War, Chiang would find that the autonomy he had enjoyed in the decision-making process in the mainland era would be long gone in the post-1950 Taiwan era, a fact further illuminated in Chapters 9 and 10.

  THE TAIWAN BASTION STRENGTHENED

  In retrospect, one major event leading to the accidental state on Taiwan was Mao Zedong’s decision to ally with Soviet Russia and to approve and support Kim Il Sung’s war plan for Korea. Without a doubt, the war on the Korean Peninsula provided both hope and opportunities to the ailing Nationalists on Taiwan. However, the challenges ahead were far greater than Chiang Kai-shek and his cohorts might have expected. It was no secret that Chiang had long craved a general war in East Asia that would lead to a consolidation of his power base in Taiwan and an eventual American war of “liberation” against the Chinese mainland. A series of confidential telegram exchanges around March 1950 between Chiang and Shao Yulin, Chiang’s ambassador in Seoul, incredibly reveal that the desperate Nationalist leaders were exploring every possible means, including such wild ideas as dispatching their secret agents to South Korea to trigger an armed conflict with the communist north, so as to bring about a total shift of U.S. policy in East Asia.12 From Taipei’s point of view, if Taiwan was necessary for American defense, then Washington must prevent the Chinese Communists from taking possession; if there was a war in the Far East, then it was folly to give up any advance base, like Taiwan. What Chiang and his followers worried about most was, if the island was not necessary for American defense, then there would be no obstacle in stabilizing good relations and trade with Communist China. This meant peace, and peace was what the island-based Nationalists feared. A man longing for World War III to save a hopeless situation, Chiang in the months before the Korean War incessantly ordered papers and draft plans to be prepared in anticipation of that eventuality.13

  Not surprisingly, therefore, immediately after the war broke out in Korea, Chiang offered to send 33,000 of his best troops, under Sun Liren’s command, to fight alongside UN forces. The offer was presumably planted by none other than Charles Cooke, who won Chiang’s approval over the opposition of other Nationalist military leaders.14 Initially, Truman was tempted by Chiang’s offer, but in the end he rejected it on the unanimous advice of Dean Acheson, Louis Johnson, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who exhorted that acceptance of the offer would divide the United Nations coalition and might incite the Chinese Communists to attack Korea or Taiwan.15 In truth, as Robert Accinelli well posited, the introduction of Nationalist armed forces in Korea would have also violated the spirit of the “neutralization” of the Taiwan Strait, and contradicted the U.S. objective of insulating Taiwan from the Korean conflict.16

  It remains open to discussion whether Chiang Kai-shek’s offer was sincere and truly intended to lead to his long-dreamed military rollback in the mainland, or whether it was little more than a diplomatic gesture. Whatever the reality, the propagandist effect such an offer brought about was colossal. Genera
l MacArthur, now leading the United Nations Command in the Korean War with his theater expanding to include Taiwan and the Pescadores, greatly appreciated Chiang’s overture.17 He personally landed in Taiwan with a dozen staff officers for a two-day visit between July 31 and August 1, an appealing diplomatic feat that immensely strengthened Chiang’s hitherto shaky political legitimacy, boosted Nationalist morale, and elevated the government’s international visibility. While staying in Taipei, MacArthur recommended that a direct liaison between his command and Taipei be established, and that the critical materials shortages on Taiwan should be rectified. He also agreed with Chiang that a “Far East Command Liaison Group” be established with Taiwan under MacArthur’s authority, which would examine the requirements of the Nationalist forces. Last but not least, without prior consultation with Washington, the SCAP chief authorized periodic reconnaissance flights over coastal areas of China, in addition to periodic sweeps of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait.18 He also seems to have made secret arrangements with the Nationalists to station three fighter squadrons on the island, an allegation repeated in Dean Acheson’s 1969 memoirs.19

  8.1 General Douglas MacArthur met with Chiang Kai-shek and his top military brass in Taipei. MacArthur’s visit to Taiwan on July 31, 1950, boosted Nationalist morale and strengthened Chiang Kai-shek’s legitimacy. (Courtesy of the KMT Party History Institute)

  Soon after MacArthur’s visit, a group led by General Alonzo Fox, MacArthur’s deputy chief of staff, conducted a three-week survey of the Nationalist military on Taiwan to determine their needs. The report of this “Fox Survey” mission trumpeted that Chiang’s army was an important backup for the Seventh Fleet, capable of repulsing a Communist landing given sufficient aid and proper military advice.20 Although the Fox report recommended a $158.2 million military aid package, nothing materialized. It was not until the Chinese Communists first intervened in Korea in late 1950 that renewed military assistance to Taiwan was seriously deliberated in Washington.

  MacArthur’s visit delighted Chiang Kai-shek as much as it annoyed the upper echelons in Washington, who were alarmed by what they now perceived to be the two men’s joint effort to determine U.S. policy. Truman sent his senior advisor Averell Harriman to meet the SCAP chief in Tokyo two days after he returned from Taiwan. Harriman’s message to the general was straightforward: “leave Chiang Kai-shek alone.” Fearing that Chiang might genuinely launch a war with mainland China, the president passed on his verbal promise via Harriman to the effect that as long as MacArthur waged war only against North Korea, he would be given whatever he wanted.21 Truman’s apprehension further deepened, when, shortly thereafter, MacArthur’s address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars annual conference was published on August 25. In his address, the general reemphasized that Taiwan was an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender, from which a hostile power could overshadow the central and southern flank of the United States frontline position in Asia. This statement was not new, but it doubtlessly conflicted with Truman’s recent policy that U.S. protection of Taiwan was only a temporary expedient deriving from the conflict in Korea. Politically, the president was enraged at the general for handing the “Acheson-haters” at home an argument behind which they could gather their forces for an attack.22 MacArthur’s seemingly unilateral actions equally unnerved America’s European allies, who wanted to keep the war on the peninsula hermetically sealed from Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek lest Beijing start taking “hostages,” particularly Hong Kong and French Indochina. The British were also worried, viewing the presence of the SCAP chief in Taiwan as a sign of Washington’s “lack of all direction in its policy toward China,” as well as of “internal difficulties” in the Truman administration.23

  As discord between Washington and London over the Far Eastern situation was about to heat up, chief policy planners in the State Department and Whitehall were endeavoring to work out mutually acceptable strategies to deal with the thorny Taiwan issue. In September 1950, the United States, Great Britain, and France settled on a unified approach in the United Nations on the status of Taiwan and the Nationalist Chinese representation. They agreed that a General Assembly commission should be established to examine the criteria for settlement of cases of disputed representation, and to determine Taiwan’s future status.24 In Taipei, Chiang Kai-shek’s reaction was surprisingly calm. Fully aware of his serious lack of bargaining chips, Chiang was preparing for the worst. If the PRC were admitted to take part in UN deliberations, as proposed by a Security Council session in late September, Chiang would order the withdrawal of Nationalist China from the United Nations.25

  On November 11, the British and the Americans concluded their agreed resolution. The final draft provided for a commission to study and make recommendations for the future of Taiwan, after conferring with “all governments, authorities and parties concerned.” Until the General Assembly considered and acted upon the resolution, there would be no attacks from or against the island or attempts to change its status by force.26 However, this UN strategy collapsed when Mao Zedong ordered massive intervention against MacArthur’s advancing forces in Korea. Conspicuously, the Pentagon was now reluctant to accept the proposed resolution in its existing form, because it would neutralize Taiwan militarily just as the situation in the Far East was taking a disturbing turn. At the end of 1950, the ban on Nationalist Chinese offensive operations against the mainland was carefully reevaluated, and an even more extensive military strategy vis-à-vis Communist China, with Taiwan playing a much larger, more active role, was under serious deliberation.27

  Like the February 28 incident in 1947, the Communist Chinese intervention in the Korean War in November 1950 lead to changes in the U.S. military and strategic perceptions of the island. To be sure, Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters saw the massive Communist assault on Korea as a boon; a prolongation of the Korean conflict and a combustible confrontation between Washington and Beijing would best serve their purposes and interests. No wonder, then, when learning that Truman had warned MacArthur against the intended bombing of Manchuria and the use of UN ground forces across the Sino-Korean border, Chiang was both discontent and dismissive.28 Although the strategic significance of the Taiwan-based Nationalist government might now increase, the island’s pending legal and international status remained a nightmare to the Nationalist leaders. As the situation in Korea worsened toward the end of 1950, Washington found it imperative to accelerate the peace settlement with Japan, to pave the way for a “post-treaty security arrangement” with Japan, now an important forward base for American military operations on the peninsula.29 One “byproduct” of this peace treaty making was that a moribund Nationalist China, now rooted primarily in Taiwan and the Pescadores with a very limited territorial and administrative domain, was legally fortified.

  In early January 1951, less than two months after the PRC joined the Korean War, President Truman elevated John Foster Dulles from consultant to ambassador, responsible for formal negotiations on the Japanese peace treaty.30 Because the United States recognized only the Nationalists and the British only the Communists as the legitimate government of China, Dulles decided to conduct bilateral talks with Far Eastern Commission members recognized by Washington on the Japanese peace treaty, including Chiang’s government. This negotiating strategy worked well, right up until a final draft of the peace treaty was forged by the end of March 1951. The British scoffed at continued American support for the Nationalists in Taiwan and instead proposed that Beijing be invited to participate in any negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty. London’s proposal, coming only a few months after the Chinese Communist entrance into the Korean War, was wholly unacceptable to Washington.31

  Having received assurances from the Japanese government that Tokyo basically would make peace with the Chinese Nationalists at some point in time apart from and after the other Allies, in June 1951, Dulles coaxed the British into issuing a joint memorandum that no Chinese government would participate in the multilateral pe
ace treaty. Both parties further agreed that, Japan’s future dealings toward China would be determined by Japan itself on the basis of its sovereign and independent status, conferred by the treaty.32 Chiang Kai-shek and his top aides were extremely disappointed at the prospect of being excluded from the peace conference and at signing a bilateral peace treaty that seemed to place the Japanese, their defeated enemy, in a position to decide with whom they wished to deal, and Nationalist China, an ally, in the position of supplicant.33 On the morning of September 9, when the signing of the Japanese peace treaty by forty-nine nations was underway across the Pacific in San Francisco, in Taipei Chiang decided to go on a private hunger strike as a way of expressing his profound humiliation and fury.34

  To Chiang, perhaps a more disturbing issue was the exceedingly slow pace of the Sino-Japanese negotiations in Taipei, which commenced on February 20, 1952. A dispute developed when the Nationalists insisted that the Republic of China be recognized as the legal government of all China and the Japanese insisted on limited recognition that would not foreclose trade and other ties with the mainland.35 The State Department instructed Karl L. Rankin, U.S. chargé d’affaires in Taipei, to mediate the dispute. Meanwhile, Chiang’s staunch sympathizers on Capitol Hill also pressured both the Truman administration and Tokyo to allow nothing in the pact that would permit Japan to act contrary to the U.S. policy toward the PRC. Intense pressure by the State Department on Tokyo initially failed to budge the Japanese, who appeared to be deliberately stalling their negotiations with the Nationalists. A bilateral pact between Taipei and Tokyo was eventually signed on the afternoon of April 28, 1952, seven hours before the San Francisco treaty came into force and Japan regained sovereignty.36