Accidental State

by Hsiao-ting Lin

  56. Zhang, Jiang Jieshi yu Wo, 484–487; Yang Tianshi, “The Third Force in Hong Kong and North America during the 1950s,” Roads Not Taken: The Struggle of Opposition Parties in Twentieth-Century China, ed. Roger B. Jeans (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), 270–271.

  57. See Thomas Tse-yu Yang, chapters 17–20, Thomas Tse-yu Yang Papers, Folder 1; Mark, Hong Kong and the Cold War, 191–192; Zhang, Jiang Jieshi yu Wo, 495–505.

  58. Xiao Jishan to Chiang Kai-shek, observation report, February 8, 1951, TD/YZ/1951, vol. 1, no. 38969; Central Reform Committee to Chiang, report on the Third Force Chinese, June 19, 1951, TD/YZ/1951, vol. 3, no. 39073.

  59. Strong to State Department, July 8, 1950, no. 794A.00(W)/7–850, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4. See also Xue Huayuan, Lin Guoxian, and Yang Xiujing, eds., Zhanhou Taiwan Renquan Nianbiao, 1945–1960 [Chronological table of Taiwan’s postwar human rights, 1945–1960] (Taipei, Taiwan: Academia Historica, 2008).

  60. Strong to State Department, August 19, 1950, no. 794A.00(W)/8–1950, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.

  61. Charles N. Spinks (first secretary of U.S. mission in Japan) to State Department, May 7, 1951, no. 794A.00/5–751; Niles W. Bond (acting counselor of U.S. mission in Japan) to State Department, June 22, 1951, no. 794A.00/6–2251, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 2.

  62. Rankin to State Department, August 22, 1951, no. 794A.00/8–2251, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 2.

  63. Chen Jiahong, Taiwan Duli Yundong Shi [History of the Taiwan independence movement] (Taipei, Taiwan: Yushanshe, 2006), 171–177.

  64. See, for example, CKSD, diary entries for June 26 and 30, July 7 and 28, and August 18, 1950, Box 48.

  65. Shen, Sun Liren Zhuan, 2:701–702. Already suspicious of Sun’s secret dealings with the United States, Chiang deemed the MAAG proposal to empower Sun to lead the command as a matter of “national survival.” See CKSD, diary entry for September 30, 1951, Box 49.

  66. Shortly after Sun was relieved of his post, Chiang wrote in his diary that even if there were no evidence that Sun was involved in the Communist conspiracy, he still believed that Sun would launch a military coup against him. Chiang was convinced that the whole investigation was thoughtfully conducted and the removal of Sun most acceptable. See CKSD, diary entry for August 20, 1955, Box 51. For a detailed examination of the Sun affair, see Shen, Sun Liren Zhuan, 2:693–825.

  67. Huang Zhuoqun, narrator, Liu Yongchang ed., Wu Guozhen Zhuan: Shang Yi Ji [Memories of the past: Biography of K. C. Wu] (Taipei, Taiwan: The Liberty Times, 1995), 2:457–459.

  68. K. C. Wu was certainly aware that he no longer enjoyed strong support from Washington. Although State Department officials regretted that Wu’s departure would mean a loss of able administration and probable reduction in provincial influence, they expected the new provincial governor would be chosen with a view toward effecting a smoother working relationship between central and provincial governments, and they welcomed such a development. See Rankin to State Department, April 10, 1953, no. 794A.00(W)/4–1053, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.

  69. See CKSD, diary entries for February 19, and March 2, 17, and 25, 1954, Box 50; Wu’s open letters to Chiang Kai-shek, dated March 20, 28, and April 3, 1954, in Hubert G. Schenck Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Box 24.

  70. Minutes of the 185th Executive Yuan meeting, May 9, 1951, in Xingzheng Yuan Dang’an [Archives of the Executive Yuan], Academia Historica (Taipei), 105–1/016; Minutes of the 187th Executive Yuan meeting, May 23, 1951, ibid., 105–1/017.

  71. Minutes of the 234th Executive Yuan meeting, April 9, 1952, ibid., 105–1/029; Minutes of the 240th Executive Yuan meeting, May 14, 1952, ibid.

  72. British Consulate in Tamsui to Foreign Office, “Summary of Events in Formosa during July, 1954,” August 20, 1954, in Taiwan Political and Economic Reports 1861–1960, ed. Jarman, 10:534.

  73. “Report on the Mutual Security Program in Formosa, First Half of 1954,” July 21, 1954, no. 794A.5-MSP/7–2154, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.

  74. This amount was broken down as follows: $50 million for the army, $5.2 million for the navy, and $16 million for the air force. See State Department, “Projected Formosa MDAP Program for 1952–1955,” top secret memorandum, February 21, 1951, no. 794A.5/2–2151, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.

  75. State Department, memorandum, February 13, 1951, no. 794A.5-MAP/2–1351; State Department, memorandum regarding MAAG for Formosa, March 22, 1951, no. 794A.5/3–2251; Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, to State Department, letter, March 23, 1951, no. 794A.5/3–2351, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.

  76. Dean Rusk to Thomas Cabot (S/ISA), “FE Proposal for Exercising United State Control over Chinese Military Expenditures,” memorandum, May 8, 1951, no. 794A.5-MSP/5–851; Rusk to Allen Griffin (ECA), May 9, 1951, no. 794A.5-MSP/5–951, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.

  77. ECA presentation to the Bureau of the Budget, “Supplementary Funds for Fiscal Year 1952 to Support Mutual Defense Assistance Program for Formosa,” top secret, May 8, 1951, no. 794A.5-MSP/5–851; Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee, State Department, top secret minutes, May 25, 1951, no. 794A.5-MSP/5–2551, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.

  78. Dean Acheson to Rankin, July 13, 1951, FRUS, 1951, vol. 7: Korea and China, Part II, 1750–1751; State Department to Nationalist Foreign Ministry, aide-mémoire, July 20, 1951, TD / DMW, vol. 9, no. 58937.

  79. CKSD, diary entries for July 24, 25, and 26, and August 1, 1951, Box 49.

  80. TD / DMW, vol. 9, no. 58944, Rankin and George Yeh, minutes of conversation, July 30, 31 and August 1, 1951; Jacobs-Larkcom to Foreign Office, “Summary of events in Formosa during the month of June 1951,” July 23, 1951, in Taiwan Political and Economic Reports 1861–1960, ed. Jarman, 9:475.

  81. Rankin to State Department, September 14, 1951, no. 794A.5-MAP/9–1451, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.

  82. State Department, “Chinese Budgetary Problem and Taipei’s Suggestions,” memorandum, September 14, 1951, no. 794A.5-MAP/9–1451, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.

  83. Rankin to State Department, September 27, 1951, no. 794A.5-MAP/9–2751, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4; Chen Cheng to Chiang Kai-shek, September 17, 1951, TD / DMW, vol. 9, no. 58941.

  84. Rankin to State Department, October 13, 1951, no. 794A.5-MAP/10–1351, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4; CKSD, diary entries for September 21 and 30, and October 11 and 20, 1951, Box 49.

  85. Rankin to State Department, December 16, 1951, no. 794A.00(W)/12–1651, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 3.

  86. Acheson to Rankin, Chase, and Moyer, October 17, 1951, no. 794A.5-MAP/10–1751, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.

  87. Rankin to Acheson, October 17, 1951, no. 794A.5-MAP/10–1751, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.

  88. Rankin to State Department, “Appraisal of Effects of United States Aid and Technical Assistance to Formosa,” memorandum, October 14, 1954, no. 794A.5-MAP/10–1451, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.

  89. General Chase to General Zhou Zhirou, June 29, 1951, TD / MXT, vol. 49, no. 59126; Zhou to Chase, January 26, 1952 TD / MXT, vol. 49, no. 59129; Rankin to State Department, Report on Mutual Security Program in Formosa, January 9, 1953, no. 794A.5-MAP/1–953, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4. Chiang Kai-shek regarded the army reorganization as an important measure in getting rid of incapable officers and soldiers. See CKSD, diary entry for October 31, 1952, Box 49.

  90. Jacobs-Larkcom to Foreign Office, November 25, 1952, in Taiwan Political and Economic Reports 1861–1960, ed. Jarman, 10:166.

  91. Jacobs-Larkcom to Foreign Office, October 7, 1952, in Taiwan Political and Economic Reports 1861–1960, ed. Jarman, 10:138–139.

  92. MAAG Taiwan, Activity Report for Month of November 1953, December 24, 1953, no. 794A.5-MSP/12–2453, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4; Activity Report for Month of December 1953, January 26, 1954, no. 794A.5-MSP/1–2654, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.

  93. Rankin to State Department, Report on Mutual Security Program in Formosa, January 9 1953, no. 794A.5-MSP/1–953; March 11, 1953, no.
794A.5-MSP/3–1153; Rankin to State Department, December 25, 1953, no. 794A.00(W)/12–2553, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.

  94. On the system of political commissars in Taiwan’s military in the 1950s, see Monte R. Bullard, The Soldier and the Citizen: The Role of the Military in Taiwan’s Development (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 80–130.

  95. State Department, “Commissar System in Chinese Army,” memorandum, September 28, 1951, no. 794A.551/9–2851, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4; Zhou Zhirou to Chiang Kai-shek, memorandum regarding General Chase’s opinions about commissar system, November 24, 1953, TD / MXT, vol. 50, no. 59139.

  96. CKSD, diary entries for August 25, 1951 and September 17, 1952, Box 49; Report of Formosa Mutual Security Program Evaluation Team, March 13, 1953, Norwood A. Allman Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Box 13; Report on Mutual Security Program in Formosa, January 9, 1953, no. 794A.5-MSP/1–953, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.

  97. Rankin to State Department, “Appraisal of Effects of United States Aid and Technical Assistance to Formosa,” memorandum, October 14, 1954, no. 794A.5-MSP/10–1454, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.

  98. Division of Research for Far East, State Department, Intelligence Report IR 7052, “Prospects for U.S. and British Bases in the Far East through 1965,” September 23, 1955, in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports VIII, ed. Kesaris, reel 1.

  99. William Chase to Rankin, October 5, 1953, enclosed in Rankin to State Department, October 21, 1953, no. 794A.5-MSP/10–2153, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4; CKSD, diary entry for October 6, 1953, Box 50.

  100. Howard P. Jones (U.S. chargé d’affaires) to State Department, October 6, 1953, no. 794A.5-MSP/10–653; Jones to State Department, “Interview with President Chiang Kai-shek on United States Review of Chinese Military Budget,” memorandum, October 8, 1953, no. 794A.5-MSP/10–853, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.

  101. See General Chase to General Zhou Zhirou, November 13, 1953; Chase to Chiang Kai-shek, November 18, 1953; Chase to U.S. Department of the Army, November 24, 1953; all enclosed in Jones to Rankin, “Ministry of National Defense Budget Estimate, January-June 1954,” December 8, 1953, no. 794A.5-MSP/12–853, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.

  102. ROC Ministry of National Defense, ed., Mei Junyuan Guwentuan zhu Hua Shinian Jianshi [MAAG’s Decade in the Republic of China] (Taipei, Taiwan: Ministry of National Defense, 1961), 37–39.

  CHAPTER 9 ▪ Between Mainland and Maritime Strategies

  1. CKSD, diary entries for October 4 and 14, 1950, Box 48. Chen Jian argues reasonably that, at this juncture, a war would serve Mao’s domestic aim to transform China’s old state and society into a new socialist country. For an analytical study of the PRC and its decision to enter the Korean War, see Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 85–117.

  2. For more about Communist China’s participation in the Korean War, see Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 168–202.

  3. CKSD, diary entries for November 7 and 9, 1950, Box 48.

  4. See, for example, CIA, “Strength and Usability of Chinese Nationalist Forces,” December 17, 1950, in Documentary History of the Truman Presidency, ed. Merrill, 32:364–366; and “Situation in Korea,” memorandum of conversation, November 21, 1950, Documentary History of the Truman Presidency, 18:679–683.

  5. CKSD, diary entry for November 7, 1950, Box 48.

  6. Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, note on the blockade of the Chinese coast by Nationalist China, August 22, 1951, NARA, RG 218, Geographical File, Security Classified 1951–53, Entry: UD 14, 24/4/07.

  7. Nationalist Chinese Navy, report on the operation and closure of territorial waters, 1950 (n.d.), Academia Historica, Xingzheng Yuan ji Suoshu Dang’an [Archives of the Executive Yuan and its subordinate agencies], 5–2–2.1; Jacobs-Larkcom to Foreign Office, “Summary of events in Formosa during the month of May 1951,” June 22, 1951, in Taiwan Political and Economic Reports 1861–1960, ed. Jaman, 9:454–455.

  8. CIA, “Chinese Nationalist attack on U.S. shipping,” memorandum, January 12, 1950, in CIA Research Reports: China, 1946–1976, reel 1.

  9. After war erupted in Korea, Cooke’s emphasis on the Nationalist Navy, rather than other services, became more practical, as a strong Nationalist Navy capable of assisting the Seventh Fleet would best serve U.S. military and strategic interests. See Cooke to General Zhou Zhirou, memorandum, September 1950, TD / MXT, vol. 48, no. 59232; “U.S. Seventh Fleet Plan for Conducting Operations to prevent an Invasion of Taiwan and the Pescadores,” memorandum, September 1, 1950, TD / MXT, vol. 48, no. 59233.

  10. Chief of Naval Operations, “Defense of Formosa,” memorandum, July 27, 1950, NARA, RG 218, Geographical File 1948–50, Entry: UD 7, 190:1/27/01; Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Defense of Formosa,” memorandum, August 14, 1950, NARA, RG 218, Geographical File 1948–50, Entry: UD 7, 190:1/27/01.

  11. Fox Report: Survey of Military Assistance required by the Chinese Nationalist Forces, top secret, September 11, 1950, NARA, RG 218, Geographical File 1948–50, Entry: UD 7, 190:1/27/01.

  12. George Kennan to Dean Acheson, top secret memorandum, July 17, 1950, no. 794A.5/7–1750, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4; Kennan to Acheson, memorandum, July 24, 1950, no. 794A.5/7–2450, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.

  13. National Intelligence Estimate, “Consequences of the Early Employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces in Korea,” NIE-12, December 27, 1950, CIA Research Reports: China, 1946–1976, reel 1.

  14. Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, report by on possible U.S. action in the event of open hostilities between the United States and China, December 27, 1950, NARA, RG 218, Central Decimal File, Security Classified 1948–50, Entry: UD 6, 631:24/2/04.

  15. Ibid.

  16. Joint Strategic Plans Committee, report by on course of action relative to Communist China and Korea—Chinese Nationalists, January 29, 1951, NARA, RG 218, Central Decimal File, Security Classified 1951–53, Entry: UD 11, 290:24/4/07.

  17. Steve Tsang’s “Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang’s Policy to Reconquer the Chinese Mainland, 1949–1958,” 48–72, presents pioneering research into Chiang Kai-shek’s true intention in launching a counterattack against the Chinese Communists.

  18. Taylor, The Generalissimo, 469–470.

  19. See Chiang’s lecture to the Central Reform Committee, January 8, 1951, in Zongtong Jianggong Sixiang Yanlun Zongji, ed. Qin, 24:1–6.

  20. State Department, “Support of China Mainland Resistance and Use of Nationalist Forces on Formosa,” top secret memorandum, January 24, 1951, in ROCA, reel 23.

  21. CKSD, diary entries for January 15, 25, and 29, 1951, Box 48.

  22. Shen, Sun Liren Zhuan, 2:701–702.

  23. CKSD, diary entry for January 17, 1951, Box 48.

  24. Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1980), 204.

  25. Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Estimate of the Effectiveness of Anti-Communist Guerrilla Operation in China,” February 12, 1951, NARA, RG 218, Central Decimal File, Security Classified 1951–53, Entry: UD 11, 290:24/4/07.

  26. State Department, “Mr. Rankin’s Views Regarding Military Aid to Formosa and Use of Nationalist Troops in the Far East,” top secret memorandum, February 28, 1951, no. 794A.5/2–2851, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4; “Assumptions for Guidance of Preparation of Plans for an Expeditionary Operation for the Seizure and Occupation of Hainan,” memorandum by Cooke, 1951 (n.d.), Charles M. Cooke Papers, Box 33; CKSD, diary entry for February 18, 1951, Box 48.

  27. Pearlman, Truman and MacArthur, 178–180; Manchester, American Caesar, 638.

  28. Manchester, American Caesar, 639–647; Jurika ed., From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam, 252–253; Donovan, Tumultuous Years, 355–362.

  29. CKSD, diary entry for April 11, 1951, Box 48.

  30. A report submitted to C
hiang in early 1952 indicates that only 28.3 percent of the promised amount of U.S. military aid and only 4.41 percent of the scheduled tonnages of war materiel for the fiscal year 1951 had reached Taiwan. See Zhou Zhirou to Chiang, January 22, 1952, TD / ZJBJ, vol. 50, no. 56694.

  31. For related analyses and discussions, see, for example, Taylor, The Generalissimo, 454–502.

  32. CKSD, diary entries for July 25 and 28, 1951, Box 49.

  33. CKSD, diary entry for August 8, 1951, Box 49.

  34. CKSD, diary entry for December 20, 1951, Box 49; Cooke to Chiang, memorandum, December 23, 1951, Charles M. Cooke Papers, Box 2.

  35. Chief of Naval Operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum, February 5, 1952, NARA, RG 218, Geographical File 1951–53, Entry: UD 13, 190:1/32/08; Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, note on proposed sweep along the China Coast, February 8, 1952.

  36. Joint Strategic Plans Committee, Employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces outside Formosa, April 24, 1952, NARA, RG 218, Geographical File 1951–53, Entry: UD 13, 190:1/32/08.

  37. State Department, top secret memorandum, May 6, 1952, no. 794A.5/5–652, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.

  38. CKSD, diary entries for March 23 and 24, 1952, Box 49.

  39. Zhou Zhirou to Chiang Kai-shek, March 20, 1952, TD / ZQJ, vol. 4, no. 56896.

  40. CKSD, diary entry for March 26, 1952, Box 49.

  41. Jacobs-Larkcom to Foreign Office, “Summary of Events in Formosa during May, 1952,” June 17, 1952, FO 371/99217 FC1019/46.

  42. Chiang Kai-shek and Admiral Arthur Radford, minutes of conversation, May 9, 1952, TD / DMW, vol. 11, no. 58956.

  43. See CKSD, diary entries for July 20 and October 16, 1952, Box 49.

  44. Jacobs-Larkcom to Foreign Office, September 3, 1952, in Taiwan Political and Economic Reports 1861–1960, ed. Jarman, 10:124–125.

  45. Zheng Jiemin and Chiang Ching-kuo to Chiang Kai-shek, report, November 22, 1950, TD / XQG, no. 59771; Zheng Jiemin and Chiang Ching-kuo to Chiang Kai-shek, November 26, 1950, TD / XQG, no. 59772.