Alamo Traces

by Thomas Ricks Lindley

  Dr. Smither arrived at Gonzales sometime that day. After meeting with Judge Ponton, Smither quickly penned a note that described the conditions at San Antonio and in the Alamo when he had departed at 4:00 p.m. on February 23. He wrote: “In a few words there is 2000 Mexican soldiers in Bexar, and 150 Americans in the Alamo. [Ramirez y] Sesma is at the head of them, and from best accounts that can be obtained, they intend to show no quarter. If every man cannot turn out to a man every man in the Alamo will be murdered.” This document and Travis’s note of the twenty-third to Ponton were then sent to San Felipe as Travis had requested—riding “night and day.”53

  Third Day — Thursday, February 25

  Albert Martin appears to have been the courier who carried Travis’s February 24 missive to Gonzales. John W. Smith most likely accompanied Martin. They probably left the Alamo sometime during the early morning hours of February 25 under the cover of darkness. The east side road to Gonzales was still open at that time. Nevertheless, there would have been enemy cavalry patrols. The Mexican horsemen, however, might have been napping as they were probably not that used to night duty.54

  At Gonzales a courier was sent to Mina (Bastrop) with the news that Smither had detailed in his short note. The rider probably arrived that evening and reported to Major Robert M. Williamson, the ranger commander. Williamson was known as “Three-Legged Willie” because of a peg leg. Soon afterward, he issued orders to Captain J. J. Tumlinson, the commanding officer of the first detachment of rangers at Mina. In part the orders read: “. . . they [Alamo defenders] implore aid from their fellow citizens and solicit it speedily – Provisions and men is the cry, are the frontiers of Colorado safe? Are there no hostile Indians bearing materially upon the frontier of Texas? If there be none you will forthwith fall down to Bastrop and wait further orders from me. It would be well for the inhabitants of Bastrop to keep out spies in the direction of San Antonio lest a foraging party of Mexicans surprise them, every inch of ground must be disputed by us until we can communicate and march against and crush them. . . .”55

  John Johnson, the Alamo’s first rider to Fannin, arrived at Goliad, probably in the afternoon. John Sowers Brooks, an aide-de-camp to Fannin, wrote: “An express from San Antonio de Bexar received here a few moments since, with intelligence that the Mexican army under Santa Anna, were in sight of that place and preparing to attack it. He heard the firing of cannon after he had gained some distance towards us.” Brooks then wrote that they would march to Bexar in the morning with “320 men, and 4 pieces of artillery, – 2 sixes and 2 fours.”56

  Fannin was busy with administrative duties when Johnson rode into the old Spanish fort in Goliad. The Colonel’s first mention of the Alamo situation is found in the closing note of a letter dealing with military expenditures written that day to the acting governor and the council. Fannin wrote: “I am well aware that my present movement toward Bexar is anything but a military one. The appeal of Cols. Travis & Bowie cannot however pass unnoticed – particularly by troops now on the field – Sanguine, chivalrous Volunteers – Much must be risked to relieve the besieged.”57

  Government officials at San Felipe learned of the Alamo situation that evening. Travis’s note of the twenty-third to Ponton and Smither’s note arrived at San Felipe at 9:00 p.m. that evening.58

  Albert Martin and John W. Smith most likely arrived at Gonzales in late afternoon or early evening. Martin quickly added a note to Travis’s letter of February 24 that reads: “send this to San Felipe by Express night & day – Since the above was written I heard a very heavy cannonade during the whole day. Think there must have been an attack made upon the Alamo. We were short of Ammunition when I left. Hurry on all the men you can in haste.” Smither added a message to the missive that reads: “When I left there was but 150 determined to do or die tomorrow I leave for Bejar with what men I can raise [& we] will be [on our way] at all events –

  “Col Almonte is there the troops are under the command of Gen Seisma [sic]

  “N b I hope every one will Randeves [sic] at gonzales as soon as poseble [sic] as the Brave soldiers are suffering do not neglect the powder is very scarce and should not be delad [sic] one moment.”59

  That night, at 10:00 p.m., someplace near San Antonio, Philip Dimmitt and Benjamin Noble departed the area for Dimitt’s Point, east of Lavaca Bay. Dimmitt later wrote: “I left the Rovia at 10 p.m., on the 25th and heard no more firing from which I concluded the Alamo had been taken by storm.”60

  Dimmitt was close to being right. February 25 was a busy day for the Alamo. That morning two or three hundred of the enemy crossed the river below the Alamo and attacked it from the south, using houses in that area for cover. The Mexican troops were able to advance to within one hundred yards of the Alamo’s southern artillery batteries. The action lasted two hours, with the defenders ousting the centralist troops from the wooden structures with point-blank canister and grapeshot fire.61

  Later that night Travis and his officers conducted a council of war to discuss their situation and options.62 Afterward Travis wrote to Sam Houston, the “Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Texas.” Travis detailed the day’s action and closed with: “. . . The Hon. David Crockett was seen at all points, animating the men to do their duty. Our numbers are few and the enemy still continues to approximate his works to ours. I have every reason to apprehend an attack from his whole force very soon; but I shall hold out to the last extremity, hoping to secure reinforcements in a day or two. Do hasten on aid to me as rapidly as possible, as from the superior number of the enemy, it will be impossible for us to keep them out much longer. If they overpower us, we fall a sacrifice at the shrine of our country, and we hope posterity and our country will do our memory justice. Give me help, oh my Country! Victory or Death!”63

  Juan N. Seguin and Matias Curvier were selected to carry the letter to Gonzales. They probably left the Alamo on foot that night as the defenders engaged the enemy outside the walls. Almonte reported the following: “The enemy, in the night, burnt the straw and wooden houses in their [Mexican cavalry] vicinity [Gonzales road east of the Alamo], but did not attempt to set fire with their guns to those in our rear.” This action may have been a diversion to cover the departure of the Tejano couriers to Gonzales. Once outside, Seguin and Curvier appear to have obtained horses from Antonio Cruz, who lived near the Alamo. Cruz joined them on their mission to Gonzales.64

  Santa Anna must have been reading Travis’s mind that night. He closed down the southeast and eastern avenues to the Alamo. Almonte wrote: “In the night two batteries were erected by us on the other side of the river in the Alameda of the Alamo – the battalion of Matamoros was also posted there, and the cavalry was posted on the hills to the east of the enemy, and in the road from Gonzales at the Casa Mata Antigua.”65

  Colonel Juan N. Seguin – Post Revolution

  Photo courtesy Texas State Library & Archives Commission

  Fourth Day — Friday, February 26

  Almonte’s journal entry for the day starts off with: “The northern wind continued very strong; the thermometer fell to 39, and during the rest of the day remained at 60. At daylight there was a slight skirmish between the enemy and a small party of the division of the east, under command of General Sesma.” A cavalry patrol seems to have encountered Seguin, Curvier, and Cruz as they broke through the Mexican line on their way to Gonzales.66

  At Mina Major R. M. Williamson departed for Gonzales. He most likely rode out at daylight, leaving Edward Burleson in charge of military affairs for the settlement.67

  About the same time, at Washington-on-the-Brazos, acting governor James W. Robinson dispatched a rider to find Sam Houston, who was on the road between Nacogdoches and Washington-on-the-Brazos. The note was addressed to “Gen. Sam Houston Wherever he may be. Send this by express day & night.” Robinson detailed the Alamo’s critical situation and asked: “Come quickly and organize our countrymen for Battle. Call the militia out en mass, send your orders East by this Express for that purp
ose.”68

  Officials at San Felipe, however, were not going to wait on the slow-moving Houston. A courier was sent off to Mina with orders for Captain J. J. Tumlinson’s ranger company to reinforce the Alamo immediately. Clearly, Robinson and other officers of the government understood that the Alamo command did not have much time. If the courier to Mina departed San Felipe early that morning, he probably arrived at Mina that night or the next morning.69

  At Goliad, Fannin was not able to pull men and equipment together until that afternoon. First, he issued a call for a volunteer company of horsemen. The unit, commanded by Captain Francis De Sauque and Captain John Chenoweth, was to ride immediately to the Seguin ranch, thirty-three miles southeast of Bexar on the San Antonio River to await Fannin’s main force of infantry and artillery. The special mounted unit was made up of Chenoweth’s company of United States Invincibles and mounted men from the other Goliad units commanded by Fannin. John Smith, orderly sergeant of Captain William Wadsworth’s company, a unit from the Georgia battalion, later wrote that Wadsworth had “received an order from Col. Fannin to raise a company to get to the Alamo. In company with Mr. David Murphy [sic] Capt Chenoweth & others the company was raised.” The company included, but was not limited to men from Chenoweth’s own company, the United States Invincibles.70

  The muster roll of the United States Invincibles included the following men who appear to have been available for Fannin’s special mounted relief force for the Alamo:

  David Murpree’s name is not on the Chenoweth roll, but he was a member of the company. After the storming of Bexar, he remained in San Antonio to care for John W. Peacock, the unit’s original captain, who had been severely wounded in the attack on Bexar. After Peacock’s death in early February 1836, Murpree rejoined the company at Goliad.72

  This muster roll reports every man as having been killed, except John Chenoweth, Peter Harper, B. H. Smith, and C. Mallon. The list, however, does not identify when and where the men were killed. Also, Hugh Frazier, T. B. Cox, and S. S. Curtis, though identified as being killed, were not killed during the revolution. Harper had originally been a member of Crockett’s small company of mounted spies. Harper, William Hunter, B. H. Smith, B. M. Clark, and C. Mallon joined the Invincibles on January 27.73

  Before Fannin’s quickly formed mounted relief departed for Bexar, it appears that Fannin sent Edwin T. “Tom” Mitchell to the Gonzales committee of safety, informing them of his plans for reinforcing the Alamo. He requested that the Gonzales soldiers “. . . effect a junction with him below Bexar, at some convenient point.” The “convenient point” appears to have been the Cibolo Creek crossing on the San Antonio/Goliad road, about halfway between San Antonio and Goliad. Then, sometime after the Chenoweth and De Sauque force rode out for the Alamo, Fannin’s main force crossed the San Antonio River on their march to Bexar.74

  John Sowers Brooks, Fannin’s adjutant, described the event with these words: “We marched at the time appointed, with 420 men, nearly the whole force at Goliad, leaving only one company of Regulars to guard the Fort. Our baggage wagons and artillery were all drawn by oxen (no broken horses could be obtained) and there were but a few yokes of them. In attempting to cross the San Antonio River, three of our wagons broke down and it was with the utmost labor and personal hazard, that our four pieces of cannon were conveyed safely across. We remained there during the day, with our ammunition wagon on the opposite side of the River.”75 Unable to repair their equipment before dark, Fannin’s men spent the night on the east side of the river. Reinforcement activities, however, continued at Gonzales.

  Major R. M. Williamson, who had left Mina that morning, probably arrived at Gonzales that evening. As the senior military officer he assumed command of the relief activities at that settlement. Later Seguin and his two men would have arrived with Travis’s letter of February 25 to Houston.76

  Houston, however, was still someplace on the road between Nacogdoches and Washington-on-the-Brazos. Yet, after four days, the reinforcement of the Alamo was in motion at the settlements that could send men the quickest. Time was the key element and it was precious. The second factor was the number of Texians that could be brought to the Alamo with sufficient arms and provisions. Bowie, in attempting an honorable surrender on February 23, understood that the Alamo’s only hope was the immediate arrival of a force large enough to bottle up Santa Anna in the city on the west side of the San Antonio River.77

  Travis also knew their backs were against the wall. Giving up was not an option. He did the only thing he could. He assumed the aggressive posture of a trapped animal, hoping to make the enemy realize that the cost would be high if they stormed the Alamo. The question was: Would the stratagem work long enough for a sufficient number of Texian soldiers to reach the Alamo in time?78

  Chapter Three Notes

  1 Travis to Houston, February 25, 1836.

  2 Walter Lord, A Time To Stand (1961; reprint, New York: Bonanza Books, 1987), 126-127; Long, Duel, 224-226; Stephen L. Hardin, Texian Iliad: A Military History of the Texas Revolution, 1835-1836 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 133; Michael Lind, The Alamo (New York and Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997), 176; Rita Kerr, The Immortal 32 (Austin: Eakin Press, 1986), 1-51.

  3 Travis to Convention, March 3, 1836.

  4 The fall of the Alamo was extremely “decisive” in that the defeat and the subsequent murder of the Goliad soldiers enraged the Texians, which resulted in the San Jacinto victory.

  5 R. M. Potter, “The Fall of The Alamo,” Magazine of American History, January 1878, 7-8. This article is an expanded version of an article that was first published in the San Antonio Herald in 1860. While many believe that Potter’s study of the Alamo defeat was the first written. That is not the case. John Henry Brown, an old Texas Ranger and newspaperman, wrote a pamphlet titled The Fall of the Alamo in September 1843. In December 1853, Brown wrote a second pamphlet titled Facts of the Alamo, Last Days of Crockett and Other Sketches of Texas. Copies of the works cannot be located today. Potter found a place in Texas history by writing about the Texas revolution. However, when given the opportunity to participate in that fight he refused. On March 6, 1836, Potter was at Velasco on the Texas coast. He was the chairman of a public meeting of the citizens of Velasco and Quintana that concerned an expected navel blockade of the Texas coast. By summer 1836 he had returned to Matamoros.

  There is no primary source that shows that the Alamo defenders actually celebrated Washington’s birthday, but given that most of them were from the United States, the party probably took place.

  6 Almonte, “Private Journal,” 16-17; Jose Enrique de la Pena, Campaign Diary, 13, Jose Enrique de la Pena collection, CAH; “Trinidad Coy: As Recalled by His Son Andres Coy,” San Antonio Light, November 26, 1911; Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna to General Joaquin Ramirez y Sesma, December 27, 1835, San Luis Potosi, English translation, Box 2/23/1063, MS-TSL.

  Order number four of the Santa Anna document reads: “On starting your march from Laredo to Bejar you will walk with the most possible precautions not to be surprised by a nocturnal ambush in your camp, taking care that this march be executed in accordance with the military strict laws.”

  Order number five starts with: “If the enemy should come out to meet you and present battle, you will examine above everything else the position they have taken, and if it should be so advantageous that you would see it impossible to defeat them, you will avoid the attack, directing your maneuver towards Bejar through one of its flanks if the territory permits it, or to initiate a false retreat of about 2 or 3 leagues.”

  7 Ruiz, “Fall of the Alamo,” 80; John Sutherland, The Fall of the Alamo Annie B. Sutherland, ed. (San Antonio: The Naylor Company, 1936), 15-16; L. Smither to All the Inhabitants of Texas, February 24, 1836, Gonzales in Michael R. Green, “To The People of Texas & All Americans in The World,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XCI: 503-504.

  Sutherland, though he was not in San Antonio on February 23, also reported that
Travis learned the Mexican army was near the city on the morning of the twenty-third.

  Also, the Ruiz account is compromised by the fact that he was not in San Antonio on March 6, 1836. See Chapter Eight of this book for the evidence that shows why Ruiz was out of town on the day the Alamo fell. Still, his claim in regard to when Travis and his men learned of the Mexican army being in the area appears to be correct.

  8 Juan N. Seguin to William Winston Fontaine, June 7, 1890, Nuevo Laredo, W. W. Fontaine Papers, CAH; Potter, “The Fall,” 6; Sutherland, The Fall of the Alamo, 6, Amelia W. Williams Papers, CAH.

  In this original Sutherland manuscript (1860), he wrote that one had to climb to the top of the church’s bell tower by a scaffold that had been erected by the Mexicans after the siege and storming of Bexar in 1835. Given that during the storming of Bexar, Texian artilleryman William Langenheim hit the bell tower’s cupola with two twelve-pound cannonball shots, the scaffold was probably in place to assist workmen in repairing the tower.

  9 Potter, “The Fall,” 7-8. If the Alamo defenders were selling weapons, they were most likely Brown Bess muskets that were captured from the Mexican army in December, not their personal weapons.

  10 Joint Resolution for the relief of H. A. Alsbury, December 29, 1838, in H. P. N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822-1897 (10 vols., Austin: The Gammel Book Company, 1898), II: 30; “Testimony of Mrs. [Susanna Dickinson] Hannig Touching the Alamo Massacre, September 23, 1876, MS-TSL; Webb, Carroll, and Branda, eds., Handbook, I: 36.

  11 Herbert S. Kimble affidavit, August 22, 1837, Springfield, Tennessee, P. J. Bailey file, M & P-TSL; Charles Merritt Barnes, “The Alamo’s Only Survivor,” San Antonio Express, May 12 and 19, 1907; Susanna [Dickinson] Hannig interview, San Antonio Express, April 27, 1881; Potter, “The Fall,” 6-7; Antonio Menchaca, Memoirs, Yanaguana Society Publications, 23; Frederick C. Chabot, With The Makers of San Antonio (San Antonio: Artes Graficas, 1937), 328; William B. Travis and James Bowie to James W. Fannin Jr., February 23, 1836, Jenkins, ed., Papers, IV: 419; James S. Brooks to A. H. Brooks, February 25, 1836, Goliad, Jenkins, ed., Papers, IV: 426; Jesse B. Badgett interview, The Advocate (Little Rock), April 15, 1836; Juana Alsbury account in Bill Groneman, Eyewitness to the Alamo (revised edition, Plano, Texas: Republic of Texas Press, 2001), 70.