The Concepcion wounded forced General Cos to do something about his failure to bring surgeons to San Antonio. To solve the problem, Cos appointed Alejandro Vidal, a local resident, to treat the men. Jose Faustino Moro, who became the first surgeon of the military hospital of Bexar, finally arrived in that city at 9:00 a.m. on December 9. Don Mariano Arroyo, the second surgeon, chief intern G. Guadalupe La Madrid, first interns Nazario Gil and Victor Samarroni, second intern Eduardo Banegas, and at least two unnamed interns (probably second class interns Jose Maria Ylisariturri and Jose Cardenas) came with Moro. They found 54 wounded men in the city.7
Moro and his team may have traveled a day or less behind Sanchez and the relief force. The fact that the medical personnel were with the reinforcement group is not included in Sanchez’s journal. It is hard to understand why Sanchez, if he wrote the journal, would not have mentioned the much-needed medical personnel, who appear to have ridden to San Antonio with him. Otherwise the Sanchez account goes to great lengths to identify the units and individuals who are alleged to have reinforced General Cos in December 1835. Apparently, whoever wrote the Sanchez chronicle was not aware that the medical staff traveled to Bexar with Sanchez and entered the city a day later than Sanchez.8
At about 6:30 a.m., previous to the arrival of the medical corp, Cos had Sanchez halt the combat by approaching the Texians under a white flag to discuss a conditional surrender. A surrender agreement was completed at 2:00 a.m. on December 10, and a final draft written agreement was signed on the eleventh. The Mexican force departed the city the next day, taking forty-some wounded soldiers in the care of Dr. Moro, chief intern G. Guadalupe La Madrid, and interns Eduardo Banegas, Victor Samarroni, and Nazario Gil. About fourteen wounded men were left behind in the Alamo. Dr. Mariano Arroyo and two interns (probably Jose Maria Ylisariturri and Jose Cardenas) remained with the wounded. About those wounded, Filisola reported: “In Bexar they had to leave some officers and soldiers who were wounded and that were in no shape to take the road. Among the former were First Assistant Don Jose Maria Mendoza, Captain of the second [Active] Nuevo Leon company, Don Francisco Rada, and Second Lieutenant Don Ignacio Solio [Solis], who volunteered to remain to take care of them. Of the soldiers we have no knowledge either as to who they were or how many.”9
It appears that most of the Mexican dead and wounded came from the Morelos battalion. Cos, on December 15, writing from the “Ranch of Salinas at 15 leagues from the city of Bexar,” reported that on the morning of December 9 the Morelos battalion only had 120 “faithful soldiers” left, the others having been killed or wounded. The October 3, 1835 muster roll for the Morelos battalion shows that as of that date the command had 246 men present for duty. Thus, it appears that the number of dead and wounded men for that unit may have been as high as 126. The other Mexican casualties appear to have come from the Alamo de Parras company and the other presidial companies. The forty-plus wounded who left with Cos were probably men from the Morelos command. The number of wounded who recovered before December 9 is unknown. Since Cos took forty-some men with him, the Morelos battalion may have had as many as eighty men killed during the siege and storming of Bexar.10
Now, let us look at what the Sanchez account reports about the wounded soldiers left in Bexar. The account claims: “The wounded stayed in Bejar in the plaza. Lt. Col. Mendoza, Captain Zenea, 2nd Lt. Solis and more than 30 troops. The first Lt. of the Second Company (Active) of New Leon, don Francisco Rada, remained behind voluntarily while pretending ordered to do so by Commanding General Cos. . . . Of the Military Sanitation Corps which went from Matamoros to Bejar there remained in Bejar don Fulano Arroyo and 2 assistants to attend the wounded and sick. By orders of Commanding General Cos their Director don N. Moro and 2 more assistants withdrew with us from Bejar. In tribute to these men the 30 and more wounded who marched with us from Bejar were all alive except one who died today [December 30].”11
There are several notable differences between the Sanchez description and the data that comes from the Colonel Nicolas Condelle’s letter of August 1, 1836, and other sources. First, Sanchez claims the wounded were left in “Bejar in the plaza,” which appears to refer to the city’s main plaza in front of the San Fernando church. The Condelle document claims the men were left in the Alamo, which makes sense. Why go to the trouble of moving the wounded across the river when their wounds were so severe that they could not travel with the retreating army? Second, Sanchez reports the number of wounded taken from the city as more than thirty. Whereas, the Condelle missive reports that “forty-some” wounded left with Cos. Third, Sanchez incorrectly reports the doctors’ names as: “Fulano Arroyo” and “N. Moro.” Moreover, Fulano is a Mexican term that means the same as “what’s his name” does in English. Sanchez did not know Arroyo’s first name. Fourth, Sanchez claims at least thirty-one men were left in Bexar. The Condelle letter indicates that at least fourteen men were left in San Antonio.12
Also, there are differences between what the Sanchez account claims about the left-behind wounded and what General Filisola wrote about them. According to the general one of the men was “Second Lieutenant Don Ignacio Solio, who volunteered to remain to take care of them.” Sanchez claimed a “Lt. Solis” was one of the wounded and that First Lieutenant Francisco Rada remained behind to care for the wounded. Filisola, however, identified Rada as one of the wounded, which appears to be wrong. Lastly, Sanchez identified a “Captain Zenea” as one of the wounded. Filisola does not include Zenea.13
Additional conflict examples can be found in Filisola’s history. First, the Sanchez account claims that at 2:00 a.m. on the morning of January 12, on the Salado River, Sanchez stopped at Filisola’s tent. Allegedly, the two men smoked cigars and talked about their dreams. Second, the Sanchez narrative claims that on January 13, as the unit marched toward the village of Lampazos, Filisola had requested more aid for their division. Whereas, Filisola wrote that he had left the Salado River on January 11 to “push ahead” for Lampazos. After conducting his business at that location, Filisola left for Monclova and arrived there on January 14. On that date, Sanchez claimed he was still marching toward Lampazos. Also, Sanchez did not reach Monclova until January 20, six days after Filisola.14
Another Sanchez conflict is exposed by a General Cos document. On February 1, 1836, Cos wrote that he had arrived in Leona Vicario (Saltillo) on January 30, 1836. The Sanchez account reports that Cos, his staff, including Sanchez, and a small escort reached that city on January 28.15
Archaeologist Jake Ivey is convinced that Filisola used the Sanchez account in writing his memoirs. Ivey wrote: “Independent confirmation that Sanchez actually took part in the events he describes in his journals is readily available. In 1848-1849, General Vicente Filisola published an account of the siege of Bexar that contains frequent mention of Sanchez, leaving no doubt of his presence at San Antonio in 1835; in fact, in his Memorias, Filisola used Sanchez’s diary as his primary source for his description of the defeat of General Martin Perfecto de Cos, though without giving him credit.”16
Why would Filisola have failed to credit Sanchez for allowing him to use his diary? Filisola acknowledged his use of Colonel Juan N. Almonte’s diary, an “unedited anonymous diary” from a soldier in Antonio Gaona’s command, an account by Colonel Francisco Garay, and documents from a Senor Arrillage. The numerous interviews that were obviously conducted for Filisola’s book, however, are not cited. Thus, it is more likely that Filisola or Agustin Escudero, Filisola’s ghostwriter, interviewed Sanchez.17
Sanchez believers, however, claim that the Sanchez journal was written contemporary to the events described in the narrative and that Filisola copied directly from the journal. If Filisola used the Sanchez “diary” in writing his history of the war with Texas, one would think that Filisola’s data about the Mexican wounded left behind in Bexar would be the same as the information found in the Sanchez account. But the information is not the same. Nor are other elements in both accounts that deal with the same s
ubject the same. Would these differences in regard to the same events exist in the two accounts if a forger wrote the Sanchez account and used the Filisola history as a source? Probably; a forger can’t afford to copy every passage word for word. Otherwise, the act of plagiarism might be obvious to a competent historian. If a forger makes minor changes in what he or she is stealing, then historians accept the differences as reasonable mistakes because of the author’s faulty memory or other unexplained reasons.18
Moreover, the Sanchez account details a strange and unbelievable story about the circumstances under which Colonel Mendoza was wounded. A story that is not found in Filisola’s history. The account claims that after the Mexicans and Texians had agreed to the terms of the Mexican surrender, General Edward Burleson, the Texian commander, asked Sanchez about the Mexican wounded and offered medical help from the Texian doctors. Such an action was within Burleson’s character. Still, Burleson’s correspondence concerning the defeat of Cos’s force reports no such offer of help. Sanchez, instead of accepting Burleson’s offer of medical assistance or saying he would forward the offer to General Cos, brought up the “bad luck” of Colonel Mendoza. The account claims that eight days earlier (December 2) Mendoza’s equipment, dispatches, clothes, jewels, and money had been taken. Then the narrative reports that Captain Robert Morris, one of the New Orleans Greys’s commanders, spoke up with great interest and offered Sanchez a bag of gold coins. Morris is alleged to have said: “This and all the baggage of senor Mendoza I took by force. It gives me great pleasure and satisfaction to return it to the agent of Senor Mendoza.”19
A footnote furnished by Carlos Sanchez Peon, who edited and self-published the Sanchez account in 1938, reports that Mendoza was “gravely” wounded at the battle of Concepcion on October 28. Sanchez Peon, however, gave no source for his claim about Mendoza. Also, the account and the footnote fail to explain the nature of Mendoza’s “grave” wound.20
There are a number of problems with the Sanchez’s Mendoza/Morris allegation. Problems that suggest the account was not written by Sanchez, who appears to have been a competent and intelligent soldier. First, Morris and his company of Greys did not join the Texian army until November 21. Therefore, Morris could not have taken Mendoza’s property from him at Concepcion. Second, Morris was not the kind of man who would have returned captured Mexican property. On November 29 Morris expressed his sentiments to Sam Houston: “There are now here 225 men, nearly all from the U.S. who on no consideration will enter into any service connected with the Regular Army, the name of which is a perfect Bugbear to them, & to them I promised to be one of those who lead them on the road to Matamoros & who declare in the most positive manner that should this not be undertaken they will return home direct from hence.” Would Morris, who wanted to take Texas—all the way to Matamoros—have willingly given back a bag of gold to Mendoza? Doubtful; spoils of war were part of the reward for coming to Texas.21
Moreover, Mendoza was not wounded at Concepcion. He was wounded on the morning of December 2. General Cos, writing on the third, described the event with these words: “Yesterday, from the sounding of reveille onward, there was resisted for almost the whole day a live cannon fire that resulted in several damages to the buildings and fortifications, because of the nearness of the pieces and the superiority of their caliber [probably the 12-lb gunade and the Mexican long 6-lb captured at Concepcion] – there having been wounded gravely my useful and honorable secretary, the very valiant and estimable Lieutenant Colonel Don Jose Maria Mendoza.” Cos failed to note the nature of Mendoza’s wound. Sam Maverick, however, on December 2, wrote in his journal: “Great cannonading this day. Col. Mendoza has the calf of his leg shot off.” A bouncing round shot probably hit Mendoza.22
The evidence strongly suggests that Mendoza lost part of a leg. What Mendoza was doing and where he was doing it when he was wounded is unknown. Still, whatever Mendoza was engaged in, it was most likely behind a street barricade in the main plaza. Cos’s description of the damage to the buildings and fortifications suggests that the Texians were firing on the Mexican troops who were defending the city’s main plaza. Mendoza, despite the nature of his wound, could have remained unattended for a short time. Still, one thing appears certain: Morris could not have taken Mendoza’s property after the colonel was wounded. First, all of the property mentioned by the Sanchez account would not have been on Mendoza’s person. Yes, he could have had a bag of gold coins and jewelry. And of course he was dressed in a uniform. The mention of “clothes,” however, is not clear in its meaning. His “equipment and dispatches” would have been in his quarters, which were probably the same as General’s Cos’s or very near Cos’s quarters, as Mendoza was Cos’s secretary. The same would have been true for any spare uniforms and civilian clothing. Cos’s quarters were in La Villita. Then Cos moved into the Alamo on December 8 after the arrival of Ugartechea’s reinforcements. Mendoza would have been in the Alamo hospital on that date. Second, the Texians did not storm the Mexican positions until December 5 and most likely did not enter the Alamo until after the surrender agreement had been completed on December 11.23
One could argue that the artillery fire on December 2 was in support of a Texian infantry attack on the north side of the city, and that Morris took the property from Mendoza’s person as he lay wounded on a San Antonio street. There is, however, no evidence of such a Texian assault in the Texian and Mexican documents. At that time, except for the cannon fire, the Texians were in disarray, about to depart the city for winter quarters in Gonzales or Goliad.24
There was a Mexican assault against the Texian cannon after Mendoza had been wounded. Cos wrote: “In the afternoon the silencing of the enemy batteries was achieved by two attacks and 40 men who, with great labor and evident risk, were able to find themselves advancing on the left flank; but at night was necessary to fall back because of the scant force of the garrison of the plaza, and in order not to expose the detachments. The Alamo sustained the artillery fire to advantage, there having been noticed in the field much disorder and uneasiness, and the abandonment of a trench occupied by about 100 [Texian] marksmen.”25
Given that Sanchez’s Mendoza/Morris story appears to be fiction, what does it mean? Why would Sanchez, a competent and professional officer, have invented such a story? Was the tale written to enliven the narrative? If so, why create fiction that shows the enemy in a good light? Why would a forger, who would be concerned with the appearance of authenticity, include such an obvious piece of fiction? Was the pro-Texian incident created to appeal to Texans? In the end, a motive for the story is hard to determine, but clearly the tale is squirrelly, which makes it a suspicious element.
The alleged Jose Enrique de la Pena memoir also has what appears to be a fictional report about Colonel Mendoza that speaks to the authenticity of the Pena narrative. According to Pena: “After the capitulation [December 11, 1836], Lieutenant Colonel Jose Maria Mendoza, who was later to lose a limb from a cannonball wound received defending the Alamo, was saved, together with other officers, thanks to the diligence and assistance given them by Dr. James Grant. Certainly this conduct is in contrast to that followed by our commander in chief: ‘I neither ask for nor give quarter,’ he used to say at Bejar, and he was known to have said once to one of his aides that he would authorize him to strike him with a pistol were he to deviate from his resolution.”26
The story is suggestive but does not identify exactly what Grant did to save Mendoza and the other officers. Still, one can assume three things about the Pena description. First, it appears to be constructed on the Sanchez claim that Edward Burleson offered Texian medical help to Cos’s wounded soldiers. Second, the incident is used to contrast Texian goodness to Santa Anna’s cruelty. Third, Mendoza appears to have been wounded while defending the main plaza of San Antonio, not the Alamo. Fourth, the Pena element does not claim that Grant actually treated Mendoza and the other officers in some kind of medical manner. The chronicle only suggests that Grant, a physician, did
something medically to save Mendoza and the other, unnamed Mexican officers. That conclusion, however, is extremely unlikely for two reasons. Grant did not participate in the siege and storming of Bexar as a physician. His was a combat commander. Also, he was seriously wounded on December 5, the first day of the storming of the city. On December 17 Dr. Amos Pollard and Dr. Samuel Stivers, the Texian surgeons, downgraded Grant’s condition to “slightly wounded.” Moreover, Mendoza’s wound, the loss of a lower leg, was one that would have required immediate medical attention. Grant would not have treated Mendoza for the same reason Morris could not have taken Mendoza’s property. Grant would not have had access to Mendoza immediately after he was wounded. Alejandro Vidal probably treated Mendoza at the time of his injury. Dr. Moro and Dr. Arroyo would have treated Mendoza after their arrival in San Antonio.27
If the Pena account is authentic, why would Pena have created the story about Grant saving Mendoza—a report that portrays Pena’s enemies in a positive way? Again, as with Sanchez’s Mendoza/Morris story, the answer is hard to determine. One can assume Pena would not have created the tale for he had no admiration for his enemy. In an authentic letter, he wrote: “He [Filisola] has been very ignominious because he retired the whole army from a handful of armed civilians [Texians] who are ignoramuses in the art of war, without union, without tactics, without discipline, and without any of those things that give strength to the masses.” Of course, as the story is presented in the Pena document, the tale is not attributed to Pena, but to “Officers who were present when Bejar was besieged in 1835. . . .” But is that the truth? Still, the story appears to be designed to picture the Texians in a positive light and to paint Santa Anna in evil black—a view that was held by most Texas historians and Texana collectors of the 1950s.28
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